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PREFACE 
This volume is the second in the series of publications of documents 
relating to British-Hungarian relations, a project which was launched 
under the agreement signed in 1988 by Professor Michael Branch, 
Director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University 
of London, and Dr Ferenc Glatz, Director of the Institute of History of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest. The work was funded 
by a twelve months’ scholarship grant from the British Council and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Without this, and also some 
additional finance provided by the School and by a private donor, the 
research in London which lasted well over a year, could not have been 
completed. 
The editor, Miklos Lojko, of the English Department, Edtvos Lorand 
University, Budapest, carried out extensive research in the Public Record 
Office, as well as in private collections, including the Lloyd George 
Papers. In compiling and annotating the documents the editor combined 
meticulous scholarship with critical intelligence. The result is a volume 
of documents which will be the authoritative work of reference on the 
subject for many years to come. The introduction, by the editor and Dr 
Tibor Zsuppan, places the documents (as a good introduction should) in 
their wider political context. 
Laszlo Peter 
Chairman, British-Hungarian Relations 
Documentation Project 
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EDITORIAL NOTES 
Two hundred and thirty-seven documents have been selected for this 
volume from a much larger number of available documents from the 
period. My foremost aim in choosing them was to present a 
representative cross-section of opinion reflected in the sources. As, 
however, the decisions were made by one individual, it is inevitable that 
others would have selected different documents. 
Notable documents are given in full. In order to save space I omitted 
those parts of the text which did not relate to the subject of the volume, or 
have been quoted as part of another document. These omissions are 
indicated by the note ‘extract’ in the title, and the sign ‘[....]’ in the text. 
The documents are quoted in strict chronological order. When their 
exact date cannot be ascertained, they are printed with the latest probable 
date. The treatment of the spelling of foreign (non-English) biographical 
and geographical names presented some difficulty. Misspellings have not 
been corrected or indicated in the text when a justifiable alternative 
spelling was used (these may be outdated, non-standard, or foreign 
versions, e.g.: ‘Buda-Pesth’ instead of ‘Budapest’, or ‘Bratiano’ instead 
of ‘Bratianu’) and when diacritic marks were irregular (e.g.: ‘Bela Kun’ 
instead of ‘Bela Kun’ or ‘Benes’ instead of ‘Bene§’). In the Index, 
however, the correct spelling was used. 
When a letter is missing from a proper name in the original document, 
it is inserted, as in ‘Phil[l]potts’. If the wrong character(s) is (are) used in 
the original, the whole word is repeated with the correct spelling in 
square brackets, e.g.: ‘Bela Kum [Kun]’ or ‘Haupricht [Haubrich]’. When 
there is an evident misspelling throughout the text, the note ‘ [sic] ’ is 
used, e.g.: ‘Cunningham [sic]’ (for Cuninghame). 
These conventions have also been applied in the case of English or 
French spelling and grammatical mistakes. 
The minutes that often follow the documents have been copied from 
the covering folders of the files. In a few cases the document is quoted 
from a different file than the accompanying minutes, because the one on 
which the minutes have been written is truncated or less legible and a 
better copy was available. This is indicated before the minutes concerned. 
I have often been unable to identify the author of a minute, either 
because it was left unsigned, or because the signature is illegible. In some 
cases, however, the author could be surmised with reasonable certitude. 
These cases are indicated by a question mark after the name of the 
presumed author. 
The treatment of the biographical data of persons in the text falls into 
three categories: 
1. Persons who play a significant role in the volume are treated in a 
short biographical summary in the Biographical Glossary at the end. 
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2. If a person only appears a few times in the text, and did not play a 
prominent role either, he is briefly described in a footnote. 
3. No biographical data are provided about persons who are 
mentioned very marginally in the text, regardless of whether they are 
otherwise important figures or not. 
All persons mentioned in the text appear in the Index. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
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BALF A J. Balfour’s papers in the Department of Manuscripts 
of the British Library 
CAB Cabinet papers in the Public Record Office 
FO Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office 
HDLM J.W. Headlam-Morley’s papers in the Churchill 
Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge 
HNKY Lt.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey’s (later Lord Hankey) 
papers in the Churchill Archives, Churchill College, 
Cambridge 
LEEP A.W.A. Leeper’s papers in the Churchill Archives, 
Churchill College, Cambridge 
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LINK Arthur S. Link, editor, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
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GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS: 
The following is a list of the most frequent abbreviations that occur in the 
text. Some simple short forms, which are in everyday use, have not been 
included. Cases where the meaning of the abbreviation remains in doubt 
for the editor have been indicated by a question mark. 
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A.R.A. 
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Initial Release Memorandum (?) 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs 
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Foreign OUce) 
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Query, suggested reply ?* for action? 
Army Medical €otps 
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Royal Naval VohmtteerReseive 
Supreme Economic ©t&incl 
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s.w.c. 
tel. 
undec. 
W.O. 
Supreme War Council 
telegram 
undecipherable 
War Office 

INTRODUCTION 
The documents in this selection cover Anglo-Hungarian relations 
between October 1918 and August 1919, complementing E.L. Woodward 
and R. Butler’s Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 
volumes I and VI in the First Series. The first quoted document dates 
from 1916, and the last from 1924. However, the bulk of the volume 
focuses on the period of the unsuccessful Karolyi regime, October 1918- 
March 1919, followed by the dictatorship of Bela Kun, the first Soviet 
republic outside Russia, which maintained itself for 133 days until 
August 1919. The period between the collapse of Austria-Hungary in the 
autumn of 1918 and the establishment of the Horthy regime two years 
later witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity, which is unparalleled in the 
history of Anglo-Hungarian relations, hence the importance of these 
documents. 
The end of the Great War found the victors filled with expectations 
about the promise of a ‘New Europe’. The defeated, like Hungary, could 
only hope that this promise would be based on the high principles 
proclaimed by the Allied leaders, and spelled out so eloquently in 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. 
The relations between Great Britain and Hungary, however, were not 
solely defined by the outcome of the First World War. Before 1918, 
Hungary, a part of the Habsburg Monarchy, had no separate diplomatic 
representation in London. But official contacts existed between the 
Hungarian government and, after its establishment in 1872, the British 
Consulate General in Budapest. British-Hungarian relations were friendly 
during the long ascendancy of the Hungarian Liberal Party in the late 
nineteenth century. They started to cool off after the turn of the century, 
and especially after 1905. This was because of the change in British 
foreign policy, which put Hungary into the camp hostile to Great Britain 
in the new political division of Europe. Also, the overall assessment of 
Hungarian internal politics changed in London. In 1905 the long 
domination of the Liberal Party in Hungarian politics came to an end and 
new forces appeared on the scene, such as the Independence Party, which 
questioned the Dualist system, weakening the stability of the Monarchy, 
which Great Britain and France considered vital for the balance of power 
in Europe. Changes in Hungary coincided with changes in the Foreign 
Office in London. A young generation of diplomats, who no longer 
shared the attitudes generated by the stability of the Victorian era, took 
over. They were ready to espouse the grievances of the non-Magyar 
nationalities in Hungary against the government’s attempts at 
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Magyarization. Hungary’s image as a country in which national 
minorities were oppressed was only enhanced by the scarcity of accurate 
reporting in the foreign press. But those who studied the question, the 
travelling Scotsman (Scotus Viator), R.W. Seton-Watson, and the Vienna 
correspondent (later Editor) of The Times, H. Wickham Steed, wholly 
embraced the case of the non-Magyar nationalities. 
The War only strengthened these attitudes. Those who argued against 
the integrity of Austria-Hungary frequently referred to the oppression of 
the nationalities there. The Tyrrell-Paget memorandum, dated 2 August 
1916, No. 2 in the volume, in advocating the break-up of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, brought this attitude for the first time into the 
realms of official policy. In contract, the scheme proposed by Count 
Mihaly Karolyi of the Independence Party, arguing for a separate 
Hungarian peace with the Entente in return for a guarantee for Hungarian 
territorial integrity, was never considered by the officials of the Foreign 
Office. 
There was no general consensus among the British politicians and 
economists about the virtues of the emerging peace settlement in Central 
Europe. The settlement was, in theory, dedicated to the granting of self- 
determination to the various ethnic groups which for centuries had 
constituted the large multi-ethnic empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, 
and Turkey, the empires which had received their coup de grace at the 
end of the War. However, the admixture of peoples in the region makes a 
clean-cut solution along national lines impossible. Virtually no 
homogeneous ethnic state can be created without a sizeable minority of 
another nationality within its borders. This was only beginning to dawn 
on British politicians after the theory behind the peace had been accepted 
by the victors. A few, including Gen. J.C. Smuts, J.W. Headlam-Morley, 
J.M. Keynes and L.S. Amery, had serious misgivings about the proposed 
peace settlement. Many also held the view that the newly created small 
nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe would eventually have to 
combine in a new form of economic and political confederation in order 
to survive in Europe (Docs. 27, 72, 124 and 179). This idea, however, 
could never get off the ground, as its advocates, both in the West and in 
the countries concerned, were unable to reconcile the many conflicting 
interests inherent in these plans. 
Initially the British showed little official interest in Hungary, as the 
War Cabinet Minutes (Docs. 9, 10 and 13) show. By centralising the 
political decision-making processes, David Lloyd George considerably 
lessened the weight of the Foreign Office in forging Britain’s foreign 
policy (Doc. 8). Had the War not necessitated these changes, and had the 
Foreign Office retained more control, things might have been different. 
In the event, however, the French went ahead with the establishment of 
their Mission in Budapest in November 1918, whilst the British were 
content with a Military Mission in Vienna only, headed by Colonel Sir 
Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, the former Military Attache. The 
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French Mission in the Hungarian capital was led by Lt-Col. Fernand Vix, 
who encountered enormous difficulties in representing the Allied Powers 
in Central Europe, an area where revolutionary and nationalist 
movements brought to the surface tensions which had been smouldering 
under the surface for decades, and which received less attention in the 
capitals of the victorious nations than would have been justified by the 
complexity of its problems. On 18 December 1918 Vix received a 
telegram from his superior, General L. Franchet d’Esperey, which 
described Slovakia’s southern boundary three weeks before the opening 
of the Paris Peace Conference. Vix protested: such arbitrariness “was the 
first serious transgression of the [military] convention”. Meanwhile, in 
Paris, the members of the British Peace Delegation had not even heard of 
the Belgrade Armistice or Convention, which had come into effect on 13 
November 1918 and was meant to be the basis of the relationship 
between the Allies and Hungary before a proper peace treaty had been 
signed. They would not do so until the proclamation of the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic on 21 March 1919. This curious state of ignorance about 
the Belgrade Armistice may have been due to the increasing Franco- 
Italian rivalry, or to French efforts to establish faits accomplis before the 
convening of the Peace Conference. 
The attempt by Count Mihaly Karolyi’s coalition government — which 
came to power after the swift and almost bloodless collapse of the dualist 
system on 31 October 1918 — to break out of the diplomatic isolation of 
Hungary by the Entente provided the first impetus for the Foreign Office 
to examine more closely the situation in Hungary and the role that 
Karolyi’s administration could play (Doc. 19), instead of their earlier held 
conviction that there was no need for contacts with the defeated nation 
until a proper peace treaty with Hungary had been signed. Karolyi’s note, 
addressed to the Entente powers via Stockholm on 26 November 1918, 
“begged all Governments of the Allied Powers to give them the 
possibility of renewing direct relations”. According to Karolyi, the 
Entente would benefit by recognising Hungary, since this step would in 
turn aid the Karolyi government “in keeping the young Republic of the 
People within the limits of democratic order which has always been 
proclaimed by the Allied Powers as one of their most important war 
aims”. Failure to recognise Hungary, the note added, would undermine 
the new democracy, as attacks by Czech, Romanian and Serbian troops, 
food shortages and disrupted communications made it increasingly 
difficult to control the situation. The responses given at the end of 1918 
and beginning of 1919 to Karolyi’s messages to the representatives of the 
Entente were, however, negative. The Entente could not prejudice the 
approaching peace talks by entering into diplomatic contacts with any of 
the defeated nations. The British Foreign Office endorsed R.W. Seton- 
Watson’s view, which had gone even further in explaining Karolyi’s 
rejection, saying that “there can be no further question of attempting to 
preserve the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary as Count Karolyi is 
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even now urging [...] for his declared policy, both in the past and in the 
present [has been] the complete incorporation of the other nationalities in 
a Magyar State”. 
It was fairly late in the day, on 17 February 1919, that a member of the 
British Peace Delegation, Lewis Namier, proposed “giving any support 
we can to the Centre bloc [of the Socialists, Karolyi’s Independence Party 
and the Radicals] as far as purely Magyar affairs are concerned”, but 
without giving the impression that the British government “encouraged 
Magyar Imperialism” (Doc 33, minutes). Namier’s was the only voice, 
however, and the reports that kept arriving from and about Hungary, 
indicating that Karolyi’s authority was about to collapse, still failed to 
evoke a sympathetic response. On 27 February 1919 A.W.A. Leeper of 
the British Peace Delegation remained inclined to regard Karolyi and his 
colleagues as instigators of “agents [...] creating Bolshevik agitators 
among the Romanians and Yugoslavs.” 
The reference to Bolsheviks who would pose a threat to Central Europe 
instilled fear in Paris, a fear that would grow into panic for many 
politicians on both sides of the Channel in the months to come. As the 
position of the French, Greek and Romanian interventionist army in the 
Ukraine began to deteriorate, a French recommendation, at the meeting of 
the Romanian Commission on 17 and 19 February 1919, for the 
establishment of a neutral zone on the western side of Transylvania (i.e. 
east of the largely Hungarian inhabited Great Plain) was accepted (Doc. 
36). Although informed by the British Section of the Supreme War 
Council about this plan, the British government did not react to it, thus 
being less prescient than some of their American colleagues. Temporarily 
laid aside amid the Paris Peace Conference’s business, and after a pause 
that many historians still find difficult to explain, the scheme for this 
neutral no man’s land reappeared on 15 March 1919. Apparently the 
Entente Powers suspected that the implementation of the neutral zone 
plan would not take place without difficulty. They realised that in 
Hungary the zone would be interpreted as a means by which the French 
wished to help their Romanian allies to attain their coveted Western 
boundary, i.e. the River Tisza. In Belgrade, the Allied Commander on the 
Danube, Admiral Troubridge, placed his monitors in readiness (Doc. 47). 
The Note on the establishment of the zone was handed over to the 
Hungarian government by Lt-Col Vix on 20 March 1919, with the 
requirement that it be accepted or rejected within twenty-four hours. The 
Hungarian government bitterly protested against the imposition of the 
new Zone which they feared represented the new political boundary. The 
Note was handed over in the presence of Allied officers, but the British 
were not represented among them. Members of the British Peace 
Delegation in Paris had to make do with interviewing Captain Nicolas 
Roosevelt, an officer of the United States Army, in an effort to ascertain 
what had taken place (Doc. 61). 
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On the following day the Hungarian Soviet Republic was declared in 
Budapest. Count Karolyi resigned (he left Hungary in May), and the 
Social Democratic and Communist Parties fused into a new Hungarian 
Socialist Party. Bela Kun, the organiser of the Communist Party in 
Hungary, formally People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, became in 
fact Hungary’s new ruler. The first actions of the new government were 
to declare an alliance with Soviet Russia (whose army was on the east 
bank of the River Dniester), and to reject the Vix Note, as it became 
known after the French officer who had communicated it. At the same 
time, the new Bolshevik administration tried to avoid the formal rupture 
of relations with the Peace Conference (Docs. 51-56). 
In spite of the quick succession of these events, it would be wrong to 
assume that the Bolshevik take-over in Hungary took the Western 
peacemakers wholly by surprise. They had been expecting such an 
upheaval somewhere in Central Europe since the Spartacist putsch in 
Berlin in January 1919. It was to a large extent the perceived imminence 
of some such event that had prompted the British peacemakers, at least 
briefly, to entertain the idea of recognising the governments of Germany, 
Austria and Hungary in the middle of March 1919, in spite of the fact that 
no peace treaties had yet existed with these countries. On 19 March, two 
days before the Communist take-over in Hungary, Sir Maurice Han key, 
the British Cabinet Secretary, had pointed out to David Lloyd George that 
the new small states which were about to be established were unlikely to 
constitute “a line of resistance” to Bolshevism as “neither the history, nor 
the disposition, nor the present attitude of these peoples offers any hope 
that they will combine to form an effective barrier against Bolshevism” 
(Doc. 49). 
While some British officials in Paris automatically blamed the 
Hungarian politicians for the crisis following the delivery of the Vix Note 
— calling the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic the “most 
disgraceful instance of blackmail” — Lord Hardinge and Sir Maurice 
Hankey in Paris, and Winston Churchill in London, regarded the 
Hungarian events as symptomatic of the “Allies drifting without a policy” 
(Minutes by Lord Hardinge, Doc. 51). It was with such antecedents that 
Lloyd George and Hankey prepared the Fontainebleau Memorandum of 
25 March 1919 (Doc. 58), which potentially could have been a 
watershed, containing as it did the suggestion “that as far as is humanly 
possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and 
that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of 
strategy or economics or communications, which can usually be adjusted 
by other means”. 
In pursuance of the concepts advanced at Fontainebleau, Lloyd George 
managed to convince the Big Four that General J.C. Smuts should be sent 
on a mission to Hungary. It was intended that the South African soldier- 
politician should repair the damage caused by the delivery of the Vix 
Note (Docs. 67-71, 73, 76, 80-84 and 86). 
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However, as with the discussions on Bolshevik Russia earlier, the 
Hungarian ‘jolt’ to the proceedings of the Peace Conference was short¬ 
lived. It appears that General Smuts’ mission was largely pre-empted. In 
spite of the British Prime Minister’s suggestion that a more 
compromising attitude be adopted, the British Peace Delegation returned 
to the idea of a peace settlement without direct talks with the defeated 
nations. Given this background it is not surprising that the proposals, 
made by General Smuts on his return, were shelved. His 
recommendations contained the important provision that the 
preliminaries of peace (the basic principles of the future settlement) be 
decided first with the participation of the affected parties in Paris (Doc. 
84). 
At the beginning of April the Paris Peace Conference was entering its 
crucial phase. The onerous task of preparing the draft Peace Treaty with 
Germany was on the agenda, and the sense of urgency to deal with 
Bolshevik Hungary, or indeed with Bolshevism in general, dissipated, 
leaving the impression that the sores created by this ideology posed no 
imminent threat to the work of the Conference, and that they could be 
addressed by diplomatic or military means when the resources became 
available. At the same time, President Wilson’s illness caused 
consternation and disrupted some of the proceedings. Bolshevik Hungary 
was put on the back burner for a while in Paris. 
Soon, however, it looked as though Hungary had made a return at the 
Conference. An invitation (rumours of which had leaked out) to the 
ostracised Hungarian Bolshevik regime to attend the Peace Conference in 
order to accept their draft peace terms was sent from Paris. However, the 
invitation was not delivered, and it seems that the episode was due to an 
administrative slip-up (Docs. 104, 106, 108-109, 112-113 and 115). In 
the event, Hungary was not invited to the Peace Conference until 1 
December 1919, by which time a regime more acceptable to the Entente 
Powers was about to be established. In contrast, the treaties with 
Germany (28 June 1919) and Austria (10 September 1919) were 
successfully accomplished, both countries having managed to achieve at 
least a partial mitigation of the conditions imposed on them in the draft 
treaties with regard to their borders, and the war reparations they would 
have to pay. 
Hungary’s absence, however, led to the sanctioning of the faits 
accomplis created by its neighbours, even though the outcome fell short 
of their maximum demands. Thus, around three million Hungarians were 
assigned to the Successor States, those in Transylvania representing the 
largest national minority in post-war Europe. The British peacemakers 
were undoubtedly aware of the risks involved. Thanks largely to the 
incisiveness of J.W. Headlam-Morley, the inclusion of provisions in the 
peace treaties securing the basic cultural rights of minorities was made a 
precondition to the coming into effect of the new boundaries (Doc. 132). 
Still in 1919, however, the endeavours of the Scottish Churches to help 
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maintain the property and religious rights of Protestants in Transylvania 
had relatively little effect (Docs. 32, 44 and 66). 
Contacts between the British and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, as 
well as various Hungarian emigre political groups in Vienna, such as 
those later forming the provisional government in Szeged, were not 
restricted to the official dialogue so far discussed. The day of 21 March 
1919 was to herald a new approach by the British in the form of 
clandestine intelligence gathering by Secret Intelligence. The departure 
from Budapest of the French Military Mission together with the United 
States military personnel, in protest against the declaration of the Soviet 
Republic, left Hungary open to Italian foreign political ambitions aimed 
at counterbalancing the French preponderance in the Danubian region. 
With no permanent representative in Budapest, the British now stationed 
a naval officer, Lieutenant-Commander Friedrich Williams-Freeman, in 
the capital, outwardly to safeguard the Entente’s interests there. In fact he 
was engaged in the systematic collection of information on all aspects of 
Bela Kun’s regime. The scope and importance of Colonel Sir Thomas 
Montgomery-Cuninghame’s activities, as Head of the British Military 
Mission in Vienna, and a contact for Commander Freeman, also 
increased. 
Almost simultaneously, using information reaching London on 
Hungarian developments — to which British reports from Budapest 
contributed — the Head of the Directorate of Intelligence and the 
Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch, Sir Basil Thomson, began to take 
interest in the events in Hungary. In a memorandum of 31 May 1919, 
titled “The Communist Revolution in Hungary” (Doc. 133), which the 
Home Secretary circulated to members of the Cabinet, he emphasised 
that for the first time in Europe itself the Communist ideology was in a 
position to toy with its “experiments on a machine in full working order”. 
It would appear that Thomson referred to the fact that the Soviet Republic 
in Hungary had taken over a state with its administration intact (unlike in 
Russia, where the old state had been destroyed). For him, the lessons to 
be learnt were applicable to Britain (he was particularly concerned with 
Clydeside). The stormy events in Hungary had little intrinsic interest for 
him. Thomson naturally noted the significance of the Hungarian Red 
Guard Order of 26 March, and its establishment of a Secret Service to be 
used by the Bolsheviks to suppress “political intrigues”. Thomson, in 
preparing the memorandum, however, could only draw on information 
sent from Hungary before 14 April 1919. He was not yet aware of the 
continued build-up of the Hungarian Secret Police, though the latter 
caused increasing concern to the two British intelligence officers in the 
field: Williams-Freeman in Budapest and Montgomery-Cuninghame in 
Vienna. 
Only a few months earlier, the British intelligence service had failed to 
change the course of events in Russia in the West’s favour (its failure 
marked by the arrest of R. Bruce Lockhart by the Cheka in Moscow). The 
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Hungarian circumstances were significantly different. Bela Kun’s 
Communists (whatever lessons they might have learnt in their early days 
in the service of the Russian revolution) could no longer openly defy the 
Entente. They would find that the affairs of Hungary could not, unlike 
those of Russia, be managed while ignoring the wishes of the victorious 
powers. Thus, on 27 March 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic 
undertook to guarantee the physical safety, freedom of movement and 
right to display flags and other insignia of the Entente’s observers sent to 
Hungary (Doc. 84). In the meantime, however, Otto Korvin’s Secret 
Police and Jozsef Cserny’s ‘terrorists’ (or ‘Sons of Lenin’ as they were 
known) were always at hand to observe and monitor the activities of 
Entente officers in Hungary. 
Amongst those seemingly, and perhaps surprisingly, unmolested by the 
Bolsheviks were the Hungarian trade union leaders who had established 
contacts with Entente representatives, most notably with F. Williams- 
Freeman. They had taken a passive attitude to politics after 21 March, but 
their strategy was about to change. For by the second half of April, large 
scale hostage-taking had started by the Secret Police, and the old blue 
banknotes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank had disappeared, while the 
Communists and left-wing Social Democrats virtually barricaded 
themselves in the Hotel Hungaria on the bank of the Danube behind 
machine-gun emplacements. These developments prompted the leaders 
and hundreds of shop-stewards of the Iron and Metal Workers, Printers, 
Bookbinders and Woodworkers Unions to discuss the possibility of 
replacing Bela Kun and the Communists by a Social Democratic 
government supervised by the trade unions. Initial contacts having 
already been made with Williams-Freeman, a mass meeting of shop- 
stewards on 29 May 1919 authorised a delegation to be sent to him to 
ascertain whether the Paris Peace Conference would recognise a 
Hungarian government formed and supported by the trade unions (Docs. 
135, 142, 164 and 176). Kun, fully informed about these manoeuvres, 
disclosed that should the working class wish him to resign, he would not 
cling to power by terror. He endorsed counter-measures, however, to 
effect internal divisions among the Iron and Metal Workers’ shop- 
stewards and manipulate information published in the Socialist paper 
Nepszava. Meanwhile, Vilmos Bohm, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Hungarian Red Army, appealed for unity lest the Army’s morale 
collapse. Kun was also helped by the fact that Williams-Freeman was 
unable to obtain from the Entente any response to the trade unions’ 
proposals. The union leaders made no further attempts to seek outside 
help to change the government until the end of July when things came to 
a head as Kun’s regime looked less and less likely to survive (Docs. 209 
and 210). However, these efforts during April and May to replace the 
Communist/left-wing Social Democratic alliance also changed the way 
the British Military Intelligence perceived the Hungarian political 
situation. As if to signal the end of attempts to replace the Hungarian 
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Soviet government through local initiative, Williams-Freeman left the 
country on 18 June 1919 (Doc. 164). Subsequent British intelligence 
involvement in Hungarian events would thenceforth be directed by 
Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame from Vienna. 
Montgomery-Cuninghame tackled the issue more vigorously and with 
more enterprise than his colleague before him. He drew the conclusion — 
which proved to be correct — from the generally passive attitude in Paris 
to Hungarian affairs, that, if needed, he could rely on his own initiative, 
and act without specific authorisation from his superiors. 
The view of Hungary from Vienna was coloured by the presence of 
various Hungarian dissident circles there. The flux of events that had 
taken place in Hungary drove hundreds of opponents of the regime (like 
Counts Istvan Bethlen and Pal Teleki) abroad, many to Vienna. A group 
of these emigres, encouraged by Montgomery-Cuninghame, moved to 
Arad and later to Szeged in south-eastern Hungary to set up an alternative 
government. 
Szeged at the time was under French occupation. No objection was 
raised by the French to a government-in-exile establishing itself there 
under the premiership of Count Gyula Karolyi, a relation of Count 
Mihaly Karolyi. (Admiral Miklos Horthy, who was as yet politically 
unknown, became Minister of War.) The existence and political aims of 
this government were brought to light by a British journalist, and 
adventurer, C.B.E. Ashmead-Bartlett of the Daily Telegraph. Barely a 
month before his appearance at Szeged, he had been involved in the 
sacking of the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna, organised by opponents of 
Bela Kun’s regime in exile in the Austrian capital, and had taken his 
share in the booty. From Szeged, Ashmead-Bartlett brought to London 
the appeal and memorandum of the provisional Hungarian government, 
which emphasised that the Szeged government represented all sections of 
Hungarian society, that, once in office, they would be ready to comply 
with the Entente requirements: disarm Hungary to the level set by the 
Peace Conference, acknowledge Hungary’s new boundaries, and hold 
free, democratic elections. The usual rhetoric, demanding more 
favourable treatment of the question of Hungary’s future boundaries, was 
missing from this document (Doc. 140). 
Instead of being passed from one Foreign Office clerk to another, the 
normal fate of such missives, the appeal and the memo were taken 
immediately to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s political secretary, and from 
him to the Prime Minister himself. It looked as though, through the 
Szeged group, a solution was found for the crisis caused by the Bolshevik 
take-over in Hungary. Further negotiations after 23 July with Hungarian 
Social Democrats in Vienna were mainly regarded by the Entente as a 
means of gaining time while the Romanians crossed the River Tisza, and 
gradually advanced towards Budapest. To make the Romanian operations 
as rapid as possible, Montgomery-Cuninghame in Vienna was supplied 
with of intelligence material by the Hungarian Red 
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Army Command, who were led to believe that they were thereby helping 
the establishment of a government by the trade union leaders. In the 
event, the trade union government, set up after the fall of Bela Kun’s 
regime on 1 August 1919 under the leadership of Gyula Peidl, lasted a 
mere six days. 
Documents relating to events after 3 August 1919 (the date of the 
Romanian Army’s occupation of Budapest) can be found in Documents 
on British Foreign Policy, First Series, volumes I and VI. By way of an 
epilogue, however, and because they shed light on the subject of this 
volume, the editor has chosen to add a few documents dated after the 
historical period examined here. Docs. 234 and 235 bring J.W. Headlam- 
Morley’s reflections to the reader on the tumultuous days of 1919 from 
the early 1920s, when he served as Historical Adviser to the Foreign 
Office. The last two documents take us to the first half of the 1920s, the 
period in which Miklos Horthy’s conservative Regency consolidated its 
political and economic base in the country. 
So traumatic and chaotic were the effects of the Communist debacle, 
that the construction of anything permanent in its place could not be 
undertaken without repeated involvement by the Entente Powers. There 
were Admiral Horthy’s Szeged Nationalists, Romanian occupiers east of 
Budapest, and a Habsburg loyalist, Istvan Friedrich, briefly emerging as 
the head of a government in Budapest. Almost as if repeating General 
Smuts’ mission, Sir George R. Clerk, a high-ranking British diplomat 
was sent by the Paris peacemakers to Hungary in October 1919. Under 
his auspices, on behalf of the Entente, a coalition government was 
established there with the participation of the Social Democrats. In the 
middle of November, Admiral Horthy, commanding the only regular 
military force in Hungary, entered Budapest. His regime, which came 
into existence with British help, soon made Budapest, the seedbed of the 
Soviet Republic, atone for its sins. In Westminster, the Liberal-tumed- 
Labour MP, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, frequently asked questions as to 
whether HM Government was aware of the atrocities committed by 
various armed groups under the new regime in Hungary. The ministerial 
replies indicated that the government was reluctant to join in the general 
condemnation of these excesses. British military figures and diplomats 
were almost solely restricted to pleading for the lives of Socialists such as 
J. Haubrich and P. Agoston, who had supplied information for the 
Entente during the rule of the Soviet government. Other prominent 
participants of the upheavals that ensured after the sudden collapse of the 
Dualist system, like Count Mihaly Karolyi and Vilmos Bohm, were 
treated with mistrust by the Foreign Office throughout the interwar 
period, either for their part in those events, or for their suspected (and the 
suspicion was not entirely unfounded) association with Communism. 
The agreement that Sir George Clerk reached with the various 
Hungarian political groups between 2 and 24 November 1919 reflected a 
policy that had derived from dispatches received by the Foreign Office in 
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London and the British Peace Delegation in Paris over a period of several 
months. The fiasco of the Hungarian Communists, and the fact that they 
had created instability in Central Europe, would not be forgotten. The 
Socialists were not to be trusted alone with the formation of a 
government. The Entente’s earlier support for the establishment of a 
democratic government melted away. While the British government, like 
other Entente governments, insisted that the election of the National 
Assembly in Hungary be based on universal suffrage, the main purpose 
of this close attention paid to the establishment of an internationally 
recognisable government seems to have been the need for the speedy 
formation of a government which would sign the Peace Treaty. The 
subsequent restrictions of the suffrage by ministerial order, in March 
1922, elicited no reaction in Britain (Doc. 236). 
As Hungary gradually assumed all the functions of a sovereign state, 
further interference in its internal affairs on the part of Great Britain or 
other Western Powers was no longer seen as desirable. After all, as the 
last document, from 1924, indicates, the regime established under Miklos 
Horthy, in spite of its excesses, proved to be a stable element in the new 
Europe. The British diplomats and intelligence gatherers had aimed at 
nothing more. As for the region as a whole, the events that followed the 
First World War in Central Europe found the victorious powers to a large 
extent unprepared and bewildered. The New Europe offered solutions, 
conceived in the circumstances of the war, and in the conference rooms 
later, which created at least as many problems as it settled, and in the 
long run could not provide the peace and security that its architects had 
hoped for. 
F.T. Zsuppan 
M. Lojko 
. 
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NO. AUTHOR, ADDRESSEE, DATE PAGE 
TYPE OF DOCUMENT 
1 Sir E. Grant-Duff (Berne) 2 August 1916 1 
to Lord Hardinge (London). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Reports Count M. Karolyi's visit to Switzerland: requests further instructions. 
Minuted by Lord Hardinge, Sir R. Graham and one unidentified official. 
2 Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir R. 7 August 1916 3 
Paget (Foreign Office). 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
The memorandum, the first of its kind prepared during the war, contains 
detailed proposals for an eventual peace settlement throughout Europe, 
which would serve both British interests and be conducive to a lasting peace. 
The specific areas discussed in the paper are: Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace 
and Lorraine, Heligolad, Schelswig-Holstein, Poland, Bulgaria, Thrace, 
Greece, Romania, Albania, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Dalmatia. It also contains sections on the ways of achieving post-war 
disarmament and on British responsibilities in the event of an inconclusive 
peace. As with other lengthy documents in this volume, for reasons of space 
only passages relevant to Austria-Hungary or Hungary could be retained 
from the original. 
Minuted by Lord Hardinge and Sir R. Graham. 
3 Lord Bertie (Paris) 24 August 1916 5 
to Lord Hardinge (London). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Reports his conversation with King George V on 17 August, during which 
Lord Bertie expressed his views regarding the difficulties of concluding a 
separate peace with Hungary. 
4 L.B. Namier for the Intelligence 11 May 1917 6 
Bureau of the Department of Information. 
Memorandum. 
"Memorandum on Austria-Hungary's Inner and Foreign Policy." Elaborates 
on the reasons why the establishment of a system of small, independent states 
in East-Central Europe would be in Great Britain's interest. Minuted by L. 
Oliphant and A. Randall (?). 
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5 J.W. Headlam-Morley 15 October 1918 11 
to Sir E. Drummond. 
Letter / Memorandum. 
Accompanying notes to an advance copy of a report (not printed) regarding 
separate peace negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
6 Captain L.S. Amery for 22 and 12 
A.J. Balfour. Letter. With enclosure. 20 October 1918 
Encloses his memorandum titled: 'The Austro-Hungarian Problem", in 
which he sets out his proposals for the creation of a Danubian Confederation 
in Central and South-Eastern Europe after the war. Minuted by L.B. Namier, 
A. Randall (?), and three unidentified officials. 
7 J.W. Headlam-Morley 30 October 1918 18 
to Sir W. Tyrrell. Memorandum. 
Relates his conversation with L.B. Namier regarding arrangements 
concerning the Austro-Hungarian Army in case negotiations take place with 
Austria-Hungary about an armistice. 
8 J.W. Headlam-Morley to H.G. Wells. 2 November 1918 18 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Expresses his views on the diminished responsibility of the Foreign Office for 
the conduct of British foreign policy under the contemporary constitutional 
structure. 
9 War Cabinet Minute. No. 501. (Extract) 13 November 1918 19 
Records a discussion about the question whether to employ a British division 
under General Milne's command in the Danubian area to counterbalance the 
French military presence there. 
10 J. Isler to A.J. Balfour. Letter. 17 November 1918 20 
Reports that the Austro-Hungarian Government is seeking permission for 
their Legation in Berne to get in touch with the Mission of the Allied and 
Associated Powers there in order to discuss economic matters. Minuted by 
C.H. Smith, Sir E. Crowe, L. Oliphant and Lord Hardinge. 
11 War Cabinet Minute. No. 503. (Extract) 18 November 1918 21 
Records the War Cabinet's negative reaction to a telegram, which indicates 
that orders have been given by General L. Franchet d'Esperey for British 
troops from General Milne's command to occupy Vienna and Budapest. 
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12 War Cabinet Minute. 22 November 1918 22 
No. 506. (Extract) 
Records discussion on, and the ultimate rejection of the French proposal that 
British troops should be dispatched to Vienna and Budapest together with 
French army units to maintain order in the two cities. 
13 War Cabinet Minute. 25 November 1918 24 
(No. not known.) (Extract) 
Records the Prime Minister's expression of regret over the War Cabinet's 
decision not to send troops to Vienna and Budapest: a resolution is made for 
further consultations with G. Clemenceau on the subject. 
14 Lord Derby (Paris) 26 November 1918 25 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. No. 1618. 
Reports the decision made by the French President not to proceed with the 
dispatch of French troops to Budapest, while the question of sending them to 
Vienna is left undecided. 
15 Political Intelligence Department early December 1918 25 
(Foreign Office). 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
"South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans." 
Describes the existing situation and sets forth the British desiderata regarding 
the political and territorial settlement in South-Eastern Europe. Annex I was 
prepared as a separate memorandum by R.W. Seton-Watson. Minutes by J.W. 
Headlam-Morley, addressed to Sir W. Tyrrell. 
16 From a French source 15 December 1918 39 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Quotes General H.M. Berthelot's telegram, which states that Hungarian 
emissaries are encouraging Bolshevism in Transylvania: following the 
disturbances that have taken place on the boundary between Hungary and 
Transylvania, Romanian troops have been authorized to take up positions 
beyond the limits fixed by the Armistice. Minuted by L.B. Namier. 
17 M.I. lc agent, code namei"G. 65" 17 December 1918 40 
(Geneva) to the Political Section of 
Military Intelligence (War Office, London). 
Letter. 
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Gives a detailed description of both the internal and the external aspects of 
Hungary's political situation, especially with regard to Count M. Karolyi's 
role. 
18 G.B. Beak (Zurich) 19 December 1918 43 
to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Reports his recent interview with visitors from Vienna and Budapest 
regarding the weakness of Count M. Karolyi's Government. 
19 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 19 December 1918 44 
to A.J. Balfour (London) 
Letter. No. 972. (Extract) 
With enclosure. (Extract) 
Transmits O. Sargent's memorandum, regarding his conversation with two 
emissaries sent by Count M. Karolyi, who asked the Entente to get into direct 
contact with Count Karolyi to discuss Hungarian affairs: O. Sargent assumes 
that such contacts are unlikely to take place as they would anticipate the 
Peace Conference. 
20 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 20 December 1918 45 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London) 
Letter. (Extract) 
Reports that, according to information received from R.W. Seton-Watson, the 
Ruthenes of Hungary asked for their inclusion in the Czechoslovak state. 
21 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 20 December 1918 45 
to A.J. Balfour (London) 
Telegram. No. 2518. 
Reports information received from the British Military Attache's Department 
in Berne regarding the growing social and racial tensions in Hungary. 
22 J.W. Headlam-Morley 28 December 1918 46 
to Sir M. Hankey. 
Letter. 
Urges action with regard to the adverse economic conditions that have 
developed in Central Europe, though recognizes that he should not address 
the Secretary of the Cabinet directly. 
23 Sir M. Hankey 28 December 1918 47 
to J.W. Headlam-Morley 
Letter. 
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Acknowledges J.W. Headlam-Morley's letter of the same date: while 
promising help if he gets the opportunity, he expresses his determination not 
to encroach on the responsibilities of Government Departments. 
24 L.B. Namier 31 December 1918 48 
for Sir W. Tyrrell. 
Memorandum. 
Encloses a detailed report by J.E. Thornton regarding the situation in 
Hungary in November-December 1918, with special emphasis on Count M. 
Karolyi's role and the need for economic assistance from the Entente for 
Hungary. Minuted by J.W. Headlam-Morley. 
25 R. Kimens (Vienna) 9 January 1919 54 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Report No. 6. 
Reports his recent interview with Count Gy. Andrassy, in which the latter 
explained why he believed that supporting a newly federated Austria- 
Hungary was a British interest; he also appealed for troops to be sent to 
Budapest to protect it against Bolshevism. Minuted by H. Nicolson, A.W.A. 
Leeper and Sir E. Crowe. 
26 Lord R. Cecil. 16 January 1919 56 
Memorandum. 
Records his interview with Sir W. Beveridge, who, during his recent visit to 
Vienna and Budapest, formed the opinion that Great Britain should play a 
more active role in the economic and political reconstruction of Hungary: 
Lord R. Cecil considers that Sir W.'s opinion is excessively pro-Hungarian. 
Minuted by Lord Hardinge. 
27 Sir W. Beveridge. Interim Report 17 January 1919 57 
for the Inter-Allied Commission for 
the Relief of German Austria. (Extracts) 
Considers that a movement towards an "Economic Confederation of the 
Danube" would be financially and politically desirable for the Allies; 
describes the fears of Bolshevism and disorder in Central Europe and 
proposes measures to be taken by the Entente. 
28 H. Nicolson and A.W.A. Leeper. 21 and 60 
Minutes on a memorandum 23 January 1919 
(not printed). 
Contests statements contained in a memorandum, sent by Professor G.D. 
Herron, regarding the dangers facing the Hungarian Protestants in 
Transylvania. 
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29 Sir M. Hankey to Lady Hankey. 29 January 1919 60 
Letter. (Extract) 
Refers to Polish and Czechoslovak affairs as being only remotely of British 
interest. 
30 Captain G.J.L. Pommerol (Budapest) 31 January 1919 61 
to Brig. General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade). 
Letter. 
Gives his views and impressions on the situation in Budapest, especially with 
regard to the inadequacies of the Government and the chances of 
revolutionary disturbances. Minuted by C.H. Smith. 
31 L.B. Namier (London) 1 February 1919 63 
to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris). 
(Extract) 
Analyses the situation in Hungary, especially the difficulties resulting from 
social tensions and the unresolved territorial issues. 
32 The Rev. R.D. Shaw et al. (Edinburgh) 3 February 1919 64 
to A.J. Balfour (London). 
Letter. 
Calls the attention of the British Government to the dangers facing the 
Reformed Church of Hungary, as a result of the emerging peace settlement. 
33 O. Phillpotts (Vienna) 11 February 1919 66 
to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Reports information received on 8 February regarding political developments 
in Hungary consequent to the violation of the terms of the Belgrade Armistice 
by Serbian, Romanian and other Allied troops. Minuted by L.B. Namier, who, 
addressing himself to J. Tilley, stresses the advisability of supporting the 
ruling Centre bloc in Hungary. 
34 Major C. Goetz to V. Wellesley. 11 February 1919 67 
Letter. 
On receipt of a communication from the F.O. to the effect that he should 
refrain from publishing his memorandum regarding British policy on 
Hungary, he reiterates his views on the subject. 
Minuted by L.B. Namier. 
35 L.B. Namier, and H. Nicolson. 
Minutes on a memorandum. 
17 and 
18 February 1919 
68 
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Contests statements in a memorandum written by Count M. Esterhazy, dated 
26 January 1919 (not printed), which claim that Count M. Karolyi's 
Government is the near dictatorship of the Socialist Party, and urges the 
sending of British troops to relieve the situation. 
36 The Romanian Commission at the 19 February 1919 69 
Paris Peace Conference. Note. 
A note read by General Alby before the Romanian Commission: describes the 
proposal adopted at a session of the Commission on 17 February regarding 
the establishment of a Neutral Zone between the Hungarian and Romanian 
armies in Transylvania. 
37 Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall 22 February 1919 70 
to General H. Wilson? Letter. 
Accompanying notes to a map (not printed) showing the British proposal for 
the Neutral Zone to be established in Transylvania. 
38 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 24 February 1919 71 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. No. 115 
Reports the content of a letter, dated 2 February 1919, sent by Count M. 
Karolyi to Count P. Palffy, regarding the social and economic crisis in 
Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe. 
39 Unidentified F.O. official to 26 and 73 
Earl Curzon. With enclosure. 27 February 1919 
Quotes and comments on an American source reporting alleged statements 
made by Col. T. Cuninghame to Socialist members of the Hungarian 
Government regarding Allied impatience with the way the question of 
Bolshevism is treated in Hungary. Enclosed is the American Aide Memoire. 
40 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 27 February 1919 74 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Letter/Memorandum. No. T.C. 118. 
"A Note on the Political Situation of Hungary." Gives a summary of recent 
developments, and a detailed account of the current situation in Hungary. 
Minuted by L.B. Namier and an unidentified official. 
41 General W.H. Greenly (Bucharest) February 1919 80 
to I. Malcolm (?Paris). 
Reports that Romanian leaders believe that undue sympathy is shown by the 
Allies, and especially Great Britain, towards the wishes of the Hungarians 
and the Bulgarians. Urges steps which would alter this image. 
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42 Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm) 3 March 1919 81 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. No. 82. 
Reports an interview with Dr J. Ludwig, representative of the National 
Council of the Hungarians of Transylvania, who stressed the need for a 
statement by the Governments of the Entente indicating that they are in 
favour of establishing a representative government in Hungary. Minuted by 
A.W.A. Leeper and an unidentified official. 
43 Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites 6 March 1919 82 
to Lord Hardinge. 
Memorandum. 
Reports his and the British General Staff's objections to the inclusion of the 
Island of Grosse Schiitt (Csallokoz) in Czechoslovakia. Minuted by H. 
Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe and Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall. 
44 L. Mallet (Paris) (for A.J. Balfour) 8 and 13 March 1919 84 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. No. 199. With enclosure. 
Suggests reply to be given to an earlier communication received from the 
General Presbyterian Alliance regarding the dangers facing the Reformed 
Church of Hungary. Enclosed is the reply sent from the F.O. to the General 
Presbyterian Alliance, signed by G.S. Spicer. 
45 Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to A.J. Balfour 9 March 1919 85 
(Paris). Letter. 
Reports information obtained privately regarding contacts between the 
Hungarian and Italian Governments. 
46 T. Fullham's answers to two 4 and 10 March 1919 85 
questionnaires prepared by M.I. 3. b. 
(Extracts) 
Answers questions relating to the Hungarian Army; Count M. Karolyi; the 
idea of a Danubian Confederation; territorial questions; the popularity of the 
British; and the stability of the Government in Hungary. Minuted by C.H. 
Smith, L.B. Namier and an unidentified official. 
47 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 15 March 1919 89 
to Maj.-Gen. Thwaites (Paris). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Reports information conveyed to him by the French Chief of Staff about 
instructions that have been received from the Peace Conference regarding the 
establishment of a Neutral Zone between Romanians and Hungarians in 
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Transylvania, and comments on the part that the British are required to play 
in connection with this plan. Minuted by an unidentified member of the 
Political Intelligence Department. 
48 G. Spicer (London) (for Earl Curzon) 18 March 1919 90 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Letter/Memorandum. No. 1473. (Extracts) 
Agrees with the content of one of Col. T. Cuninghame's telegrams, and 
advises that the Entente should recognize the Governments of Austria and 
Hungary, as that move would be an effective deterrent against the spread of 
Bolshevism; proposes ways of resolving the conflicts between Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe, 
and initialled by Lt.-Col. J. Cornwall. 
49 Sir M. Hankey to D. Lloyd George. 19 March 1919 92 
Memorandum. (Extract) 
Warns that the system of independent, small states, which is to be established 
in Central and South-Eastern Europe, is unlikely to act as a successful line of 
resistance against the spread of Bolshevism. Annotated by Lord Hankey in 
1951. 
50 Unidentified writer. Notes for the c. beginning of 93 
War Cabinet. March 1919 
"Notes regarding the demarcation line between Hungary and Roumania in 
Transylvania." 
51 General L. Franchet d'Esperey 22 March 1919 94 
(Constantinople) to Marshal F. Foch 
(Paris). 
Telegram. Nos 746, 747, 748. (Extract) 
Reports the resignation of the Hungarian Government after receiving 
notification of the new demarcation lines imposed on Hungary by the Peace 
Conference; the Hungarian Right presented an alternative proposal: alliance 
with the Entente against the Russian Bolsheviks, while the present lines of 
demarcation are kept, or the Hungarians ally themselves with the Bolsheviks. 
Minuted by A.W.A. Keeper, Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge and Maj.-Gen. 
Thwaites. Also enclosed is a minute by L.B. Namier on a memorandum (not 
printed). 
52 War Office. Summary of Intelligence. 22 March 1919 96 
19th Series, No. 16. (Extract) 
Reports on the prospects of a Bolshevik take-over in Hungary. 
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53 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 22 March 1919 97 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 116. 
Reports that Count M. Karolyi's Government has fallen, and a Soviet 
Government has been formed in Hungary. 
54 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 22 March 1919 97 
to Captain V.H. Haggard (Budapest). 
Letter. No. 299. 
Briefs Captain V. Haggard about the situation in Hungary, and gives him 
instructions for his mission to Budapest, where he is to ensure the safety of 
the Allied Missions. 
55 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 24 March 1919 99 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 117. 
Reports that the revolutionary government at Budapest has declared 
Bolshevik war against Serbia and is said to have opened the frontiers with 
Russia. 
56 War Office. Summary of Intelligence. 24 March 1919 99 
19th Series, No. 17. (Extracts) 
Reports the circumstances of the recent political changes in Hungary, and 
provides a brief description of some of the members of the new government. 
Minuted by Brig.-Gen. (?) Thomson and an unidentified official. 
57 T. Jones (London) 24 March 1919 101 
to Sir M. Hankey (Paris). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Reports heated discussion in the War Cabinet about the question of 
equipping the Romanian Army. 
58 D. Lloyd George and Sir M. Hankey. 25 March 1919 102 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their 
terms"; also known as the "Fontainebleau Memorandum". States that while 
large Irredentas remain, peace and resistance to Bolshevism cannot be 
achieved in Central and Eastern Europe. 
59 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extract) 
25 March 1919 103 
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States that Hungarian Bolshevism is not disinterested, but rooted in 
nationalism. 
60 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 26 March 1919 104 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 533. 
Reports that Professor H. Lammasch shares the view that the Bolshevik take¬ 
over in Hungary is the result of a nationalist manoeuvre engineered by Count 
M. Karolyi. Minuted by C.H. Smith and G. Spicer. 
61 Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites. 27 March 1919 105 
Memorandum. 
'The Outbreak in Hungary". Reports his and Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall's 
conversation with Captain N. Roosevelt of the United States Army regarding 
several details of the situation in Budapest, including the role of the Italian 
Mission there. Minuted by Sir M. Hankey, J.W. Headlam-Morley, Sir E. 
Crowe and A.J. Balfour, and initialled by Lord Hardinge. 
62 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 27 March 1919 108 
to the Admiralty (London). 
Telegram. No. ?923. 
Seeks permission from the Peace Conference to proceed to Budapest and 
implement a scheme there, whereby he hopes to check the further 
strengthening of the Bolshevik system. Minuted by an unidentified official. 
63 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 28 March 1919 109 
to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty (London). 
Letter. No. 322. With enclosure. 
Reports on Captain V. Haggard's mission to Budapest. Enclosed is a message 
received on board the monitor "Enns" on 23 March 1919 from a 
representative of the Bolshevik Government in Budapest. 
64 Sir W. Townley (The Hague) 28 March 1919 112 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. No. 81 (Extract) 
Reports Dr. Leipnik's impressions of the situation in Hungary after his recent 
visit there. 
65 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 28 March 1919 113 
to A.J. Balfour (London) 
Telegram. No. P. 202. 
xl DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS 
Relying on British sources, reports on the circumstances of the fall of Count 
M. Karolyi's Government, and the events that immediately followed the 
change in leadership. 
66 An unidentified clerk. 28 March 1919 113 
Minutes on a document. 
Suggests reply to be given to two memoranda received from the United Free 
Church of Scotland on 19 March 1919 regarding the welfare of, and assistance 
to be given to the Hungarian Reformed Church. 
67 Sir M. Hankey to A.J. Balfour. 29 March 1919 114 
Memorandum. With enclosure. 
Encloses an Aide Memoire presented by Bela Kun to Prince Borghese in 
Budapest on 24 March for communication to the Peace Conference, and 
reports the Prime Minister's suggestion that General J.C. Smuts could be sent 
on a mission to Hungary. 
68 General J.C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George. 31 March 1919 116 
Letter. 
Enquires whether his envisaged mission to Budapest might not also be used 
for discussions with representatives of the Russian Bolsheviks. 
69 Sir M. Hankey (Paris) 1 April 1919 117 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Reports the Council of Four's decision to send General J.C. Smuts on a 
mission to Hungary. 
70 Council of Four. Resolution. 1 April 1919 118 
Resolutions and instructions to General Smuts with regard to his mission to 
Hungary. 
71 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 1 April 1919 119 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Writes about the preparations for, and his personal feelings about General 
Smuts' forthcoming mission to Hungary. 
Sir W. Townley (The Hague) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram No. 15. 
With enclosure. 
72 1 and 5 April 1919 120 
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Forwards a message from Dr. Leipnik for Lord Hardinge concerning a 
scheme that Dr. L. has discussed with Count M. Karolyi, which is directed at 
the preservation of the economic unity of the former territories of the Dual 
Monarchy, and which enjoys the support of Bela Kun's Government as well. 
Minuted by E.G.F. Adam, Sir E. Crowe and Lord Hardinge. Enclosed is a 
telegram sent to General Smuts, forwarding the above dispatch and asking 
his views about it. 
73 Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to 3 and 2 April 1919 122 
General J.C. Smuts (Vienna and Budapest) 
Telegram. Nos 1 and 2. With enclosure. 
Communicates amended instructions to General Smuts for his mission to 
Hungary. Enclosed is a letter from Sir M. Hankey to General Smuts, 
explaining the background of the amended instructions. 
74 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 3 April 1919 124 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 138. 
Reports contacts between Bela Kun and the Allied Headquarters, which 
reveal that the new Hungarian Government's policy is not based on the 
principle of territorial integrity. Minuted by an unidentified official. 
75 I. Bratianu to M.P. Dutasta. 3 April 1919 125 
Letter. With enclosure. 
Encloses a telegram from Bucharest, dated 31 March 1919, asking Dutasta to 
bring it to the notice of the Supreme Council: the telegram calls for the 
enforcement of the newly established demarcation line on Hungary so that 
Romania can maintain her resistance against Russian Bolshevism in the east. 
76 A.W.A. Leeper (Vienna) 3 April 1919 126 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Writes about his experiences and impressions from General Smuts' mission 
on the eve of their departure for Budapest. 
77 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 3 April 1919 127 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty 
(London). Letter. No. 332. 
Gives an account of Captain V. Haggard's mission to Budapest (22-26 March 
1919), and comments on the weak position of the new Hungarian 
Government. 
* 
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78 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 4 April 1919 129 
to Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Reports Allied proposals for dealing with the situation in Hungary, and 
stresses the need to support Romania as it is an important factor in the fight 
against Bolshevism. 
79 I.C. Bratianu to D. Lloyd George. 4 April 1919 130 
Letter. 
Expresses his disappointment at not having been informed about the plan to 
send General Smuts on a mission to Hungary, and about the intended 
extension of the mission to Romania. 
80 General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) 4 April 1919 130 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 1. 
Gives an account of his negotiations with Bela Kun. 
81 General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) 6 April 1919 133 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 3. 
Reports his further negotiations with members of the Hungarian 
Government. 
82 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 7 April 1919 134 
to General J.C. Smuts. 
Telegram. Nos 9 and 10. 
Orders General Smuts to proceed to the French and Romanian headquarters. 
83 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 9 April 1919 134 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extract) 
On his return from the Smuts Mission, relates how the Mission missed the 
telegram ordering them to Bucharest, Belgrade and Constantinople. 
84 General J.C. Smuts for the 9 April 1919 135 
Supreme Council. 
Memorandum. With four enclosures. 
"The Mission to Austria-Hungary". General Smuts' final report and 
recommendations after his mission. Minuted by Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, 
an unidentified person for A.J. Balfour, and initialled by H. Nicolson and D. 
Lloyd George. 
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85 General de Lobit? 10 April 1919 151 
Memorandum. 
Discusses internal and external aspects of the Bolshevik transformation in 
Hungary, and urges the Entente to support the Szeklers in their effort to 
overthrow the Government in Budapest. Minuted by Major H.W. Temperley 
and Sir E. Crowe. 
86 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 13 April 1919 153 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Believes, with hindsight, that General Smuts' mission was a failure. 
87 G.N. Barnes to D. Lloyd George. c. 13 April 1919 153 
Letter. (Extract) 
Suggests that General Smuts' recent mission to Hungary could be exploited 
further to arrange contacts with Russian Bolsheviks. 
88 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 14 April 1919 154 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 
Letter. No. 388. With two enclosures. 
Forwards two reports by Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, regarding the 
situation in Hungary after General Smuts' mission. 
89 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 15 April 1919 159 
to Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites (Paris). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Reports his conversation with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, held on 13 
April, during which the latter envisaged a personal role for himself in 
organizing the removal of the Government in Budapest. 
90 Lord Derby (Paris) 16 April 1919 159 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. No. 631. 
Forwards a telegram received from Bucharest, dated 13 April, concerning the 
discontent in Romania with the continued non-compliance by the Hungarians 
with the Allied note regarding the demarcation line in Transylvania, and with 
the proposals that General Smuts made during his recent visit to Hungary. 
91 Earl Curzon (London) 17 April 1919 160 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 2323. 
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Enquires whether the Foreign Secretary approves of a French proposal for the 
supply of coal to Budapest. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe, H. 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, B. (?) Hanson and H. Nicolson. The minutes enquire 
how the results of General Smuts' mission are relevant to the question raised 
in the telegram. 
92 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 19 April 1919 162 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 218. 
Reports his contacts with anti-Government forces in Hungary seeking the 
tacit support of the British Government to recognize peasants against 
Communists. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall. 
93 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 20 April 1919 163 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 557x. 
Reports information received from Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman 
regarding plans for a counter-revolution in Hungary, the organizers of which 
seek recognition by the Allies. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe and 
Lord Hardinge. 
94 Bela Kun (Budapest) 21 April 1919 164 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. 
Offers to accept full responsibility for the fulfilment of an agreement reached 
with General Smuts regarding property owned by foreigners. 
95 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 22 April 1919 164 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 240. 
Reports the visit of a Hungarian Minister to Vienna, who invited him to go to 
Budapest to discuss the situation there: he is planning to leave for Budapest 
the next day. Minuted by H. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, and an 
unidentified official, who all discourage his planned visit to Budapest. 
96 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 24 April 1919 165 
to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Forwards an order from Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, calling Col. Sir T. to refrain 
from becoming involved in the political power struggle either in Vienna or in 
Budapest. (Signed by Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall on A.J. Balfour's behalf.) 
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97 Earl Curzon (London) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram No. 553. (Extracts) 
25 April 1919 166 
Forwards reports by Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm) regarding the effects that 
General Smuts' mission has had in Hungary. 
98 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 
to Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
25 April 1919 166 
Comments on the Romanian advance in Transylvania, and criticizes the 
American Relief Administration for overriding the Allied military authorities. 
99 General Sir H. Wilson 
to A.J. Balfour. Letter. 
2-26 April 1919 167 
Proposes the withdrawal of the last four British battalions from the Italian 
theatre. Minuted by Sir E. Crowe, Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, Lord Hardinge and 
an unidentified official. Maj.-Gen. Thwaites announces that the Prime 
Minister has ordered the Fiume battalion to remain in Italy. 
100 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. Unnumbered. 
26 April 1919 169 
Forwards Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's report from Budapest, sent to 
Admiral Troubridge, about the deteriorating situation in Budapest and Bela 
Kun's readiness to give up power to moderate Socialists. 
101 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 249. 
27 April 1919 170 
Reports quiet in Budapest, but continued unrest in the Hungarian 
countryside. 
102 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 254. 
28 April 1919 170 
Reports Bela Kun's statement to a British agent regarding his willingness to 
accept a Socialist government. Minuted by H. Nicolson. 
Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 2 May 1919 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty 
(London). Letter No. 442. With enclosure. 
171 103 
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Reports preparations for a possible Allied advance on Budapest; the mining 
of the Danube by the Hungarians, and comments on the importance of Lt.- 
Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's presence in Budapest. Enclosed is a message 
from the Hungarian Government, informing Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams- 
Freeman that the clearing of the Danube of mines has already started. 
104 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 May 1919 174 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 264. 
Reports a request made by the French Commissioner in Vienna to deliver an 
invitation for Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference. Minuted by H. 
Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss, A.J. Balfour and General Sir H. 
Wilson. 
105 C. Gosling (Prague) 3 May 1919 176 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. No. 77A. 
Reports that Czech detachments have crossed the demarcation line with 
Hungary in the south. 
106 General Sir H. Wilson (Paris) 4 May 1919 177 
to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna). 
Draft telegram. 
Orders Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to take no action with regard to the invitation 
of the Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference without further 
instructions from Paris. 
107 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 4 May 1919 177 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 267. 
Reports Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's telephone message from 
Budapest regarding the situation there, and Professor P. Brown's departure to 
Szolnok to mediate between Bela Kun and the Romanian authorities. 
108 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 5 May 1919 178 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 268. 
Reports negotiations between an Italian representative and Bela Kun 
regarding a proposal for the occupation of Budapest by Czech troops under 
an Italian officer: Bela Kun refused the proposal; Major Borrow arrived in 
Budapest with the invitation to the Hungarian delegates, but will not present 
it without orders from H. Allize. 
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109 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 272. 
5 May 1919 179 
Reports recent developments in Hungary, and the fact that he has received 
instructions from H. Allize to order Major Borrow to present the note of 
invitation to Hungarian delegates the next day, unless instructions to the 
contrary are received from Paris. Minuted by H. Nicolson. 
110 Earl Curzon (London) 
to the British Peace Delegation (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 269 (R.). 
5 May 1919 180 
Reports Col. J. Wedgwood's private notice question in the House of 
Commons regarding British policy on Hungary, especially the alleged 
suppression by Allied troops of the revolutionary Government, and requests 
answer to the question. Minuted (in London) by C.H. Smith, and (in Paris) by 
H. Nicolson, who suggests a reply to be given. Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, 
A.J Balfour and P. Kerr. H. Nicolson's reply is based on the false presumption 
that Bela Kun's Government has fallen. 
Ill Lord Derby (Paris) 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. No. 692. 
6 May 1919 182 
Forwards a telegram received from Bucharest regarding the reasons put 
forward by the Romanian Government for advancing to the line of the River 
Tisza, and their demand for the occupation of Budapest by Allied troops. 
Minuted by C.H. Smith and H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. 
112 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 277. 
6 May 1919 183 
Reports that the invitation for Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference 
has not been presented. 
113 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 1. 
7 May 1919 183 
Reports that Major Borrow returned from Budapest, leaving the note of 
invitation for Hungarian delegates with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman; 
other aspects of the unfolding situation in Hungary are also commented on. 
114 Major E. Borrow. 
Memorandum. (Extract) 
7 May 1919 184 
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Records the impressions he gained during his recent visit about various 
aspects of life in Budapest: lays stress on the deteriorating political and 
economic situation, and recounts how the Government exploited the Peace 
Conference's apparent wish to invite Hungarian delegates to Paris. Minuted 
by Sir M. Hankey and General J.C. Smuts. 
115 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 8 May 1919 186 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Relates that the invitation for a Hungarian delegation is held up until a 
government which can be recognized by the Allies is formed there. 
116 Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites 10 May 1919 186 
for General Corvisart. 
Note. No. ? E.L.S. 6404 
Forwards a report by General L. Franchet d'Esperey on Professor P. Brown's 
talks on behalf of Bela Kun with Allied military leaders in south-east 
Hungary. 
117 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 10 May 1919 187 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 11. 
Forwards Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's report from Budapest 
regarding Bela Kun's recent negotations with a Czech Socialist Minister in 
Komarom, and other internal developments in Hungary. 
118 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna). 10 May 1919 188 
Memorandum. (Extract) 
Analyses the effects of the Communist Government in Hungary on Austro- 
Hungarian relations, and contemplates methods of overthrowing the 
Bolshevik regime in Budapest. Minuted by H. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe and A.J. 
Balfour, and initialled by P. Kerr. 
119 R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 11 May 1919 190 
to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Reports views expressed by T.G. Masaryk and V. Srobar with regard to the 
territorial settlement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Minuted by 
A.W.A. Leeper. 
Austrian Relief Commission Report. 
Sent by Sir W. Goode? (Vienna?) 
13 May 1919 191 
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Suggests that the Entente should make a statement to the effect that the 
blockade will not be lifted from Hungary while the Bolsheviks are in power 
and reports on the disunity among Bolsheviks and Socialists: proposes the 
dispatch of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to Budapest to detach the Socialists from 
the Communists, and to facilitate a change of administration. 
121 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 13 Mav 1919 190 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 17. 
Reports the stiffening attitude in the Hungarian Army towards acts of 
insubordination. Minuted by A.W.A. Peeper. 
122 Lord Derby (Paris) 14 May 1919 192 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram .No. 721. 
Forwards a telegram received from Allied Representatives in Bucharest 
dated 6 May, regarding overtures by the Government in Budapest to 
conclude peace with Romania: the Romanian Government gave no response 
to these proposals, as they believed these were delaying tactics on the part of 
the Hungarians, who only wanted to reconstitute their army and forge a 
S.tr°f§ alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks. Minuted by H. Nicolson and 
A.W.A. Leeper. 
123 D.E.M. Crackanthorpe (Madrid) 15 May 1919 m 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 2. 
Reports information received from the Spanish Consul in Budapest regarding 
secret negotations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments8 
Minuted by H. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe. 
124 Sir R. Rodd (Rome) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
19 May 1919 195 
Reflects on an alleged French plan for the creation of a 
Confederation, and the hostile Italian attitude to the plan. 
Danubian 
125 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) 22 and 14 May 1919 196 
to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty (London). 
Letter. No. 513. With enclosure. 
Encloses a report by Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, sent from Vienna 
summarizing the political, economic and military developments in Hungary' 
between 3 and 14 May. Minuted by C.H. Smith and an unidentified official. ^ 
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126 Sir W. Goode (Vienna) 22 May 1919 200 
to the British Peace Delegation (Paris). 
With enclosure. 
Forwards a telegram received from C.K. Butler (Trieste), urging Allied 
military action to remove the Government in Hungary, as a pre-condition to 
the economic relief of the region. Enclosed is Sir W. Goode's reply: he is 
taking up the issue with H. Hoover and the highest Allied authorities. 
Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and Maj.- 
Gen. W. Thwaites. 
127 C. Gosling (Prague) 22 May 1919 201 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 100. 
Expresses doubts concerning reports about contacts between the Hungarian 
and Czechoslovak Governments, and reports the diplomatic activities of H. 
Allize and Croatian agents. 
128 R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 26 May 1919 202 
to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris). 
Letter. 
Reports his interview with Semjan, an unofficial Czechoslovak agent posted 
in Hungary, with regard to the situation in Hungary and its effects on 
Czechoslovak politics. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe and Lord 
Hardinge. 
129 General J.C. Smuts 27 May 1919 207 
to D. Lloyd George. 
Letter. 
Expresses his opposition to the official line regarding war reparations to be 
demanded from countries which were formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and, therefore, declines the post offered to him on the Commission 
for Austrian Reparation. 
130 C. Gosling (Prague) 28,20 and 208 
to Earl Curzon (London). 22 May 1919 
Letter. No. 65. With two enclosures. 
Encloses a report by Dr V. Tusar, Czechoslovak representative in Vienna, on 
various political and ethnic questions affecting the settlement in Central and 
South-Eastern Europe, and a memorandum by Gy. Smrecsany, former Prefect 
of Pressburg, regarding the political situation in Hungary, and Czechoslovak 
plans to participate in military operations to suppress the Bolshevik regime in 
Budapest. Minuted by C.H. Smith, A.W.A. Leeper and an unidentified 
official. 
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131 Captain B.N. Barber (Vienna) 29 May 1919 212 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. (Paris). Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. No. T.C. 480. (Extracts) 
Reports the reasons for and the consequences of the Hungarian Red Army's 
success over the Czechoslovak Army. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss, 
Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites and Lord Hardinge. 
132 J.W. Headlam-Morley. 30 May 1919 214 
Memorandum. (Extract) 
Suggests that the final transfer of the new territories to Romania should be 
made only on condition that Romania provides clear guarantees as to the 
observance of the rights of the minorities in these territories. Minuted by Sir 
M. Hankey. 
133 Sir B.H. Thomson for the 31 May 1919 216 
Directorate of Intelligence (Home Office). 
Memorandum. 
"The Communist Revolution in Hungary." A Special Report, containing facts, 
data and analysis regarding the Communist Government and life under the 
new system in Hungary. 
134 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 2 June 1919 230 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram. No. 996. 
Replying to a telegram from General L. Franchet d'Esperey, records the 
formal disapproval of the Council of Allied and Associated Powers regarding 
the decision of the Romanian High Command to march on Budapest. 
135 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 June and 230 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 30 May 1919 
Telegram. No. 49. With enclosure. 
Reports his recent interview with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, who 
urges immediate answer to be given to the Hungarian trade unions' 
proposals regarding intervention by the Entente in Hungary. Enclosed is a 
memorandum by Lt.-Commdr. Williams-Freeman, in which he gives an 
account of his conversation in Budapest with a deputation of Hungarian trade 
union leaders. Minuted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, H. Nicolson and Sir E. 
Crowe. 
136 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 4 June 1919 233 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 53. (Extract) 
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Reflects on the prospect of the trade unions ousting the Communists in 
Hungary, and ruling over a united country with a victorious army, capable of 
opposing the wishes of the Entente. 
137 F. Rattigan (Bucharest) 6 June 1919 234 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Telegram. No. 314. 
Warns about the dangers of the policy of non-intervention in Hungary, and, 
once again, urges action. Minuted by an unidentified official. 
138 G. Clemenceau (Paris) 7 June 1919 235 
to the Hungarian Government (Budapest). 
Telegram. 
Informs the H. Govt, that the Hungarians are launching their attack on 
Czechoslovakia when the Allies are about to invite Hungary to the Peace 
Conference; the Allies will use extreme measures if the Hungarians do not 
comply with their demand to cease the attack; an answer has to be sent to the 
telegram within forty-eight hours. 
139 The Military Representatives of the 7 and 6 June 1919 236 
Supreme War Council. Joint Note No. 43. 
(S.W.C. 419. Extract) With enclosure. 
"Military Measures to be Taken with Regard to Hungary". Enclosed is an 
extract from a memorandum (originally attached to the Joint Note) by 
General T.H. Bliss, the American Military Representative, recording his 
reservations with regard to the recommendations of the Military 
Representatives contained in Joint Note No. 43. 
140 E. Ashmead-Bartlett. 7 June and 239 
Memorandum. (Extracts) ' 29 May 1919 
With enclosure. 
"Memorandum on the Position in Hungary". Describes the situation in 
Hungary, its social and military aspects, gives an account of the counter¬ 
revolutionary movements, and proposes that the Entente should co-operate 
with the Szeged based counter-revolutionary government in bringing down 
the regime in Budapest. Enclosed is a declaration signed by Count G. Karolyi 
and Baron G. Bornemisza in the name of the Szeged Government regarding 
the policy of a future counter-revolutionary government in Hungary. 
141 Count Gy. Karolyi (Szeged) 7 June 1919 247 
to General P. de Lobit (Belgrade). 
Letter. 
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Announces the establishment of a provisional Hungarian government in 
Arad on 5 May 1919 and its subsequent transfer to Szeged; sends a list of its 
members and outlines its political aims. 
142 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 7 and 11 June 1919 249 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 59. With enclosure. 
Seeks urgent answers to the recent offer made by delegates of the Hungarian 
trade unions to Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman. Minuted by H. Nicolson, 
Sir E. Crowe, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and initialled by Lord Hardinge. Enclosed 
is A.J. Balfour's draft reply to Col. Cuninghame's tel. No. 49 (No. 135). 
143 Lt.-Col. B. Coulson (Prague) 8 June 1919 250 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. 
Describes the grave situation created by the Hungarian military successes, 
and asks for immediate help for Czechoslovakia from the Entente. 
144 Bela Kun (Budapest) 9 june 1919 251 
to G. Clemenceau (Paris). 
Telegram. 
Expresses satisfaction with the Allied decision to invite Hungary to the Peace 
Conference, but denies that Hungary attacked Czechoslovakia: to the 
contrary, he argues, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania are 
committing aggression against Hungary; he would like to settle these 
differences with representatives of the three countries at a conference to be 
convened in Vienna. 
145 R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 9 June 1919 
to A.J. Balfour (for J.W. Headlam-Morley, 
Paris). 
Telegram. Unnumbered. 
252 
Describes the grave military situation as the Hungarian offensive succeeds 
against Czechoslovakia, and urges prompt help for Czechoslovakia from the 
Entente. Minuted by Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and 
J.W. Headlam-Morley; initialled by A.J. Balfour. 
146 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 9 June 1919 255 
to R.W.A. Leeper (London) 
Letter. (Extract) 
Criticizes the Council of Four's telegram of 7 June to the Hungarian 
Government, which gives the impression that this Government has been 
recognized, and has been invited to the Peace Conference. 
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147 C. Gosling (Prague) 11 June 1919 256 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known, repeated to 
the F.O., London, as No. 118.) 
Reports that in spite of Bela Kun's positive reply given to the Entente's recent 
ultimatum, the Hungarian attacks against Slovakia are still continuing. 
148 C. Gosling (Prague) 12 June 1919 256 
to the Foreign Office (London). 
Memorandum. Enclosure to Letter No. 76. 
Reports his interview with Dr. Boh. Vydra, who relates what he learnt about 
Bolshevik plans for the domination of Europe from the leader of the Silesian 
Bolsheviks while he was held by the Germans in the same prison with him at 
Ratibor. 
149 G. Clemenceau (Paris) 13 June 1919 257 
to the Hungarian Government (Budapest) 
Telegram. 
In two parts: General and Special. Communicates an ultimatum requiring the 
Hungarian Government to withdraw behind the newly established frontiers 
and, at the same time, carries a pledge that as soon as the Hungarian troops 
have evacuated Czechoslovakia, the Romanian troops will be withdrawn 
behind their new borders. 
150 Captain G.H.L. Fitzwilliams (Vienna) 15 June 1919 258 
to C.K. Butler (?Trieste). 
Letter. (Extract) 
Describes the precarious position of the Hungarian Government, as, in spite 
of the military successes in Slovakia, discontent continues to grow against it. 
151 Bela Kun (Budapest) 16 June 1919 260 
to Lenin (Moscow). 
Telegram. 
Intercepted telegram: states that the Hungarian Government is in treaty with 
the Entente by wireless, and requests the sending of Bukharin to Budapest to 
help inaugurate a foreign policy, which would be to the advantage of both 
Russia and Hungary. 
152 Bela Kun (Budapest) 16 June 1919 260 
to G. Clemenceau (Paris). 
Telegram. 
Promises to accede to the demands of the Entente, but requests more time to 
carry them out; expresses strong criticism regarding the newly established 
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borders of Hungary both from the economic and the ethnic point of view; 
seeks the help of the Entente in establishing contacts with Czechoslovak and 
Romanian representatives with a view to resolve the conflict between 
Hungary and the two aforementioned countries. 
153 SirM. Hankey 16 June 1919 262 
to General T.H. Bliss. 
Letter. 
Communicates the Council of Four s invitation to General T. Bliss to express 
his views on the latest telegram from the Hungarian Government proposing a 
meeting between the military representatives of Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Romania. Minuted by H. Nicolson. 
154 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 17 June 1919 263 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 616. 
Forwards the translation of a communique by the Hungarian Chief 
Command announcing that the Hungarians have taken the necessary 
measures for the suspension of hostilities: nevertheless, attacks by Czech 
forces are continuing, and this forced the Hungarians to take energetic 
measures for defence; according to the official Hungarian news agency the 
Slovak Republic of Councils has been declared. Minuted by H. Nicolson and 
Sir E. Crowe. 
155 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 17 June 1919 264 
to General Sir H. Wilson (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Relates his efforts in Vienna to prevent the spreading of Bolshevism from 
Hungary to Austria; comments on the alleged support given by the Italian 
Mission to the Hungarian Government, and on some of the international 
implications of the unfolding political situation in the region. 
156 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 17 June 1919 265 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Letter. No. 103. 
Reports the visit to Belgrade of Vice-Admiral M. Horthy and Count P. Teleki, 
members of the anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged. 
157 Sir S. Hoare (Prague) 19 June 1919 266 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Letter. 
Reports the impressions he gained during a fortnight's visit to Prague and 
Slovakia: warns of the dangers of allowing the Hungarians to continue to 
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occupy Slovak territory, and urges military action against them. Minuted by 
Lord Hardinge. 
158 Lenin (Moscow) 
to Bela Kun (Budapest). 
Telegram. 
19 June 1919 268 
Warns against trusting the Entente, whose only 
and Russian Bolshevik Governments. 
aim is to crush the Hungarian 
159 Bela Kun (Budapest) 
to Lenin (Moscow). 
Telegram. 
21 June 1919 269 
Reply to No. 158; expresses his pride in being one of Lenin's best pupils, but 
believes he is superior to Lenin in the question of bad faith when it comes to 
negotiations with the Entente. 
160 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 21 June 1919 269 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 80. 
Reports that orders issued by V. Bohm for the Hungarian Army to retire in 
the north were not carried out because nationalists and Bolshevik extremists 
are opposed to the idea of compliance with the demands of the Entente. 
Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper. 
161 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 22 June 1919 270 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 620. 
Reports the proceedings of the session of the Congress of Councils in 
Hungary on 21 June, where they discussed the political and military position 
of the country. 
162 Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites 24 June 1919 270 
for Lord Hardinge. 
Memorandum. 
Recapitulates the events since 30 May, concerning contacts between the Peace 
Conference and the Hungarian Government, and the political and military 
developments in Hungary, which lead him to the conclusion that a military 
intervention would be the best way of dealing with the threat posed by the 
Communist regime in Hungary. Minuted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, Sir E. 
Crowe and an unidentified official. 
163 F. Rattigan (Bucharest) 
to H. Nicolson (Paris). 
Letter. 
24 June 1919 273 
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Finds the Peace Conference's attitude to the Hungarian problem utterly 
incomprehensible and detrimental to British interests, and reports on the 
Hungarian situation as it is perceived from Bucharest. Minuted by A.W.A. 
Leeper, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss, Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites and J.W. Headlam- 
Morley. 
164 Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams Freeman 24 June 1919 275 
(Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Letter. With enclosure. 
Reports the events of his last weeks in Budapest: his negotiations with trade 
union leaders, sessions of the Congress of Councils and his necessitated 
departure. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and C.H. Smith. Enclosed is a 
petition (undated), presented to Lt.-Commdr. F.W.-F. by the Society of 
Awakening Hungarians, denouncing the Bolshevik system and seeking 
British help. 
165 G. Clement-Simon (Prague) 24 June 1919 280 
to S. Pichon (Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Describes a recent exchange of messages between General M. Pelle and Bela 
Kun, in which the latter agreed to conform to the wishes of the Peace 
Conference regarding the evacuation of Czechoslovak territory by the 
Hungarian Army. 
166 H. Allize (Vienna) 25 June 1919 280 
to S. Pichon (Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Reports the recent publication of a telegram by Bela Kun to G. Clemenceau, in 
which additional guarantees are demanded before withdrawal from 
Czechoslovak territory; quotes the results of the elections at the Congress of 
Councils. 
167 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 25 June 1919 281 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 623. (Extract) 
Reports the difficulties facing the Communist regime in Hungary resulting 
from the rift between the nationalists in the army and the Socialists. 
168 Marshal F. Foch 25 June 1919 281 
to G. Clemenceau. 
Letter. No. 3128 (?). 
Points out that the Romanian Army will be defenceless against a Hungarian 
attack after its retirement from the Theiss, and, therefore, the Romanian 
withdrawal should be made contingent on the strict application of all the 
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clauses of the Armistice to Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Maj.-Gen. 
W. Thwaites and Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
169 C. Gosling (Prague) 25 June 1919 284 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 34. 
Reports General Pelle's statement, according to which, in spite of the 
cessation of hostilities, the Hungarians are not intending to withdraw from 
occupied territory, and that — in view of the bad faith that they have shown 
— they are not to be trusted, and force will have to be used against them. 
Accompanying letter by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
170 Bela Kun (Budapest) 26 June 1919 285 
to G. Clemenceau (Paris). 
Telegram. 
Protests against a Romanian attack on Hungarian positions in spite of the 
cessation of hostilities by the Hungarians: the Romanians do not respect the 
decisions of the Peace Conference. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
171 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 26 June 1919 286 
to the American Relief 
Administration (Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Reports a recent counter-revolutionary attempt in Budapest, and argues for 
Entente intervention in Hungary in spite of the Hungarian compliance with 
the Entente's demands regarding the cessation of hostilities against 
Czechoslovakia, as the Bolshevik Government continues to be a destabilizing 
factor in Central Europe. 
172 Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss 27 June 1919 287 
to J.T. Davies. 
Letter. (Extract) 
Proposes that the Prime Minister should see Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams- 
Freeman, and reports his recent interview with an ex-Austro-Hungarian 
officer. 
173 L.B. Namier. 27 June 1919 287 
Minutes on a memorandum 
(not printed). 
Defends Col. T. Cuninghame against accusations made in a memorandum 
received from an unidentified Czechoslovak source. 
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Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 28 June 1919 288 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 626. 
Reports the details of a counter-revolutionary coup attempt in Budapest on 24 
June 1919. 
175 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 29 June 1919 289 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 84. 
Reports that Bela Kun is willing to resign if he can find a pretext; an Italian 
Civil Commission arrived in Budapest; three counter-revolutionaries have 
been executed, and hostages have been released. 
176 Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman. 30 June 1919 290 
Memorandum. 
Memorandum on the Situation in Buda Pest and Hungary". Describes the 
difficulties faced by moderate Socialists and trade union leaders, who 
endeavour to put an end to Communist rule, expresses his views regarding 
the damage caused by the Bolshevik Government in Budapest inside and 
outside Hungary, and argues for Entente intervention. 
177 C. Gosling (Prague) 30 June 1919 292 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 35. 
Reports that General M. Pelle has received a telegram from the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Hungarian Army, stating that the Hungarian Government has 
ordered the immediate withdrawal of the Army from all the occupied 
territories. r 
178 Sir W. Goode. End of June 1919 292 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
'The Hungarian Situation and Its Effect on the Restoration of Public Order 
and the Rehabilitation of Economic Life in Central Europe." A memorandum 
based largely on British information. 
179 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 1 July 1919 296 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. No. T.C. 573. (Extracts) 
Reports increasing dissent among the political and military leadership in 
Budapest, a change in the attitude of the Italian representatives in Hungary 
and O. Bauer's views on the idea of a Danubian Confederation. 
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180 Bela Kun (Budapest) 1 July 1919 298 
to G. Clemenceau (Paris). 
Telegram. 
Reports and protests against a Romanian attack on Hungarian positions near 
Tiszaluc. 
181 A.J. Balfour. 2 July 1919 299 
Memorandum. 
Records his farewell interview with I. Bratianu, during which the latter 
indicated that it would be impossible for the Romanians to abandon the line 
of the River Theiss until Hungary has been disarmed. 
182 Colonel B. Coulson (Prague) 2 July 1919 299 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. HC. 104. 
Reports the retirement of the Hungarian Army from Czechoslovak territory. 
183 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 2 July 1919 300 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 88. 
Reports his recent interview with a special agent returning from Budapest, 
who gave an account, among other things, of the impression that Bela Kun 
has realized that he could not keep the Red Army idle; in a speech made on 
30 June Bela Kun said that troops would be used against Romania across the 
Theiss. 
184 L.B. Namier 3 July 1919 300 
for Sir W. Tyrrell. 
Notes on a memorandum. 
With enclosure. 
Reports his conversation with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman regarding 
various aspects of a possible political settlement in Hungary. Enclosed are 
comments recorded on the same memorandum by A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. 
Crowe. 
185 Telegram from Vienna, 5 July 1919 303 
communicated by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss 
to the British Peace Delegation. 
Reports Hungarian preparations for an offensive against Romania. 
186 Telegram from Budapest, 5 July 1919 303 
communicated by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss 
to the British Peace Delegation in Paris. 
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Reports the issuing of a manifesto by the Hungarian Government to soldiers 
of the Red Army, declaring, among other things, that although they had to 
withdraw from the Czechoslovak territories, the country will receive more 
territories on the other side of the Theiss, and that they do not renounce their 
claim to a single inch of Hungarian-speaking territory. 
187 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 7 July 1919 304 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 93. 
Gives an account of a meeting of the Allied Military Representatives in 
Vienna, where it was agreed that the Entente should make clear their 
intention of removing the Government in Budapest. 
Major H.A. Cartwright (Prague) 8 July 1919 
to Oliver? of the British Peace 
Delegation? (Paris). 
Letter. (Extract) 
305 
Gives an account of his recent journey in Slovakia, where he acted as an 
umpire during the retirement of the Hungarian army. 
189 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 8 July 1919 308 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 
Telegram. No. HAM 779. 
Transmits information from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, revealing that Bela Kun 
is about to arrange a counter-revolutionary disturbance in Budapest, using 
agents provocateurs, in order to upset the Socialists. 
190 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 8 July 1919 309 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 
Telegram. No. HAM 785. 
Transmits Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's telegram, who reports his interview with 
a high Staff Officer of the Hungarian Red Army regarding various aspects of 
the political and military situation in Hungary, including the position of the 
extreme Left and the Socialists in the government; as long as the Red Army- 
remains armed, peace is impossible: the army cannot be kept idle or cannot be 
disarmed by the existing government. 
191 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 9 July 1919 310 
to Earl Curzon (London). 
Telegram .No. 1137. (In two parts.) 
Discusses the two options open to the Entente with regard to the Government 
in Budapest: one is to do nothing, which is neither very dignified nor very 
safe, the other is to compel it to accept the terms of the Conference but the 
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military force available may not be sufficient to pursue the latter course. 
Minuted by an unidentified official. 
192 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 10 and 9 July 1919 312 
to Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites (War Office, 
London). 
Letter. With enclosure. 
Transmits an account of the situation in Budapest given by the Chief of Staff 
of the Hungarian Red Fourth Army Corps: the reason why Bela Kun does not 
resign is that he himself is terrorised by the terrorists, believes in the 
spreading of the revolution, and he is not the kind of man to resign 
voluntarily; the Entente alone is able to restore order in the country, and this 
it would be able to do within one week. 
193 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 10 July 1919 313 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 796. (Extract) 
Forwards Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's dispatch: reports the reasons for the 
resignation of Col. A. Stromfeld, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army, and 
the decision at the Hungarian Headquarters to take the offensive against the 
Romanians. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
194 D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) 11 July 1919 314 
for A. Bonar Law (Paris). 
Telephone message. 
Believes that, in regard to Bela Kun, the difficulty is a good deal due to the 
Romanian advance to the Theiss in defiance of the Peace Conference: the 
decrees of the Conference must be enforced against friend and foe alike. 
Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
195 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 11 July 1919 315 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris.) 
Telegram. No. 638. 
Reports the publication of a statement in Vienna, indicating that the 
Hungarians are planning to attack the Romanians if the latter do not retire 
from the Theiss. 
196 D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) 13 July 1919 315 
to P. Kerr (for A.J. Balfour, Paris). 
Telephone message. 
Considers that the Peace Conference should insist on a Romanian withdrawal 
from Hungarian territory with simultaneous compliance by the Hungarians 
with the terms of the Armistice, as a condition precedent to peace, the same 
way as they insisted on the Hungarian withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. 
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197 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 13 July 1919 317 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 97. 
Calls the attention of the Peace Conference to the fact that Bela Kun is in 
possession of a secret telegram, dated 3 July, from G. Clemenceau to General 
Hallier, in which it is expressed that a purely Socialist Government would be 
more agreeable to the Entente than the one based in Szeged: remarks that the 
Szeged Government includes ex-Socialist functionaries as well. 
198 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 13 July 1919 318 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 98. 
Reports alleged acts of violence carried out against peasants by the Bolsheviks 
in Hungary. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
199 Captain B.H. Barber (Vienna) 15 and 10 July 319 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 1919 
Telegram .No. 844. (Extract) 
Forwards Captain B. Weiss's memorandum, originally written for A. 
Halstead, American Commissioner in Vienna, on the situation in Hungary, 
including an account of his recent interview with Bela Kun, and an 
assessment of the reasons for the survival of the Communist Government in 
Hungary. 
200 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 15 July 1919 323 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 844. (Extract) 
Forwards Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's report regarding a statement in V. Bohm's 
farewell speech, made on his resignation as Commander-in-Chief, indicating 
that, if the Red Army took the offensive against the Romanians, the national 
socialists in the Szeged Government, under Count Gy. Karolyi, would leave 
the White side and join the Reds. 
201 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 15 July 1919 324 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. (Extracts) 
Reports and reflects on the preparations for the forthcoming offensive of the 
Hungarians against the Romanians. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
202 P. Kerr (Paris) 16 July 1919 325 
to D. Lloyd George (Criccieth). 
Letter. (Extract) 
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Transmits A.J. Balfour's reply to an earlier communication from the Prime 
Minister, expressing the view that the terms of the Armistice have to be 
enforced on Hungary before any other measure is taken with regard to the 
situation there. 
203 Lord Acton (Berne) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 226. 
17 July 1919 326 
Reports that Count M. Karolyi is in Milan, where he is endeavouring 
the support of Italian Socialists in order to recover power in Budapest. 
to gain 
204 Sir M. Hankey. 
Memorandum. (Extract) 
17 July 1919 327 
"Towards a National Policy". Expresses the view that no great 
interests will be involved in Central Europe in the foreseeable future. 
British 
205 W.S. Churchill, A. Bonar Law, ca. 18 July 1919 328 
D. Lloyd George and 
General Sir H. Wilson. 
Notes. 
Draft proposal for obtaining an undertaking from the Romanians that they 
will retire to the line prescribed for them by the Peace Conference as soon as 
the Hungarians have disarmed. 
206 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 18 July 1919 329 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. No. T.C. 692. (Extract) 
Reports his discussion with O. Bauer about the opportunities created by the 
nomination of V. Bohm as the new Hungarian Minister in Vienna. 
207 D. Abraham and Count P. Teleki 18 July 1919 330 
(Szeged) for the British Government. 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
They comment on the character of the Communist regime in Hungary, and 
seek assistance from the Entente to overthrow it. Minuted by W.L.O. Twiss, 
and initialled by H. Nicolson. 
208 F. Rattigan (Bucharest) 22 July 1919 333 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 366. 
Reports a Hungarian attack on Romanian positions on the line of the River 
Theiss. 
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209 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris). 
Telegram. No. HAM 911. 
22 July 1919 334 
Transmits Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's telegram, who reports his forthcoming 
meeting with V. Bohm: he believes that this amounts to the acceptance by 
Bela Kun of the necessity of stepping down if an agreement between the 
Entente and the Socialists can be reached. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
210 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 102. 
23 July 1919 335 
Reports his negotiations with V. Bohm, during which he proposed that Bohm, 
with J. Haubrich and P. Agoston, should overthrow Bela Kun's Government, 
create a military dictatorship, and call the assistance of a strong Entente 
Commission to adjust and control; Bohm is prepared under certain 
guarantees to take steps; the scheme will be discussed with Entente 
representatives on 23 July. Minuted by H. Nicolson and Lt.-Col. W.L.O. 
Twiss. 
211 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 104. (In two parts.) 
24 July 1919 336 
Part I: transmits Captain T.T.C. Gregory's dispatch to H. Hoover, which 
includes an eight-point formula, submitted to V. Bohm for the removal of 
Bela Kun's Government. Part II: reports V. Bohm's provisional acceptance of 
the plan, and seeks Entente authorization for its prosecution. Minuted by Lt.- 
Col. W.L.O. Twiss and an unidentified official. 
212 General E.L. Spears. 
Telephone message. (Extract) 
25 July 1919 338 
Transmits a report received from General L. Franchet d'Esperey on 22 July, 
regarding the lack of co-operation between the French and Romanian armies 
in south-eastern Hungary. 
213 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 105. 
25 July 1919 339 
Reports his negotiations with V. Bohm: Bela Kun is apparently not opposed to 
the negotiations; Bohm thinks everything depends on the outcome of the 
Hungarian attack on the Romanians: if the Romanians hold their own, he can 
intervene successfully, if they are pressed back, it will be more difficult. 
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214 The Supreme Council. 26 July 1919 340 
Statement. 
Released to the press and wired 
to Hungary at the same time. 
Declares that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot lift the blockade from, 
and cannot make peace with Hungary, while the country is led by an 
unrepresentative Government, whose authority rests on terrorism; they think 
it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungary will cease as soon 
as the terms of the Armistice have been satisfactorily complied with. 
215 A.J. Balfour. 27 July 1919 341 
Memorandum. 
"Armies and Economics Being Reflections on Some Aspects of the Allied 
Situation on July 27th, 1919". Reflects on the results of the diminished 
military capability of the Allies with regard to the enforcement of armistices 
and peace treaties; considers aspects of applying economic sanctions on 
defaulters. 
216 H. Allize (Vienna) 28 July 1919 343 
to S. Pichon (Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Expresses his lack of confidence in V. Bohm, as every time, when Bela Kun's 
regime finds itself in difficulty, it tries to negotiate with the Entente; 
nevertheless, a government presided over by Bohm would certainly show less 
resistance to the peace conditions offered by the Entente than a counter¬ 
revolutionary, nationalist government, like the one in Szeged. Minuted by Lt.- 
Col. W.L.O. Twiss and General C. Sackville-West. 
217 Marshal F. Foch 29 July 1919 344 
to G. Clemenceau. 
Letter. No. 3599 (?). 
Presents the Czechoslovak, the Serbian, and the Romanian views with regard 
to participation in a military intervention in Hungary. 
218 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 29 July 1919 345 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. No. T.C. 704. (Extracts) 
Reports on the progress of his negotiations with V. Bohm, and the forming of 
a Peasants' Organization in Hungary; relates his personal role in warning the 
Romanians of the Hungarian attack, and summarizes the latest developments 
in the latter conflict. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
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219 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 31 July 1919 345 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 106. 
Reports his recent conversation with V. Bohm, during which the latter said 
that the pressure on Bela Kun was not yet sufficient to induce him to yield, 
though he (Bohm) is fairly confident of eventual success; he also gave his 
assessment of the military situation in the conflict between Romanians and 
Hungarians. 
220 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 1 August 1919 348 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 107. 
Reports his recent interview with the Chief of the Budapest Workmens' 
Council and V. Bohm: they seemed to think that Bela Kun could be forced out 
if the right movements were chosen; Bohm is secretly in touch with the 
Government in Szeged. 
221 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 1 August 1919 348 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 686X. 
Transmits the identifications of various units of the Hungarian Red Army in 
the conflict with Romania. 
222 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 1 August 1919 349 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 687X. 
Reports the fall of Bela Kun's Government on 1 August, and its replacement 
by a wholly socialist government under Gy. Peidl; the Romanians are 
reported to have crossed the Theiss, and are advancing; the Red Army is in 
rout. 
223 G. Clemenceau (Paris) to 2 August 1919 350 
Lt.-Col. G. Romanelli (Budapest). 
Telegram. (No. not known) 
Acknowledges the receipt of Lt.-Col. Romanelli's dispatch of 1 August 
regarding the fall of the Republic of Councils in Hungary, and informs him 
that the Supreme Council does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Hungary, and does not consider itself bound by the proposals recently put 
forward by members of the Allied Missions in Vienna: the relations between 
the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary are based exclusively on the 
Armistice of 13 November 1918 and the Note issued by the Peace Conference 
on 13 June 1919. 
lxviii DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS 
224 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 2 August 1919 351 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 688. 
Reports the arrival and internment of Bela Kun in Vienna, and the suicide of 
T. Szamuely. 
225 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (?) (Vienna) 2 August 1919 352 
to the American Relief Adminstration 
(Paris). 
Telegram. (No. not known) (Extract) 
Reports the forthcoming arrival of fugitives from Budapest; suggests that the 
new Hungarian Government should be given a chance to consolidate its 
position; believes that the Conference should not allow the Romanians to 
occupy Budapest; reports further developments concerning a child feeding 
programme for Budapest, the fate of former members of the Hungarian 
Government, and the Romanian advance towards Budapest. Minuted by Lt.- 
Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
226 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 August 1919 354 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 689. 
Reports his recent interview with Reuter's correspondent, who returned from 
Budapest on 2 August, and who states that there would have been excesses 
on the part of extreme elements, had it not been for the declaration by the 
Entente, published on 27 July, which enabled the trade unions to control the 
situation. 
227 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 August 1919 354 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 690. 
Transmits the programme of the new Hungarian Government as received 
from V. Bohm and J. Weltner, who also asked that the Romanian advance 
should be stopped, the Theiss made a demarcation line, and the blockade be 
raised immediately. 
228 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 August 1919 355 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 691. 
Reports events related to the continued advance of Romanian troops towards 
Budapest. 
229 J. Gorvin for 3 August 1919 356 
Sir W. Goode. 
Two telegrams and commentary. 
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Copy for Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. Transmits two telegrams sent by Captain 
T.T.C. Gregory to H.C. Hoover, transmitting the new Minister of War, J. 
Haubrich's, message asking that the Romanian advance be stopped; Gregory 
suggests that Admiral Troubridge should proceed to Budapest with monitors, 
backed by French and Italian detachments, to stabilize the situation; Haubrich 
has already started to comply with the Armistice; Gorvin reports an Allied 
plan to send Admiral Troubridge up the Danube with monitors. 
230 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 4 August 1919 358 
to A.J. Balfour. 
Telegram. No. 692X. 
Reports the formal occupation of Budapest by the Romanians; the 
Government are in doubt whether they will be able to remain; the Czechs and 
the Serbs are also advancing; General R. Gorton is in Vienna on his way to 
Budapest. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. 
231 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 5 August 1919 359 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 694X. 
Reports negotiations between the existing Government and the Szeged 
Government: the arrival of E. Garami in Vienna is expected to facilitate these 
conlcicts. The Romanians in Budapest are reported to have pacifying 
influence. 
232 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 5 August 1919 359 
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). 
Letter. No. T.C. 713. 
Gives an account of the recent political changes in Hungary, and reports the 
steps that are being taken to bring about a coalition between the Socialists and 
the Szeged Government; he is also active in helping to form a Peasants' 
Organization in Hungary. 
233 Foreign Office (London) 8 August 919 361 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 
Telegram. No. 1067. 
Transmits a parliamentary question by Col. J. Wedgwood scheduled for 11 
August, asking whether the Entente have demanded or intend to demand the 
surrender of Bela Kun from Austria, and if so, why. Minuted by H. Nicolson 
and Sir E. Crowe, who reply in the negative. 
234 J.W. Headlam-Morley. 
Memorandum. 
c. end of 1919 362 
or later 
"Note on the Austrian Treaty". A critical assessment of the way in which the 
Foreign Office and the Paris Peace Conference treated questions relating to 
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Austria and Hungary towards the end of the war and during the Peace 
Conference. 
235 J.W. Headlam-Morley 27 June 1922 366 
Memorandum. (Extracts) 
"Peace Settlement Memoranda, Reparation": Chapter IV/I of an unpublished 
history of the Paris Peace Conference. Describes the vengeful attitude 
adopted by the smaller Allied states towards the smaller defeated states after 
the war, and considers that this was modelled on the similar attitude of the 
Great Powers towards their former enemies; believes that this spirit, if not 
checked, must be fatal to the future of Europe. 
236 A. Ponsonby. 16 February 1924 367 
Memorandum. 
Points out the undemocratic nature of various aspects of the Hungarian 
political scene, including the electoral system, rights of expression, the form 
of government, trade union laws and judicial processes. States that some of 
these are in contravention of the agreement that the Hungarian political 
parties made with Sir G. Clerk in November 1919. Suggests possible ways of 
amending this situation. Minuted by M.W. Lampson, and commented on in 
part of a memorandum by the Central Department of the Foreign Office. 
237 T.B. Hohler (Budapest) 26 March 1924 370 
to R. MacDonald (London). 
Letter No. 137. 
Reports his recent conversation of a private nature with Count I. Bethlen, in 
which the latter explained that the agreement reached between the Hungarian 
political parties and Sir G. Clerk in November 1919 served solely the purpose 
of forming a government which could be recognized, and with which the 
Allies could negotiate a treaty of peace, and that no long-term engagements 
were entered into for the future. They also discussed the question of recent 
restrictions imposed on the franchise in Hungary. Minuted by C.H. Smith, H. 
Nicolson, M.W. Lampson, Sir E. Crowe and A. Ponsonby. 


No. 1 
Telegram from E. Grant-Duff (Berne) to Lord Hardinge (London. 
Received 2 August 1916) 
No. not known. [PRO LO 371/2602 No. 150294/16] 
Berne, 2 August 1916 
Private and Secret 
Count Karolyi of Independent Party in Hungary is in Switzerland. He has sent me a 
message through Mrs. Barton asking for an interview.1 He did not say what his object 
was but gave impression that he wishes to discuss Hungarian peace terms. Mrs. Barton 
replied that she would not move in the matter unless he produced written credentials. 
He replied that it would be easy to obtain these. He is accompanied by member of 
General Staff. 
He seemed particularly anxious to see me as distinct from other Allied Chefs de 
Mission. Should he produce credentials what attitude do you wish me to adopt? 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Count Karolyi, with a following of some 25 members, has just resigned from the 
Independent Party and announced a ‘democratic’ policy. The first doubt is therefore 
whether his credentials, even though backed by a member of the General Staff, would 
be good enough to warrant any sort of discussion with him. Had Hungary really 
wanted to put out feelers, another emissary would have seemed more suitable. 
The next point is that, whether Count Karolyi is acting for himself or really 
representing the bulk of Hungarian feeling, any overtures are due, just as at the 
beginning of 1915, to fears of imminence of Roumanian intervention, as to which 
Buda-Pesth must be well informed. 
This leads to the position that, though we cannot be on with the new love before we 
are off with the old, we could use the fact of advances from Hungary to show M. 
Bratiano that he may easily delay too long. I think however that it would be fatal to 
suggest this at Petrograd just now, or M. Stunner’s2 attitude would be stiffer than ever. 
In my humble opinion, Mr. Grant Duff might be authorized to listen to anything 
Count Karolyi has to say, but to make it clear that he cannot enter on any discussion or 
give any expression of opinion. 
G.D.[?]C. 2/8/16 
1 The report that Count Mihaly Karolyi was in Switzerland was the result of a misunderstanding on the 
part of Mrs. Barton, and was wholly unfounded. (Source: Tibor Hajdu, Karolyi Mihaly, Budapest, 
1978.) The telegram is quoted here for the sake of the reaction that it elicited from the Foreign Office. 
2 B.V. Sturmer, Russian wartime Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior. 
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The above instrns. [instructions] would, I think, present some risk, if the information 
reached the Russian & French Govts. I doubt if Count Karolyi would be able to 
produce satisfactory credentials, but if he wd, the only place where such an interview 
could take place would be in Mrs. Barton’s house. Mrs. Barton is a Miss Peel, daughter 
of Sir R. Peel and lives in Switzerland. 
Lord] H[ardinge]. 
Instruct Mr. Grant Duff to have it conveyed to Count Karolyi that the utmost he could 
do would be to transmit to H. M. Govt, anything that Count Karolyi might have to say 
& that for this purpose it ought to be in writing or in some definite form such as a 
memorandum. 
That if the communication refers to terms of peace, H.M. Govt, would not be able to 
take it into consideration except in consultation with their Allies to whom they must be 
free to communicate it. 
If after this is conveyed to Count Karolyi he still desires an interview, it should not be 
at the Legation, but at some non-official place such as Mrs. Barton’s house.3 
Give to French, Russian & Italian Ambassadors here a memorandum stating the 
nature of the communication made to Mr. Grant Duff from Count K. and giving the 
first two paragraphs of the instructions to Mr. G.D. adding it verbally when giving 
memo: that we do not see how this is to lead to anything; but that it could perhaps be 
desirable to say nothing to the other Allied Ministers at Berne, as, if it becomes subject 
of discussion there, Count K. will probably go away without saying anything. 
Point out also that if a real peace overture is received, it may quicken the decision of 
M. Bratiano to join the Allies. 
[Sir R.] G[raham]. 
3 Instructions were sent to E. Grant-Duff in the way indicated here, in Lord Hardinge’s name, on 2 
August 1916. 
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No. 2 
Memorandum by Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir R. Paget (Extracts)1 
[PRO FO 371/2804 No. 180510AV39] 
Foreign Office, 7 August 1916 
[•...] 
His Majesty’s Government have announced that one of their chief objects in the 
present war is to ensure that all the States of Europe, great and small, shall in the future 
be in a position to achieve their national development in freedom and security. It is 
clear, moreover, that no peace can be satisfactory to this country unless it promises to 
be durable, and an essential condition of such a peace is that it should give full scope to 
national aspirations as far as practicable. The principle of nationality should therefore be 
one of the governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements after the 
war. 
[••..] 
The end which the Jugo-Slavs have in view is the liberation of all Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes from the domination of Austria-Hungary or any other Power and their union 
into one State. 
[....] 
The Jugo-Slavs desire that the boundaries or their prospective Confederation shall be 
determined on ethnological lines, and upon this basis they lay claim to extensive 
territories. These would include, in addition to Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, 
Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, portions of Carinthia and Styria, the whole of 
Gorizia, Carniola, Istria, and the coast, together with islands down to the Albanian 
frontier. The northern frontier of their State would run approximately from Graz in a 
south-easterly direction along the Drave, then north of the provinces of Baranja, Backa, 
and the Banat, along the Moris River to Arad, thence south past Temesvar to the point 
where the Roumanian western frontier joins the Danube. 
Although these claims may appear extravagant at first sight, the Jugo-Slavs maintain 
that in all these localities the population is predominantly Slav (vide Appendix III). [....] 
APPENDIX III 
In Austria-Hungary the Jugo-Slavs are subordinated to two dominant State 
organizations, viz. the German and the Magyar. Their territory is broken up into ten 
provinces; they are politically oppressed, socially persecuted, and in every way 
hampered and menaced in their intellectual, economic, and national development. 
[....] 
1 This document is partially reproduced in D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, New 
York, 1972,1-II, pp. 11-23. For an early assessment of the British war aims see “The Peace Settlement in 
Europe, Memorandum by the Rt. Hon. A.J. Balfour”, 4 October 1916, in Blanche C. Dugdale, Arthur 
James Balfour, 1906-1930, London, 1936, pp. 435-442, where Balfour argues for the maintenance, if 
only in a truncated form, of Austria-Hungary: “I should myself desire to see the Dual Monarchy 
maintained, shorn indeed of a large portion of its Slav, Italian, and Roumanian territories, but still 
essentially consisting of Austria and Hungary.” 
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Under the Magyar domination there are 3,100,000 Jugo-Slavs, viz. 2,300,000 in 
Croatia-Slavonia and 900,000 in Southern and South-Western Hungary (in the 
Medjumurje, along the Styrian frontier, in the Baranja, Backa, and Banat). 
A joint Austria-Hungarian Administration controls the 1,900,000 Jugo-Slavs living 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The future of Austria-Hungary will, of course, depend very largely on the military 
situation existing at the end of this war. If the situation should be one which enables the 
Allies to dispose of its future, there seems very little doubt that, in accordance with the 
principle of giving free play to nationalities, the Dual Monarchy, which in its present 
composition is a direct negation of that principle, should be broken up, as there is no 
doubt that all the non-German parts of Austria-Hungary will secede. [....] Assuming the 
Allies, for purely political reasons, contemplated the keeping alive of an independent 
Dual Monarchy, they would have to consider very seriously whether it would be 
possible to secure the real independence of Vienna from Berlin. In the light of past 
events we do not hesitate to come to the conclusion that whether the Central Powers are 
victorious or not, Austria-Hungary will remain, to all intents and purposes, subservient 
to its ally. 
[••••] 
To sum up, we should say: let the Slav provinces of Austria constitute themselves 
into a Southern Slav State; let the German provinces of Austria be incorporated in the 
German Empire; let Bohemia be linked up to Poland; and let Hungary be formed of the 
purely Magyar portions of the country into an independent State with the fully secured 
commercial outlets to the Adriatic at Fiume, and by means of the Danube to the Black 
Sea. This solution promises permanency, as it will be based on the national and 
economic elements of the countries affected by this settlement. 
Were it proposed still to maintain an Austrian Empire, in the hope that it might 
eventually free itself from German influence, the arrangement which we have indicated 
would be open to the objection that Austria is entirely cut off from the sea, and some 
provision would have to be made to afford her a commercial outlet of her own. But in 
view of the conclusions which we have ventured to set forth above this is now of no 
consequence, and the question of securing from Italy concessions on behalf of Austria 
at Trieste does not arise. 
With these considerations before us the boundary we suggest for the Jugo-Slav State 
would be approximately a line coterminous with the Italian frontier as laid down in the 
Agreement of the 26th April, 1915, [....] 
This boundary, while conceding all the Jugo-Slav demands in Austria proper, 
excludes the Hungarian provinces of Baranya, Backa, and the Banat, to which they also 
desire to lay claim. If, however, Hungary is to be an independent State with any chance 
of vitality it would be inexpedient to deprive it of territory beyond that which is 
necessary in order to conform to the priciple of nationality. This boundary has the 
further recommendation of being in accordance with the Serbian strategical 
requirements for possession of the country on the north bank of the Danube opposite 
Belgrade, and of not conflicting with the Roumanian claims. 
The above settlement may at first sight appear somewhat academic, being as it is 
mainly in accordance with national aspirations, but we quite appreciate that it may have 
to be modified in deference to the views of Russia, geographical configuration, military 
considerations, &c. Our main object at present was to devise a scheme that promised 
permanency from the national point of view. 
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[-.] 
In putting forward the above considerations we have endeavoured to approach the 
settlement, after the war, mainly from a political point of view. We have attempted to 
draw up a scheme which is not confined to the promotion alone of British interests as 
regards either territorial acquisitions or the establishment of British spheres of 
influence. We have tried to work out a scheme that promises permanency; we have 
aimed at a reconstruction of the map of Europe intended to secure a lasting peace. We 
have been guided by the consideration that peace remains the greatest British interest. 
[....] 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This is an interesting report requiring a good deal of digestion. 
[••..] 
I would suggest that copies be distributed to the War Committee. It seems premature 
at present to express any decided opinion. 
[Lord] H[ardinge]. 
I have not yet had time to read the whole of the report. It seems to me to be very ably 
done. It must be kept very confidential & should be circulated in first instance to War 
Committee with a notice saying it is most important that no copy should be allowed to 
go astray & that the (nature) existence of the report should be kept very secret. 
[Sir R.] G[raham]. 
No. 3 
Letter from Lord Bertie (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (London. Extracts) 
[Ll.G. E/3/14/6] 
Paris, 24 August 1916 
My dear Hardinge, 
At an audience which I had of the King on August 17th, His Majesty gave me an 
account of certain statements made by the President of the Republic when the King 
received him at the British front in France. They were to the effect that [....] he believes 
Hungary to be anxious to come to terms with the Allies independently of America and 
Germany; that advantage ought to be taken of this desire on the part of Hungary; [....]. I 
told the King that I thought that [....] as a great part of the dominions of Hungary have 
been parcelled out on paper to Italy, Russia, Serbia, Roumania might be expected to 
claim a share in the Hungarian spoils; it would be impossible to devise any scheme 
which Hungary could accept unless completely crushed;[....]. 
On my return to Paris I paid a visit to Briand on August 21st in order to sound him 
on the subject of the statements made to the King by Poincare [....]. 
[....] as to coming to separate terms with Hungary, Poincare does not seem to realise 
the difficulty of doing so without dissatisfying Italy, Serbia, Roumania, Russia [....]. 
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Poincare talks of detaching Hungary from Germany and Austria by a separate peace, 
but is it conceivable that Hungary would have peace at the price of losing a great part of 
her dominions to Serbia and to Roumania if she joins the Entente Allies and to Italy, 
and are the Powers who have been promised the spoils of Hungary and particularly 
Italy likely to forego them? 
Bertie 
No. 4 
Memorandum by L.B. Namier for the Intelligence Bureau of the Department 
of Information 
[PRO FO 371/2862 No. W3/97435] 
Department of Information, 11 May 1917 
MEMORANDUM ON AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S INNER AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Austria-Hungary is bound to remain in international politics dependent on Germany 
because Germany is the only Power which defends the basis on which the Habsburg 
Monarchy rests — German preponderance in Austria and Magyar domination in 
Hungary; and this is the only basis on which the Habsburg Monarchy can exist. If as a 
consequence of the war Austria were to lose Galicia, the Bukovina and some strips of 
Italian land, any such losses would merely serve to transform the German 
preponderance in Austria into absolute dominion, because it would give its Germans a 
clear numerical majority over the non-German nationalities within the Western half of 
the Monarchy. The very condition would result which the Austrian Pan-Germans 
wished to create by means of a constitutional exclusion of Galicia. But if the Polish, 
Little Russian and Italian provinces are left to the Habsburg Monarchy and continue as 
parts of it alongside of a new Poland, a free Russia and Italy, this would add three more 
irredentist claims and movements to those of the Rumans and Jugo-Slavs and will 
render the Habsburgs still more dependent on the protection of Germany. Germany has 
it both ways: a decrease in the proportion of irredentists in Austria means so much 
more influence to the Germans within it; but the more there is of irredentist feeling and 
claims, the more the Habsburgs depend on the support of Germany in international 
politics. 
These are the fundamental facts of Austria-Hungary’s existence: 
(1) That the Austrian-Germans are Germans in feeling, that they will never admit an 
anti-German tendency in Austria’s foreign policy [cf. their attitude in 1870],1 that they 
are determined to render closer in every way the connection between the Habsburg 
Monarchy and Germany and that they are prepared to forgo direct inclusion in the 
German Empire only at the price of being conceded a dominant position in Austria. “If 
Austria is reconstructed on a federal basis,” wrote in 1866 Count J. Andrassy (the 
Elder) in a secret memorandum for the Emperor, “the cry of pain of the German 
provinces would soon be heard in Berlin and Munich.” 
* Brackets in the original. 
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(2) That the Magyars will never admit the territory of the Hungarian State being 
merged with Austria in one single State (Grossosterreich), that absolutely every single 
one of them denies the very existence of such a State (die Gesammtmonarchie) and that 
without such a change neither the Czechoslovaks, nor the Jugo-Slavs, nor the Little 
Russians nor the Rumans would obtain national unity even within the limits of Austria- 
Hungary. But the very fact that their lands, though geographically continuous, remain 
divided within the Habsburg Monarchy between two States is the most eloquent proof 
of their being subject to two dominions (German and Magyar) and not being equals of 
these races. 
(3) That the Czecho-Slovaks will never abandon the idea of a Bohemian State 
endowed with the same rights of independence as Hungary obtained in 1867 — their 
“bohmische Staatsidee” and their “bohmisches Staatsrecht”; that this claim runs counter 
to the very constitution of the Dual Monarchy and will never be admitted either by the 
Germans or the Magyars. The Czecho-Slovaks are as unlikely to give up their claims as 
the Irish, and the Germans and Magyars are as unlikely to grant them as would the 
Orangemen if the decision rested exclusively with them. 
(4) That the Rumans, Jugo-Slavs and whatever other nationalities are left within the 
Habsburg Monarchy whilst national States of their own exist just across the border, 
cannot be granted full liberty and equal rights in Austria. Liberty implies the choice of 
allegiance. Once this choice is denied, equal rights, even in other matters, cannot be 
conceded because this implies a share in the direction of the State and its policy both in 
internal and in international matters. But can such a share be conceded to people whose 
heartfelt allegiance is not with Austria-Hungary? 
(5) The scheme of national autonomy which would assign national matters as far as 
possible to non-territorial bodies analogous to religious communities would no longer 
satisfy any of the subject nationalities even within Austria, and of course would not 
touch the problems involved in the separate existence of Hungary. The Austrian 
Socialist Party which had adopted that scheme in the so called Brunner Programm 
(1899) has broken up since into national groups, some of which fight each other, and 
the programme finds now its only supporters in the German group. But the bulk of the 
German Socialists in Austria now forms only the least aggressive portion of the 
German Nationalists. The war has proved that self-determination in foreign politics is 
essential to every nation, great and small; otherwise it may, like the Czechs in the 
present war, be forced to fight for a cause to which it is directly hostile. Where 
problems of that kind are liable to arise even equality which implies the rule of the 
majority fails to supply an acceptable basis for a united and centralised State. 
(6) As long as Austria-Hungary continues to exist there must be German 
preponderance in Austria and Magyar domination in Hungary; there must be intense 
dissatisfaction and disloyalty among the Czecho-Slovaks and all the other subject races; 
there will be claims raised by the neighbouring states which are allied by language or 
race to the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary. And as long as this is the case the 
Habsburgs will remain in constant danger from possible hostile coalitions and will have 
to look somewhere for support. 
(7) This support they cannot find with Russia even if her national claim to Eastem- 
Galicia is satisfied. The Magyars cannot give up the Little Russian districts of Hungary; 
by doing so they would hand over to Russia the main part of the Carpathian wall from 
Doma Vatra to the Dukla. A Little Russian irredenta must remain. Further, the Pan- 
Slav feeling in Russia, even if dimmed for a moment by the internal issues of the 
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revolution and by blind hatred against all reminiscences of the ancien regime, is certain 
to revive with even greater force in a free Russia. “II grido di dolore” of the Czechs and 
Jugo-Slavs will always find an echo in it. 
(8) The support of Italy (should her own irredentist claims be satisfied) on an anti- 
Jugo-Slav basis, and in spite of conflicting interests in the Balkans, in the Adriatic and 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, would not be sufficient if Austria-Hungary were not 
certain of Russia. 
(9) The claims of Serbia and Rumania can be settled only by the virtual disruption 
of Austria-Hungary or the inclusion of these two States within it. But such an 
inclusion, if it could be imagined at all, would never be admitted by the Magyars, 
because even then the settlement of the Rumanian and Jugo-Slav question would imply 
the dissolution of the Magyar State in a Habsburg “Gesammtmonarchie” (cf. e.g. Count 
J. Andrassy’s article against further acquisitions of Serb territory in the “Neue Freie 
Presse” of April 23, 1916, “Guter und Schlechter Friede”). 
(10) The only Power on whose support Austria-Hungary can always rely is 
Germany. Austria-Hungary, just because she is entirely dependent on Germany is her 
natural ally. She puts at Germany’s disposal the forces of more than 30,000,000 Slavs 
and Latins who might otherwise enter into hostile combinations against Germany. She 
opens and holds for Germany the road to the Balkans and the over-land route to Asia. 
She is her economic dependency. She is the inheritance and the backbone of German 
Imperialism in Europe. She is dear to the Germans even for sentimental reasons — to 
treat at the present day the bickerings that occur between the Austrian Germans and the 
Prussians as a factor in international politics is to repeat Napoleon Ill’s mistake of 1870 
and emulate the miscalculations committed by the Germans with regard to Ulster in 
1914. 
(11) The Magyar “scheme” in international politics has remained the same ever 
since 1848. 
One can put the writings and speeches of Julius Andrassy (the Elder) and of Koloman 
Tisza,2 of forty or fifty years ago, beside those of their sons and there is hardly a 
difference between them. Their fundamental axiom is the existence of a Magyar State in 
Hungary, independent in the fulness of its sovereign rights. Both for historical and 
strategic reasons not an inch of its territory can be ceded to any one. Nothing, however, 
must be added or the national balance within Hungary might be upset. Austria should 
be a centralised State ruled by its Germans; by restraining her Czechs, Little Russians 
and Jugo-Slavs she is to enable the Magyars to crush the fellow countrymen of these 
nations within Hungary. This task is to keep the Germans in Austria busy and prevent 
them from attempting any schemes of “Grossosterreich” as has been tried by Bach and 
Prince Schwarzenberg. The conflict with the non-German nationalities in Austria is also 
to prevent them from taking an indiscreet interest in the Hungarian Germans. For these 
very reasons Austria is never to form part of a Great Germany (Grossdeutchland), 
because then Hungary, a State of 21,000,000 inhabitants containing 2,000,000 
Germans would border on a German Empire of 90 to 95 millions and would be at its 
mercy. Poland, whose interests nowhere clash with those of the Magyars, is to be free 
and receive a definitely anti-Russian interest by free play being given to Polish 
Imperialism in Lithuanian, White Russian and little Russian lands. Russia is the arch¬ 
enemy because she can never be expected to forget or abandon the Slavs who surround 
from the north-east, the north-west, west and south the 10,000,000 Magyars who 
2 K&lman Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, 1875-90. 
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inhabit an open, indefensible plain. Germany is the ally which Providence itself has 
given to Austria-Hungary, because Germany alone has an interest in restraining the 
Slavs within Austria-Hungary and in defending by arms the existence of the Austro- 
Hungarian State. 
(12) There are people who oppose the disruption of Austria-Hungary because the 
10,000,000 Austrian-Germans set free by its disruption would have to go to Germany; 
there are others who oppose the disruption of Austria-Hungary because it would 
strengthen the Slavs and might increase Russia’s influence in East-Central Europe. But 
these two arguments neutralise each other; if the disruption of Austria-Hungary 
strengthens both the Slavs and the Germans the balance of power remains 
approximately the same, but the clash of interests between Germany and Russia 
becomes sharper and more direct. Hitherto the Germans and Magyars in Austria- 
Hungary have done Germany’s dirty work. Germany could disclaim before Russia all 
responsibility for the position of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary. If there is no Austria- 
Hungary all threats and action will come direct from their source. 
(13) As a matter of fact a system of small states in East Central Europe, of States 
sufficient in their size and also in their number to keep up their separate independent 
existence but each of them too weak to form any imperialist schemes, lies even from the 
point of view of cynical Realpolitik in the interests of Great Britain. Both the German 
and the Russian Empires will be deprived of access to the Eastern Mediterranean. 
(14) For military or naval reasons the Entente may be compelled to accept the 
continued existence of Austria-Hungary, but it is clear that this means a definite victory 
for Germany. The strength of the German nation, as far as it is based on its own 
numbers, cannot be destroyed, but Germany can be deprived of its auxiliary States. It 
cannot be deprived of the support of these auxiliary States, at least not of the support of 
Austria-Hungary, by diplomatic negotiations — such negotiations Germany can watch 
with the greatest complacency, or even encourage in secret. The Germans know that if 
only the links of the chain are left in existence the chain will be reconstructed without 
fail. Moreover Great Britain cannot detach Austria-Hungary from Germany without at 
the same time detaching her own Eastern Allies from her own cause. Russian 
democracy will fight if it is clear that we are fighting for the right of every nation to 
shape by its own will its future destiny and that the same right which they themselves 
have conceded to the Poles is now demanded from the Central Powers for every 
nationality within Austria-Hungary. But the Russians will not continue to fight 
Germany either for the sake of the Poles (who are organising a State of their own and 
an army under the auspices of the Central Powers) and against their will (because what 
the vast majority of the Poles want is immediate peace); nor will they fight Germany for 
the sake of defeating the German nation — this in itself will not be an aim to them. 
They know that the enemy sword directed against a nation can only consolidate it 
internally, and that a self-governing, united nation can be freed only from within. If the 
Entente declares the right of self-determination for every single nationality to be its war 
aim and this demand of ours is refused by the Central Powers, then, and then alone, can 
we hope to see the sincere democratic and revolutionary elements in Germany rise on 
our side and against their own government. We should then have a principle in 
common. 
Each of the above points is a summary for which evidence is supplied partly by 
history but foremost by the events and developments which have taken place during the 
present war. 
L. B. N[amier]. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
I am not sure whether the Intel. Bureau is for the collection of news only or whether 
its duties are also advisory. 
In this and (99689) [not printed] there are passages which are of the latter character. If 
such items are sent direct to the Private Sect, of the Prime Minister, it opens up a 
possibility of the Secretary], of S[tate], for F[oreign]. A[ffairs]. not always being the 
channel of communication and of advice to the Prime Minr. on foreign affairs. 
As the Intelligence Bureau has only lately been started, I venture to point out the 
matter now. 
Lancelot]. Ofliphant] 
19/5/19 
I do not myself see any objection to papers on the lines of this one nor do I think the 
Prime Minister is likely to be unduly influenced by them. But if we note false 
deductions we should call attention to them. 
R[andal]l [?] 
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No. 5 
Letter from J. W. Headlam-Morley to Sir E. Drummond 
[HDLM ACC 727/35] 
Foreign Office, 15 October 1918 
Dear Drummond, 
In Tyrrell’s absence I am sending you an advance copy of a Report on the events 
which are now taking place in Austria-Hungary.1 You will doubtless have noticed the 
Proclamation by the Jugo-Slav Club in Vienna published in the “Times” beginning 
“The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is not competent to take any peace steps on behalf 
of any nationality save the Germans and Magyars”. This agrees presumably with our 
policy to which we are committed by our agreements with the Czecho-Slovaks, etc. The 
corollary obviously is rightly drawn that no peace negotiations could be begun with the 
Austro-Hungarian Government which could in any way be interpreted as implying the 
claim of that Government to be the channel through or with which negotiations take 
place as to these nationalities. 
I assume that we may take it that the President,2 whose line of action is apparently 
parallel with ours, will have his mind fully open to the danger of taking any step by 
which he might eventually find himself committed to peace negotiations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Government (except so far as it represents the Magyars and the 
German Austrians). In view of the fact that he has in his Note to the German 
Government stated that he proposes to make a separate reply to the Government of 
Austria-Hungary, might it not be desirable that a message should be sent conveying to 
him the point of view that in the opinion of the British Government the position of 
Austria-Hungary is completely different from that of Germany, and that the British 
Government would not be prepared to negotiate with the Government of Austria- 
Hungary regarding peace terms as they apply to the Slavonic peoples and districts of 
the Empire. The object of such a communication would be to draw the attention of the 
President to the very difficult situation which might arise unless his answer was so 
worded as positively to exclude its being used by the Austro-Hungarian Government as 
admitting their claim to participate in peace negotiations as representatives of these 
peoples, with whom we shall have to deal direct.3 
Yours very truly, 
[J.W. Headlam-Morley] 
1 The report referred to is not enclosed in the file. 
2 The President of the United States. 
3 The communication suggested here has not been traced by the editor. 
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No. 6 
Letter and Memorandum by L.S. Amery to A.J. Balfour 
[PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223/W3] 
22 October 1918 
Dear Mr. Balfour, 
President Wilson’s setting of the Czecho-Slovak claim in the forefront of his reply to 
Austria1 has suggested the enclosed notes, which bring out some of the difficulties of 
the question. His action may have been quite right at the moment, but I can’t help feeling 
that when it comes to the Peace Conference we shall have to face the Middle-European 
situation in a constructive, and not merely in an anti-German spirit. Otherwise we shall 
simply turn Central Europe into a new Balkans. 
Yours sincerely, 
L.S. Amery 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 6 
Memorandum by L.S. Amery 
The Austro-Hungarian Problem 
20 October 1918 
President Wilson’s declaration that the Czecho-Slovak National Council should be the 
judge of what will satisfy its aspirations — that is in effect what his reply to Austria 
amounts to — has probably put an end to all question of an armistice with either 
Austria or Germany. The similar demand on behalf of the Yugoslavs might conceivably 
have been yielded by both Austria and Hungary, inasmuch it involves no subjection of 
German or Magyar population to a foreign rule, and no serious impairment of the 
territorial integrity of Hungary proper. But the satisfaction of the Czecho-Slovak 
demand is something which neither Germany nor the Magyars are likely to agree to 
without a further struggle. 
It is necessary to realise precisely what the Czechoslovak demand comprises. It 
consists firstly of the demand that the Czechs shall be set up as an independent 
sovereign state in the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. This involves the subjection to 
Czech rule of over three million Germans living mostly in a compact belt of territory on 
the borders of Bavaria, Saxony and Prussian Silesia. It is a claim based, not on 
ethnographical “self-determination” but on historic, economic and strategical — in other 
words what are now called “Imperialistic” — grounds. The Czechs are no more 
prepared to accept a Bohemia without the German districts, than the Irish nationalists 
are prepared to accept Home Rule without Ulster. The second part of the Czech claim, 
namely that the northern regions of Hungary, where the Slovak speaking peasants are 
in a majority over the Magyar upper classes, should be cut off from Hungary and 
attached to Bohemia, is based on precisely that ethnographic principle which the Czechs 
reject in Bohemia. 
In connection with President Wilson’s note to Austria, and the Czechoslovak claims, see Wilson’s letter 
toT.G. Masaryk, dated 21 October 1918, in LINK, vol. 51, p. 395. 
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President Wilson’s support of the Czecho-Slovak claim, involving as it does the 
subjection of a large German population to what they would regard as an aggressive 
and intolerant alien Government, bent on de-nationalising them, is calculated to unite all 
Germans, whether in Austria or Germany, in uncompromising resistance. It is equally 
calculated to put an end to any ideas that may have been entertained by a section of the 
Magyars that Hungary might secure peace by detaching herself from Austria, and will 
convince them that their only chance of saving their independence now, or regaining it 
hereafter, lies in the German alliance. 
But, whether President Wilson’s reply to Austria causes the breaking off of 
negotiations or not, it will be necessary to face the Austro-Hungarian problem 
eventually, and to decide the principle on which we are going to settle it. To settle it on 
the principle of simply using our victory to satisfy the ambitions of our friends will 
inevitably create a state of unrest and instability which will sooner or later lead up to 
another war. There can be no talk even of a League of Nations if the Czecho-Slovak 
claim is granted as it stands. 
There are two principles on which we might attempt to create a lasting settlement. One 
is the ethnographic principle. On this basis German speaking Bohemia would either be 
allowed to join Germany, or form part of German Austria, as suggested in the Emperor 
Charles’s recent proclamation. Hungary would then be carved up, the north-western 
part going to the Czecho-Slovak state, the north-eastern to the Ukraine, the eastern to 
Rumania, the south to Serbia, the west to German Austria, and an irregular block in the 
centre being left to the Magyars. But the new Czecho-Slovak and Magyar states would 
obviously be incapable of a really independent existence, either from the economic or 
the defence point of view. They would have to enter into some sort of close federal 
union with their neighbours. In the case of Hungary the union might be with 
Yugoslavia and Rumania, or with Yugoslavia, German Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. 
In the case of Czecho-Slovakia its geographical position would make it practically 
impossible for it to be in any federal system which did not include either Germany or 
German Austria. In other words the ethnographic solution leads us back to the 
necessity either of creating a new Austro-Hungary, though not necessarily a Hapsburg 
Austro-Hungary or one based on German-Magyar supremacy, or else of creating a new 
Danubian confederation, including Magyars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and possibly 
Bulgars, leaving Czecho-Slovaks and German Austrians to attach themselves to 
Germany. 
The other, and probable [sic] more practical basis is to take history and economics as 
well as ethnography into account and create states capable of a greater degree of real 
independence, making special provision for the “cultural” rights of minorities. On that 
basis one might break up the present Austria Hungary into four states (excluding 
Galicia and Bukovina which would be divided between Poland, the Ukraine and 
Rumania): viz. Bohemia, including German Bohemia and Moravia, but excluding the 
Slovak districts of Hungary; German Austria comprising all the German speaking 
districts not in Bohemia or Hungary; Hungary as at present but minus Slavonia and 
Croatia; the latter together with the Slovene districts of Austria, Dalmatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Serbia would form the new Yugoslavia. Even these states, however, 
would still have to enter into federal relations with their neighbours, though possibly 
not quite so close as under the other scheme. And the necessity for this would be 
strengthened by sentimental considerations. A Bohemia which included German 
Bohemia could only command the patriotic interest of the German element if it was 
politically closely linked up with German Austria and Germany --just as South Africa 
can only enlist the unanimous patriotism of its population of both white races if it 
remains in the British Commonwealth. Hungary similarly could only hope to reconcile 
its Rumanian minority if it entered into some intimate and permanent pact with 
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Rumania. To satisfy Czecho-Slovak sentiment it ought also to be closely associated 
with Bohemia and so with German Austria and Germany. 
On this basis then a position of permanent stability and prosperity could best be 
secured by a new Danubian Confederation comprising German Austria, Bohemia, 
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and probably also Bulgaria. Such a confederacy would 
no longer be under German Magyar domination. But the presence in it of a large 
German element would make its close association or even economic and defensive 
alliance with Germany almost inevitable in the long run. An alternative but probably 
less satisfactory solution — especially for the Czecho-Slovaks — would be to let 
German Austria and Bohemia join the German federation — to which they both once 
belonged — and let the others set up as a separate Danubian Confederation. 
The essential thing to realise is that whatever basis is taken for the creation of new 
units in the area now covered by Austria-Hungary, they cannot really be independent 
units. To attempt to create artificial sovereignties, especially on the basis of “spoils to 
the victor”, is only to create a new and more troubled Balkan Peninsula. The wisest 
course is to aim at securing the fairest and most workable rearrangement on national 
lines, but at the same time actively to encourage the idea of a new union, preferably one 
which would include the whole of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire (excepting 
Galicia and Bukovina), and Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria as well. In such a union the 
different nationalities would find the solution of their nationalist rivalries and an ample 
field for prosperous development. That such a union would largely work in co¬ 
operation with Germany is also a fact which we should accept with a good grace. The 
co-operation will be of a very different character from the league between Hapsburg 
and Hohenzollern in the past. 
The fact is that “Middle Europe” is an inevitable and necessary outcome of this war 
whatever the actual issue of the struggle or the terms of peace imposed by the victors. 
In the long run the economic and defensive factors which make the whole of this region 
a natural unit in the present conditions of the world, are bound to prevail over the 
exaggerated nationalism — German, Magyar, Serb, Bulgar, Czech — which has been 
at the root of this war. There is no possible solution which can wholly satisfy that 
nationalism, any more than there is any possible solution which can wholly satisfy Irish 
nationalism. But nationalism, at any rate in the exaggerated form in which it is 
represented by the class of parliamentarian whose political life consists in working it 
up, is not a permanent factor. The German variety of it is already in process of being 
cured by defeat. The wave of Bolshevism which threatens to submerge Ukrainian and 
Polish nationalism as soon as the support of German bayonets is withdrawn, might 
conceivably obliterate all the minor nationalisms of Austria-Hungary, even before this 
war is over, in the more elementary, and possibly more permanent, struggle between 
Bolshevik and Anti-Bolshevik. In any case the various nationalities of Central Europe 
are also interlocked, and their racial frontiers are so unsuitable as the frontiers of really 
independent states, that the only satisfactory and permanent working policy for them 
lies in their incorporation in a non-national superstate. We can delay but we cannot 
prevent the eventual coming of that superstate. 
To commit ourselves unreservedly to nationalism at the Peace Conference, and to 
ignore the inevitable coming of the larger non-national super-state, would be to commit 
precisely the errors which our grandfathers committed at the Congress of Vienna, when 
they settled Europe on the basis of legitimism, on which the war had been fought and 
argued, and not on the basis of the new nationalist forces which the war had called into 
being. A League of Nations based on the principle of nationalism might soon find itself 
as much of an anomaly and an obstacle to progress as the Holy Alliance in its day. In 
any case a lasting League of Nations cannot be built up on a chaos of independent 
sovereignties of every sort and size. The reduction of the present total of states to a 
limited number of groups, federations or “super-states” is an essential stepping-stone 
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towards any higher integration. For the purposes of the war we have rightly backed up 
Czecho-Slovaks, Yugoslavs and every anti-German and anti-Austrian movement we 
could find. But for the purposes of a lasting settlement we must regulate the satisfaction 
of these national aspirations by the need of creating, or recreating, a larger super- 
nati< entral and South-Eastern Europe. 
L. S. A.[mery] 
Minutes attached to the document: 
I am in considerable sympathy with Capt. Amery’s views. Unless we can induce the 
small states we are setting up to federate with one another the last state of Europe may 
well be worse than the first. 
This paper should be considered in the War Dept, with skilled technical assistance of 
the P.I.D. 
R[obert].C[ecil]. 
[To] Sir R. Graham. 
Please see Lord R. Cecil’s minute on 177223 herewith. 
Mr. Namier & I have concerted the annexed minute. 
H.G.N[icolson]. 
Captain Amery appears to have been somewhat prematurely disturbed by the political 
conditions which will evolve from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He 
sees a multitude of States arise and fears that their future political and economic rivalries 
may lead to a Balkanisation of Central Europe. He then urges that the only remedy for 
this danger exists in some form of federal union or unions. 
One wonders whether he clearly visualises the fact that the disruption of Austria- 
Hungary will not add to the number of States in Europe, but merely render their 
frontiers more reasonable, and that the entire problem which he has raised reduces itself 
to that of the Czecho-Slovaks and Magyars. Jugo-Slavia will take the place of Serbia 
whilst Transylvania will go to form a Greater Roumania, and neither of them will 
constitute a new problem for the future. The emergence of Poland and the Ukraine is 
due, not to the disruption of Austria-Hungary, but to the collapse of Russia, and the 
dangers which are to be apprehended as between these two States do not arise out of 
East Galicia alone, nor can we expect them to be solved by any kind of confederation 
between these two States. 
As regards German Austria, it must be remembered that the great mass of German 
Austrian opinion has now come to regard the disruption of the Empire as an unpleasant 
amputation perhaps, but at least as an accomplished fact, and their eyes are turned with 
a feeling of something akin to relief away from the hereditary incubus of a Slav or 
Magyar connection to their congenital home in Germany. It is unthinkable that the 
German Austrians could contemplate reuniting on equal terms in however loose a form 
with their former Slav compatriots. They might perhaps agree to a reunion if a 
predominant position were conceded to them in the new federation, which would then 
be but the old Austria under a new name. To its recreation the other nationalities have 
no reason whatsoever to agree, nor would it be to our interest for, so far from restoring 
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the balance against Germany, an Austrian federation under German leadership would 
merely increase the difficulties caused by the collapse of Russia. 
There remains, therefore, only Hungary and Bohemia, and it is indubitable that the 
problems which will arise between these two will be acute and pregnant with future 
friction. It should be observed, however, that we are at present entirely in the dark as to 
what is happening either in Hungary or Bohemia, and that it is impossible at the present 
stage to forecast what will emerge from the present acute confusion in both countries. It 
would surely be wiser for us to form no settled policy, or even opinion, as regards the 
future status of these countries and their relations towards each other and their 
neighbours until they themselves have evolved some national principle and are in a 
position to provide us with a definite scheme representing the views of some more or 
less permanent organism. It is surely unnecessary and imprudent to embark on 
conjectures as regards the future Central European Federation when the political leaders 
in the States of Central Europe are not as yet certain in regard to their own wishes. 
As regards the Czecho-Slovaks, however, there are certain principles which have a 
less remote application. At present they confuse the claims of legitimacy, of paramount 
interests and of self-determination, and combine a plea for their historic and strategic 
frontiers in the west and north with a plea for their ethnographic frontiers in the south 
and east. The incorporation of Germans in the Czecho-Slovak State will be a weakness 
to it, and the Czechs in their own well understood interest should avoid as far as 
possible the inclusion of German districts in their State. If in some particular districts, 
as seems to be really the case, the paramount strategic and economic interests of the 
Czechs, though contrary to the national principle, are such as cannot be disregarded, we 
must make clear to them that the doctrine of self-determination, not being merely an 
excuse for anti-German map-making, overwhelming reasons will have to be adduced 
for any infringement of that principle whomever this may concern. 
In a word, it would be unwise to allow ourselves to be frightened by the 
kaleidoscopic changes in the map of Europe into attempts to recreate federations which 
might prove unnatural and contrary to the wishes and real interests of those concerned. 
Self-determination will inevitably lead to much confusion and rivalry, but the League of 
Nations should do much to localise the danger and eventually to stabilise the situation. 
L.B. N[amier]. 
7/11/18 
I agree. 
R[andal]l [?] 
This seems very sound and a copy of it should be sent to 
Capt. Amery. 
B? 
Remarks on Captain L.S. Amery’s Paper on the Austro-Hungarian Problem, 
October 22nd, 1918 
Captain Amery’s remark that in Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs base their claims on 
an historic basis, whilst in Slovachia [sic] they change to that of ethnography is 
incontestibly correct. With this kind of shifting of ground in accordance with the one 
that suits them better we meet in every single one of these small nationalities. It is in the 
same way that the Poles claim Posnania on grounds of ethnography and everything 
they can get hold of in the east on grounds of history. I certainly agree that such a 
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procedure is by no means legitimate, but it must be admitted that in the case of the 
Czechs there is some sense in it and more justification for it than in most other cases. 
Certain parts of German Bohemia are absolutely essential to the Czecho-Slovak State, 
and if after this war international relations continue on a basis which makes strategic or 
economic securities necessary, the Czechs cannot possibly admit an ethnographic 
partition in Bohemia. On the other hand, their clams to Slovachia are not merely claims 
to a wider frontier — they involve the very existence of an entire nation, the Slovaks. 
This, I think, is a question which deserves some attention: whether the disregarding of a 
certain national claim affects merely a branch of the nation or the nation as a whole. 
Should even a few million Germans be included in the Czecho-Slovak State, there will 
still exist in the world a powerful political German nation which in every respect 
renders the life of those not included in that German State more tolerable. Should, 
however, the ethnographic Slovak claim in north-western Hungary be disregarded, the 
Slovak nation would not exist anywhere in the world at all. 
Still, should it prove possible to cut off certain parts of German Bohemia from the 
Czech State and unite it to Germany, I think this should be done even though the 
Czechs might violently protest against such an “amputation”. 
As to Captain Amery’s far-reaching and no doubt interesting speculations about the 
future of the different nationalities, I do not believe it would be of much profit to enter 
into them in the abstract. Jugo-Slavia and a Great Roumania can exist on their own even 
better than the small Serbia and the small Roumania have hitherto existed. The Austrian 
Germans will determine their own fate, and it is hardly profitable for us to discuss what 
they should do whilst they themselves probably do not yet know what they intend to 
do. It is just for this reason that I feel it to be so futile to develop at the present stage 
plans for the future Danubian Federation. So that in the last resort the questions raised 
by Captain Amery may be reduced to two: (1) to the question of the Czecho-Slovaks 
(2) the question of the Magyars — what frontiers are to be given to these two nations, 
ethnographic or historic? And what is to happen to their States once they are constituted 
within such frontiers? 
The problem of the bigger super-national units which Captain Amery raises in his 
paper hangs closely on the question of the League of Nations, and I do not presume to 
pronounce any judgment upon it. 
But these are two questions of interest which emerge from the paper and which we 
had better consider in a fundamental manner: (1) Are we in the peace settlement going 
to practise equal justice and with an even hand apply certain principles for which we 
profess to stand or are we going to take the view that in all doubtful cases our enemies 
— the Germans and Magyars — have to suffer? (2) Have the new States which we 
propose to create to be created on bases strategically and economically such as were 
required previous to this war, or is the League of Nations going to become something 
real which will change the face of European politics just as the introduction of a 
municipal or Government police has made it possible for people to do away with iron 
shutters in their houses? 
[Unsigned] [H. Nicolson?] 
This is a very interesting letter, and requires careful thought: It should perhaps be 
examined as soon as possible by the P.I.D. 
[Unsigned] 
25/10/16 
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No. 7 
Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley to Sir W. Tyrrell 
[HDLM ACC 727/16] 
Foreign Office, 30 October 1918 
I saw Mr. Namier last night. He pressed very strongly that if there are negotiations 
for an armistice with Austria-Hungary, one of the conditions to be imposed should be 
that all regiments should be returned to the territories to which they belong. The 
Austrian regiments are territorial; the result of this would be that the Croatians should 
go back to Croatia, the Czechs to Bohemia, etc. This is very important to get the 
organised strength of the army available for the establishment of the provisional 
governments in the different parts of the Empire, and to prevent a professional army 
movement against a dissolution. I do not know whether you will think it worth while 
passing this on.1 
1 No further trace of this idea has been found by the editor. 
No. 8 
Letter from J.W. Headlam-Morley to H.G. Wells (Extracts) 
[HDLM ACC 727/36] 
Foreign Office, 2 November 1918 
Dear Wells, 
I was reading with much interest the account of your speech the other day, but there is 
one passage in it which perhaps you will allow me to animadvert. You said that the 
Foreign Office did nothing itself and prevented anybody else from doing anything. This 
I think I shall probably be correct in connecting with the short conversation which took 
place at the Committee last Tuesday. 
Now the point I should like to make is this, which I should have thought is now 
pretty well known, that it is unfair to blame the Foreign Office for delays which take 
place because the Foreign Office is not ultimately responsible under the present 
substitute for a constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs. Everything of importance 
has to be referred to the War Cabinet of which the Secretary of State is not even a 
member, and the Foreign Office cannot act until it has received the permission of the 
War Cabinet. 
I know how tempting it is to assume that mistakes and delays which may occur are 
the natural consequence of the indifference and incapacity of old established 
Government Departments; I think it is too often forgotten that the work of a Department 
is necessarily conditioned by the superior control. Myself I have never been able to 
understand how one could expect an able and vigorous conduct of foreign affairs under 
the present system by which the final control is vested in a body of men, none of whom 
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have given any special attention to, or got special experience of international relations, 
and of which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is not even a member. 
Successful conduct of foreign affairs, just as successful conduct of a war, requires that 
the full responsibility should be put in the hands of some man who has a well organised 
staff under him; nothing but disaster can come of a system in which the control and 
responsibility is divided. 
Yours very truly, 
[J.W. Headlam-Morley] 
No. 9 
War Cabinet Minute No. 501 (Extract) 
[PRO CAB 23/8] 
13 November 1918 
MOVEMENTS OF BRITISH TROOPS IN EUROPE 
(a.) The Balkans 
[....] The Chief of the Imperial General Staff1 said that there were one or two 
questions as to which he desired War Cabinet authority, regarding the movements of 
British troops in Europe. In the first place, there was the question of General Milne’s 
command in the Balkans. General Wilson said that the Roumanians were proposing to 
move into Transylvania, and that the French were anxious to obtain a hold on 
Roumania, and wished, in that connection, to employ one of our divisions. He himself 
was opposed to the policy of our becoming involved in these operations, and would 
like to remove the 26th Division away from that theatre. He suggested that we should 
inform the French Government that, in view of the fact that military operations were 
now over, we propose to take General Milne away from General Franchet d’Esperey’s 
command. 
The First Lord of the Admiralty,2 on the other hand, pointed out that, from a political 
point of view, it might be undesirable, by withdrawing British troops, to leave the 
French with a free hand in that part of the world, and, more particularly, to allow 
French influence to predominate on the Danube. Unless the British flag were shown 
there, the people on the spot would infer that we had abandoned our interests there. 
The War Cabinet decided that— 
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff should telegraph to General Milne, informing 
him that the Secretary of State for War was shortly going to Paris, and would discuss 
with M. Clemenceau the question of the employment of British troops in Roumania, 
and that, in the meantime. General Milne should delay sending the 26th Division to that 
destination pending further instructions. 
1 Gen. Sir Henry Wilson. 
2 Sir Eric Campbell Geddes. 
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No. 10 
Letter from J. Isler to A.J. Balfour 
[PRO FO 371/3138 No. 190082/W3] 
Swiss Legation, 
London, 17 November 1918 
Tres urgente. 
Monsieur le Secretaire d’Etat, 
Le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres a Vienne a fait connaitre au Gouvernement 
Federal que c’est avec satisfaction qu’il verrait les missions diplomatiques des 
Puissances Associees, residant a Berne, recevoir l’autorisation d’entrer en rapports 
directs avec la Legation d’Autriche-Hongrie aupres de la Confederation suisse, aux fins 
de traiter toutes questions d’ordre economique et de ravitaillement. 
Considerant qu’il est dans l’interet de l’Europe entiere que ces questions soient 
solutionees aussi t6t que possible, mon Gouvernement me charge et j’ai des lors 
l’honneur de soumettre, par le tres aimable intermedaire de Votre Excellence, la 
proposition dont il s’agit au Gouvernement de sa Majeste Britannique. 
Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Secretaire d’Etat, les assurances de la plus haute 
consideration avec laquelle j’ai l’honneur d’etre 
de Votre Excellence 
le tres humble, 
obeissant serviteur 
J. B? Isler1 
Minutes attached to the document: 
The Contraband Dept, ask for op.[inion] of War Dept, in first instance. 
As regards relief the proposal wd. appear sound, but I would imagine there wd. be 
strong political objections. , agree [£ OUpham] 
(1) The Austrian Legation at Berne does not represent any Govt, at the present time, 
or does it represent all? 
(2) The Austrians wd. endeavour to play off the Allies against each other and 
provoke friction. 
If the proposal is adopted the meetings shd. I submit, be under Swiss chairmanship. 
Q. Enquire views of French, U.S. and Italian Govts, indicating above mentioned 
difficulties, 
and copy [to] D.M.I. 
and circulate to War Cabt. in translation. 
C.H.S[mith]. 
18/11/18 
1 Swiss Minister in London. 
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I agree to the procedure suggested. The proposal seems to me unacceptable. 
E. Crowe 
20/11/18 
The French Govt, are opposed to any direct & official relations with the Austrian 
Legation until peace has been signed. They consider that such questions should be 
treated with the Swiss Govt., who are in charge of Austrian relations, and that Austrian 
technical delegates could be attached to the Swiss Govt, for the purpose. 
M. de Fleurian2 gave me a note today in the above sense. I think we should conform 
to it. 
[Lord] H[ardinge]. 
2 French Charge d’Affaires in London. 
No. 11 
War Cabinet Minute No. 503 (Extract) 
[PRO CAB 23/8] 
18 November 1918 
ARMY OF OCCUPATION: STATUS OF GENERAL MILNE 
[....] The attention of the War Cabinet was called to a telegram which had been received, 
indicating that orders have been given by General Franchet d’Esperey for British troops 
from General Milne’s command to occupy Vienna and Budapest. Apparently General 
Franchet d’Esperey was under orders to proceed to these cities, and the action 
contemplated was being taken without consultation with His Majesty’s Government. 
It was pointed out that such action would be interpreted in this country as an 
interference on behalf of a particular form of government, that there would be 
opposition in Labour circles, and that it would elicit a protest from the public, who were 
anxious to see the soldiers return home at the earliest possible moment. No 
representations had been made that the advance proposed was necessary in order to 
enforce the terms of armistice, and it was most undesirable that we should let ourselves 
be dragged into a selfish exhibition by any of our Allies. 
The Director of Military Operations1 referred to the status of General Milne, and the 
desirability of making his command independent of the French command. 
The Secretary of State for War2 said that he was strongly opposed to involving the 
British troops in the Central European operations unless it was necessary in order to 
preserve order, but there was no necessity whatever for the Allies to be called upon to 
preserve order in Vienna and Budapest. 
1 Major-General P.P. de B. Radcliffe. 
2 Lord Milner. 
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The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs3 said he feared that these projects of the 
French Government were likely to cause trouble. There were already signs of trouble in 
another quarter, between the Italians and the Serbians. In his opinion, the proposed 
advance into Austria-Hungary was a matter for Allied decision, and if a decision were 
given in favour of the advance, then the British Army should be represented, even if 
only by a small contingent. He thought it probable that the French would argue that the 
enterprise was a military operation required in the interests of the effective carrying out 
of the armistice, and that it was entirely under the control of Marshal Foch. 
The War Cabinet decided that— 
The Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, should send a telegram to the French Government (a) stating that General 
Milne could not be allowed to send troops with the proposed expedition to Vienna and 
Budapest (b) that His Majesty’s Government had learned the proposal with surprise, 
and wished to know what objects it was intended to serve; (c) asking for information as 
to the number of troops Marshal Foch was likely to require as the British contribution 
to the Army of Occupation. 
3 A.J. Balfour. 
No. 12 
War Cabinet Minute No. 506 (Extract) 
[PRO CAB 23/8] 
22 November 1918 
PROPOSED DESPATCH OF BRITISH TROOPS TO AUSTRIA 
[....] The War Cabinet had under consideration Lord Derby’s telegram No. 1357, 
reporting that the French Government had been asked by the Emperor of Austria, as 
well as by the Government of Austria-Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, to send troops to 
Vienna and Budapest to ensure order. The French Government were determined to 
comply with this request, and were anxious that British troops should participate 
equally. In any case, French troops, probably to the extent of some two or three 
divisions, would be sent.1 In M. Clemenceau’s opinion there was no question of their 
being engaged in military operations, and he thought that they would meet with a very 
friendly reception. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs2 read a letter supplementary to the above 
telegram, which he had received from Lord Derby. The latter said that M. Clemenceau 
attached great importance to complying with this request, and had impressed upon Lord 
Derby that it was not a military operation, but merely a march of honour, at the 
invitation of the authorities in Austria and Hungary. Mr. Balfour said that he himself 
did not see how the French were going to find all the troops necessary for purposes of 
1 For further developments regarding the sending of French troops to Vienna and Budapest see No. 14. 
2 A.J. Balfour. 
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occupation. There had already been many desertions in the French Army, especially 
among the older classes. There was no diplomatic or political reason for complying, 
except to please M. Clemenceau. He thought it was an intolerable position for British to 
be called upon to act as police in the Austrian capitals. It was not our business to 
interfere in internal matters in the Central Empires. The French Government’s present 
suggestion was a very different matter from the proposal to send British troops with the 
Italians to Fiume and elsewhere in order to prevent disturbances between the latter and 
the Yugo-Slavs. A dangerous feeling already existed, and he strongly favoured sending 
small bodies of British troops — with whom he very much hoped that American troops 
would be associated — to keep the peace. There was a further point: if there was to be a 
march of honour in Vienna, why should there not also be one in Berlin? Otherwise the 
Germans might say that their allies had been defeated, but that they themselves had not. 
The Secretary of State for War3 said that he would regard the further use of British 
troops as simply disastrous. Our military liabilities had already reached appalling 
dimensions, while every day brought storms of applications for further releases. Troops 
were required for Baku, Batum, Archangel, the Balkans, Fiume, Italy, Mesopotamia, 
and so on. To meet the present demands would reduce our army in two months by one- 
half, and he strongly deprecated any further commitments. He quite agreed with Mr. 
Balfour that there was a distinct reason for our associating ourselves with the Italians in 
order to prevent trouble arising between them and the Yugo-Slavs, but the present 
Austrian proposal was a very different matter, and we could have no idea what it might 
involve. We were already arranging to send food to Austria, and he thought that that 
was a much better way of showing her kindness than by so-called “marches of 
honour.” If peace conditions obtained, and the Austrians had really got a settled 
Government, it might be a different matter; but Austria at present was in a state of 
raging chaos, and it was the wrong moment for formal acts of display. The despatch of 
our troops might even lead to a great fiasco. 
Lord Curzon said he understood that the idea was that the French and ourselves 
should show troops in the two capitals in order to give a feeling of security and to 
restore order. He himself saw no great objection to this, subject to three provisos;— 
(a.) That the number of troops sent was limited. 
(b.) That the period for which they were to remain should be short. 
(c.) That the objects for which they were sent were clearly defined. 
It might possibly be desirable, if the French were going, that we should also show 
our flag. 
Mr. Barnes thought that it would be generally represented as an unwarrantable 
interference in the internal affairs of Austria. The political effect in this country of 
sending troops to Russia was bad. 
Lord Reading said that he was afraid that by sending troops we might be led into 
complications, the result of which we could not foresee. 
General Smuts doubted whether this was very probable, if it were true that the 
Austrians and Hungarians were now really friendly to us. 
The War Cabinet decided that— 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should inform the French Government in 
the sense that the British Government are unwilling to co-operate in the despatch of 
troops to Vienna and Budapest. 
3 Lord Milner. 
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No. 13 
War Cabinet Minute (No. not known. Extract) 
[PRO CAB 23/17] 
25 November 1918 
THE OCCUPATION OF VIENNA AND BUDAPEST 
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he regretted the decision of the War Cabinet that 
British troops should not take part in the occupation of Vienna and Budapest. (War 
Cabinet 506, Minute 7)1 He felt that the outward and visible sign of conquest was 
occupation and if French and Italian troops were utilised mainly for the occupation of 
Austrian territory, it would leave behind the impression that the French and Italians had 
been mainly responsible for the Allied victory. As a matter of fact, the British Empire 
had been mainly responsible for our victory, and the tendency was for us to leave it to 
M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch and Colonel House to get the credit and to settle the 
fate of the world. 
LORD MILNER said that he was apprehensive that we might get into serious 
difficulties by the occupation of Austrian territory. Already immense demands were 
being made for British troops in all parts of the world — Archangel, Murmansk, 
Siberia, the Caucasus, Turkey, &c. Moreover, very large numbers of men were being 
brought home in connection with demobilisation, coal, and for other purposes. All these 
demands fell on the fighting men. Although the British Army abroad numbered some 
1,700,000 men, only a proportion of these were fighting troops, and he did not want to 
see them scattered too widely. 
THE PRIME MINISTER said that there were advantages in not demobilising too 
quickly, as it would be difficult to absorb all the men at once. This strengthened his 
argument in favour of taking part in the occupation of such places as Vienna and 
Budapest. He did not ask that the War Cabinet should reverse their decision, but he 
thought that they should reserve their final judgment until they had heard M. 
Clemenceau’s arguments2 in favour of occupying these places. 
LORD MILNER agreed that it would be desirable to have a conversation with M. 
Clemenceau on the subject. 
1 See No. 12. 
2 See No. 14. 
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No. 14 
Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 27 November 1918) 
No. 1618. [PRO FO 371/3139 No. 195380] 
Paris, 26 November 1918 
Urgent. 
I saw President of the Council1 2 this afternoon. Following is position with regard to 
sending of French troops into Austro-Hungary. Foch had taken initiative in ordering 
troops to go to Budapest. Question of sending them to Vienna had not been decided. 
President of the Council is of opinion that troops would receive an enthusiastic 
welcome at Vienna but would not be so welcome at Budapest, as he recognises that we 
are doing something very disagreeable to Hungary when taking Transylvania from her 
to give to Roumania. President of the Council thinks sending of a comparatively small 
body of French troops to Budapest might put them in a very unpleasant position. He 
has therefore this morning stopped the whole movement and has asked Foch to 
reconsider the question of occupation of Budapest by French troops. If he considers it 
necessary for military reasons movement is to proceed, but if not troops are to wait to 
see how situation develops. 
1 G. Clemenceau. 
No. 15 
Memorandum prepared by the Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office. 
Extracts) 
[PRO CAB 29/2] 
Foreign Office, December 1918 
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS 
SOUTH AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 
Synopsis of British Desiderata 
General 
[....] 
1. To obtain a just and permanent settlement based on the principles of nationality, 
self-determination, security, and free economic opportunity. 
2. To frame this settlement in such a way as (a) to leave no ^avoidable cause for 
future friction in South-Eastern Europe, and thus to prevent as far as possible a 
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combination between Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania against Greece and Jugo-Slavia, (/?) 
to liberate the main economic routes and outlets in such a way as will draw the trade of 
Central Europe to the Mediterranean, while at the same time laying the foundation for a 
future Customs union. 
3. To make full provision for the rights of minority nationalities in the new States. 
4. To include the whole settlement in the Final Act of the Congress, thereby to give it 
the sanction, if not the actual guarantee, of the League of Nations. 
5. To permit no secret understandings and agreements between the countries of 
South-Eastern Europe, and to secure that public opinion in these countries realise that 
the settlement is imposed by the League of Nations and will be permanent. 
Treaties 
1. Austria-Hungary 
(a.) The authorities who are recognised as the successors to the former Austro- 
Hungarian Government to renounce all claims to the territories inhabited by the 
liberated peoples as defined within the frontiers recommended, and to recognise the 
right of these peoples to determine their own future status and governance. 
A Joint Commission to be established to delimitate the new frontiers. 
(,b.) The successors of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire to undertake to enter into 
treaties with the States formed by, or representing, former Austrian subject races in 
regard to such questions as national minorities, concessions and State succession. 
These treaties to be submitted to, and approved by, the Congress at Paris, and to be 
embodied in the Final Act of that Congress. 
The question of the future responsibility of the liberated peoples for the Austro- 
Hungarian war and pre-war debts to be referred to a Mixed Commission. 
(c.) Provisions for the maintenance and safeguarding of British commercial and 
private interests, concessions, claims and contracts in former Austro-Hungarian 
territory. 
[....] 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA 
Jugoslavia and Serbia 
Proposed Frontiers 
2. The Hungarian Frontier.— This is roughly formed by the line of the Drave to its 
confluence with the Danube, though, as we have seen, in Baranja Slav populations are 
found to the north of the Drave. The line of the Danube may again be used almost as far 
as Baja. From there to the Theiss, just west of Kikinda, an artificial line must be drawn 
in which geographical and economic considerations must be taken into account. 
Both in the case of the German and Magyar frontiers, due notice must be taken of the 
fact that German and Magyar minorities will be left within the frontiers of the new 
State; Germans, especially in the Gottschee district of Carniola, and scattered around 
Esseg and throughout Badka, as well as in the Serbian Banat; Magyars in very large 
numbers in the north of Badka. These minorities must be considered as coming under 
the head of minorities demanding favoured treatment under international arrangement. 
3. The Rumanian Frontier.-— Under the Treaty with Rumania of August 1916 the 
whole of the Banat was to pass to Rumania. Apart from people of wholly officialised 
mentality, it is now realised by Rumanians that this is not only unjust, but impossible. 
The result of unofficial or semi-official conversations between competent and moderate 
MIKLOS LOJKO 27 
representatives of both sides has been to arrive at an arrangement by which the greater 
part of the county of Torontal and the south-west corner of Temes shall be incorporated 
in Jugoslavia. The rest of the Banat, with the possible exception of the extreme north¬ 
west corner, where there is a Magyar majority, shall unite with Rumania. No 
arrangement can be reached on purely racial lines. Not only are there very large 
German, and not negligible Magyar, minorities throughout the Banat, for which, as we 
have seen, special provision must be made, but Serbian and Rumanian populations are 
in many cases inextricably interlocked. 
[....] 
Rumania 
The Rumanian Question 
The Treaty of August 1916 recognised as Rumanian not only the whole of 
Transylvania, the Banat, and practically the entire Bukovina, but a very considerable 
area of Hungary proper (the greater part of it, indeed, Rumanian in character), and in 
many points allowed Rumanian demands to be in excess of what they were justified in 
putting forward on racial or any other grounds. This treaty, it has been ruled by His 
Majesty’s Government, is no longer binding since the conclusion of peace by Rumania 
with the enemy Powers, and we are thereby relieved from obligations the execution of 
which would undoubtedly have caused intense difficulties with the Jugoslav, Magyar, 
and Ukrainian populations of Austria-Hungary. Quite apart from this fact, the basis of 
the treaty, viz., acknowledgment of Rumania’s right to annex certain parts of Hungary, 
was radically wrong even in the eyes of the Rumanians of Hungary themselves; as we 
have seen, it is not annexation but free union which they will support. 
Its Difficulties 
The Rumanian question is in certain respects more difficult than the Jugoslav 
question. No territorial line can be drawn in Hungary which will not, in uniting 
Rumanian territory with Rumania, at the same time enclose a very considerable and in 
some cases compact Magyar and German population. The Rumanian territories are not, 
as are the Jugoslav territories, inhabited by people almost exclusively of one race, nor 
are they bounded by natural frontiers such as we have seen in the case of Jugoslavia. It 
goes without saying, therefore, that the frontier line must be largely an artificial one, and 
secondly, that the question of the minorities of alien race passing under Rumanian rule 
must be carefully noted as one for special international arrangement. 
Rumania’s Annexations under the Treaty 
The territories handed over to Rumania by the Treaty of August 1916 included the 
whole of the Banat, following the line of the Danube and the Theiss from Orsova to 
Belgrade, and thence to Szegedin. From there the line went north-east in rather arbitrary 
fashion, passing through, to take the chief points, Hodmezb-Vasarhely 
[Hodmezdvasarhelyl, Bekesc[s]aba, just east of Debreczen, up to the Theiss again at 
Vasaros-Nameny [Vasarosnamenyj; thence following the line of the Theiss through 
Huszt to Maramaros-Sziget, and soon after that turning north, and subsequently north¬ 
east, it enclosed the whole Bukovina except the small angle of it beyond the Prut. 
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Justified Rumanian Claims 
In the greater part of this area, indeed, the Rumanian population is in a considerable 
majority. In Transylvania, even according to Hungarian statistics (notoriously falsified 
against the Rumanians), the Rumanian percentage is 55 per cent; while the minority is a 
mixed one of Magyars, Germans, and other nationalities.1 f‘n the original] 
Suggested Arrangement 
The arrangement suggested in regard to the Rumanian-Jugoslav frontier on the Banat 
has already been dealt with in the section devoted to Jugoslavia, (see [above]). 
There is little doubt that a friendly agreement can be reached between the Jugoslavs 
and Rumanians over this. The sole part of the Banat which theoretically ought to be 
excluded from this arrangement is the extreme north-west comer in the angle formed by 
the Maros and Theiss, which is purely Hungarian in character, and faces the Hungarian 
city of Szegedin. Whether the Jugoslavs and Rumanians can be brought to leave this 
district to Hungary remains to be seen, but the attempt ought, perhaps, to be made. 
North from this, the line of the frontier between Rumania and Hungary should certainly 
run east of that drawn by the 1916 treaty. In the districts of Ugosca [Ugocsa], Szatmar, 
Szilagy, Bihar, and Arad, certain sub-districts assigned to Rumania should be 
reconsidered. These have been tabulated in the memorandum by Dr. Seton-Watson 
hereto annexed,1 and it is therein suggested that a “grey zone” between Magyars and 
Rumanians should be created, including certain of the districts named. Even when this 
has been done it is, of course, clear that, though the territories joined with Rumania 
would contain a considerable and adequate Rumanian majority, amounting even 
according to the Hungarian statistics, to 57.5 per cent., the Magyars would possess, 
again according to their own figures, 27.7 per cent., and the Germans 11.5 per cent. The 
actual figures of the population according to the Hungarian census of 1910, would be 
for the whole territory united with Rumania 4,789,175, of which 2,756,211 would be 
Rumanian, 1,333,509 Magyar, and 552,023 German. These are obviously very 
considerable minorities and must be given an important place in the consideration of the 
question of racial minorities in general. The Transylvanian leaders express themselves 
as perfectly willing to allow cultural autonomy to these minorities, providing for the use 
of their language in primary schools. For the Szekler counties, where the population is 
almost entirely Hungarian, a measure of administrative autonomy may be obtained. 
Transylvanians and Bessarabians 
It cannot be argued too strongly that, alike in the case of the Rumanians of Hungary 
and the Rumanians of what was formerly Russia, there can be no question of our 
appearing to allow, or of the populations accepting, out-and-out annexation by 
Rumania. The time for this has passed, and for Transylvanians and Bessarabians alike 
(in the case of the latter they have made their independent standpoint perfectly clear both 
at the time of their union with Rumania and since) union must depend on the free choice 
of the accredited representatives of the people. Such a preliminary choice can be made 
1 [in the original] some 0f the counties just to the west of Transylvania are equally Rumanian in character. 
Szilagy, for instance, possesses, according to Hungarian statistics, a Rumanian percentage of 59; Arad 
has about an equal percentage. But in certain parts, for instance, the county of Csanad and the parts of the 
county of Bekes allotted to Rumania under the treaty the population is really practically purely Magyar, 
and the Rumanians have no racial claim. 
JSee below. 
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by the existing representatives: in Bessarabia the present Diet, in Transylvania the 
National Council, into which the executive of the Rumanian National Party of Hungary 
seems to have developed. It is clear that the Bessarabians and Transylvanians alike will 
play a great part in the reconstruction of the new Rumania. Possibly they may not 
demand conditions of entry into the Rumanian State, but what they will undoubtedly 
demand is the recognition of the fact that they enter that State as free agents, not as 
annexed subjects. While no such acute differences as have arisen between the Serbian 
Government and the Jugoslav Committee ought to arise between Rumania and the 
Transylvanians, grave danger is to be foreseen of a similar situation being created 
should politicians of so old-fashioned a type as M. Bratianu come into power again and 
put forward the Treaty of 1916 as the basis of Rumanian unity 
Rumanian Representatives at the Peace Conference 
It is important that the delegations from Rumania shall be so constituted that it will be, 
and be accepted as, fully representative not only of the Rumanians of the Rumanian 
kingdom but also of the Rumans of Hungary and Bessarabia. 
[....] 
The Czecho-Slovak State 
Introductory Summary 
1. THE population of the three Czech provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian 
Silesia, amounts to over 10 millions, of Slovakia to about 2,250,000. If certain feasible 
frontier rectifications are carried out in the Czech provinces the population of the future 
Czecho-Slovak State will amount to about 12 millions, of which 8,300,000 will be 
Czechs and Slovaks, almost 3,500,000 Germans, and about 150,000 Magyars. Some 
600,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain outside the boundaries of that State, in Lower 
Austria and Vienna and in small enclaves in the Magyar plain. 
[-.] 
6. No re-federation between the Czecho-Slovak State and German Austria is 
possible, as it would imply an indirect connection with Germany. Nor can the Czecho¬ 
slovaks federate with the Magyars so long as any trace is left of the old Magyar 
imperialism and the old Magyar oligarchy. An alliance between the Czecho-Slovak 
State and Poland seems desirable, but can hardly be secured unless the Poles abandon 
altogether their aggressive imperialist schemes against Russia, and give up their anti- 
Russian attitude. 
[..••] 
3. The German Problem in the Czecho-Slovak State 
[....] 
Nor is it fair to draw an analogy between the mountain fringe of Bohemia and the 
Carpathian frontier of Hungary, and say that if the Czechs refuse to abandon the 
German districts of Bohemia they forfeit their claims to the Slovak districts of Hungary: 
(1) If Slovakia remained part of Hungary the entire Slovak nation would be refused a 
political existence, which obviously does not apply to the Germans and Bohemia. (2) 
In the Czecho-Slovak State, if certain admissible frontier rectifications be made, the 
alien element will hardly amount to one-third of the population, whereas if the 
Carpathian frontier were left to Hungary, in Hungary proper (excluding Croatia) the 
Magyars would form at the utmost half the population. Their own statistics, which give 
them 60 per cent, of the population of Hungary, are notorious forgeries. (3) Slovakia is 
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not economically bound up with Hungary as German Bohemia is with Bohemia. (4) 
Lastly, the Magyars have had their chance, and so far from conciliating the non-Magyar 
nationalities, have alienated them by the most brutal persecutions; should the Czechs 
engage on a similar policy towards the Germans the settlement would undoubtedly have 
to be reconsidered. 
^ The Czechs [....] are likely to prove to us the greatest asset in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It would be most deplorable should they leave the Peace Conference 
disappointed and with a feeling of having been abandoned to the Germans or Magyars. 
[..••] 
4. Czech Claims to Territory outside the Czech Provinces and Slovakia 
Early in the war the idea was put forward by Professor Masaryk of a territorial 
connection to be established between the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs through German 
and Magyar territory. The distance which separates the Czechs from the Jugo-Slavs 
amounts to about 100 miles, and their enclaves in that territory are practically negligible. 
Such a “corridor” through these territories would seem of small practical value; in time 
of war it would probably be found strategically untenable; in time of peace economic 
relations between the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs can, if necessary, be safeguarded by 
means other than a direct territorial connection. Lastly, even on political grounds it 
would seem unadvisable to press that demand under the new conditions created by 
revolution. Such a violation of German and Magyar national rights would re-create a 
common cause between the Germans and the Magyars, whereas at present there is at 
least some hope that the complete breakdown of Magyar imperialism, and, which is still 
more important, the overthrow of the Magyar oligarchy by the revolution, may in time 
obliterate the memory of that common interest which up till now had rendered the 
Magyar-German connection indissoluble. 
Recently another idea of the same kind has been mooted in the Czech and Rumanian 
circles, namely, to make Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian territory meet in north-eastern 
Hungary. There the distance between them is slightly smaller, though yet about 60 
miles. The intervening territory is mountainous and densely wooded, and it would seem 
doubtful whether one slope of a high mountain range without the plain below (which is 
Magyar) would be of any real value as a connecting link either in peace or war. The 
country which intervenes between the Slovak[s] and the Rumanes is inhabited by Little 
Russians (otherwise called Ruthenians or Ukrainians), who in these districts, however, 
have shown so far but weak national tendencies. Where they exist they are of the 
“Russophile” rather than of the “Ukrainian” type, i.e., the people consider themselves 
an integral part of the Russian nation, and not a separate nationality. There is just a 
possibility of these Ruthenes voluntarily choosing to join the Slovaks should the 
Ukrainian Separatists prevail in East Galicia and the Ukraine, and prevent, even if only 
temporarily, their union with Russia. But anyhow, the Czechs are perfectly decided not 
to anything in this matter which might cause friction between them and Russia. 
[....] 
10. The Czechs and the Magyars 
It is difficult to speak at the present moment of the future relations of the Czecho¬ 
slovaks and the Magyars. Up to now the Magyars have been to the other nationalities 
inhabiting Hungary a “master nation” in the fullest meaning of the term. They were their 
masters not only politically, but also socially. They owned the big landed estates in 
Slovakia, formed a large proportion of its capitalist class and intelligentsia, and held the 
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posts under the government. They despised the Slovak peasant nation and were hated 
by them in turn. Even the liberation of the Slovaks from Magyar rule, political and 
social, will not close up the abyss between them, unless the Magyar nation is 
profoundly transformed by social revolution. Should they remain an essentially 
aristocratic nation, there can be no amity between them and their peasant neighbours, 
their late serfs. But if social revolution sweeps away the Magyar oligarchy and a 
peasants’ and workmen’s government takes its place, the Magyars will be able to 
approach their neighbours in a very different spirit. Until then the relations between the 
freed Slovaks and their late masters must remain cool, to say the least. 
[....] 
ANNEX I 
THE FUTURE FRONTIERS OF HUNGARY 
(Note by Dr. R.W. Seton Watson.)2 
THE future frontiers of Hungary can only be drawn in accordance with the 
principles— 
(a.) That Czecho-Slovak, Rumanian, and Jugo-Slav unity are the bases upon which 
the new States of Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania are to rest. 
(,b.) That special linguistic guarantees in church, school, and law court must be 
assured to all racial minorities living within the newly-drawn frontiers of each of these 
States. 
For the delineation of the frontiers of these new States it will be necessary to 
constitute boundary commissions, consisting of representatives of the two countries 
directly concerned and delegates appointed by the Peace Conference, or by the League 
of Nations, if already constituted. 
With a view to allaying inter-racial friction in the meantime it may be helpful to 
establish certain “gray zones,” which are generally admitted to be matters of dispute 
between parties, and which should be administered under international control until the 
boundary commission shall have completed their enquiries. Only thus would it be 
possible to avoid intensive propaganda and intrigue and the “incidents” which this 
would inevitably provoke. 
On the territory of Hungary it would be necessary to establish three such “gray 
zones”:— 
(a.) Between Magyars and Slovaks; 
(b.) Between Magyars and Rumanians; 
(c.) Between Magyars and the Jugo-Slavs. 
The problems of the future frontier between Hungary and the Ukraine, and between 
Hungary and German-Austria stand somewhat apart, since economic and geographical 
2 In conjunction with this memorandum, R.W. Seton-Watson also prepared a paper titled: “The Legal 
Factors Replacing the Dual Monarchy”. It is reproduced in D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace 
Treaties, London, 1938, vol. II, pp. 905-911. 
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considerations play an even greater part in these two cases than in the three principal 
cases already specified. 
(A.)—The Magyar-Slovak Frontier 
(a.) In Slovakia there are seven existing counties (Komitat-Megye) which are 
incontestably Slovak—the only noticeable minorities being German rather than Magyar, 
and then only amounting to a very small proportion. These seven counties (for 
convenience we adhere throughout to the Magyar names) are Trencsen, Turocz, Arva, 
Lipto, Zolyom, Szepes, Saros. With regard to them there can be no discussion, and they 
should from the first be regarded as integral parts of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 
(b.) The border counties between Slovaks and Magyars are nine in number (from 
west to east): 
Pozsony (Pressburg), Nyitra, Bars, Hont, Nograd, Gombr, Abauj-Torna, Zemplen, 
Ung. These nine, however, fall into two categories:— 
1. Counties which are in the great majority Slovak, but from which certain 
amputations can and should be made in favour of Hungary. 
2. Counties which are distinctly mixed, and where the line of demarcation cannot 
follow purely ethnographical lines. To the latter belong Hont, Gombr, and Abauj- 
Torna. 
In the case of the two south-western counties — Pressburg and Nyitra — special 
circumstances must be considered. The city of Pressburg, which according to Magyar 
statistics contains 32,700 Germans, 31,700 Magyars, and only 11,600 Slovaks, is 
indispensable to Bohemia as providing it with a suitable Danubian port. The whole 
district to the north, as far as the very suburbs of the town, is purely Slovak. Its 
possession by Bohemia is further necessary in order to ensure the regulation of the 
river March, a problem of first-rate importance to Moravia and Slovakia. 
Just east of Pressburg the Danube divides into two channels, and most of the rich 
territory lying between the two, known as the “Grosse Schiitt”, belongs to the county of 
Pressburg, and its population is overwhelmingly Magyar. It is to be expected that the 
Czechs will claim this island, in order to obtain a certain stretch of the Danube as their 
southern frontier. Thus the first point for decision-by a boundary commission will be 
whether the frontier should follow the southern and main arm of the river, or the 
northern and small arm. 
In the case of the county of Nyitra, all the northern and central districts are Slovak, 
but there is a small, purely Magyar district in the south, round the small town of Ersek 
Ujvar, which Hungary would be entitled to claim. On the other hand, this would leave 
the mouth and about 15 miles of the lower reaches of the River Vag — otherwise a 
purely Slovak river — in the hands of Hungary. The Czechs are certain to put forward 
the view that the whole river to its mouth in the Danube (which coincides with the 
reunion of the two arms of the main river) must be included in Bohemian territory. 
If, however, this latter claim were admitted, it would be necessary to extend the 
Danubian frontier of Bohemia as far as the mouth of the River Garam, thereby 
including portions of the counties of Komarom and Esztergom, whose populations are 
almost exclusively Magyar. 
From the river Garam, north-eastwards as far as the Carpathian frontier between 
Hungary and Galicia, the new frontier Magyars and Slovaks will inevitably disregard 
the boundaries of the existing frontiers; it will be necessary to find a compromise 
between the natural ethnographic line of division, and a geographical line corresponding 
approximately to the division between mountain and plain (it being obvious that a 
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certain portion of the foothills, and in particular the outlying spur of the Tokay [Tokaj] 
hills, must remain in Magyar hands). 
To sum up, the “gray zone” between Magyars and Slovaks would be composed 
roughly as follows:— 
1. The Grosse Schutt. 
2. The district of Ersek Ujvar, in the county of Nyitra. 
3. The portions of the counties of Komarom and Esztergom, lying north of the 
Danube. 
4. In the county of Bars, the sub-district (Jaras) of Leva. 
5. In the county of Hont, the three sub-districts of Ipolynyek, Szob, and 
Vamosmikola. 
6. In the county of Gdmor, the sub-districts of Rimaszecs, Putnok, and Rozsnyo. 
7. In the county of Abauj-Torna, the sub-districts of Kassa (Kaschau) and Tiizer 
the town of Kassa being assigned to the Slovaks. 
8. In the county of Zemplen, the sub-district of Nagy Mihaly. 
It is suggested that everything to the north-west of this strip of territory should be 
regarded as indisputably Slovak; and everything to the south-east as indisputably 
Magyar. 
It is to be born in mind that the small Magyar minorities in the districts described as 
indisputably Slovak will diminish by a natural process, owing to the disappearance of 
the numerous imported Magyar officials. The proportion of real Magyar populations in 
these districts is very small; even among them a considerable number are really 
magyarised Slovaks. Meanwhile it will in any case be necessary for the Slovaks to 
sacrifice very considerable colonies which are situated in the indisputably Magyar 
territory of Hungary, e.g., numerous wealthy villages scattered along both banks of the 
Danube between Esztergom (Gran) and Budapest, and also the large Slovak oasis of 
Bekes-Csaba in the great Hungarian Plain. 
(B ?)—Magyar-Rumanian Frontier 
The “gray zone” between Magyars and Rumanians would run from the River Tisza 
(Theiss) in the north to the River Maros in the south, and would contain roughly the 
following territory:— 
(a.) In the county of Ugocsa, the sub-district of Tiszantul. 
\b.) In the county of Szatmar, the sub-districts of Szatmar and Erddd. 
(c.) In the county of Szilagy, the sub-districts of Tosnad [Tasnad], then Szilagy 
Cseh, then 
Szilagy Somlyo, and Kraszna. 
(,d.) In the county of Bihar, the sub-districts of Ermihaly Falva, Szekelyhid, 
Margit[t]a, Szalard, Nagy Varad (Grosswardein), including the town of this name, 
Cseffa, Nagy Szalonta, and Tenke. 
(e.) In the county of Arad, the sub-districts of Kisjend, Vilagos, Elek, and Arad. 
To the west of the zone there are isolated Rumanian settlements, but the 
overwhelming majority of the population is Magyar. To the east of this zone there are 
considerably larger Magyar settlements, even apart from the solid block of Szekel[y] 
population (numbering roughly 500,000) which occupies the extreme south-eastern 
comer of Transylvania, and cannot under any conceivable circumstances be excluded 
from a united Rumanian State. 
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It is to be remembered that nowhere has the falsification of the census been carried to 
such lengths by the Magyar authorities as among the Rumanians of Transylvania; and 
therefore it may be safely assumed that in the event of an impartial census anything 
between 10 and 20 per cent, would fall to be deducted from the total Magyar figure. 
Moreover, in addition to those Rumanians who have been fraudulently included in the 
census as Magyars, there are large numbers of other Rumanians who have yielded to 
political and personal pressure, and enrolled themselves as Magyars in order to curry 
favour with the local authorities. Under a new regime all these weaker brethren will 
once more come out as Rumanians. A further percentage falls to be deducted in view of 
the large (indeed quite needlessly large) numbers of Magyar administrative officials in 
Transylvania, who will automatically tend to migrate back to Hungary proper. 
(The best indication that there is something wrong with the Magyar statistics is to be 
found in the following fact: The entire Orthodox and Uniate population of Hungary is 
either Roumanian, Serb, or Ruthene, with the exception of a few thousand who have 
been Magyarised. None the less, though the total Rumanian, Serb, and Ruthene 
population in Hungary is given in the Hungarian statistics as 3,800,000, the total 
Orthodox and Uniate population is given as 4,300,000. The half-million unaccounted 
for are presumably non-Magyars who have been included in the racial census tables as 
Magyars.) 
None the less, even on the most favourable assumption, it will probably be necessary 
to include between 600,000 and 700,000 Magyars in Greater Rumania. For them it will 
be necessary to produce a definite charter, assuring to all certain definite linguistic rights 
in church, school, and law courts, and to the compact mass of Szekel[y]s perhaps a 
definite measure of local autonomy, similar to that which the Saxons of Transylvania 
are entitled to claim. 
(C.)—The Magyar-Jugo-Slav Frontier 
Starting from the Western frontier Between Austria and Hungary, the new Jugo-Slav 
frontier against Hungary at first follows a clearly-defined course — namely, the river 
Mur to its junction with the Drave, and then the river Drave to its junction with the 
Danube. The only districts to the north of this line which could conceivably be claimed 
by the Jugo-Slavs are— 
(a.) The district of Mura Szombat, running along the Austrian frontier north of the 
Mur; and 
(b.) That portion of the county of Baranya lying in the fork of the Danube and Drave 
to the south-east of Pecs (Fiinfkirchen). 
The former can only be considered in connection with the question of the so-called 
“Corridor” between Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, which it is not proposed to 
discuss here.3 Unless such a “Corridor” were created, this district must obviously 
remain with Hungary. The latter is largely inhabited by Serbs, but the disadvantages of 
creating yet another artificial frontier are so great, that it would seem better to retain the 
river frontiers as far as possible. 
In the case of the Banat, Serbian and Rumanian claims may for the moment be 
regarded as identical in so far as the frontier against Hungary is concerned. (The 
question of the future Serbo-Rumanian frontier in the Banat must be reserved for 
special treatment.) 
The northern frontier between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary can only be the river 
Maros, from a point near the town of Arad westwards. The only portion of the Banat 
3 See above. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 35 
which could be treated as a “gray zone” between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary is the 
extreme north-west corner lying in the fork of the rivers Maros and Theiss, and facing 
the Magyar city of Szeged. This triangular piece of territory corresponds almost exactly 
with the two “Jaras” of Tbrok-Kanizsa and Nagy-Szent-Miklos, or, from a 
geographical point of view, with the course of the Aranka River (an old channel of the 
Maros). It will undoubtedly be contended by the Magyars that this triangle is 
predominantly Magyar, and is necessary to the development of Szeged as the second 
city of Hungary. 
Between the Banat and the Baranya lies the Bacska district, which must in any case be 
regarded as the principal “gray zone” between Magyars and Jugo-Slavs. This zone may 
fairly be regarded as identical with the large county of Bacs-Bodrog, which contains a 
mixed Magyar-Serb-Slovak-German population. 
Foreign Office, 
December 13, 1918. 
HUNGARY 
[....] 
What is “Hungary”? 
Until the political situation in Hungary is fully cleared up it is difficult to discuss our 
dealings with a State as to the future extent, character, and intentions of which we are at 
present in the dark. A National Council was set up, under the presidency of Count 
Karolyi, on the 30th October, when the last attempts of King Charles to form a 
Coalition Government had failed. On the 31st October the King entrusted Count 
Karolyi with the formation of a Government. The declared object of this Council and 
Government was a complete break with Germany and Austria and a policy of 
Hungarian independence. The possibility of maintaining the dynasty was at first 
contemplated, but this seems now to have been abandoned and a republic decided on. 
Realising that a great part of their Jugoslav territories have been lost for ever, Count 
Karolyi’s Government did not hesitate to recognise the separation of Croatia from the 
territories of the Crown of St, Stephen, and to insist on their willingness to live in 
cordial relations with the new State. With regard to the nationalities in Hungary 
generally, however, Count Karolyi has not adopted a similar policy. He claims that the 
Slovaks, Ukrainians, Rumans, and Serbs of the Banat and Ba£ka must remain in the 
Hungarian State as integral portions of it. This claim was at once strongly repudiated by 
the Slovaks, who have pronounced themselves in favour of an independent Czecho¬ 
slovak State, and have summoned the Czech armies to their aid against the Hungarians. 
Similarly, the news now comes to hand that the Rumanians have set up a National 
Council, denounced their connection with Hungary, and appealed to an international 
decision based on self-determination. Their leaders have already arrived in Ia§i to ask 
for union with Rumania. As to the attitude of the Jugoslavs of Southern Hungary there 
can be no question. Their representatives have already declared in favour of Jugoslav 
union. The position of the Ukrainians of North-East Hungary is for the moment 
obscure. 
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British Policy 
The attitude of His Majesty’s Government and the Allied Powers towards these 
different nationalities varies in the particular cases. Our recognition of the Czecho¬ 
slovak Government commits us to acceptance of the separation of the Slovak 
population within territories yet to be determined from Hungary. In the case of the 
Jugoslavs and Rumanians we have not gone so far, but we have both declared and 
shown our interest in the aspirations of these two peoples to union and independence. 
The union of the Jugoslavs has practically been achieved. In the case of the Rumanians, 
political events have postponed but cannot long prevent it. It may, then, be taken for 
granted that the only “Hungary” which His Majesty’s Government can recognise is 
roughly that portion of the former Kingdom of Hungary which is inhabited by compact 
Magyar majorities. 
Suggested Frontiers 
Under “Jugoslavia,” “Rumania,” and “The Czechoslovaks,” some suggested 
frontiers with Hungary have been submitted. There remains only (1) the question of the 
400,000 Ruthenians of Northern Hungary which will be treated under Czecho-Slovaks, 
and (2) Hungarian frontier with German Austria. 
As regards (2), a demand has now been put forward by Vienna for the incorporation 
in German Austria of the compact German populations in the north-western corner of 
the new Hungary (Counties of Wieselburg, &c. [....]). 
The new Hungarian Republic from which these territories have been detached will be 
a land-locked State. The chief problems, then, which will confront us are (1) the access 
of this territory to the sea, and (2) its relations with its neighbours. 
(1) Access to Fiume is a vital interest to Hungary. Fiume must be included in the list 
of seaports which will be the object of special consideration as passing into the political 
possession of a Power other than that to which its economic importance is vital. Like 
Trieste, Salonika, Danzig, and others, international arrangements must secure for 
Hungary, in the case of Fiume, every facility for transit of goods and export. Similar 
facilities should be given to Hungary on lines already built, or yet to be built, through 
Jugoslav and Rumanian territories towards the Tigean and the Black Seas. 
(2) To secure the friendly acquiescence of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians to such an 
arrangement it is necessary that we should have positive guarantees that the old regime 
in Hungary is for ever abolished. It will be difficult to secure through Count Karolyi, 
for instance, any confidence on the part of the newly constituted National States, for his 
declared policy, both in the past and in the present, is the complete incorporation of the 
other nationalities in a Magyar State. There must be clear recognition on the part of the 
Hungarian Government, whatever they may be, that there can be no further question of 
attempting to preserve the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary as Count Karolyi is 
even now urging. When this has been secured, the case for concessions on the part of 
the Jugoslavs and Rumanians will be enormously strengthened. These concessions will 
be: (1) the economic facilities already referred to, and (2) the assurance of full personal 
and cultural liberty for the Magyar populations necessarily included in the Jugoslav and 
Rumanian States. Especially in the case of the Szekle[r] counties of Transylvania, as 
has been already noted under Rumania, some measure of administrative autonomy 
seems not only just but feasible. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[From:] [HDLM ACC 72 7/16, Extracts]4 
[To] Sir William Tyrrell. 
Herewith are the Memoranda drawn up by Sir Ralph Paget based on material 
supplied by Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Allen Leeper on the Balkan States and Hungary. 
[....] 
There are two general points of principle which arise in all the Memoranda on which 
a decision is necessary. These are— 
(a) Securities for the cultural autonomy of minorities belonging to one race included 
in a State of another nation. 
(b) Provision of access to the sea at ports such as Fiume, Salonika, Kavala, for States 
which are either completely without seabo[a]rd, such as Hungary, or excluded from 
convenient access to certain portions of the sea, such as Serbia and the Aegean. 
(c) The inter-mixture of the inhabitants throughout the Balkans makes it impossible 
to draw a frontier which will not leave considerable communities amounting sometimes 
to three or four hundred thousand individuals under the government of an alien nation. 
The intense feeling of national animosity which unfortunately exists in these districts 
necessarily arouses serious apprehensions as to the treatment of these minorities, for 
they are left without any kind of guarantee. This raises a very difficult and a most 
serious principle. Generally speaking, it seems to be a matter of paramount importance 
that if any kind of League of Nations is established, it should not claim any form of 
interference in the internal affairs of the Sovereign States of which the League will be 
constituted, and I should urge most strongly that this country should not enter into any 
League unless this principle was laid down as one of the fundamental principles of the 
constitution of the League. This is the only way in which we can be sure of avoiding 
difficulties about Ireland, and we certainly do not wish that people such as the 
Catalonians in Spain should have any right to appeal to the League as to the matters at 
issue between them and the Spanish Government. 
We must however recignise [sic] that the situation in regard to these Balkan States is 
in fact a very different one and some means will have to be devised to get over this. 
There are two ways in which this might be done. We might frankly recognise what is 
the fact, that these States, especially those which are being newly constituted, such as 
Yugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia cannot at once claim full and complete status of the 
older States and in their case special conditions might be imposed upon their 
recognition as members of the European family of States; one of these conditions 
would be that they should give international guarantee for the just treatment of these 
minorities. There might also be included in this category those Balkan States, such as 
Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, which, though previously existing are in fact very new; 
[....] 
The Memorandum on Hungary seems to require some additions and alterations, 
especially the last paragraph. This ignores the fact that Hungary is a State with which 
we are at war; the recognition by the Hungarian Government of the separation from 
Hungary of those territories which will be acquired by other States will of course be 
4 These notes had been written before the memoranda to which they refer were printed, and presumably 
before Annex l was attached. The extracts from these memoranda, which are reproduced in the main 
section, are based on the printed version, and show no signs of the kind of alterations suggested by J.W. 
Headlam-Morley. 
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part of the terms of peace which will have to be made with Hungary; the particular point 
as to, for instance, Count Karolyi’s opinion is, from this point of view, completely 
unimportant; the whole is written as if it was the duty of Rumania and Yugo-Slavia to 
obtain the necessary concessions from Hungary. This is not their business, it is the 
business of the Allies. 
This leads up to a very important and complicated question which does not seem 
hitherto to have been dealt with at all, viz: the forms that will have to be adopted for the 
liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In the case of Germany and Bulgaria 
where the nation continues there will presumably be a Treaty of Peace in the ordinary 
form. Will this be possible with regard to Austria-Hungary? Someone ought to be 
instructed to draw up a memorandum on this point. It is only necessary here to point 
out that whatever might be the case with regard to the other parts of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, in the case of the Kingdom of Hungary there will continue to be 
a State and a Government which we shall be able to regard as the legal inheritor of the 
rights and obligations of the previously existing Magyar State, a State which it must be 
remembered as [having had?] a continuous history for a thousand years. This being the 
case[,] a formal Treaty of Peace can be made with this State and it would be an essential 
part of any such Treaty that in it they should formally renounce all claims of any kind 
over those districts which it is determined shall be separated and also it will be possible 
to include in the Treaty the assumption by the Magyar State of a portion to be 
determined of the debt of the Dual Monarchy. In this Treaty there will also necessarily 
be included securities which the Magyars will require for free access to the sea at Fiume 
and for free access to and participation in the navigation of the Danube. 
[J.W. Headlam-Morley] 
5/12/18 
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No. 16 
Telegram from a French Source to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 27 December 1918) 
[PRO FO 371/3139 No. 211756] 
15 December 1918 
Secret. 
POSITION IN HUNGARY. 
General Berthelot wired on 15th December1 that the Hungarian Emissaries in 
TRANSYLVANIA are acting precisely in the same manner as would revolutionary 
agents, and are encouraging Bolshevism in order to counter act Allied action. 
Consequently disturbances have taken place on the boundary between HUNGARY 
and TRANS YUVANIA. Roumanian troops have, therefore, been authorised to occupy 
certain strategical points beyond the limits fixed by the armistice. 
If Bolshevism develops in HUNGARY the military occupation of this country will 
be necessary. The Hungarian Government is encouraging Bolshevism and anti- 
Roumanian manifestations. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
If there is any Magyar Bolshevik propaganda in Transylvania, it certainly does not 
come from the present Hungarian Govt., nor is it in the Magyar interest, as the Magyars 
form an unproportionately large part of the upper classes in Transylvania & wd. stand 
to lose most shd. Bolshevism break out there. This seems to me only another example 
of how the cry of “Bolshevism” is exploited nowadays by anyone who wishes to 
obtain a hearing and prejudice the case of his opponents. 
L.B.Nfamier]. 
30/12/18 
1 Gen. H.-M. Berthelofs headquarters were in Bucharest at the time, so presumably the telegram was 
sent from there. 
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No.17 
Letter from “G. 65.” (Geneva) for Military Intelligence, Political Section 
(War Office, London) 
[PRO FO 371/4354 No. 161 (file 52)) 
Geneva, 17 December 1918 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN HUNGARY 
Count Karolyi’s Position 
The political situation in Hungary has not the satisfactory features which characterises 
[sz'c] the situation in German Austria. In the latter country the temporary coalition 
government is the expression of popular will in so far as its members were nominated 
by the temporary national assembly — in reality the old Reichsrat — in proportion to 
the membership of the respective parties. The democratic character of the Austrian 
voting system has therefore given the members of the government an authority which 
the various governments in Germany and the Government at BUDAPEST entirely lack. 
The Hungarian Government consists in reality of one man, COUNT KAROLYI, who 
governs, if one may say so, under politically false pretences. COUNT KAROLYI, an 
otherwise estimable man and honest politician, has to a marked degree the Hungarian 
characteristic of egoism. He definitely promised the Hungarian people that “with 
KAROLYI as Prime Minister the Entente governments would at once treat 
HUNGARY favourably.” This promise indiscreetly enough was made by COUNT 
KAROLYI in the initial stages of the revolution and had a great deal to do with the 
unanimous way in which the Hungarian public summoned him to office. Newspapers 
like the “PESTER LLOYD”, which had violently criticised the Count’s earlier activities, 
and violent political opponents accepted, in common with the mass of the population, 
his assurance and with a somewhat childish optimism awaited its fulfilment. Put quite 
frankly COUNT KAROLYI has so far failed “to deliver the goods” and the 
dissatisfaction which prevails seems likely to provoke at an early date a political crisis 
which COUNT KAROLYI and his party will probably find difficult in overcoming. 
His political opponents are already beginning to draw a contrast between the early 
promise and its lack of realisation, and several Hungarian newspapers have begun 
against him one of those violent press campaigns which have no exact parallel in other 
European countries. 
COUNT KAROLYI himself realises that the delay which the country gave him to 
make the promised peace will soon expire and that failure on his part to do so will mean 
his downfall. 
In a long interview which I had with him he made no secret of the bitterness and 
disappointment and the unreadiness of the Entente to make him favourable proposals. 
In a long pro domo statement which he made he emphasised repeatedly his antagonism 
against Germany during the war, and his old-time sympathies for Great Britain and 
America. He added that if the Entente would not, in view of his past, give to him more 
favourable terms than to his rivals his position as Hungarian Prime Minister would 
become intolerable. 
The same point of view found even cruder expression from the other members of the 
KAROLYI Cabinet whom I saw. The somewhat irritating view was frequently 
expressed that the Entente governments should give HUNGARY preferential treatment 
because of the sympathetic personality of its present Prime Minister. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 41 
COUNT KAROLYI’s most loyal and energetic supporter is the COUNTESS 
KAROLYI, a highly intelligent lady of 25 years of age who is using all the social and 
political influence she possesses at home and abroad to consolidate the position of her 
husband. The Countess leaves for Switzerland on Saturday next presumably to take 
part in a conference in the interests of prisoners of war, but, as I understand, to 
endeavour to put the point of view of her husband before authorised representatives of 
the Allies in that country. COUNT KAROL YI himself believes that if some 
opportunity were given him of frankly outlining the Hungarian standpoint the peace 
terms which the Entente Governments would offer her (Hungaria) would be less severe 
than their present attitude seems to suggest. 
During my recent stay at BUDAPEST the Government and newspapers declared that 
the Count had received authority to go to Berne to put the Hungarian case before the 
Allied Governments, but when I questioned him on the point he admitted there was no 
grounds for the report. Its publication was probably part of the conspiracy to make the 
people believe that COUNT KAROLYI’s maintenance in office is necessary to 
Hungarian interests. 
In emphasising this aspect of the political situation in Hungary I do not want to cast 
doubt on COUNT KAROLYI’s sincerity or the very real value his authority may have 
for the Entente governments. All I mean to point out is that COUNT KAROL YI 
governs for the moment because HUNGARY believes he is the man who can save 
from the disintegration and disaster which loom so menacingly and so near ahead. 
Hungarian egoism prevents politicians at BUDAPEST from seeing the situation as it 
really is. In this respect they are not in touch with the realities of the moment in the way 
that, for example, the members of the German Austrian government are. Thus when I 
asked HERR OTTO BAUER, the German-Austrian foreign secretary his point of view 
on the question of Serbian compensation he readily agreed with the principle of 
payment, but maintained that all the countries which previously made up the dual 
monarchy should share in it. The same question put to COUNT KAROL YI and to his 
Minister of Finance, PROFESSOR SZENDE, provoked expressions of pained 
surprise. The idea that Serbia should be compensated and that necessarily by her 
aggressors, was quite novel to them. Compensation to Serbia probably meant payment 
by Hungary, a probability which from the Hungarian standpoint was extremely 
unpleasant and could not readily be entertained. 
The conditions of peace which Hungarian official circles would regard as satisfactory 
are partly negative, partly affirmative in nature. They are: (1) that TRANSYLVANIA 
should not be given to ROUMANIA but should remain part of HUNGARY; (2) that 
the Slovak territories North of Budapest should not be ceded to BOHEMIA; (3) that an 
international treaty should guarantee the use of a port on the Adriatic to HUNGARY 
and generally regularise conditions of commerce and traffic among the nations which 
previously constituted the dual monarchy. 
On her side HUNGARY would agree to complete autonomy being granted to the 
lesser nationalities under her rule, if necessary such autonomy to be guaranteed by the 
Entente Powers. 
The question of TRANSYLVANIA is the one which to the exclusion of all others 
agitates official circles and the population generally at BUDAPEST. The claim is made 
alike by COUNT KAROLYI and PROFESSOR JASSY [Jaszi] that the 26 counties 
claimed by ROUMANIA have willingly formed part of the Hungarian kingdom for one 
thousand years and that the non-Roumania[n] population — Hungarians, Germans and 
Slovaks — exceed in numbers the Roumanian population. 
COUNT KAROLYI and other members of the Government repeatedly insisted not 
only on the ethnical claims of Hungary to Transylvania but also on the economic 
disaster which they contend would overtake Hungary if it were deprived of a province 
which supplies it with coal, wood, water-power, salt and, to a lesser degree, gold. The 
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admission of the pretensions of Roumania and Bohemia would mean, they further 
contend, the economic ruin of Hungary and the reduction of a great country of high 
culture to the restricted geographical area of BUDAPEST and the surrounding plain. 
As indicated the sacrifice of the territory claimed by the Slovaks would be consented 
to, very grudgingly but still consented to, if Transylvania were retained and if an 
economic confederation of states were agreed to. The idea of a Danubian confederation 
of states — to include German Austria, Hungary, Bohemia and the new Yougo-Slav 
kingdom is a favourite conception of ministers at both BUDAPEST and KONIA. The 
proposal is represented as an economic necessity for all the countries concerned, 
although it is frankly agreed that the nationalistic tendencies of the newly constituted 
and naturally exuberant states of Bohemia and Yougo-Slavia will retard the realisation 
of this conception. 
More than is the case in Germany and German Austria, Hungary is undergoing a 
grave moral crisis provoked by the catastrophe which faces her. The national sentiment 
is still very strong, and the present temper of the people is such that any settlement 
which cuts athwart that sentiment would create wounds which would take many 
generations to heal. If Germany looks to President Wilson, if not to champion her 
claims at any rate to display a sympathetic comprehension of her point of view, 
Hungary looks in the same way towards Great Britain. There is much talk about the 
possibility of the new national assembly declaring in favour of a monarchy and as a 
consequence the crown being offered to an English prince. The name of the Duke of 
Connaught is mentioned in this connection in both official and popular circles. When 
questioned by me on the point one of the members of the KAROLYI Government 
frankly admitted that the main reason underlying the proposal which is still in an 
extremely vague state was that the offer of the crown to an Englishman and still more 
his acceptance of it would win the sympathies and support of the British Government 
for Hungary. 
For the same purpose of enlisting British (and American) sympathy a committee of 
Hungarian protestant clergymen has been formed the object of which will be to plead 
the cause of the large section of the German-Hungarian protestant population in 
Transylvania who, if Roumanian claims are endorsed by the Allies will be necessarily 
handed over to the orthodox authorities. It is claimed that protestantism of a Calvinistic 
type is a very vital force of religion and culture among this population; and that it would 
be a great scandal were they to be placed at the mercy of an ignorant and fanatic 
Orthodox authority. A propaganda to be carried on from neutral countries will be 
conducted by the committee mentioned. 
In spite of the statement of COUNT BETHLEN which follows in detail1 I think that 
Bolshevism as a doctrine or a theory has so far gained [?little support] in BUDAPEST, 
or indeed, in Hungary generally. The soldiers’ councils, as in Austria, are very harmless 
organisations which make very little attempt to meddle in politics. In the country 
districts a certain amount of lawlessness certainly prevails and bad economic conditions 
or even an unsatisfactory peace from the political standpoint might produce disorders 
and a certain amount of temporary chaos. On the other hand the middle-class elements 
seem stronger than in Germany and the absence of any really numerous industrial 
population renders their resistance to any attempt to introduce Soviet government 
efficacious. 
Great preparations are being made to hold the elections for the new national assembly 
as soon as possible. The middle of January is mentioned in this connection. It is 
probable that were the Entente to indicate that the personality and career of the present 
Prime Minister are likely to secure for Hungary more favourable peace terms than she 
might otherwise hope for an enormous majority for the KAROL YI parties — the 
1 The statement referred to is not appended to the original file. 
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radicals and the socialists — will be obtained. On the other hand failure to do so would 
provoke an uncertain political situation. 
In short, so far as politics are concerned the situation in Hungary is extremely fluid. 
The country is out to cut its losses and any policy likely to help that end would be 
speedily and blindly followed. 
The curious feature is the complete indifference felt for the Hapsburgs. The King and 
the royal family have passed off the Hungarian stage unsung and unwept. 
If there is one positive conclusion to be drawn from the present condition of Hungary 
it is that the last Hapsburg has worn the crown of St. Stephen. The clergy and the 
peasants seem to have accepted the new situation if without enthusiasm at any rate 
without regrets. The new agrarian law, by which through a system of the taxation of 
land value it is expected to make the large landowners sell their property, appeals to the 
peasants who expect to divide the spoils among themselves. 
The aristocracy has concealed itself from view. High finance mainly in the hand of 
Jews adopts a waiting attitude. Admiration for England is largely genuine and it is 
astonishing to note the influence of English thought upon Hungary. Politically and 
socially in that the virus of Bolshevism has not corroded the national spirit the situation 
in Hungary though at present unsatisfactory is hopeful. If Russian emissaries really are 
active in Budapest their efforts have so far been singularly unsuccessful. 
No. 18 
Letter from G.B. Beak (Zurich) to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne. Extracts) 
[HDLM ACC 727/35] 
Zurich, 19 December 1918 
Dear Sir Horace, 
Within the last two or three days I have had visits from two Austro-Hungarians, one 
of whom recently left Vienna, the other Budapest. Their accounts do not, I think, throw 
very much light on the situation at those places, but I will endeavour to repeat them for 
what they may be worth. 
[..••] 
At Budapest it is thought that Karolyi’s tenure of office will be very brief owing 
mainly to the fact that he cannot, apparently, maintain order. No one appears to know at 
present, however, who is likely to succeed him. 
My Budapest informant states that the British have made a good impression at 
Budapest, and the Italians at Innsbruck, whereas the French, he says, are generally 
disliked. I was rather surprised to gather from him that the idea of the Duke of 
Connaught becoming King of Hungary was taken quite seriously by the Hungarians. 
[...•] 
Yours sincerely, 
G.B. Beak 
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No. 19 
Letter from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (London. 
Received 23 December 1918. Extract) 
No. 972 [PRO FO 371/3138 No. 210629] 
Beme, 19 December 1918 
Sir, 
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a memorandum recording a 
conversation which Mr. Sargent had on the 15th instant with Count Mich[a]el Esterhazy 
and Monsieur Elemer Balogh. 
I should explain that, in accordance with the verbal instructions given me by you in 
Paris, I have received Austrian and Hungarian subjects with a view to obtaining 
information from them which might be of use to His Majesty’s Government. I confined 
myself to listening to what they had to say. But I declined of course any attempt to enter 
into any discussions whatever with de facto or unofficial representatives either of the 
German-Austrian or Hungarian Governments. 
The proposal that the Entente Governments should enhance the prestige of Count 
Karolyi’s Government in the eyes of the Hungarians by consenting to enter into 
unofficial communication with him or his representatives, is so naive as to strengthen 
the impression that Count Karolyi is not really fitted for the r61e he has assumed. 
[....] 
I have, &c., 
Horace Rumbold 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 19 
Memorandum by O. Sargent (Extract) 
Memorandum 
19 December 1918 
Count Mich[a]el Esterhazy and Monsieur Elemer Balogh, Professeur a la Faculte de 
Droit de l’Universite a Budapest called on the 15th instant at the Legation and presented 
credentials from Count Karolyi showing that they were acting on his behalf, and stated 
that they wished to make enquiries of the British Legation on the two following points:- 
[....] ' 
2. They stated that it was essential, if anarchy was not to break out in Hungary, that 
Count Karolyi’s government should be able to retain its prestige in the eyes of the 
Hungarian people, and in order to accomplish this end Count Karolyi was most anxious 
that the Hungarian people should realise that his government had the approval and 
support of the Entente Governments. In order to give Hungary a clear demonstration of 
this fact Count Karolyi is anxious to show that he is in unofficial communication with 
the Entente governments, and Count Esterhazy and his friend were sent to enquire 
whether representatives of the Entente would consent to see Count Karolyi in the event 
of his coming to Switzerland to discuss Hungarian affairs. He would come 
accompanied by a small party of international lawyers and “Scientists” who would 
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explain the economical and ethnological conditions which must determine the future of 
Hungary. 
Count Esterhazy also pointed out that a further reason why Count Karolyi wished to 
get into direct touch with the Entente governments in Switzerland was to be found in 
the fact that the Hungarian Government were finding it very difficult to reconcile the 
two armistices which they had negotiated, one with General Diaz and the other with 
General Franchet d’Esperey, the terms of which were to a large extent contradictory. 
Count Esterhazy acknowledged that the Hungarian Government were able to get into 
touch with General Franchet d’Esperey through the commission which he has sent to 
Budapest, but he pointed out that there is no such channel for communicating with 
General Diaz, who has no representative in Budapest. 
In [sic] undertook to submit both these enquiries to you, but I pointed out that I 
doubted whether the Allied Governments would be prepared, pending the Peace 
Conference, to enter into communications with the Hungarian Government by any 
channel other than that provided for by the Armistice. For the same reason it was 
unlikely that they would be willing to discuss with Count Karolyi the future of 
Hungary, since by doing so they would be anticipating the Peace Conference. 
Count Esterhazy was going to return to Hungary the next day, but Monsieur Balogh 
is remaining on at the Bellevue here. 
No. 20 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[.LEEP, Folder 2] 
Paris, 20 December 1918 
Does Namier know (S.W. [ R.W. Seton-Watson] told me) — that the Hungarian 
Ruthenes have asked for inclusion in the Cecho-Slovak state. If this is true, it simplifies 
many things. 
[....] 
No. 21 
Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (London. 
Received 4 January 1919) 
No. 2518 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 2374] 
Beme, 20 December 1918 
An agent of the Military Attache’s Department learns from a Hungarian now in 
Budapest that on the 2nd instant the date of writing order was still maintained in the 
town though in the country districts there was a certain amount of unrest. The present 
Government though nominally non-socialistic, is really in the hands of the Socialists in 
whose power it lies to overthrow them. The jews [sic] who predominate in the Cabinet 
are arousing bitter hatred among the population, and there is consequently a danger of a 
series of pogroms. 
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No. 22 
Letter from J.W. Headlam-Morley to Sir M. Hankey1 
[HDLM ACC 727/35] 
Foreign Office, 28 December 1918 
Private & Unofficial. 
Dear Sir Maurice Hankey, 
I should like to have seen you to speak about a matter which seems to me of the most 
extreme urgence, viz: the general economic condition of Central Europe. We are 
constantly getting accounts, both from other sources and from Englishmen, who have 
returned from different places, as for instance Austrian Silesia, Vienna, Budapest. 
Every one says the same thing. At present order is being maintained under difficulties 
better than might have been expected, but the economic condition is extremely serious 
and what is to be anticipated is that in a very short time, under pressure of want of food, 
coal and raw materials for starting work, there will be a complete collapse of society, 
the consequences of which will be disastrous. From every part of Germany and of 
Austria-Hungary we get the same request; they ask for Englishmen to be sent to 
enquire into the conditions on the spot and that, as soon as possible, such provisions as 
appear after enquiry to be necessary, shall — so far as possible — be available. At 
present there is a complete want of confidence and security. The Allies keep up the 
blockade, but since the armistice nothing apparently of any kind has been done in order 
to make provision for the consequences which must inevitably arise if the blockade is 
continued and arrangements are not made for the admission of the necessary materials 
and provisions. The factories cannot start working; men will not work; nobody knows 
what to do. We have a definite personal request from Karolyi; we have similar requests 
from the present Government at Berlin, from Vienna and elsewhere. 
We have been waiting week by week to hear the result of the negotiations for meeting 
this situation; nothing is done, no intimation as to the probable action of the Allies is 
given, and it will soon be too late. This matter is far more important than questions to be 
discussed at the Peace Conference, because if we are not careful a state of things may 
arise throughout Europe which will make anything which is determined at the Peace 
Conference abortive and might conceivably even make the meeting of the Peace 
Conference itself almost impossible. 
I should like to urge in the strongest way that this matter should be given precedence 
over everything else. I do not of course know what has been done in conversations 
with President Wilson, but I cannot but feel that if the matter was put before him and 
the Prime Minister in the way in which it appears to those whose duty it is to watch 
what is taking place in Europe, they would find a way out of any difficulties there may 
be and see that the necessary action were taken immediately. 
If it is not done all the results of the war may be lost and the responsibility for this 
will rest upon the British and the American Governments. 
1 For Sir M. Hankey’s answer to this letter see No. 23. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 47 
I am attaching to this copies of some papers which I am sending forward in the 
Foreign Office.2 If it can be of any use my seeing you or anyone else, I shall be here all 
this afternoon. Of course it is rather out of order that I should address you directly and 
not through the Foreign Office, but the urgency of the matter is, I think, sufficient 
justification. 
Yours very truly, 
[J.W. Headlam-Morley] 
2 The papers referred to are not enclosed with the original document. 
No. 23 
Letter from Sir M. Hankey to J. W. Headlam-Morley1 
[HDLM ACC 727/35] 
28 December 1918 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
Dear Mr. Heedlem-Maley,2 
Many thanks for your letter of 28th December, marked Private and Unofficial, and 
which I shall treat accordingly. You hit the right nail on the head in the last sentence of 
your letter. If there is one thing about which I have to be more careful than another if I 
am to do any useful work, it is to avoid trenching on the responsibilities of Departments 
within their own sphere. This is a matter which I conceive to be wholly in the sphere of 
the Foreign Secretary. If he agrees in your point of view it is up to him to advise the 
Cabinet in that sense. Nevertheless, what you say in your letter is useful and helpful, 
and if, in an unofficial way I get an opportunity to help, I will not neglect it. 
Yours sincerely, 
M.P.A. Hankey 
J.U. Heedlem-Maley, Esq., &c., &.,2 
FOREIGN OFFICE. 
* Reply to J.W. Headlam-Morley’s letter, reproduced in No. 22. 
2 It is difficult to account for this misspelling of Headlam-Morley’s name. It may have resulted from a 
misreading of his signature. 
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No. 24 
Memorandum by L.B. Namier for Sir W. Tyrrell 
[PRO FO 371/4354 No. 161 (file52)] 
Foreign Office, 31 December 1918 
[To] Sir William Tyrrell. 
I enclose an extremely interesting report on conditions in Hungary which I have 
received from a certain Mr. J. Edward Thornton, an Oxford graduate and a cousin of 
the Master of Balliol. He has spent some seven or eight years as a teacher in some of 
the leading families of Hungary and has been there throughout the war. He left 
Budapest on December 14th last. 
Count Karolyi’s proposal that an Entente commission should be sent to Budapest with 
a view to helping in regulating economic problems, seems sound and reasonable, and 
nothing could be more desirable than that an end should be put to the exclusive 
management, or rather mismanagement, of East European affairs by the French. I 
venture, however, to suggest that the food control or any other control of ours should 
not envisage the territory of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire as its basis; the late 
Austro-Hungarian Empire is a reminiscence which had better be forgotten, and we 
ought not to deal or think in units other than the new States now established. 
If a mission goes out to Hungary I should think Mr. Thornton might usefully be 
employed in that connection. I know from him that he is seeking employment. I do not 
know him well personally — our entire acquaintance consists of one meeting in 
January 1913 and several conversations during the last week. As far as I can judge, he 
seems to me a very sound, level-headed man; he has no undue pro-Magyar bias, and 
although he unfortunately does not speak Magyar, his personal acquaintance with 
leading people in Hungary might prove useful. If necessary, further personal references 
about him might be obtained from the Master of Balliol. 
With Mr. Thornton’s report I enclose a few papers dealing with Hungary which I 
have received from M.I.lc and which seem of interest.1 
L.B.N[amier]. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 24 
Memorandum by J.E. Thornton 
Oxford, 29 December 1918 
Report 
On the Situation in Hungary in Nov.-Dec. 1918 
It was not till the surrender of Bulgaria that Hungary realised she had lost the war. 
For months previous to this date the political leaders had been aware of the 
1 One of these is printed as No. 17. 
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hopelessness of the situation, but the Press was under a drastic censorship, and the 
fiction of victory was maintained. Even five days later when Count M. Karolyi uttered, 
for the first time in Parliament, the fatal words: “We have lost the War” he was greeted 
with a storm of indignation both in the House and in the Press. On the following day, 
however, the late Count Stephen Tisza had the courage to make a similar statement, 
though he qualified it by adding that Hungary had lost the War “in the sense that she 
could no longer hope to win it and must therefore open negotiations for concluding 
peace” — or words to that effect. 
Such a declaration from the mouth of such a man was conclusive. There was a 
moment of dumb surprise followed by a violent movement of resentment. The 
Government lost its head, violent scenes occurred in Parliament, the King hurried to 
Budapest and there followed ten days of negotiations and combinations. The people, 
realising they had been hoodwinked by the war-party, turned spontaneously to Karolyi 
as the one man who had consistently opposed the war-policy of the late Government. 
Each day’s delay increased the popular demand for Karolyi, but the King still hesitated. 
Then suddenly came the Revolution of October 31st which brought Karolyi to power, 
as the leader of a revolutionary people’s Government. 
Count Karolyi’s popularity was extraordinary. His photograph was exposed in every 
shop-window of the town, his name was on everybody’s lips, and he was regarded, not 
only by the people but by his own fellow aristocrats, as the prime mover and organiser 
of the Revolution. As a matter of fact he was nothing of the sort. He did not want a 
revolution and tried to prevent it; still less did he desire the change from the monarchical 
to the republican form of government, which took place later. And if the King had had 
the courage to nominate him Prime Minister ten days earlier it is probable both events 
could have been avoided. 
Throughout the War Count Karolyi had consistently opposed the war ambitions of 
Germany, especially in regard to “Mitteleuropa”. He had in consequence to suffer 
severe repression, both as regards his person and his Press. He told me he had finally 
to forbid his paper to publish any leading articles, as it was impossible to express any 
criticism of Government policy without risking having the whole paper confiscated. 
The surrender of Bulgaria opened the people’s eyes to the fact that the war part had 
deceived them, and they instinctively turned to Karolyi as their champion. Thus it was 
that Karolyi became the champion of a cause he would never willingly have espoused, 
and that the Revolution and the proclamation of the Republic became associated with 
the name of the man who had laboured to prevent their accomplishment. 
Count Karolyi is just over forty. He is intelligent, well-informed and quite fearless. 
He possesses great personal charm and it is impossible to talk with him for any length 
of time without being convinced of his sincerity and transparent honesty of purpose. 
But he is full of contradictions. Himself by birth and character an aristocrat of 
aristocrats he is intellectually a convinced Socialist of the moderate type. He desired the 
autonomy of the nationalities, yet wished to preserve the integrity of the Hungarian 
State. And at the same time that he wished to maintain Magyar ascendancy he 
condemned the alliance with Germany by which alone it was and could have been 
preserved. He is greatly impressed by President Wilson and has always been an 
admirer of Lloyd George. I remember him asking me at the time of the famous Budget, 
to procure for him from England any books dealing with Lloyd George’s reforms. 
During the War the Count and I never once met, as was natural. I saw him again 
shortly after his assumption of power. He told me he was in a most extraordinary 
position. He had promised to end the War, and would keep his word. But though the 
order had been sent for the army to lay down their arms, the Higher Command refused 
to obey the order or communicate it to the troops. Moreover, the emissaries he had sent 
to negotiate the Armistice terms were not allowed through to the enemy lines. Three 
aeroplanes he had sent to establish connection with the French Headquarters had not 
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reached their destination. He then announced his intention of starting off himself in a 
special train south, and flying over the two armies himself, to the Headquarters of 
General Franchet O’Esperey [sic]. This adventurous journey never took place, for the 
Higher Command agreed that same afternoon to the surrender of arms. 
The demobilisation of the army took place in disorder. For over three weeks the 
soldiers, who had been half-starved at the front, were left to make the best of their way 
home. They arrived on crowded trains, hanging on to the steps, sitting on the roofs, 
without any provision for food either on the journey or on their arrival in Budapest. All 
day and all night streams of these poor fellows could be seen making their way across 
the town from one station to another. It was a sad home-coming after the long years at 
the front. 
The disorder at the time of demobilisation and at the time of the Revolution would 
have been much greater had the leaders not had the happy idea of proclaiming at the 
same time the separation of Hungary from Austria. The day of the Revolution became 
the feast of Hungary’s emancipation from the hated yoke of Austria,2 and even weeks 
after, as the soldiers straggled home, it was the idea of national freedom which served 
to veil the bitterness of national defeat. 
When the rush was over trouble began all over the country. The soldiers had arrived 
home filthy, hungry, and in rags. They started looting for food and clothes. They 
cleared out the nearest villages; they went deer-stalking in the rich preserves of the 
Magyar aristocracy; they shot cows and sheep in the meadows. Bullets from service 
rifles were whizzing all over the country. Many castles were plundered, some few were 
burned to the ground but these cases mostly occurred where the landowner was an 
absentee landlord. Where the Lord of the Manor was known and respected no harm 
was done to his goods. In one case known to me personally the peasants 
commandeered all the horses and carts on the property, carried off all the food and 
fodder supplies, divided the loot amongst the village (giving their due share to the 
Count’s servants) and next day brought back and stalled the carts and horses! There 
was trouble of a more serious kind on the Croatian frontier where a band of some 
10,000 deserters organised under a capable leader terrorised the country for miles round 
for some weeks. It was no uncommon thing for travellers by train from Fiume to arrive 
in Budapest stripped not only of their money, but of their clothes! But by the time I left 
Hungary (December 15th) the country-side was orderly enough, and the disturbances 
were never more than spasmodic in character. 
Hungary is a land of peasants and the Hungarian peasant is a hard worker. His thirst 
is for the land, and he has no conception of political issues. For the moment he refuses 
to work. He worked last year from morning to night, he says, and all he produced was 
taken from him. But with returning security and peasant-ownership he may be relied 
upon to settle down again to orderly productive life. 
It was a misfortune from more than one point of view that the war came to an end in 
the autumn. As most of the manhood of the country were at the front the agricultural 
labour was largely supplied by the Russian and other prisoners of war. These at once 
dispersed at the time of the Revolution with the consequence that a large part of the late 
potato and sugar-beet crops was left in the ground, where it is now hard frozen. But 
beyond the fact that the peasant is helping himself to his lord’s venison and cutting 
down his lord’s forests for fire-wood, he is behaving on the whole very well. 
In Budapest itself order was restored the day after the Revolution and has been 
maintained ever since. The people were in a good humour. The War was at last ended: 
Hungary was at last free: those two facts were enough for the crowd. But order could 
2 The words in italics were marked with a broken line by L.B. Namier, who also recorded the following 
notes on the margin: ‘? That “yoke”, as far as Hungary was concerned, was clearly a mere reminiscence & 
a legend. L.B.N.’ 
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never have been maintained without the “working man”. His attitude was one of the 
surprises of the situation. Many of the large factories in Ujpest, outside Budapest, are 
employed in the production of provisions for the troops. There were attempts made to 
plunder some of them, but the workmen met the plunderers with rifle-fire. The owner- 
manager of one of these factories, when he had recovered from his astonishment, called 
his men together and thanked them. He was met with derision. They explained they had 
defended the factory because it was theirs, and did not belong to him any longer! This 
method of appropriation cannot be denied the advantage of directness and extreme 
simplicity. In some cases, where the owner was popular, the men offered to keep him 
on as manager at a monthly salary: where the owner was unpopular he was simply 
kicked out. 
I observed a similar spirit among tram-men. Trams are few, and Budapest is 
overcrowded so that for months past it has been a struggle to get on a tram. The girl 
ticket-collectors had grown tired of forcing their way through the crowded cars, and it 
was the exception rather than the rule to have to pay for your ride. After the Revolution 
all this was changed. Drivers and ticket-collectors suddenly showed a renewed zeal in 
the matter of payment. Especially were they remorseless with the soldiers, who had 
taken the habit of using the trams free of charge. I heard one driver delivering a 
veritable speech to a delinquent soldier and reminding him that the workmen were not 
disreputable bands like the soldiers! The reason is the same as with the factory workers 
— the trams now belong to them, and they do not intend to allow the public to defraud 
them. 
Another notable and ominous development in the life of Budapest is the sudden and 
artificial raising of the workmen’s wages. This is out of all proportion even to the high 
price of commodities. A captain of police known to me had his salary raised from 
K.7000 to K. 18000 (£240 to £720) a year. He said he would have been delighted to 
have had K.1200 (£480). (Ordinary policemen were raised from K.150 (£6) to K.700 
(£28) a month.) All officials have been raised double or more: an ordinary day-labourer 
gets £3 a day. With great “protection”31 managed to obtain a ton of fourth-grade coal, 
which cost £4. But to cart it to the house (a matter of half-an-hour) cost £6. A well- 
known doctor complained to me that he had to pay his chauffeur £32 a month and 
provide him with a flat into the bargain! The Government has been spending millions in 
salaries during the last few weeks, and everyone knows it cannot go on. It is true that it 
is all paper money, but even paper money cannot be produced in this reckless fashion 
indefinitely. The exchange is bad enough as it is. A K.100 note is now worth little more 
than a £1, instead of £4. On K. 10,000 I lost over £250 on the exchange in Budapest. In 
London no one will tough [touch] Austro-Hungarian notes and it is impossible to 
change them. 
Another feature of Budapest life is the apathy in regard to work. This is a 
phenomenon common to all defeated countries. The soldiers say they have done four 
years’ toil for their country and have nothing but misery to show for it. It is up to their 
country to do something for them. When I left (December 15th) the police calculated 
there must be between 20 to 25 thousand disbanded soldiers, most of whom have arms, 
living in idleness in Budapest. In spite of the enormous wages offered it is difficult to 
induce any one to work. 
The Government, for instance, cannot persuade any one to enlist in the army. After 
three weeks’ strenuous effort the War Minister, Bartha,4 resigned the task as hopeless. 
The few who have joined are boys attracted by the high wages and are innocent of any 
sort of discipline. The streets of Budapest remain unswept, the dustbins unemptied. 
Exhaustion is everywhere. 
3 L.B. Namier remarked above this word: “(backing)”. 
4 Albert Bartha, Hungarian Minister of War, November-December 1918. 
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The aristocrats maintain a brave face, and their spirit is admirable. All of them expect 
to be mined and await with remarkable calm a future that can bode no good for them. 
The rich Jewish merchants, some of whom have amassed incredible fortunes during the 
war, keep as much as possible to their houses. If the storm of Bolshevism bursts on 
Hungary the Jews will be among the first to be swept away. But up to my departure 
from Budapest, although great lack of order was everywhere evident, there was little 
actual disorder, in the sense of rowdyism, to be observed. 
The Church has, rather late in the day, made the great sacrifice and thrown its vast 
lands into the melting-pot. But it would be a mistake to regard the Church as given over 
in a body to reaction. A very powerful section, under the leadership of Bishop 
Prohaszka5 is quite alive to the needs of the times. Prohaszka, as early as 1916, came 
forward with a programme for distributing the Church lands among the wounded 
soldiers who returned disabled from the War. And the peasant-priest in the village has 
always been in favour of the distribution of the Church lands. But the part the Church 
may play in the problem of reconstruction is as yet but ill-defined. 
i saw Count Karolyi for the last time on December 12th, shortly before I left 
Budapest. He was looking tired and complained that he could neither sleep nor eat. His 
position, he said (he was in a despondent mood), was becoming impossible — indeed 
almost comic. The Entente seem disinclined to make any distinction between himself 
and the late Count Tisza, and he felt he could be of no use to his country. He would 
gladly resign, but there was no one to whom he could hand his resignation! He was 
President and Premier rolled into one. His endeavour would be to hold the elections for 
the Presidency as soon as possible and then hand over his task to some one else. But he 
was anxious to make a final effort, and had sounded Paris as to whether he should 
come in person to talk things over. “Just think,’ he said, “the people here now think I 
want to run away and I have just received a report that the ‘Nemzeti Tanacs the 
National Assembly — would arrest me on the frontier if I tried to leave for Paris.” 
The Count then asked me if I would undertake to carry despatches to London. I 
replied I could not do so. He pressed me and explained that it was not the political but 
the economic question that was so urgent. I then said I should be willing to report what 
he told me on this point. He said: “Our greatest need is coal. In Budapest we have been 
living for weeks past in regard to coal from day to day. We have more than once had 
less than two days’ supply in the town. We may at any time find it impossible to light 
the city at night. The lack of coal also hinders us from sending what food and other 
commodities we have to places where they are required. Moreover, the Czechs, 
Roumanians, Serbians etc., as they advance from the frontiers towards Budapest, are 
appropriating whatever supplies they find — potatoes, coal-mines, grain, rolling stock 
etc. If this process of disruption continues — and we are powerless to prevent it — the 
country is faced with starvation, and its inevitable result, Bolshevism, before the winter 
is over.” 
Count Karolyi suggested a remedy. It was that the Entente should send out a 
commission to take an inventory of the food and other essential commodities available 
in the countries of Central Europe, with power to control the equal distribution of such 
commodities as between the various countries, according to their individual needs. In 
the Count’s opinion, even with the best possible control and distribution serious trouble 
is inevitable owing to food-shortage in the spring: without such Entente control nothing 
can save the country from the impending starvation and consequent anarchy. 
Count Karolyi would regard a military occupation of the country as greatly tending to 
help reconstruction, but he does not ask for it. In general Budapest would welcome the 
5 OttokcQ' Prohaszka, Bishop of Szekesfehervar, ecclesiastical writer. 
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arrival of Entente troops with great relief. But the Count presses for Entente control in 
regard to food distribution. 
In my opinion Count Karolyi’s suggestion is valuable. I believe that if a commission 
for food control and distribution were sent, and especially if the scarcity of food were 
helped out by contributions from Entente resources, it would enormously tend to relieve 
the situation not only in Hungary, but over all Central Europe. The fact that the Danube 
is under Entente control, and that both Budapest and Vienna could be dominated from 
it, would tend to give the Commission the necessary authority and support. But I do not 
believe any military intervention, or threat of it, would be wanted. Provided an 
absolutely frank statement of the food situation were published, and the Press were 
organised to back the work of the Commission and popularise the measures necessary 
to meet the situation, it is my belief that the people would rally round it. 
It is unnecessary to emphasise the menace of Bolshevism. In Hungary it is already 
present, though in a bloodless form. Count Karolyi repeated to me more than once that 
that was his chief concern. “The political questions can await the decision of the Peace 
Conference — in any case we shall have little voice in their settlement — but what calls 
for immediate solution is the problem of how to feed the people and maintain order 
during the months that must elapse before these world-negotiations are concluded. 
Hungary is defeated. The Entente can do as they like with her. But our State is over a 
thousand years old and was for centuries the outpost of Europe. It cannot surely be the 
wish of the victorious Entente — it is not even in their interest — to crush us absolutely 
to the ground, and make it impossible for us to combat the spreading menace of 
Bolshevism.” 
At parting Count Karolyi added that he did not expect to maintain himself over the 
New Year. I think his judgment is here at fault. His popularity is still great: the people 
know that the difficulties of his situation are none of his making: but especially there is 
no one else to represent Hungary at the Peace Conference. For these reasons I believe 
he will be still in power — unless he insists on resigning — when the Conference 
meets. 
(signed) J. Edward Thornton 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Sir William Tyrrell 
This useful paper is by Mr. Thornton; I have already sent you a note of interview 
with him. The last part deserves special and urgent attention. 
I agree with Mr. Namier as to the advantage of using him if it was desired to send 
someone to Hungary. x 
J.W.H[eadlam-].M[orley]. 
2/1/19 
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No. 25 
Report Written by R. Kimens (Vienna) for the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 16 January 1919) 
No. 6 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/142] 
Vienna, 9 January 1919 
Having read in the papers of our presence in Vienna, Count Julius Andrassy travelled 
up from Hungary and invited us, through a member of the Polish Legation, to visit him 
to-day, as he wished to make a statement to us. 
We called on Count Andrassy to-day at the house of his sister, Princess Esterhazy. 
He was anxious, first, that we should at once send a small force, say 20,000, safe 
troops to Budapesth, where the situation is not only serious but critical. He fears an 
outbreak of Bolshevism may occur at any moment. It is of the utmost importance, 
therefore, that the Allies should take immediate steps to check the further advance of the 
Bolshevist movement; as, given Hungary, the Bolshevist wave would sweep to Italy 
and France.1 
We are most anxious, said Count Andrassy, to know what the Entente propose to do 
with us; but we hear nothing from them. We only know that, on the one hand, the 
Tcheko-Slovaks state that the Entente have promised them a large part of Hungary, not 
only that inhabited by Slovaks, but also districts which are inhabited exclusively by 
Hungarians. On the other hand, Rumanians state that, for their part, they have been 
promised the Rumanian part of Hungary. Further we gather that Croatia is also to be 
detached from Hungary. This would leave Hungary a small, purely agricultural country, 
deprived entirely of its rich mining and industrial districts. Under these circumstances 
Hungary would be a country which could not live, but at the same time it would refuse 
to die. “If England pronounces this sentence of death upon us”, said Count Andrassy, 
“I for one shall be a revolutionary. I am and shall remain a Hungarian, and shall seek to 
defend Hungary so long as I live.” 
I admit, said Count Andrassy, that my policy has been a German policy. Foreseeing 
the Slav danger, we had to seek a strong Ally against Russia, and Germany was 
naturally the Power to which we turned. But I wanted also a rapprochement, as did my 
father, between England and Germany, as I could not see why these two nations should 
quarrel. England is now the strongest European power and, in the future, will be forced 
to come to an agreement with Germany, as a divided Europe would be a standing 
temptation to an aggressive imperialist America or Japan. We want, above everything 
else, an understanding with England -— that is, if we are to exist at all, — and it seems 
1 On 2 January 1919 Sir H. Rumbold reported in a letter from Berne to the Foreign Office that he had 
received a letter from the Marquess Gyorgy Pallavicini, Count G. Andrassy, the younger’s son-in-law, 
communicating Count Andrassy’s wish to go to Switzerland to get in contact with representatives from 
the Entente in order to discuss matters relating to the future of Hungary, especially the problem of the 
growing danger of Bolshevism. L.B. Namier recorded the following minutes on the letter on 15 January 
1919: “Count Andrassy never carried much weight, & carries none at present. He was good at court 
intrigues but is not a leader. It certainly would not pay to make an exception for him from the rule 
previously laid down. [I.e. not seeing representatives of the defeated countries before the signature of the 
peace treaties.] As to Bolshevism in Hungary, there really does not seem much danger of it; a very level 
headed Englishman who has returned from Hungary recently [probably J.E. Thornton (see No. 24)] 
assures us that there is none. But whatever danger there is of political confusion it is largely created by 
such intriguers as Andrassy, Pallavicini, Esterhazy &c., who by their activities, play straight into the 
hands of the extremists.” (PRO FO 371/3529 No. 4915/W3) 
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to me that the best development would be a federation with Austria, as Austria must be 
linked on to some power, and England surely would prefer a friendly Austria-Hungary 
to driving Austria into German hands. I assume that England, now the strongest power 
in Europe, will restore and keep order in Constantinople; but the time is certain to come 
when both Bulgaria and Serbia will raise objections to England’s presence in 
Constantinople. Surely, in that case, a friendly Austria-Hungary will be an invaluable 
Ally. Further, given a Hungary which can continue to exist, we must come to some 
agreement with Poland, which again will be to England’s interests. 
To revert to the subject of Bolshevism: The position of Hungary is now so uncertain 
that the whole country is in a state of nerves, and, consquently, a fit subject for 
Bolshevik propaganda. It must be remembered that we have in Hungary Tcheko-Slovak 
and Rumanian troops, and Hungarian agents, working from patriotic motives, are 
preaching Revolution in Tcheko-Slovakia and Rumania, as a means of getting these 
troops withdrawn from our country. At the present moment everything tends to the 
development of Bolshevism, which is a danger for all of us. 
Help for us in the form of troops for Budapest and a definite statement that Hungary 
is not to be annihilated, will not only save our country, but will help to protect Western 
Europe against Bolshevism. 
We, of course, made no statement or comment whatever to Count Andrassy. 
R. Kimens 
Rowland Kenney2 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This is further indication of the efforts being made by the Magyars to capture British 
sympathy. Count Andrassy appeals to our humanity, our vanity & even our cupidity 
(e.g. Constantinople). 
Harold Nicolson 
16/1/19 
The admission (last line of p. 2) [5th paragraph] that Bolshevik agents in Rumania & 
among the techo-Slovaks are supported by Hungarians “/or patriotic motives” is very 
important & interesting. So long as the Hungarian authorities continue this policy it is 
hard to see why the Rumanians & C-S.’s shd. adopt a conciliatory attitude towards them 
over food supplies. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
16/1/19 
Count Andrassy still moves on the old diplomatic plane on Mettemich’s plan. To 
appeal to us by promising Austro-Hungarian support against Serbia and Bulgaria 
vocals [?] a frame of mind which should not encourage us to enter into political 
discussions or bargains with Hungarian politicians. 
E. Crowe 
16/1/19 
2 The editor has not been able to establish further details about this second signatory of the document. 
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(From) [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/140] 
[....] Mr. Kimen’s report of January 9 from Vienna (paper No. 142) illustrate^] 
opportunely the absurdity of the Hungarian complaint, voiced by Sir R. [W.] 
Beveridge,3 that the Hungarians have been quite unable to place their views before us. 
In fact, of course, we have been inundated with every Hungarian’s views for many 
months past. 
E. Crowe 
16/1/19 
3 See Nos. 26 and 27. 
No. 26 
Memorandum by Lord R. Cecil 
[LI. G. F/49/3/1] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 16 January 1919 
Sir R. [W.] Beveridge who has just returned from a visit to Vienna and Budapest, 
where he went on a mission on behalf of the Food Controller in connection with the 
proposed relief scheme, came to talk to me at length to-day on the result of his 
mission.1 He appears to entertain the most extended views as to the action to be taken 
by the International Food Commission, and appeared very insistent on the necessity and 
advantage of utilizing the situation in those countries as regards food and raw materials, 
for the purpose of all sorts of political and politico-economical schemes, which in my 
opinion go far beyond what should be the scope of any relief scheme. He is strongly 
imbued with the idea that peace is already practically concluded and all trade restrictions 
as between Germany, Austria and Hungary on one side, and the territories liberated 
from Austria-Hungary on the other, ought to be promptly removed, and that we ought 
to encourage the several new States to enter into an economic Union with Austria and 
Hungary. He also made himself the spokesman of all sorts of Hungarian grievances, in 
particular the complaint that the Hungarians were not allowed to place their side of their 
case before us. To this end Sir R. [W.] Beveridge recommends either (a) that regular, 
practically official, relations should be established with some Hungarian Representation 
to be at Christiania, or (b) that a regular F.O. Representative should be sent to Budapest, 
or (c) that he himself (Sir R.[W.] Beveridge) should return there in connection with the 
Relief Scheme with authority to enter into political discussions with the Hungarians. 
I confess that all this seems to me altogether wild and injudicious. Sir R.[W.] 
Beveridge, whilst he talked with great assurance, did not give one the impression that 
he had any real understanding of the political situation; he seemed to make himself the 
advocate of all purely Hungarian interests, and dwelt much on the necessity of our 
conciliating Hungarian opinion and feelings. 
1 For extracts from Sir W. Beveridge’s report, prepared after his return from the mission, see No. 27. 
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I trust that none of his three alternative proposals will be approved or encouraged. It 
may be useful and desirable to attach to the Relief Mission when it returns to Austria- 
Hungary, some competent observer who can furnish us with reliable information on 
what is going on not only in the economic, but also in the political, field. But I feel 
strongly that Sir R, [W.] Beveridge would not be a competent or reliable adviser on 
political matters and that, should it be decided to send some one, another selection 
should be made in consultation with our Political Intelligence Department. 
Meanwhile, I understand, Sir R.[W.l Beveridge proposes to put his suggestions 
direct before the Prime Minister. If so, I think it would be well to let the Prime Minister 
or his private secretary know that Sir R.[W.] Beveridge’s political ideas want checking. 
I ought to mention that Sir E. Howard, Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Seeper (?) [Leeper] 
were present at the interview. I regret that Sir E. Howard did not appear to share my 
views on the political situation, being rather attracted by Sir R.[W.] Beveridge’s ideas. 
But I remain convinced that they are not on the right lines, and could not safely be 
pursued at this juncture. 
(Intd.) R[obert]. C[ecil]. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Hungary is just as much an enemy country as Germany, Bulgaria &c. and I see no 
reason why official political relations should be established with her rather than with 
other enemy countries. It would be useful to know rather more than we do as to what 
is going on at Pesth. 
(Intd.) H[ardinge]. 
No. 27 
Report Written by Sir W. Beveridge (Extracts) 
[LI G. F/197/5] 
17 January 1919 
Interim Report by the Inter-Allied Commission on 
Relief of German Austria1 
[....] 
At any rate the most hopeful outlook for Vienna (and so, for its creditors) lies in 
restoring its importance as a transport and trading centre: this in turn probably depends 
upon restoring as much as possible of the previous economic unity of Austria- 
Hungary, despite its political dismemberment. A movement for an “Economic 
Confederation of the Danube”, which would also be for German Austria a movement 
1 For the reaction of senior officials in the Foreign Office to Sir W. Beveridge’s proposals, see No. 26. 
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away from Germany, may thus be both financially and politically desirable from the 
point of view of the principal Allies; whether the feeling between the different states 
that must compose such a confederation is such as to allow of its being realised in any 
reasonable period of time is another question. 
Fear of Bolshevism and Disorder 
Wherever the Commission went — but particularly in Prag and Buda-Pesth — they 
found a constantly repeated expression of fear of Bolshevism arising, both out of the 
hardships to which the workmen were being subjected and as the result of agitation 
fostered from Russia. 
The expression of the fear was generally followed by a request for the presence of 
allied troops. M. Kramarsch (whom we interviewed on the day before he was shot at) 
was extremely emphatic in his fear, and President Masaryk was also prepared to 
welcome such intervention. Buda-Pesth, at the time of our visit, was in the throes of a 
political crisis, and though the issue there did not concern the Bolshevists properly so 
called (but was an issue between the bourgeois and the social democratic parties) the 
spectre of Bolshevism was always present to the minds of everybody. The only 
publicly armed force in Hungary now is entirely in the hands of the Social Democrats 
and entirely undisciplined. The Minister of War, M.[S.] Festetics,2 told me that he very 
seldom issued an order now because every order issued by him was submitted by the 
soldiers to a Soldiers Council to consider whether or not they would obey it. At any 
moment there is fear that the extremer social democrats may become Bolshevists or the 
soldiers themselves may go over to a party of robbery of [or?] violence. There seems 
indeed little doubt that if Buda-Pesth is left to itself it will sooner or later explode and 
the only difference of opinion that I have heard is as to whether the explosion was 
likely to take place in a few days or in a few weeks. 
I recognise that the remedy of military occupation is not one that should be lightly 
adopted, but it is difficult to feel any security without it. 
I am inclined to suggest for consideration that at any rate an appreciable force of 
Entente troops (say 5000 or 10,000) should by agreement with the Czechs be sent to 
Czecho-Slovakia, which may be regarded as an island of allied feeling and comparative 
stability surrounded on all sides by disorganization and threats of disorder. Troops sent 
to Czecho-Slovakia would be, from there as a base, able to deal rapidly with disorder in 
the neighbouring districts (Eastern Silesia, Buda-Pesth, Galicia) and a small stiffening 
of Entente troops would enable the Czech troops themselves to be employed to a 
considerable extent by increasing their prestige. 
Any permanent safeguard against disorder must clearly be sought, not in military 
occupation, but in the restoration of economic security: that is to say in the immediate 
provision of the minimum food, clothing and fuel and in the resumption at as early a 
date as possible of ordinary industrial activity. 
[....] Conclusion and Recommendations 
The cessation of war without the restoration of peace in Austria Hungary, combined 
with its political dismemberment has produced a state of general economic paralysis. It 
seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that in order to prevent a collapse of the social 
order comparable to what has occurred in Russia, the Allies must practically if not 
formally treat the war with all parts of Austria as finished, and must give positive help 
in reconstruction there. The reason for this is not that the Hungarians or German 
2 Count Sandor Festetics, Minister of War in Count M. Karolyi’s cabinet, December 1918-January 
1919. 
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Austrians deserve special consideration, or have a claim to avoid suffering as Northern 
France and Belgium did. The real grounds are twofold:- 
(i) The war is in fact so completely finished, as far as these countries are concerned, 
and they are so completely smashed, that war-time standards of inhumanity are no 
longer applicable. 
(ii) The further spread of disorder in Europe is a danger to the Allied countries 
themselves. 
A third ground was advanced by representative men both in German Austria and 
Hungary. In each case they stated that if they were left alone and on unfriendly terms 
with their immediate neighbours (Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania), since it 
was impossible for them to stand alone — with their reduced territories and economic 
impoverishment they would be bound to fall into close relations with Germany, which 
would thus get a material accession of strength. If on the other hand German Austria 
and Hungary could enter on reasonable terms into a close economic relation with their 
neighbour states — an “Economic Confederation of the Danube” — the whole might 
form a group of connected states too clearly differentiated in character ever to join 
Germany as a whole, yet with sufficient internal cohesion to prevent any one member 
of the group breaking off to Germany. A permanent equipoise would be produced in 
the South to German power in the North. No doubt both German Austria and Hungary 
would have ideas as to their respective positions in such a group and as to territorial 
questions which are not likely to be realised. 
This argument touches the fringe of very large and much debated questions, and I only 
give it for what it is worth. In the mouths of most of those who used it, it was certainly 
not a threat but an expression of their own desires. The making, in effect if not in form, 
of an earlier economic peace in the whole of Austria-Hungary and thus leaving 
Germany alone to the last would be a simple continuance of the strategy which 
terminated the war, by a succession of armistices at different dates. 
Assuming, however, that, whether with this in view or not, the Associated 
Governments are prepared to treat the war as ended so far as is necessary to prevent 
both extreme privation and disorder, the following programme of action is suggested. 
Proposals for Action 
A: General 
1. Two general principles should be accepted and publicly announced by the 
Associated Governments of France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
irrespective of the peace negotiations, viz. 
(a) That all the territories formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
should be enabled and assisted to obtain the indispensable minimum 
supplies of food, fuel and other primary commodities up to the next 
harvest. 
(b) That without prejudice to political claims there should be an immediate 
resumption of supply and interchange of such commodities between all 
those territories, irrespective of any terms of military occupation under 
the armistice. 
[....] 
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No. 28 
Minutes on a Memorandum by H. Nicolson and A. W.A. Leeper 
[PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/375] 
[These minutes precede a memorandum sent by Professor George D. Herron on 10 
January 1919 from Geneva, reporting that a plea has been placed before him by a 
visiting commission representing the Protestant Churches of Hungary with regard to 
the dangers facing the Protestant community in Transylvania as a result of the emerging 
peace settlement.]1 
More Hungarian propaganda! 
H.G.N[icolson]. 
21/1/19 
An extraordinary mass of misstatements; e.g. that 1 out of the 21/2 million 
Transilvanians [sic] are Protestants is absurd. Similarly the suspicions of Rumanian 
intolerance here put forward are, so far as we know, quite unjustified both by past & 
present attitude of the Rumanians towards the German & Magyar Protestants, who will 
be given complete equality, cultural & religious. (The Szekler are mainly Roman 
Catholic). Profr. Herron was speaking to me this morning of the various attempts of 
this kind made by Hungarian religious & political persons to get in touch with Paris. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
23/1/19 
1 For documents regarding a request by the General Presbyterian Alliance (Edinburgh) for help for the 
Reformed Church of Hungary see Nos. 32 and 44. 
No. 29 
Letter from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to Lady A. Hankey (London. Extract f 
[HNKY 3/24] 
Quai d’Orsay, 
Paris, 29 January 1919 
[....] This afternoon Poles and Tseco-Slovaks are droning out their interminable 
“revendications” and explanations of their national desiderata. They are only remotely a 
British interest, and Ll.G. has been getting more and more restive. As I write these 
words, he has burst in to try and stop what is the most infernal waste of time. [....] 
1 This letter is also partially quoted in S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets , London, 1972, vol. II, 
1919-1931, p. 56. 
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No. 30 
Letter from Captain J.G.L. Pommerol (Budapest) 
to Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade)1 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 28506] 
British Mission, Budapest, 31 January 1919 
Acting upon the instructions received from you at Semlin I immediately proceeded to 
Buda Pest and arrived there during the night of the 20/21 January. 
I immediately got into touch with people who could give me reliable information on 
the local situation and the state of unrest in this country. I also had conversation with 
Colonel Vyx on the subject. My wire to you was the result of these 3 days observation 
and conversations. From accounts I had received before my arrival here I expected to 
find Hungary and Buda Pest especially in an awful state. I had been told that it was not 
safe to be out of doors after dark and that Communism was rampant etc. There appears 
to have been good reason for anxiety for some time and it looked as if things might 
have been very nasty. The French received threatening letters and for a while, I 
understand, they had the “wind-up”. The papers published articles against the 
Entente,— The situation had already improved when I reached Buda Pest. This was due 
to various causes but mainly to the defeat of the disruptive elements in Berlin and the 
death of the Bolshevik leaders there. The turn of events in Germany for a while damped 
the ardour of the ringleaders in Hungary. How long the truce will last it is difficult to 
say. At present the enemies of order and law are organizing themselves: they have 
papers, offices in different parts quarters [sic] of the city and carry on a very active 
propaganda but excepting a few instances there has been no bloodshed in Hungary so 
far. 
There is some sort of a Government in the Country but they have not got the country 
behind them. The members are mostly Jews with no status. They dare not move a 
finger lest the Council of Workmen and soldiers should turn them out. The Army 
demobilised itself and the 8 divisions allowed them by the terms of the Armistice are 
not in existence. In the event of any serious disturbance happening the Government are 
powerless to keep order as they have no organised force to depend upon There is no 
telling what would happen then. The workmen in Budapest and the peasantry are 
armed. As the Army was not demobilised the Authorities could not collect all the arms 
and ammunition; as a result of this there are thousands of rifles all over the country with 
a very large number of machine guns. The German soldiers of Mackenzen’s 
[Mackensen’s] Army also sold their arms to the peasantry. The cause of discontent & 
the ensuing unrest is economic rather than political. Food is very dear and scarce, 
clothes are beyond the reach of the poor people. There is enough food in the country for 
the whole of the population but the industrial and commercial life of Hungary is almost 
at a standstill and the distribution of food is very bad. I do not think that the Bolsheviks 
really mean business on the Russian lines. In my opinion the workmen will only resort 
to brigandage if they are driven to it by famine. The scarcity of coal has forced 50% of 
the factories to close down and reduced the output of the others considerably. There are 
hundreds of thousands of workmen idle. The Government passed a decree some time 
ago according to which all persons who had no work would be given between 15 and 
20 Crowns a day. The effect of this decree was deplorable, as nobody wants to work 
1 The letter was transmitted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites to Lord Curzon in London, where it arrived on 
18 February 1919. 
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now. In the country conditions are even worse — a large portion of the year’s harvest 
has not been gathered: potatoes, beet, etc., remained in the ground, immense quantities 
of maize have not been brought in. Famine thus stares everyone in the face and 
revolution will follow as a consequence. The whole force including the police which the 
government possess to enforce order total 23,000 men. They admit that they cannot 
trust these men as Communistic and Bolshevik doctrines have spread among them. 
There is no discipline in the Army and the men obey their officers only when it suits 
them to do so. 
The trouble, when it comes, will be directed mainly against the moneyed classes — 
the rich landowners and the Jews. The latter number 500,000 in Budapest alone. The 
movement as a whole is not directed against foreigners. The American[s] and British 
are not disliked. The French on the other hand are not liked, owing to the fact that their 
Colonial troops which occupy part of the country have behaved rather badly, I am given 
to understand. I have made arrangements in conjunction with the Spanish Consul for 
the embarkation of the Allied subjects in case of a Revolution breaking out. 
The situation may be summed up thus:- There is a real danger of an outbreak in 
Flungary, in Budapest especially. The present state of unrest among the workmen and 
peasants alike is due to the very high cost of living, scarcity of clothes and lack of 
work. The output of coal which is available is not sufficient to keep the factories, 
railways etc., going. The Bolshevics are not Bolshevics in the real meaning of the term. 
There are a few leaders who profess Communist and Bolshevic doctrines but the mass 
of the people are a rabble without much in them. They are a discontented crowd who 
would welcome the return of normal conditions, if circumstances and a Government 
worthy of the name could get the country out of the rut in which it has fallen. This 
government does not exist here. The majority of the Ministers are a lot of upstarts, men 
who know nothing and have no idea as to how a country ought to be run. They are 
simply driving the whole nation to min and disaster. 
(signed) J.G.L. Pommerol. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
The position is clearly very bad, but it is for the French who are on the spot to take 
measures. 
[....] 
C.H.S[mith]. 
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No. 31 
Memorandum by L.B. Namier (London) to J.W. Headlam -Morley (Paris. Extract) 
[HDLM ACC 727/11 Folder 2) 
Foreign Office, 
London, 1 February 1919 
[.-] 
From the latest Austrian papers I gather that the situation in Hungary is becoming 
rather tense, that labour troubles are breaking out in the Magyar towns and mining 
districts, but the Magyar government seems incapable of any positive work. To some 
extent this is due to the uncertainty of frontiers. The Rumanes, Jugo-Slavs and Czecho¬ 
slovaks were continually advancing, in many cases into indisputably Magyar territory. 
The Magyar upper classes, on the other hand, have not given up all hope of being left 
even with certain non-Magyar territories and do not want to accept the narrow basis for 
final work. As Count Karolyi said on one occasion — “Five Comitats are not a 
country.” Worst of all this uncertainty of basis renders elections for a new Hungarian 
Assembly practically impossible. They cannot elect new members in the disputed 
territories or any territories under occupation, they do not want to assemble a “Rump 
Parliament” as they would call it, they can hardly appoint new members for the disputed 
areas and they cannot summon the old Magyar members from them because this would 
give the Conservatives an undue preponderance. Under these conditions even the 
moderate bourgeois parties are very much hampered in their work, a fact which has to 
be faced and acknowledged whatever we may think of the Magyar claims as such. For 
Hungary, as for all parts of Eastern and Central Europe, it is essential that the Peace 
Conference should hurry up. 
The army in Hungary seems to be entirely under the control of the moderate Socialists 
to the exclusion of the bourgeois parties, though not altogether of the Bolsheviks. 
Among the bourgeois Radicals the demand has been recently put forward for much 
stronger action against the Bolsheviks. The moderate Socialists are opposed to such 
action, and over this question very serious differences had arisen in the Karolyi 
Cabinet. Karolyi’s own bourgeois followers were moving to the Right in favour of a 
bourgeois coalition, which reacted on the Socialists by making them move to the Left. 
Karolyi demanded that the coalition should remain intact and answered his bourgeois 
followers that he would not agree to governing to the exclusion of the Socialists. On the 
other hand he offered the Socialists to retire and to leave the entire government to them, 
which the Socialists refused. Finally a compromise was patched up enlarging the 
influence of the Socialists in the government. Karolyi, who had hitherto been something 
between a president of a republic and a Prime Minister, was moved, I believe on 
January 14th,1 into the position of a temporary President of the Republic. But all these 
changes seem to me of very little importance because all these politics hang in the air. 
There is no Parliament, no popular mandate and no definite territory which would 
enable any one to get it. 
1 Count M. Karolyi was declared temporary President of the Hungarian Republic by the Executive 
Committee of the Hungarian National Council on 11 January 1919. 
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No. 32 
Letter from the Reverend R. Dykes Shaw et al. of the General Presbyterian Alliance 
(Edinburgh) to A.J. Balfour (Londonf 
[PRO FO 371/3529 No. 22101/W3] 
General Presbyterian Alliance, 
Edinburgh, 3 February 1919 
Memorial Regarding the Reformed Church of Hungary 
Sir:- 
We are instructed by the Eastern Section of the General Presbyterian Alliance 
respectfully to submit the following Memorial for your favourable consideration. 
The Alliance is an “Alliance of Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the 
Presbyterian System”, and includes about ninety Presbyterian Churches and 
Missionary Organisations, representing a Christian community of about thirty millions. 
Its Executive Commission is in two Sections — the Western, which embraces the 
Presbyterian Churches of America and Canada, and the Eastern, which embraces the 
Presbyterian Churches of the United Kingdom and the Colonies, a number of the 
Reformed Churches on the Continent of Europe, and others in various countries in the 
Eastern World. 
In the Eastern Section the largest Church is the Hungarian Reformed Church, with a 
membership of not less than two and a half millions. 
This Church has had a most honourable history since the very dawn of the 
Reformation. It has again and again nobly maintained itself when its very existence 
was assailed by the persecuting intolerance of Austrian Roman Catholicism on the one 
hand, and by the onslaughts of Turkish power on the other. It has not swerved from its 
fidelity to the principles of Western Protestantism, and indeed has often been a bulwark 
to the Western Churches themselves, especially in the early days of the Reformation 
when they were engaged in struggles for their own life and liberty. On the other hand it 
has frequently received countenance and help of the most practical and effective kind 
from the Western Powers, and not least from Great Britain, whereby it has been 
delivered from crushing edicts launched against it by reactionary forces in Austria. Its 
bonds with this country as a leading Protestant Power have for the last two or three 
centuries been close and strong, and during the past fifty years its associations with the 
Western Presbyterian Churches have become increasingly intimate, largely owing to the 
influence of the “Scottish Mission” in Hungary, and to the fact that nearly one hundred 
Hungarian students have studied for longer or shorter periods at Presbyterian 
Theological Colleges in Great Britain, Ireland, and America. It is natural therefore that it 
should look to us again to support it with our strength in the day of threatening peril to 
its unity and to its free and unfettered development as a Church of the Reformed Faith. 
It is further our conviction that help rendered to this Church in the present critical 
juncture of its history would have a beneficial effect on the settlement of affairs in 
* A letter signed by J.C. Tilley was sent to the General Presbyterian Alliance on 13 February, 
acknowledging the receipt of their communication, and informing them that the subject of their 
memorandum had been referred to A.J. Balfour in Paris. The letter was referred to Balfour on 17 
February in dispatch No. 682. For the reply given by L. Mallet in the absence of A.J. Balfour see No. 44. 
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Eastern Europe, ministering, as it would, to the peace that ever finds its surest 
foundation in conditions of religious and intellectual liberty such as the Hungarian 
Church undoubtedly stands for. 
It is in the interests of this sister Church of ours, and in response to an earnest appeal 
from it, that we now address you. 
It appears possible that, as a result of the Peace Settlement, large portions of territory 
may be transferred from Hungary and put under the rule of some other Power or 
Powers. In the territory that it is feared may be thus affected the Hungarian Reformed 
Church has two Theological Colleges, one thousand Congregations, and over a million 
members, about half the total strength of the Church. It has also, in the Transylvania 
district alone, educational institutions of various grades, numbering, with primary 
schools, more than six hundred in all. 
The Hungarian Reformed Church is moved with the greatest anxiety lest it should be 
called upon to face so serious a disruption, and lest the parts thus lost to it should come 
under a domination that would be alien to them in sympathy, and that would force upon 
them repressive laws such as they have suffered from in former days of religious 
enmity and persecution. 
ACCORDINGLY the Eastern Section of the Presbyterian Alliance very earnestly 
prays that, whatever changes the Peace Conference may deem it wise and proper to 
make, you will lend the great weight of your influence to conserve the interests and 
unity of this historic Church, to secure free opportunity for the development of its 
spiritual and intellectual life, and to safeguard it in the full exercise of its religious 
liberty. 
(Signed) 
William Park D.D., Chairman of the Section, and President of the Alliance. 
R.R. Simpson Kt., Vice-Chairman of the Section. 
J.N. Oglivie D.D., Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland, and member of the Section. 
R. Dykes Shaw D.D., General Secretary of the Alliance. 
Robert J. Drummond D.D., Moderator of the General Assembly of the United Free 
Church of Scotland, and member of the Section. 
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No. 33 
Telegram from O. Phillpotts (Vienna) to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne. 
Received 12 February 1919f 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 21459] 
Vienna, 11 February 1919 
BUDAPEST February 8th:- 
KAROLYI informs us that conservatives here are using the violation of terms of the 
BELGRADE armistice by SERBIANS, RUMANIANS and sailors [?] of Allies in 
agitating against government and present regime. They declare Allies regard present 
government as too socialistic and semi-Bolshevik and Allies would treat more 
favourably any government composed of men of more conservative Parties. 
KAROLYI points out that socialistic element absolutely necessary in any government 
which hoped to maintain itself for a single day as their’s the only party with organized 
followers and therefore able to keep order in BUDAPESTH. 
Present regime coalition BOURGEOIS and socialists and only (group mutilated) 
possibly without civil War. Socialists work against BOLSHEVIKS who are not 
dangerous provided the coal supply can be maintained. He urges ENTENTE should tell 
HUNGARY what they wish her to do and should also give HUNGARIAN 
government opportunity to explain its view. 
(Signed) PHIL[L]POTTS. 
(Note by M.I.l.c: This telegram badly mutilated.) 
Minutes attached to the document: 
(From) [PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/21459] 
[To] Mr. Tilley. 
From all the information we have I should think Karolyi’s statement accurate and his 
request reasonable, barring of course discussion of problems which the Peace Congress 
alone can decide. 
The Left wing of the Karolyi party has broken with the Conservatives, and in 
exchange the Social Democrats have broken with the Bolsheviks. These two parties, the 
bourgeois Radicals and the moderate Socialists, now form together a Government bloc 
resembling that of Democrats and Majority Socialists in Germany, and represent the 
only combination through which Hungary can escape civil war. If the power passed 
either to the Right of it or to the Left, civil war would start automatically. Nothing is 
better calculated to lead to anarchy than the intrigues of the old Magyar oligarchy such 
as are reported in Sir H. Rumbold’s despatch of February 3rd (No. 59; Austria- 
This telegram was sent from Berne to Military Intelligence, War Office, London, on 12 February and 
was received there on 13 February. 
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Hungary No. 21459).2 In these circumstances it would seem advisable for us, short of 
active interference, to give any support we can to the Centre bloc as far as purely 
Magyar affairs are concerned, which of course excludes anything affecting territorial 
claims and anything which might in any way be misconstructed into an encouragement 
of Magyar Imperialism. 
One of our representatives in Hungary might be instructed to ask Count Karolyi*3 
what subjects these are which he wishes to discuss, and moreover state to him in a form 
which might be used for publication, that H.M.G. does not mean to interfere in internal 
Magyar affairs and certainly entertains no prejudice against the existing Magyar 
Government. 
L.B.N[amier]. 
17/2/19 
2 See No. 35. 
3 The asterisk was inserted by an unidentified F.O. official, who remarked in a footnote on 17 February: 
“I do not know how far this is in accord with our policy. Count Michael Esterhazy at any rate is far from 
convincing.” 
No. 34 
Letter from Major C. Goetz to V. Wellesley 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 23948/W3] 
11 February 1919 
Sir, 
I am obliged by your letter of yesterday’s date, in view of which I shall of course 
refrain from publishing any of the information to which you refer.1 
I regret Lord Curzon’s decision in the matter, as the only point in which anything I 
had to say might be said to show bias, was that I feel that the good treatment of all 
British subjects interned in the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire during the war, entitle 
those countries to more consideration than is merited by other enemy nationalities. 
In view of your statement that Lord Curzon personally considered the notes I gave to 
Lord Acton when I passed through Berne, I should be glad for him to be informed of 
the grounds upon which I based my conclusions. 
These were as follows: 
1 That all the Hungarians claim at present is that their country should not be 
dismembered until the Peace Conference has decided on their ultimate fate. 
2 That the racial questions in Hungary are the result of immigration into the ex- 
Kingdom of Hungary by foreign races. 
3 That the dismemberment of Hungary would entail precisely the same racial 
questions, in which the Magyars would be the aggrieved parties. 
1 The reference is to a memorandum sent by Major Goetz to the Foreign Office in late 1918, which he 
also intended to publish in The Daily Telegraph. The Foreign Office decided that the memorandum 
should not be published because of its pro-Hungarian bias. 
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4 That this state of affairs would result in a most ardent & irrepressible Irredentism 
— the Magyars are perhaps the only patriotic and warlike people in that portion of 
Central Europe which constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
5 That whatever the faults of an enemy country have been, it should not be deprived 
of the means of existence. 
6 That while one thing at present desired in Hungary is a predominating British 
influence, the result of dismembering the country might be to drive it into the arms of 
some anti-British combination. 
7 That the economic possibilities of Hungary are such that it would be very much in 
our interests to prevent its dismemberment — 
I have etc., etc., 
Charles Goetz 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Major Goetz says that “the racial questions in Hungary are the result of immigration 
into the ex-Kingdom of Hungary of foreign races.” It is not clear what practical 
conclusion he wishes to draw from this fact but it seems quite clear that he is not aware 
of the fact that the Slavs have been in Hungary for centuries before the Magyars came. 
L.B.N[amier]. 
18/2/19 
No. 35 
Minutes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier and H. Nicolson 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/21459] 
[These minutes are preceded by a memorandum written by Count M. Esterhazy 
during his visit to Berne on 26 January 1919, and forwarded by Sir H. Rumbold on 3 
February 1919. In it, Count Esterhazy claims that Count Karolyi’s Government is the 
near dictatorship of the Socialist Party, and urges the sending of British troops to 
relieve the situation.] 
Count Th. Batthianyi [Batthyany]1 belonged to the right wing of the Karolyi Party 
which has now broken entirely with the Government. The present Govt, is no more 
Bolshevik than the bloc of Democrats & Majority Socialists in Germany. Count 
Esterhazy states that the Magyar Socialist party represents only 240,000 labourers — 
but this is a lot in a nation of 9-10 millions in which the peasants are the strongest 
element. Now the peasants support the present Govt.; the Minister in charge of the 
agrarian reform, Szabo is one of their most prominent leaders. The reason why Count 
Estehazy & Co. ask for Entente troops is that they have no real following among the 
Magyar people and would like us to carry out for them a coup d’Etat. 
1 Count Tivadar Batthyany was Minister of the Interior in Count M. Karolyi’s first cabinet. 
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It is interesting to note that Budapest now lies on the line London — Persian Gulf. In 
the past it was always in Hungary Berlin — Budapest — Baghdad. 
L.B.N[amier]. 
17/2/19 
I am inclined to think we had better take no action for the present, especially as it is 
presumably quite out of the question to think of sending any troops. 
H.N[icolson]. 
18/2/19 
No. 36 
Note Read by General Alby before the Romanian Commission of the Paris Peace 
Conference 
[PRO CAB 25/117] 
19 February 1919 
Dans la seance du 17 fevrier, la Commission des Affaires Roumaines, a propose de 
fixer une z6ne de non occupation militaire (l),1 entre Hongrois et Roumaines en vue 
d’eviter les conflits armes qui se produisent actuellement entre eux en Transylvanie. 
La Commission des Affaires Roumaines, envisage l’occupation eventuelle de cette 
z6ne per des troupes alliees en vue de maintenir l’ordre centre [?contre] de possibles 
tentatives Bolchevistes. 
Ces propositions appellent les observations suivantes: 
A) II s’agit, en fait, de denoncer la Convention militaire signee a Belgrade le 13 
novembre avec le Gouvernement hongrois et de fixer une nouvelle ligne de 
demarcation. 
II y aurait lieu tout d’abord pour eviter toute fausse interpretation de specifier que 
Fancienne ligne est maintenue a Fouest de Szegedin inclus et que la nouvelle ligne ne 
conceme que la Transylvanie au nord d’Arad. 
B) En ce qui concerne la ligne proposee pour le retrait des forces hongroises, aucune 
objection n ’est aformuler. 
C) Mais les propositions de la Commission en ce qui conceme la limite d’occupation 
des troupes roumaines laissent dans la zone de non occupation les localites de 
Grosswardein, Nagy-Karoly et Szatmar-Nemeti 
Or ce point, comme Fa deja fait observer plusieurs fois le general Berthelot, sont des 
noeude [noeudsl de voies ferrees d’une extr6me importance, puisqu’ils commandant 
toutes les communications en Transylvanie. II est done impossible, si l’on veut assurer 
la vie economique et par suite maintenir l’ordre et eviter les conflits de ne pas occuper 
ces localites dans une region ou s’exercent les intrigues Bolshevistes. 
“Or si Arad est actuellement et peut rester occupee par des troupes frangaises, il est 
impossible d’envoyer des elements frangais plus au nord, (Grosswardein, etc....) etant 
donnee la penurie des effectifs de l’armee Henrys dont une division devra sans doute 
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dtre bientdt dissoute et de l’armee Berthelot qui a a faire face a de nombreuses missions 
et qui doit etre conservee disponible peur un empli eventuel en Russie meridionale. 
“II est done necessaire de permettre l’occupation de la ligne Grosswardein, Nagy- 
Karoly et Szatmar-Nemeti, localites inclus, par les troupes roumaines et de la choisir 
comme nouvelle ligne de demarcation pour celles-ci. 
Toutes reserves pourraient d’ailleurs dtre faites pour que cette occupation ne prejuge 
pas de decisions de la Conference de la Paix, pas plus que l’occupation de tdtes de pont 
sur la rive droite du Rhin par des troupes franfaises n’en signifie 1’attribution ulterieure 
aux allies. 
Conclusion 
“En consequence, on a l’honneur de proposer ce qui suit: 
“Le general Franchet d’Esperey, charge de 1’application de rarmistice sur le front 
hongrois, notifiera au gouvemement hongrois, de la decision suivante: 
“1° — les troupes hongroises se retireront dans un delai de.a 10 Km a l’ouest de 
la ligne de Vazares-Nameny [Vasarosnameny], confluent des deux Koros [Kbrds], 
Algyo [Algyd] (N. de Szegedin). 
2° — a l’ouest de Szegedin, il est cree une z6ne neutre limited a l’ouest par la ligne 
define au paragraphe 1, au sud et a Test, par la ligne Szegedin, Make [Mako], Arad, 
Grosswardein, Nagy-Karoly, Szatmar-Nemeti — ces localites etant occupees par les 
troupes alliees a l’ouest d’Arad inclus, roumaines au nord d’Arad excluis [sic]”.1 
(I)2 z6ne verte, croquis ci-joint. 
1 For further details of the history of the establishment of the Neutral Zone referred to in the document 
see Nos. 37, 47, 50 and the Enclosure with No. 139; “Minutes of the Supreme War Council”, 
S.W.C./379/1, PRO CAB 21/129; and FRUS PPC, vol. IV, pp. 59-61, 145-147, 157-158, 172; vol. 
VII, pp. 179-180. 
2 The map accompanying the original document is not printed here. 
No. 37 
Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.M. Cornwall for General H. Wilson (?) 
[PRO CAB 25/117] 
British Peace Delegation, 
Paris, 22 February 1919 
Dear General, 
I enclose a map1 showing our proposal for the furthest eastward & northern limit of 
the Rumanian occupation. It is drawn mainly with the idea of giving the Rumanians free 
use (with 10 kilometres to spare for safety) of the VERSECZ-TEMESVAR-ARAD 
railway & also the NAGYVARAD-SZATMARNEMETI-NAGYBANYA line, 
which is necessary for their effective occupation of the foothills. This line is the nearest 
approach to the ethnic boundary, so it is fair on that score. 
1 Not printed. 
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In the BANAT of course the ethnic problem is insoluble, & the Serbs (probably also 
the French) may squeal over our proposal. 
Magyar troops should be ordered to respect a 25-kilometre neutral zone west of the 
line indicated.2 
Yrs, 
H.M. Cornwall 
2 For further details of the establishment of the Neutral Zone referred to in the document see No. 36 and 
note 2 to No. 36. 
No. 38 
Letter from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 
28 February 1919) 
No. 115 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 32986] 
Berne, 24 February 1919 
My Lord, 
The Military Attache’s Department has obtained perusal of a letter dated 2nd instant 
and written from Budapest by Count Karolyi to his cousin Count P. Palffy who was 
employed in the Military Attache’s Department of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Legation at Berne and who continues to reside in Switzerland. The object of the letter is 
to furnish Count Palffy with arguments in favour of the Hungarian case, for use in 
conversation with nationals of Entente states. 
The line of the reasoning is roughly as follows:- The Bolchevist movement in 
Hungary is not a Russian importation. It is the direct result of the economic situation 
produced by the policy of the Entente. The dearth of coal is the main cause of distress, 
most of the Hungarian mines being in the hands of the new states. The position is so 
desperate that there is barely sufficient coal to run the trains which should supply the 
capital with the little which remains of that commodity. The closing down of countless 
factories has in addition created a mass of unemployed labour and to these elements of 
hungry malcontents must be added large numbers of disbanded soldiers and liberated 
prisoners. The only method of combating native bolchevism consists in the palliative of 
state assistance to the necessitous. To conciliate and reassure the masses it has been 
found necessary to form a coalition Government into which socialists have been 
admitted who enjoy popular sympathy and inspire confidence in virtue of the doctrines 
they hold. 
Hungary has fought not only to her last drop of blood but to her last pound of grease. 
For this reason it would be far better if instead of drawing supplies from America the 
Allies were to organize an equitable distribution of urgently needed commodities on the 
spot by compelling the new states to release their resources and come to the assistance 
of Budapest and Vienna. 
In Karolyi’s opinion Bolchevism will never be vanquished by force of arms, as the 
danger of fraternisation is too great. Nor will the Entente succeed in disposing of 
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Russian Bolchevism by means of economic pressure — for starvation breeds anarchy 
and the last state will be worse than the first. Hungary does not ask for military aid 
from the Entente for the repression of anarchy. She asks for such economic measures 
as will appease the elements of unrest and thereby indirectly serve the cause of the 
Allies themselves. 
The letter concludes by explaining that the socialist party in Hungary have purged 
themselves of all Bolchevist stigma, and that Bolchevist agitators have been expelled 
from Hungary. The same course has been pursued in regard to officers tainted with 
Bolchevism on their return from Russian captivity. These have been handed over to the 
French military mission and their funds have been seized. 
Karolyi insists on the fact that a socialist government is alone capable of combating 
Bolshevism, since an administration recruited from the bourgeois parties would excite 
the angry mistrust of the working classes were it to endeavour to cope with the unruly 
elements of the population. 
I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to the British Delegates at the Peace 
Conference. 
I have, etc., etc., 
Horace Rumbold 
Minutes attached to the document: 
(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/2969] 
I would submit 
(1) That there seems no justification for the idea that the Allies “should compel the 
new States” (themselves short of almost every necessary of life) “to release their 
resources & to come to the assistance of Budapest & Vienna”. 
(2) That Count Karolyi is playing a peculiarly characteristic Magyar role in 
endeavouring to enlist our sympathies against Bolshevism in Hungary at a time when 
his agents are — as I have received documentary proof from Dr. Vaida, the 
Transylvanian Minister — being subsidised by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior 
to create Bolshevik agitations among the Rumanians & Jugoslavs. 
A.W.A. Deeper 
27/2/19 
We should have no touch with the Hungarians. Count Karolyi has, as it is, no 
reputation to lose. 
E. Crowe 
1/3/19 
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No. 39 
Foreign Office Minute for Earl Curzon 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 33965] 
Foreign Office, 27 February 1919 
[To] Lord Curzon. 
Mr. Franklin Gunther, First Secretary of the United States Embassy, called this 
evening and gave me the annexed Note with regard to the alleged conduct of Colonel 
Cuninghame, the British Military Representative at Vienna. It will be seen that Baron 
Podmanisky [.vie],1 of the Hungarian Foreign Office, states that Colonel Cuninghame 
declared to certain Socialist members of the Hungarian Government that unless 
Bolshevism was immediately stamped out in Hungary the Roumanians, Czechs and 
Serbians would be allowed to enter the country and take possession of it in the interest 
of peace and order. Colonel Cuninghame is alleged to have said that he represented the 
Allied Powers and the United States. 
I asked Mr. Gunther to whom Baron Podmanisky [sic] had made this statement. He 
answered that it had been to an official member of the American Mission at Vienna. I 
said that we would certainly take steps to enquire into this allegation, but that it seemed 
to me inconceivable that Colonel Cuninghame could have used any such language as 
that attributed to him. Hungarian association with the Germans had probably enabled 
them to acquire the old German trick of endeavouring to sow dissension by repeating 
alleged statements which had either never been made or else had been skilfully garbled. 
In no country has this trick been more persistently used and more clearly exposed than 
in the United States. 
[Unidentified official] 
ENCLOSURE IN NO. 39 
Aide Memoire Prepared by the United States Embassy in London 
26 February 1919 
Aide Memoire 
It has just been stated by Baron Podmanisky of the Hungarian Foreign Office that, in 
accordance with Colonel Cunningham’s [sic] express wish a meeting was arranged 
between him and Messieurs Garami, Bohm and Peidl, Social Democrat members of the 
Government; that this meeting occurred before Colonel Cunningham [sic] left for 
Vienna, and lasted until three in the morning, in the course of which Colonel 
Cunningham [sic] made many enquiries as to what was being done to suppress 
Bolshevism, and stated in conclusion that he represented the Entente Powers and the 
United States, and in their name warned the three Ministers that, unless Bolshevism 
was immediately stamped out in Hungary, the Entente would the Roumanians, Czechs 
and Serbians to enter Hungary and to take entire possession thereof in the interest of 
peace and order. 
1 Baron Tibor Podmaniczky. 
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Baron Podmanisky also stated that Colonel Cunningham [s/c] informed the Ministers 
that if the Hungarian Government would take energetic steps to suppress the Bolsheviki 
at once, he would go in person to President Masaryk and get them coal. Baron 
Podmanisky added that the Hungarian Government was much upset by this demand 
which appeared to them somewhat peremptory, and that his Government was anxious 
to ascertain on what authority such a statement was made in the name of the Associated 
Powers.2 
2 The documents in the original file are followed by an F.O. note, dated 4 March 1919, requesting an 
investigation into the background of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s alleged statements. No document has been 
traced by the editor which refers to the result of this investigation. Col. Sir T. Cuninghame later reflected 
on the allegations, saying that the reports were distorted and exaggerated: see Sir Montgomery - 
Cuninghame, “Between the War and Peace Treaties. A Contemporary Narrative”, Hungarian Quarterly, 
V, No. 3 (1939), pp. 421-422. 
No. 40 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 21 March 1919) 
No. T.C. 118 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 44286] 
Vienna, 27 February 1919 
A Note on the Political Situation of Hungary 
In Hungary the moral breakdown of authority is more complete than in Austria, and 
the difficulties which confront the Government are accordingly of a more complex and 
grave character. The succession of events which led to the formation of the present 
Coalition Government are too well known to need repetition. Since the 23rd October 
upon which day the Socialist Party in conjunction with the Karolyi group in the House 
of Representatives brought down the past administration by a coup d’etat, the 
Conservative Deputies have lost all influence in the country and are not likely to 
reappear upon the political stage for some time to come. 
The aim of the Karolyi Party in taking over the responsibility for the Government at 
this juncture was to obtain from the Entente the most favourable terms by instant 
desertion of German Imperialism and the Austrian alliance. In this the party have 
suffered disappointment and it is not easy to sympathise much with them on that 
account, in as much as the mode and method of their desertion took no account 
whatever of the desperate situation of their ex-allies. It is, however, fair to point out that 
the Conservative leaders cannot be acquitted either of leanings towards the Nationalistic 
policy which developed towards the end of the war, which paved the way for the 
eventual desertion of Austria and for the break up of the Army. It is certain that 
pressure had been brought to bear upon the Austro-Hungarian joint Command to strip 
the Piave front for the benefit of pure Hungarian defence before the events of October 
23rd, and after the defection of Bulgaria, all that the various party leaders seemed to 
think about was the direct defence of Transylvania oblivious to what might occur in the 
principal theatre of war. Before the crisis of October 23rd the joint Foreign Secretary 
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Baron Burian1 was occupied with the reply to the note of President Wilson concerning 
the settlement of the Nationalistic questions in Austria and Hungary, and the 
subsequent and simultaneous declaration of independence by the Czechs in the north 
and the Croats in the south forced the Manifesto of October 31st from the Emperor. To 
this decision however the desire of all parties in Hungary to bring the Ausgleich of 
1867 to an end, and to cut free from Austria, notably contributed. Although the 
Manifesto contained an appeal to soldiers to be true to their oath, its principal effect was 
to destroy the common Army altogether and to release the Hungarian Honved for the 
purpose of Home defence, for which it was deemed necessary by the politicians of 
Hungary. Discipline founded on the soldiers’ oath could not be maintained when the 
oath itself was removed by imperial decree. 
The first transfers of troops however from the Piave antedated this decree, and the 
Austrians covered these by the improvisation of emergency formations, but when on 
the accession to power of the Karolyi Government the whole Hungarian Army was 
ordered to march to Transylvania, a collapse was inevitable. 
The Karolyi Party did not however content themselves with the recall of the Army, 
but proceeded to independent negotiations for an armistice with the Entente, and further 
to the immediate dissolution of all existing Hungarian forces. A certain Colonel Linder2 
— an unpractical idealist — was hastily appointed Minister of War. The Armistice was 
signed with General Franchet d’Esperey on November 8th3 and the order was 
immediately given for the demobilazation [sic] of the Army. At this time the bulk of the 
Army was on its way home. One complete division was however cut off by the Italians 
in their advance. Most of the remaining divisions seemed to have reached their places of 
assembly in Hungary in fair order, but arrived there, discipline collapsed, and the whole 
force degenerated into an anarchistic mob dispersing to their homes and taking their 
small arms with them. 
In accepting the terms of the Armistice Karolyi seems to have considered that he 
would get better terms by disbanding the army, and does not seem to have contemplated 
the break up of Hungary by the Entente-Powers, although as a practical policy it had 
been long advocated by a certain set of political journalists in England, notably by those 
who control the “New Europe”. He threw himself in fact entirely upon the mercy of the 
Entente, and, while stipulating for a line of demarcation beyond which he expected no 
Entente forces to come, made no preparations whatever to resist the passage of any 
forces that might for any reason attempt to do so. This line of demarcation was confined 
to the southern and eastern frontiers of Hungary; — invasion by Czechs in the north 
being apparently altogether outside his calculations. Even within the occupied zones he 
stipulated that the civic control of the Hungarian officials should not be interfered with. 
When later, therefore, in all the occupied zones, the Allied Forces removed the 
Hungarian officials, when the Czechs occupied Slovakia and when the Roumanians 
penetrated into the country wide to the west of the line of demarcation the people in 
Hungary considered that the Entente were guilty of breach of contract. When it becomes 
realised in Hungary that the Entente do not recognise the validity of civil stipulations in 
a military convention, and when further they recignize [sic] that no attempt was made to 
secure from the Entente any guarantee for the integrity of Hungary, Karolyi will lose 
the last remaining shreds of influence that remain to him and will fall. 
1 Count Istvan Burian, Foreign Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, April-October 1918. 
2 Colonel Bela Linder, Minister of War, 9 November-12 December 1918, Military Attache in Vienna 
during Bela Kun’s regime, May-August 1919. 
3 The Belgrade Armistice was signed on the 8th, but it only came into effect on 13 November 1918. 
76 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY 1918-1919 
From the first it was evident that in any coalition between the Karolyi Party and the 
Socialists, the policy to be pursued by the Government would be determined by the 
latter, as they already controlled the trade unions. The Socialists before the coup d’etat 
of October 23rd held no single seat in the Parliament and govern therefore rather as a 
Directorate than as a Parliamentary Group. After the proclamation of the Republic and 
the election of Karolyi as President of the State, the old Parliament was dissolved with 
the power left in the hands of the Socialist Extremists, who consisted of a group of 
fanatical Jews, who drew support for their communistic programme both from the 
working men’s councils of the trade unions and from the soldiers’ councils which were 
formed in the army. Behind these organizations stood the armed mob. 
It soon became obvious that the extreme Socialists in the Cabinet either could not or 
would not be content with the moderate policy favoured by the better men of the 
Socialist Party and by the bulk of the Karolyi Party. The moderates were forced to 
resign including Mr. Lovaszy,* 4 Count Batthyany5 and Mr. Bart[h]a6 who had 
succeeded Col. Linder as Secretary for War. Further than this the Socialist Party either 
took steps, or were obliged by the proletariat behind them to take steps, to stop all 
meetings of other party groups. 
Whether this was necessary or wise is a matter for later investigation but it must be 
remembered that on the one hand authority had universally broken down and on the 
other that the communistic sentiments inspired by Bolshevist agitators from Russia and 
the Ukraine, were a factor which had to be reckoned with. The mere fact that an order 
was given by an authority was reason for disobedience. The problem then was to 
restore the idea of civil authority and to expell [sic] the counter-notion that individual 
whim backed by armed force was the determining agent in matters of conduct. The 
problem was only soluble by two methods. Either by the use of force by the authority 
itself, or by exploitation of the machinery of the trade unions. The objection to the first 
alternative was the absence of any home made force, and the refusal of the Entente to 
supply the deficiency by armed occupation of the country. The second alone could 
therefore be used. 
The trade unions are organised as in England and not on any zonal or area system. It 
was necessary as a preliminary that the disbanded soldiers rejoining them should render 
obedience to the union officials, and to ensure this [these] workmen’s councils were 
formed, composed of confidence men (Vertrauensmanner) elected by the workmen 
themselves, whom all by force of public opinion were bound to obey. A similar 
organization was instituted in the army where the soldiers’ councils acted in a similar 
manner: init[i]ally as a bridge to secure the reacceptance of the principle of deference to 
authority, and subsequently as a safety valve for complaint. These soldiers’ councils as 
far as their organization is concerned are by no means “Soviets”, their functions not 
extending to initiation of movement or to Authority. 
The Trades Unions had of course been in existence for some time, but the Army, as 
reformed after the collapse of November 1918, was a new institution, and upon its 
tendency the Socialists considered that much depended. They desired to make a popular 
force, which the Government could use for the maintenance of order, but which could 
be at the same time of service to the Nation in times of difficulty in which the 
Hungarians were likely to find themselves. They wished in fact to copy the example of 
the Austrians in forming a Socialistic Volkswehr7 free from reactionary elements, but 
desired to escape the State [sic] of helplessness caused by the possession of a force 
Marton Lovaszy, Minister of Religion and Public Education, October-December 1918, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in I. Friedrich’s government, 15 August -11 September 1919. 
^ See No. 35, note 1. 
6 See No. 24, note 4. 
V > 
People s Militia, the name adopted by the new regular armed forces in Austria. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 77 
incapable of use as a Military instrument, but which by its presence prevented the 
formation of any other. 
The principal difficulty was the instilling of sufficient discipline into the newly raised 
force, under the circumstances, and with so peculiar a view of the functions of a 
National Force. The terms of Armistice permitted the retention of Six Infantry and of 
two Cavalry Divisions but nothing was said as to the War Establishments to be 
maintained. At first in order to find the personnel for these Divisions the men of the 
five junior year Classes were retained with the Colours and from these three fairly 
complete Divisions were formed. But it was found that discipline could not be 
maintained under this system, consequently it was determined to dismiss the two 
youngest Classes, to hold the remainder as a temporary Volkswehr and to replace them 
all by the gradual enrolment of a professional element voluntarily enlisted from ex¬ 
soldiers of and over the age of 24. This process is now being carried out and will be 
complete by March 26th. It is to be understood that this organization is itself only 
temporary, but will serve to maintain the internal order and to provide the Government 
with that moral force which will prevent unlimited provocation at the hands of exterior 
Enemies. Comparing the Hungarian Force with the Austrian, it should be realised that 
the former will be concentrated and mobile, whereas the latter is dispersed, immobile, 
and unprovided. 
When the Army was in its Volkswehr State, the question of the formation of Soldiers 
Councils arose, and the method of their institution cannot be separated from the career 
and aspirations of the Communist leader Pegany [Pogany], who, when the Socialist[s] 
first seized the Power, constituted himself Commissary of the Soldiers Councils and 
formed them on lines entirely his own, and not represented, so far as is known, in other 
Armies. In order to recover the idea of Military Obedience it was considered necessary 
to form Councils, but in order that they themselves should not dissipate the force of 
Authority they were not given any regulating powers at all. They were formed as a 
separate branch of the War Department with a function of inspection and report only, 
but they were also charged with the administration and lodgment of the force they 
served. Thus they acted primarily as a bridge for the recovery of Authority and finally 
as an escape valve for complaint. When the Army was in its original State there is no 
doubt that the Commanding Officers were too much under the thumb of the Soldiers 
Councils, and it has yet to be seen how far this undesirable result will be bettered when 
the reorganization is carried through. 
The main point of interest will in any case revolve round the subservience of the 
Army to the Socialist Party. The War Minister denies that even at present there is any 
subservience at all, simply in fact a guarantee that the Army shall be th[o]roughly 
democratic and therefore free from prejudiced attack by the Communistic Political 
Elements. 
With regard to the Communists it must be realised that the political aims of the 
Socialists and of the Communists are identical. The difference between them is one of 
method and not of aim. In disturbed times like the present this difference is obviously 
more than nominal. The Socialists wish to attain their ends by pacific means, step by 
step, and in conformity with the general rate of progress of neighbouring States. They 
wish for an international recognition of the advantages of Socialism as they see them: 
they wish neither to compromise them by hurried legislation of their own contrary to 
Public sentiment, nor by isolated action of their own country without the support of 
similar legislation over their borders. The Communists on the contrary, are aggressive 
and prepared to take advantage of all opportunities, local or general, to bring about what 
they deem to be the Social Millennium. It is thus easy for a Communist to be 
absorbed into the ranks of the Socialist Party, as the surrender of excessive activity, not 
the surrender of political faith, alone is demanded. It would not then be correct to 
assume that the Socialist Party is on the one hand anxious for power in all 
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circumstances, nor would it be correct to assume that any refusal to take Office has any 
other motive than Party advantage. The Socialist Party would sooner occupy a position 
permitting unrestrained criticism than be responsible for Government under 
circumstances so difficult that popular censure is inevitable. 
This is now the position of the Socialist Party in Hungary. They have absorbed the 
majority of the Communists and are interested for the moment in keeping them quiet, 
but they are not independent of them in any way. Nor are they in the least anxious to 
continue the Government of the Country themselves for any lengthy period at this 
juncture, or willing either to see the Communists hold it. They desire a Coalition which 
while ratifying past legislation, enables them to explain to their Communistic adherents 
that they are not responsible for what is done by the Government. 
The Karolyi Party are equally anxious for a Coalition which may tide over a difficult 
tune for them and enable them later to escape altogether from the paramount influence 
of the Communistic element. Accordingly an arrangement has been engineered by 
which the “Small Peasant” Party from the Opposition has been won over to the 
Government group by the Land Reform Bill, the leader of this latter Party, by name 
Szabe [Szabo]8 having been entrusted with its conduct and practice. 
Thus there are in the Government of Hungary at present 4 main groups namely, The 
Socialists and Communists, still undivided, the Karolyi Party, which is a type of Whig 
Party, the Small Peasants, and the Radicals. The latter party has no following whatever 
in the Country and consists merely of a few enthusiastic fanatics of the ultra intellectual 
type. The practical result of this Government deal is the pooling of ail resources for the 
coming election, in order to secure the necessary ratification for the acts of the existing 
Directorate. For it must be remembered that the Socialists in the last Parliament held no 
seat whatever, and having governed since their seizure of power, without a Parliament, 
may see their work undone if they fail to secure a majority. When the Parliament was 
dissolved it was not anticipated that the period of Armistice would endure long. So long 
as this was so no special effort were made to hold Elections. But when it became 
obvious that the Socialists would be held responsible for what occurred throughout the 
period of difficulty, with economic distress on the one side and continued invasion by 
Enemy forces on the other, the necessity of seeking a mandate became clear to all. 
Consequently the Government approached the Entente Powers for permission to hold 
Election in the Occupied Provinces, and received, as no doubt they expected, a reply in 
the negative. Now they are about to hold elections in the unoccupied Provinces, and as 
aforesaid are going to pool their resources with those of the other Governmental 
Groups. The Elections will be on the Belgian plan. Each Party will nominate a list of 
Candidates for a whole Electoral District. Each list must be supported by 500 
nominators. Each Elector will vote for the whole list of the Party he supports. 
The Conservative and Burgher Elements are likewise organized in four groups. The 
purely Conservative elements are represented by the Clerical Agrarian Group led by 
Mar[k]graf Pallavicini9 and by Count Aladar Zichy.10 11 The dissenting rump of the 
Karolyi Party led by Lovaszi[Lovaszy]n and the Burgher Group of Heinrich12 
8 Istvan Nagyatadi Szabo, leader of the Smallholders’ Party, arrested during Bela Kun’s regime. Minister 
for Smallholders’ Affairs under the premierships of Karoly Huszar, Sandor Simonyi-Semadam and 
Count Pal Teleki, August 1919-December 1920. 
9 Marquess Gydrgy Pallavicini. Member of the Counter-Revolutionary Committee in Vienna during 
Bela Kun’s regime. 
1,9 Conservative politician, president of the Szeged-based Hungarian National Committee from 4 August 
1919. 
11 See note 4. 
19 
- Ferenc Heinrich, Vice President of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry during the 
First World War. Minister of Commerce in the governments of Istvan Friedrich and Karoly Huszar, 
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represent the Industrial Element while the fourth group is a small party of politicians 
who carry on the traditions of the Tisza Party, and have as a matter no following 
whatever in the Country. The nominal Chief of this Party is Count Bethlen, a Schekely 
[Szekely (Szekler)] Noble, who bases his claim to popularity on his intense anti- 
Roumanian attitude. The latest reports from Hungary indicate that these four opposition 
groups will now also pool their resources and fight the Government Group on rather 
better terms. But it would appear that the Government must obtain a large majority. 
Whether the right of free speech and protection against interference in Electoral 
campaigns will be secured is not at all certain. The Moderate Socialists are in favour of 
a policy of non-interference. The argument that appeals to them herein is that if a 
tyranny is projected or maintained, the inhabitants of the occupied territories may 
express a desire to remain under the permanent rule of their present occupiers. 
The Communist Party are simply awaiting the results of affairs in Germany. The 
effect of the partial recognition by the Entente of the Bolshevist Regime in Russia has 
had an immense effect on them. They consider that if the Spartakists win in Germany 
the Entente will be equally obliged to recognise them and then they will come out in 
their true colours and will bring an immense following with them out on a patriotic 
ticket. For it must be remembered that the Hungarian Socialists are to a man determined 
to recover for Hungary the ancient frontiers, and if they cannot do it in any other way 
they will attempt to do it by means of international Socialism, whose fiat they deem will 
eventually override that of the Paris Conference. The leaders of the Communists 
therefore, especially Pegany [Pogany] are careful always to play up to the patriotism of 
the rank and file, and as a result of their efforts in this connection the feeling between 
the forces opposite the Roumanians is intense. Thus it may happen that a Communist 
victory over the Government may provoke an outbreak of hostilities between the 
Magyar and the Roumanians, and on the other hand an outbreak of hostilities may mean 
a coup d’etat by the Communists. 
The principal reason for restraint is the fear of famine. All Parties know that 
widespread and long continued disturbance must hinder the incoming of Supplies. The 
effect of the proposed Land Reform in this connection should not escape notice. 
However wisely it is applied it is certain to result in a greatly lowered output of cereals 
during the initial years. Its application, and even the threat of its application, in Spring 
Time, restricts enterprise on the part of those who stand to lose estate. The want of 
Land and Equipment, of Machinery for Cooperation, and the difficulties of Division, 
drainage, and finance, can have no other result than a comparative shortage, sufficient 
only perhaps for local consumption and insufficient for export. This may oblige the 
Entente to continue for an indefinite period the task of feeding Austria and even Buda 
Pesth. 
(Sd.) T.M. Cuninghame, Lt.Col., 
British Military Representative at Vienna. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[••..] 
On the whole Col. Cuninghame’s report agrees with information derived from other 
reliable sources or gathered from the press. But whilst he renders full justice to the 
moderating influence of the Socialists and to their desire to maintain order, he 
August-September 1919 and November 1919-March 1920. Established the Hungarian Burghers’ Party 
in 1918, the National Centre Party in 1920, and the National Burghers’ Party in 1922. 
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occasionally, when he comes to deal with the persons of their leaders, describes them as 
“communists”, the Hungarian equivalent for Bolsheviks. Thus at the bottom of p. 3, [p. 
63, para. 4] Col. Cuninghame speaks of “extreme socialists” in Count Karolyi’s first 
Cabinet. As a matter of fact its only socialist members were Garami, one of the most 
moderate of Hungarian socialists, and Kunffi [Kunfi], also a fairly moderate man. Nor 
does the account of the crisis which occurred in Dec. 1918-Jan. 1919 give a full picture 
of what actually happened. The Karolyi party comprised a socially conservative wing 
which had joined it on issues of foreign policy. In his social views Count Batthyanyi 
[Batthyany] differs comparatively little from the late Count Tisza or Counts Esterhazy, 
Andrassy or Apponyi. By the end of the year stronger measures against the Bolsheviks 
had become necessary but with Batthyanyi [Batthyany], Lovaszy &c. even the moderate 
socialists wd. not have agreed to taking them for fear of a complete swing to the Right. 
An agreement was thereupon reached whereby the bourgeois radicals of the Karolyi 
Party broke with their right wing & the moderate socialists in exchange broke with the 
Bolsheviks, forming a block which can be compared to the coalition of Majority 
Socialists & bourgeois radicals in Germany. — Nor is it correct to describe Pogany as a 
“Communist” (cf. p. 5) [p. 64, para. 4]. — Lastly Col. Cuninghame seems to attach 
undue importance to the fact that in the last Parliament “the Socialists held no seat 
whatever”. They probably are over-represented in the present Govt., but the last 
Parliament supplies no criterion. The franchise was extremely narrow — only about 6% 
of the population had votes. Judging by these standards one could never have guessed 
that the 8 members of the subject races in a Parliament of 413 members represented 
40% of the population of Hungary. 
L.B.N[amier]. 
22/3/19 
He evidently regards the difference between Socialists & Communists as one of 
degree only. 
[Unidentified] 
22/3/19 
No. 41 
Letter from General W.H. Greenly (Bucharest) to I. Malcolm (?Paris. Extracts) 
[BALF, Additional 49749] 
Bucharest, February 1919 
[....] [The Roumanian leaders] also believe (and I regret to say much has come to my 
notice to support the view though I know it is not true) that undue sympathy is being 
given to Hungarian and even Bulgarian wishes: and that the Allies, especially Great 
Britain, are pro-Bulgar and pro-Hungarian. 
What the Government really wants in order to strengthen its hands and position 
generally is some manifest expression of support and confidence of Allies:- 
(a) When Treaty 1916 is definitely stated to be abrogee a clear public statement that 
the Allies fully recognise that Roumania had no possible choice except to make peace, 
that they fully recognise her great efforts, great sacrifices and great help, and that she 
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did her duty to the full. Also that there is no intention of “doing her down”, and that she 
will be generously treated and that Allies certainly will not let her interests suffer in any 
way to the benefit of those of her enemies, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
(b) Recognition of her undisputed Sovereign Rights in the Dobruja by allowing her 
troops to re-enter it — Keeping them out of a small stretch in the south is a separate 
question but now they are not allowed anywhere in Dobruja. 
(c) Allow advance in Transylvania to line asked which is not beyond ground of 
majority of Roumanian nationality and presumably certain finally to be allotted to 
Roumania at Conference. 
[A new agrarian law and Jewish enfranchisement have been passed in the Romanian 
Parliament.] 
Roumania is still very oriental and doubtful how fast steps towards more democratic 
methods can wisely be taken. 
M. Bratiano himself here is very down in his luck and feels very isolated and the 
“despised and rejected of men” he certainly pictures things as regards Roumania’s 
future far too black. 
[....] [Mr. Balfour should make a statement encouraging the Romanians.] 
This seems to me all the more important as he [Bratiano] and I think Roumania 
generally seems convinced that we, Great Britain, are the chief cause of the abrogeeing 
of Treaty and present neglect. 
[....] 
[W.H. Greenly] 
No. 42 
Letter from Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 12 March 1919) 
No. 82 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 39386] 
Stockholm, 3 March 1919 
My Lord, 
I have the honour to report that Dr. Ludwig Jen6, the representative of the National 
Council of the Hungarians of Transylvania, called at the Legation to-day to urge the 
extreme urgency that some measures should be taken at Buda Pesth. 
He expressed the views:- 
1. That if it were found impossible to send British troops to Buda Pesth (the number 
required he estimated at 10,000) improvement in the situation could nevertheless 
immediately be brought about by 
2. Some intimation that the Associated Governments were in favour of the 
establishment of a representative Government. 
Dr. Ludwig stated that Count Esterhazy, who was recently sent to Switzerland by the 
National Council, but who was not allowed to proceed, announced on his return to 
Buda Pesth that he had gathered indirectly that this was the case. This mere rumour, Dr. 
Ludwig stated, caused a crisis in the present Government. 
On behalf of Gabriel Ugron, the President of the National Council of Transylvania, 
Ludwig urged that the interests of the Associated Governments would be served by 
their granting to Hungary an opportunity at the present juncture to establish a 
parliamentary constitution. 
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The forces of Bolshevism were growing, but a mere announcement that the 
Associated Governments desired to see such a Government established would have an 
immediate and far reaching effect. The first necessity was that a General Election should 
be made possible. 
I have etc., etc., 
Coleridge Kennard 
Minutes attached to the document: 
We are already suggesting to the P[eace]. Delegation], the advisability of recognizing 
the Austrian, Hungarian & Bohemian Govts. 
G.[?] H.[?] 
13/3/19 
(From) [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/4477] 
How had Count Esterhazy “gathered indirectly that this was the case?” 
The Hungarian Transylvanians would be acting more wisely in thinking about 
Bucarest than Budapest. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
17/3/19 
No. 43 
Memorandum by Major-General W. Thwaites for Lord Hardinge 
[PRO FO 608/7 No. 35/1/5/3815] 
British Delegation, Paris, 6 March 1919 
Lord Hardinge, 
I note in today’s Bulletin that the British Delegation has agreed to the inclusion of the 
Grosse Schutt in the Czecho-Slovak state. This is not in accordance with the views of 
the General Staff, and I feel very strongly that our point of view should be considered 
before a final decision is made. The strategic character of this region will be affected if 
Czecho-Slovakia is made into a Danubian state by the inclusion of a large Magyar 
enclave within its frontiers. General Mance is also of opinion that this large extension 
of the southern frontier of Czecho-Slovakia is unnecessary from the point of view of 
transportation. 
May I ask you to be good enough to allow our views to be considered before a final 
decision is made which may lead to great difficulties in the future, in which we shall 
certainly be involved in one way or another. 
W. Thwaites, Maj.-Gen. 
for Chief of the Military Section 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
The Czecho-Slovak Committee unanimously decided to recommend that the Grosse 
Schutt should be given to the Czechs. A proposal to this effect will appear in the report 
of the Committee to the Supreme War Council, and it will, of course, be for that 
Council to take whatever suggestions or criticisms they desire before the report is 
adopted. 
The decision of the Committee was governed by economic and political 
considerations, but it was also felt that from a strategic point of view the Main Danube 
would give the Czechs a better frontier against the Magyars than the Little Danube. This 
view was advanced and supported by General Le Rond, but if our own General Staff 
feel that the Grosse Schutt should not, for strategic reasons, be given to the Czechs, it 
would be of value if they could furnish us with precise indications as to why, from the 
military point of view, the inclusion of the Grosse Schutt is strategically dangerous. The 
political disadvantages of incorporating so compact a Magyar population in Czecho¬ 
slovakia were carefully examined by the Committee but it was in the end decided that 
the economic considerations involved overweighed the other aspects. If therefore the 
question is to be re-opened before the Supreme Council, it will be better to confine our 
arguments to the purely military aspects of the case which may throw new light on the 
whole question. 
Harold Nicolson 
10/3/19 
I would suggest that an officer be directed to confer with General Le Rond on the 
subject of the strategical aspect of this question. 
E. Crowe 
10/3/19 
The military objections to transferring the Magyar population of the Grosser [sic] 
Schutt to Czechoslovakia are based mainly on the unsettling effect which this transfer 
is likely to have on the balance of military power in Central Europe, as it may tempt the 
Czechs to further territorial aggrandisements in the Danubian region. 
In view however of the unanimous decision of the Czecho-Slovak Committee, the 
General Staff do not desire to reopen the matter. 
J.H.M. Cornwall Lt. Col. 
11/3/19 
84 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY 1918-1919 
No. 44 
Letter from L. Mallet (for A. J. Balfour. Paris) to Earl Curzon (London. 
Received 10 March 1919) 
No. 199 [PRO FO 371/3529 No. 38023/W3] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 8 March 1919 
My Lord, 
With reference to your despatch No. 682 (22101/W3) of the 17 February1 and 
similar correspondence enclosing protests in regard to the future of the Reformed 
Church of Hungary, I have the honour to suggest that a reply should be returned to all 
such protests in the sense that His Majesty’s Government will not lose sight of the 
legitimate interests of the Reformed Church of Hungary, which there is no reason to 
suppose will be jeopardised. I leave it to Your Lordship’s judgment to decide whether 
it would be of value to add to such acknowledgement a statement to the effect that all 
reports which are received in regard to the treatment of the dignitaries and members of 
the Reformed Church emanate to a very considerable extent from Magyar propagandist 
sources. 
I am, etc., etc., 
Louis Mallet (for Mr. Balfour) 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 44 
Letter from G.S. Spicer (Foreign Office, London) to 
the Reverend R. Dykes Shaw (Edinburgh) 
Foreign Office, 13 March 1919 
Sir, 
With reference to the letter from this Department of the 13th ultimo relative to the 
question of the conservation of the Reformed Church of Hungary,21 am directed by 
Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that a despatch has been received from Mr. 
Balfour at Paris stating that the Delegates of His Majesty’s Government at the Peace 
Conference will not lose sight of the legitimate interests of the Reformed Church of 
Hungary which there is no reason to suppose will be jeopardised. 
I am, etc., etc., 
(signed) G.S. Spicer 
1 See No. 32. 
2 See No. 32, note 1. 
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No. 45 
Letter from Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to A.J. Balfour (London) 
[BALF Additional 49745\ 
Rome, 9 March 1919 
Dear Mr. Balfour, 
It may be interesting for you to know — in the event of your detecting any special 
tenderness towards Hungary on the part of the Italians — that I have heard privately 
that an emissary from Karolyi has been here1 and that he saw Orlando and also 
Cardinal Gasparris. I think the Italians will wish to maintain good relations with the 
Hungarians and so have some contact with Central Europe on the other side of their 
uncomfortable Jugo-Slav neighbours. There was, in the earlier phase of the war, an 
emissary from Karolyi’s party here,2 who came through Switzerland, and mooted the 
question with Sonnino of a rising in Hungary to insist on a separate peace, just when 
Roumania was about to enter the war. The price, however would have been 
Transylvania remaining Hungarian, and things had gone too far then for this question to 
be entertained. I shall try to pick out more about this visit, and perhaps de Salis3 will 
have heard something. 
Sincerely yours, 
Rennell Rodd 
1 In February 1919 Barna Buza, Head of the Hungarian National Propaganda Committee, sent two 
university professors, Alajos Zombra and Tibor Gerevich, and a grammar school teacher, Laszlo 
Koszegi, on a mission to Italy to the cities of Bologna, Florence and Rome. The reference here is 
probably to one of these negotiators. 
2 This is probably a reference to Janos Tdrok, a Greek Catholic priest, and confidant of Count M. 
Karolyi, whom Karolyi often sent on foreign missions to represent his views. 
3 Count John Francis Charles de Salis. British diplomat, a Count of the Holy Roman Empire. British 
Envoy on a Special Mission to the Holy See, 1916-1923. 
No. 46 
T. Fullham’s Answers to Questions in Two Questionnaires Prepared by M.I.3.b. 
(Extracts. Received in the Foreign Office on 24 March 1919) 
[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 46194] 
M.I.3.b., 4 March 1919 
Information Required About the Hungarian Army 
[Q: 1 I. General. 
[....] 
(2) How many of the troops are reliable, i.e. likely to uphold the Karolyi Government 
in the event of Bolshevist unrest? 
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[A:] Neither Magyar troops nor Magyar police will fire upon Magyar citizens for 
political reasons. As long as the supplies of food and coal and unemployment pay can 
be guaranteed nothing but spasmodic outbursts may be expected. 
[iQ:] II. Infantry. 
[....] 
(5) What is the relation between officers and men? What is the power of Soldiers’ 
Councils? 
[A:] The relations between officers and men are friendly. In some cases they follow the 
usual lines of cleavage, — social distinction, money, education &c. In the majority of 
cases there is a strong bond of fellowship, cemented by common misfortunes and 
national peril. 
The practice of saluting, discontinued in November has been revived. 
Soldiers’ Councils: Moribund from their inception. Will develop into Officers’ Clubs 
or die painlessly. The whole thing is a question of psychology. 
Questionnaire 
M.I.3.b., 10 March 1919 
[Q:] 3. What is your opinion of Count Karolyi? 
[A:] [....] Son of the friend of King Edward. Probably the richest man in Hungary [....] 
admiration of England and France, determined his intervention in politics. Steadily 
opposed that trend in politics which would have made of Hungary a pawn in the game 
of Mittel Europa. Strongly anti-German, he was anti-Austrian only in so far as a lively 
fear of the Slav peril — the century old obsession of the Magyar — could be affected 
by the counter-irritant of the sapping of Magyar independence vis-a-vis Austria herself. 
That is to say he would risk the Slav rather than the German absorption. 
During the course of the war his activities in conjunction with those of his press 
organ “Magyarorszag” were so insistent and marked that he became the bugbear of 
Tisza and the object of personal persecution and espionage by Major Kouston, head of 
the German Secret Service in Budapest. This became, at length, the subject of debate in 
the House. 
For weeks before the debacle Count Kerolyi [sic] made most incessant and 
determined efforts to rescue the weak-minded King Karoly (Karl) from the hands of 
Hohenlohe,1 Windischgraetz2 and the Camarilla. His popularity hourly increased until 
at length he formulated a programme, engineered the Revolution and took the helm. 
Count Karolyi is not a leader of men in any sense. Events have forced him up: 
Events and the declared wish of the Entente keep him in position. But it is much to be 
feared that he has become the unconscious puppet of the Hebrew-Socialist combination 
which rules Budapest and imagines that it represents Hungary. Count Karolyi stands 
for the British connection. 
* Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingfiirst, Austrian aristocrat. Held various ministerial posts in the Austrian 
government and the joint government of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
~ Prince Louis Windischgraetz, Austrian aristocrat. Minister of Public Feeding in the Hungarian Wekerle 
Government, and in the last days of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Head of Department at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Count G. Andrassy, the Younger. 
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[Q:] 4. Do you think that his administration makes towards normal conditions of law 
and order? 
[A:] Emphatically Yes. To such an extent is he the master of the situation that he 
represents the only hope of the Magyars. Karolyi is the one man — failing a Napoleon 
— whose name, wealth prestige and Entente connections — are guarantees against 
dissolution. 
[Q:] 5. If so, how can he be best supported by the Allies? 
[A:] An extremely delicate question. Support of Karolyi could take one of the following 
forms: 
(a) Concession to strong national sentiment. 
(b) Official declaration that the “piratical” activities of Rouman, Czech and Jugo-Slav 
do not establish a final settlement. 
(c) Occupation. 
NOTE: I am firmly of opinion from long study of the psychology of the Magyar that 
the most effective move on the part of Gt. Britain would be the despatch of two 
Squadrons of Life Guards in guard-mounting order and one battalion of Highlanders in 
Kilts — and I most strongly commend this obvious solution to H.M. Government. 
Kismet!! 
[Q:~\ 6. How far is the Government able to cope with the Bolshevistic tendencies? 
[A:] Bolshevism is totally alien to the prevailing Oriental tinge in the Magyar character. 
[....] His instinct is monarchical and I do not see how the eventual return of a purely 
Magyar Monarchy is to be prevented. The forces of Order are as deeply rooted as in 
England and the Magyar is far too inherently conservative to care about Bolshevism as 
a system. Sporadic disturbances and looting, due to want of food and fuel should not be 
confounded with a settled desire to place society upon an experimental basis. 
The whole thing is ridiculed even amongst common soldiers and working Socialists. 
[Q:] 7. How far has it succeeded in disarming the population? 
[A:] A system of house-to-house visitation and systematic searching of private 
individuals in places of public resort has well served the purpose. Any arms secreted 
are either personal trophies or the stand-by of the timid in case of imaginary upheaval. 
Prohibition extends even to revolvers. 
[Q:] 12. Did you hear any views expressed about a DANUBE CONFEDERATION? 
[A:] In view of the fact that I myself, before Masaryk, was the original pioneer of this 
idea, that I have discussed it with countless Magyars, of the old regime, now snowed 
under, and that I am called upon, subjectively, to review my own political hobby 
objectively, anything I may say must bear the taint of pre-possession. 
In olden days the oligarchs who represented numerically .0005 of the population 
would not hear of this idea. They stood for Magyar hegemony on the basis of ancient 
settlement, continuous administration, cultural superiority, natural pride and native 
arrogance, always with an eye to the Kiegyezes (Ausgleich) of 1867 and the court 
connection. 
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At the time of the debacle the ruling chiefs vanished. They are now hibernating. The 
Socialists and Jews who rule a third of Budapest and imagine themselves Hungary 
receive the idea sympathetically, but I am driven to suspect as the lesser evil, a bid for 
the integrity of the country. If Hungary can be preserved intact upon a Federal or other 
basis, she would have no objection to seeking a modus vivendi with Czech, Rouman 
and Jugo-Slav, as a unit, perhaps the directive unit in a Danubian Confederation. 
[iQ:] 16. Do you consider that the average Hungarian has English sympathies? 
17. If so, how could they best be cultivated ? 
[A:] The further an ordinarily cultured Englishman moves East, retracing his atavistic 
path against the sun the more does it become apparent that his importance varies with 
the square of his distance. In France he is somewhat, in Switzerland somewhat more, in 
Hungary, the extreme limit of cultural Europe he is exalted to a plane which puts a 
severe strain upon his native modesty. Popularity does not cover this; popularity is 
mere agreeable equality. He is rather regarded with a tinge of reverence. 
[....] 
This admiration of England is due partly to moral partly to historic causes — the 
parallel political development of the two States, sympathy of our unofficial classes in 
‘48; the reception of Kossuth, but it is chiefly due to education; knowledge and 
perspective; later impressions caused by the policy of Campbell-Bannerman in Africa, 
Morley and Kitchener in India and the Soudan respectively and the social schemes of 
Lloyd-George have merely deepened a settled admiration. 
As a Prince, King Edward was loved and admired: as a King he was held to be the 
wisest, most intrinsically powerful and most diabolically wonderful statesman that ever 
appeared upon the European stage, whilst the relationship of Queen Mary to some 
Magyar families is a source of national pride and gratification. 
It is characteristic of the psychology of the Magyar that he should be profoundly 
grateful for sympathy in national disaster. If the exigencies of the political situation 
should allow of official England intervening on his behalf the result would be 
incalculable. 
Anglomania is the prevailing passion of the Magyar. It is for us to appraise the 
political value of Hungary as a coadjutor and then to act at once overtly, assuming of a 
course, that other factors do not discount his values. 
Magyar sympathy needs no cultivation. It is inherent. As long as Britain pursues that 
path which destiny and experience have marked out for her so long will the passive 
sympathy of this people be assured. 
It would take little to place these countries upon the footing of Old Russia and Old 
Bulgaria. If England could find it politically, that is economically worth while to place 
herself on the same footing vis-a-vis Hungary that she occupied successively vis-a-vis 
Portugal, Greece, Naples, Savoy and Belgium, the same results, but intensified would 
accrue. 
It is the fashion to assume that sentiment and psychology do not count as international 
factors: the war itself disproves this. 
It would be an error to assume superficially that the movement in favour of calling an 
English Prince or Noble to the Throne was dictated by any hope of mitigation of 
sentence. It was a reasonable and acceptable way out of a blind alley. Naturally I 
ridiculed the movement. What about guarantees, the question of unanimity, the 
instability of Europe, the language question? It is by no means improbable that the 
question will be revived always remembering that the sentiment of Hungary — save for 
that of the Socialist-Jewish clique in Budapest — is essentially and historically 
monarchical. 
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It is a point of immense significance that at a critical juncture England had no Franchet 
d’Esperey — another that France had. And Hungary remembers. 
I suggest some kind of tentative propaganda. Any agent, fortified with definite 
assurances, however slight would bind Hungary to the side of England. But these 
assurances should be positive in character. [....] Another reason. It was said by a 
prominent Italian statesman upon the occasion of Gladstone’s death that if in any 
question of international moment the moral presumption lay in favour of England this 
result would be found to be the result of his influence. That holds. Hungary knows that 
England stands, roughly for justice. I seriously commend these rather disjointed 
observations to your notice. They are objectively true. 
[....] 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Interesting from the point of view of a Hungarian enthusiast. 
C.H.S[mith], 
27/3/19 
I should say there was a great deal of truth in it. 
D. [?] 27/3/19 
Mr. Fullham is violently pro-Magyar & anti-Slav & he does not even try to disguise 
the fact. [....] [The late subject races of Austria-Hungary and not the Hungarians were 
Britain’s allies in the war, and Britain agreed to go by ethnic numerical majorities in 
drawing frontiers.] These are facts on which one cannot go back, and Mr. Fullham’s 
statements in defence of the Magyars, even where accurate, seem irrelevant. 
As to the activities and methods of General Franchet d’Esperey & Col. Vix, hardly 
any criticism would seem too severe. 
L.B.N[amier]. 28/3/19 
No. 47 
Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 
to Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extract. Received 22 March 1919) 
[PRO FO 371/3508 No. 44850] 
Belgrade, 15 March 1919 
My dear General, 
The French Chief of Staff this morning told me that instructions had been received 
from Paris Conference to the effect that in a few days time the Hungarians were to be 
informed that they were to retire to a line considerably further to the West, and that a 
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zone, of which the line Debreczin — Bekes-Csaba is about the Centre, is to be occupied 
by French troops in order to keep Roumanians and Flungarians at a distance from each 
other. 
Admiral Troubridge is going to employ some of the monitors under his command 
under British and French flags to show a force on the Danube, for the French divisions 
of the Armee d’Flongrie are mere skeleton divisions and the French want at any price to 
avoid shots being fired. 
Under these circumstances the Chief of the Staff said it would be a help if a British 
Officer could be attached to the Headquarters of the French General Commanding the 
troops to be employed. The French Chief of Staff said he would like the officer we 
nominated to be “a serious man”, and I am sending to Brigadier General Gordo#at 
Fiume to ask for the services of Col. Sir H. Waechter whom he mentioned to me as 
being a suitable officer for other work of the same nature. I have not as yet received 
definite instructions from the French but they expect to inform me in two or three days 
time. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Reports in today’s papers show the result of the enforcement of the neutral zone.1 
[Unidentified official] 
24/3/19 
1 he. the fall of the Hungarian Government and the proclamation of a Republic of Councils. 
No. 48 
Letter from G. Spicer (for Earl Curz.on, London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extracts. 
Received 20 March 1919) 
No. 1473 [PRO FO 608/6 No. 34/2/1/4749] 
Foreign Office, 
London, 18 March 1919 
Sir, 
[....] you will have received my despatch No. 1254 of the 8th instant1 enclosing [....] 
a copy of a further telegram from Sir T. Cuninghame in which the latter advocates that 
the Governments of Austria and Hungary should now be recognised by the Allied 
Powers. 
3.1 am now inclined to agree with Sir T. Cuninghame’s suggestion since in my view 
it is at this stage, and in the very grave circumstances at present existing, unnecessary to 
insist too stiongly upon matters of form since if Bolshevism obtains a further hold 
1 Not printed. 
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upon Austria and Hungary it is evident that there will be no Governments in existence 
in those countries with which Peace may be finally concluded. 
4. I would accordingly suggest for your consideration that a proposal on the 
following lines might be made to the assembled Delegates at Paris, in the manner set 
out below. 
5. The Peace Conference would address a telegram to all the States in question, 
namely Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, indicating that the various differences which 
have arisen between them render it increasingly difficult for measures to be taken to 
feed and to give economic assistance to the various States and that the Peace 
Conference have therefore decided to send to Vienna a Commission (on which would 
be included economic and financial experts) which would be empowered to effect 
settlements of outstanding differences for the general good. These settlements would 
not, of course, prejudice in any way the final settlements of territorial claims which can 
only be reached in the Treaty of Peace. 
6. Sir T. Cuninghame would at the same time be instructed to draw up a list of the 
more important of the differences outstanding between the various States, and on their 
arrival in Vienna the Commission would summon representatives from the various 
States and endeavour to reach a modus vivendi which would put an end to the continual 
disputes between these States. 
7. It will no doubt occur to you that a settlement would be most promptly arrived at if 
the proposed Commission was limited to British and American members but it will no 
doubt be necessary to include on it representatives both of France and Italy. 
8. It is my opinion that when this Commission is constituted and sitting at Vienna the 
various States will realise that it is in their interest to cooperate rather than to continue 
their present policy of aggression and mutual distrust. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston) 
Gerald Spicer 
Minutes attached to the document: 
There is unfortunately no Govt, in Hungary either to recognise or to co-operate with. 
The old Magyar regime did not encourage the growth of liberal elements or develop any 
political capacity in the average citizen. Hence the present state of affairs which seem 
for the moment to destroy any chance for Interallied Commission proposed. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
26/3/19 
Moreover Sir T. Cuninghame is a far from reliable guide in such matters. His 
judgment has rarely been proved sound. 
So far as I know there is already an allied military mission at Budapest. 
[J.H.M.] Cornwall 
Lt. Col. General]. S[taff]. 31/3/19 
[To] Military Section E. Crowe 
28/3/19 
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No. 49 
Memorandum by Sr M. Hankeyfor D. Lloyd George (Extract) 
[HNKY 8/10] 
Villa Majestic, 
Paris, 19 March 1919 
[To] Prime Minister: 
[....] 
5. These series of States [the planned system of independent small states in Central, 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe] form the outpost line against the spread of 
Bolshevism. Is there any ground for the belief that the outpost line can be also a line of 
resistance? The answer must be given in the negative. Materially every one of these 
States is weak. They are apparently incapable of compensating for their weakness by 
effective combination. There has not been the smallest sign of any serious attempt at 
combined effort to resist the Bolshevists among them. On the contrary, they show all 
the worst qualities that we have become accustomed to in the Balkan States. Already, 
while the Great Powers in the full flush of victory, with great armies still mobilised, are 
sitting in solemn conclave to settle the peace of the world, these nations are fighting 
among themselves. The Poles, who ought to be reserving all their efforts to resist the 
Bolshevists, are fighting with the Ukrainians and threatening to drive the Ukrainians 
into the arms of the Bolshevists. At Teschen the Poles have fought with Czecho¬ 
slovaks, and recent telegrams show the position there to be still very serious. The 
Roumanians have only been prevented from fighting with the Magyars by the 
interposition of the Allies. The Jugo-Slavs and the Italians are ready to fly at each 
others throats. A project has just been put forward for the Roumanians to attack the 
Ukrainians. Neither the history, nor the disposition, nor the present attitude of these 
peoples, offers any hope that they will combine to form an effective barrier against 
Bolshevism. When attacked they will just whine for assistance from the Allies and go 
on fighting each other. If they have not the physical force which they might attain by 
combination to resist the very moderate power of the Bolshevists, they almost certainly 
have not the moral force to resist an effective propaganda. Moreover, as General Sir 
Henry Wilson points out, the configuration of these States, which shuts Russia 
completely off from the sea on every side, except the Black Sea (where the development 
of the Ukrainian State may equally exclude them), provides a real and justifiable excuse 
for the Bolshevists to attack and overwhelm them. 
6. If the outpost line is a weak one, lacking cohesion, what is there behind? 
7. In former days, before the War, we should have said that there was a safe and solid 
line. In spite of some of their detestable characteristics, the Germans were a solid, 
patriotic, reliable, and highly-organised people. The Austrians, less solid and less 
patriotic, were nevertheless a great force. Germany and Austria between them might 
have been relied upon to stem the advance of Bolshevism had it come in those days. 
8. The position now is very different. Austria has completely collapsed, and Germany 
is rapidly falling to pieces. The Peace Treaty, as it is now developing, holds out no 
prospect that this process of disintegration will be stayed. 
[..-] 
M.P.A. Hankey 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
The original of this paper is believed to have influenced Mr. Lloyd George in his 
decision to hold the Fontainebleau Conference of March 22-23 [, 1919]. 
[M.P.A.] Hankey 
15/11/1951 
No. 50 
Notes for the War Cabinet 
[PRO CAB 25/117] 
ca. early March 1919 
NOTES REGARDING THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN HUNGARY 
AND ROUMANIA IN TRANSYLVANIA 
1. Armistice line. 
This is shown Blue on the attached map.1 
In accordance with the Military Convention drawn up on Nov 13th 1918 the 
Hungarian troops withdrew N and W of this line, and evacuated the regions of 
THERESSIOPEL [Mari-Theresiopel] (SZABADKA) BAJA and FUNFKIRCHEN. 
These latter are now held by French troops. 
The civil administration remained under the local Hungarian Government, who were 
allowed sufficient police forces to maintain order and guard the railways. The Allies 
reserved for themselves the right to occupy any strategic points and to maintain troops 
at any time throughout Hungarian territory. 
2. Advance beyond the Armistice Line. Present situation. 
General Berthelot reported on January 9th that the most advanced Roumanian troops 
had occupied the line NAGYBANYA-KLAUSENBURG (KOLOZ[S]VAR)-DEVA 
(KARLBURG) (shown in Red on the attached map) on strategic grounds. He also 
stated that Hungary had violated the terms of the Armistice (in allowing part of 
Mackensen’s Army to get away and arms & ammunition to be sold) which he 
suggested should be denounced and that Roumanian troops should be allowed to 
proceed to the western limit of the territory claimed by Roumania. (Viz the 1916 Treaty 
line shown in Black on the attached map) French troops to occupy such points as 
ARAD, GROSSWARDEIN and DEBRESIN [Debrecen]. 
Gen. Berthelot ordered the Hungarian troops to withdraw to a line about 75 kms W of 
that held by Roumanian troops (at Red line). 
1 Not printed. 
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3. Opposing forces. 
Roumanian In Transylvania there are 
2 Infantry Divisions 
2 Light Inf[antry].” 
Total 39,000 men 
Note. A Russian wireless of Feb 18th stated that owing to an uprising in Bessarabia a 
large portion of the Roumanian troops in Transylvania had been moved to the former 
country. There is little reason to believe this is true. 
Hungarian. According to the Armistice terms Hungary was allowed to maintain six 
Infantry and two Cavalry divisions. 
The Hungarian War Minister2 stated on January 10th that there were 3 Hungarian 
Divisions on the Transylvanian frontier. They consist of the youngest classes (19lb- 
1918) and form a total of 30,000 men and according to him are well disciplined. 
This latter statement is hardly justified by reports. Considerable difficulty is 
experienced by the War Ministry in dealing with the self-constituted Soldiers’ Councils; 
Employing only the youngest classes not answer, and efforts are being made now to get 
older men to volunteer. Officers who do not belong to the Social-Democratic party 
either cannot or will not serve in the Army. 
Nevertheless the War Minister3 stated that by the end of March 6 divisions total 
strength 66,000 men wd. have been formed. 
2 Count Sandor Festetics. 
No. 51 
Telegram from General L. Franchet d'Esperey (Constantinople) 
to Marshal F. Foch (Paris. Extract. Received 24 March 1919) 
Nos. 746, 747, 748 [PRO EO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/5089] 
Constantinople, 22 March 1919 
le - Decision Congres Paix1 lui ay ant ete notifiee le 19 mars, gouvernement hongrois 
a demissione, declarant ne pouvoir ni la recevoir ni faire mesures prescrites. II demande 
que sa decision soit communiquee d’urgence a conference Paix, a 19 heures Colonel 
Vix a re£u de representants parti bourgeois declaration proposant ou bien alliance avec 
entente centre les bolchevicks russes a condition que lignes demarcation actuelle soient 
maintenues et dans ce cas allies devraient envoyer 15,000 hommes a Budapest pour 
permettre d’exister a Gouvernement ordre, ou bien en cas de refus de l’entente, feraient 
alliance avec bolchevicks. 
* This refers to the decision by the Peace Conference to establish a Neutral Zone between the Hungarian 
and Romanian forces in Transylvania. For further details see Nos. 36, 37, 47 and 50. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 95 
2e - General commandant armee Hongrie2 rend compte que Gouvernement Hongrois 
aurait donne ordre attaquer a partir de 18 heures ce 21 mars sans que front attaque soit 
specific. 
3e - D’apres les renseignements parvenus anterieurement Hongrois disposeraient front 
Transylvanie de 25,000 hommes environ, disciplines et resolus. 
4e - General Berthelot prevenu ainsi que Voivode Mitchitch [Vojvoda MiSic]3 et 
General Pelle. 
5e - Je donne l’ordre a armee la Hongrie et Voivode Mitchitch [Vojvoda MiSic]3 
grouper forces region nord Belgrade et Banat de fa£on a avoir 2 D.I.4 franfaises et 3 
D.I. serbes pretes a toute eventuelite et s’abstenir si pas attaquees toute intervention 
jusqu’a nouvel ordre. 
6e - Je vous demande instructions sur attitude a prendre [....] (Fin). 
Minutes attached to the document: 
The most disgraceful instance of blackmail, worthy of the past & present rulers of 
Hungary. The position is extremely serious & justifies the repeated requests of the 
Roumanian & Chekho-Slovak authorities for immediate assistance. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
24/3/19 
[....] The situation certainly appears most threatening, and the case of Roumania 
especially desperate as she is exposed to the attack of the Hungarians and the Russian 
Bolshevists at the same time. 
It seems hardly possible for the 5 allied & associated govts, to look on inactively 
whilst the cause of Roumania is in great jeopardy. We should be accused of having 
abandoned Roumania for the second time. 
[....] 
Qu: 
Telegraph to Lord Curzon expressing hope that the War Cabinet will without 
delay decide upon all possible measures for relieving the situation. 
[To] Sir H. Wilson at Military Section E. Crowe 24/3/19 
It is serious, but the situation everywhere is deteriorating rapidly and in favour of the 
Bolsheviks, owing to the Allies drifting without a policy. It is difficult to know what 
measures can now be taken to relieve the situation but a policy is needed in the first 
instance. 
H[ardinge]. 
2 Gen. P. de Lobit. 
3 Vojvoda (civilian and military leader) Zivojin MiSic, the Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army. 
4 Infantry Divisions. 
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[To] Lord Hardinge 
[....] Joint action by the Allies under unity of Command seems to be necessitated. 
W. Thwaites Maj. General D.M.I. 
25/3/19 
(From) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 55622] 
[These minutes are attached to a memorandum by Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) (not 
printed) on the events associated with the Communist take-over in Hungary after the 
fall of Count M. Karolyi’s Government on 21 March 1919, dated 31 March, received in 
Paris on 10 April.] 
The territory from which Col. Vix ordered the Magyars to withdraw their troops was 
not in Transylvania as stated on p. 1 of the despatch but well in the Magyar plain. 
L.B.N[amier]. 
15/4/19 
No. 52 
War Office, Summary of Intelligence, 19th Series, No. 16 (Extract. Received by the 
Supreme War Council in Paris 26 March 1919) 
[PRO CAB 25/117] 
22 March 1919 
[....] 
Hungary. —Bolshevik activities.— If recent reports are to be trusted, the number of 
adherents to the Bolshevik movement in Hungary is smaller than was originally 
supposed. Information obtained about the 25th February put the number of Bolsheviks 
among soldiers of the Budapest garrison at 650. The number of workmen holding 
Bolshevik views is said to be about 2,000; but not more than 500 have been counted at 
the various unsuccessful attempts at insurrection. “Bolshevik anti-semitism” is not 
increasing, for the reason that many of the leaders of the movement, including Bela 
Kun, are themselves of the Jewish faith. Kun was reported in the press to have been 
lynched on or about the 22nd March [?February], but this lacks confirmation. 
The Hungarian Government is doing what it can to check the movement. On the 3rd 
February the editorial offices of four Bolshevik news-sheets were raided by the police, 
on the ground that the paper restrictions had been disobeyed. One of the four 
newspapers, however, the Vdros Ujsag (Red News), appeared again on the 5th 
February. The Government are not taking active measures against the movement; 
indeed they are hardly in a position to do so. The liberty of the press and the right to 
hold meetings are freely exercised. Yet the police are alert and efficient and keep the 
Bolshevik leaders under strict supervision. 
It is thought by a reasonable observer that the prospects of any great number of men 
being converted to Bolshevism is small, in spite of the discipline of the army being at a 
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low level. The organization is still sketchy, the number of adherents insignificant; 
provided food and coal were available this observer thought that the danger might pass. 
It is believed, however, that revolutionary outbreaks will be attempted in the near 
future; and the Bolshevik organizations, if short of men, can at the same time dispose of 
a large number of rifles and machine guns, most of which were bought from men of 
Mackensen’s army or stolen from transports. 
No. 53 
Telegram from Sir C. des Graz. (Belgrade) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 24 March 1919) 
No. 116 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/45473] 
Belgrade, 22 March 1919 
Very Urgent. 
We hear that Count Karolyi’s Government has fallen on refusal to accept peace 
conference’s directions to withdraw from Transylvania and a Soviet Government has 
been formed. 
All Missions are being withdrawn from Budapest. 
Admiral Troubridge has sent two Monitors up the river to insure safety of Allied 
Missions. 
Repeated to Astoria. 
No. 54 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to Captain V. Haggard (Budapestf 
No. 299 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 59528] 
Belgrade, 22 March 1919 
According to my latest information the situation at Budapest is changing hourly and 
will probably continue to do so. I am therefore only able to lay down on general lines 
the scope and intention of your mission. 
You will have arrived at Budapest today, and doubtless have taken such measures as 
seemed proper to you to carry out the instructions contained in my telegram of 21st 
For Admiral Troubridge’s reports to the Admiralty, London, concerning Captain Haggard’s mission to 
Budapest, see Nos. 63 and 77. The present document originally appears as Enclosure No. 2 to the 
Admiral’s letter No. 322 to the Admiralty, dated 28 March, printed as No. 63. 
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March2 to ensure the safety of the Allied Missions and at the same time the safety of 
the ships, while avoiding hostile action. 
My information, to 2.30 a.m. 22nd March, is to the effect that the Hungarian Soviet 
Government is interning subjects of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Serbia, 
preparatory to declaring war on those countries. These countries are our Allies and so 
far as is possible you should endeavour to procure the safety of their people equally 
with that of subjects of other Entente countries. 
The instructions at present preclude the use of military action on your part except as is 
necessary to ensure the safety of the ships under your command, which must under no 
circumstances be permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy. 
It is, however, clear that, if the information received from Budapest is accurate, 
Hungary has broken the armistice conditions, and, in spite of declarations that her 
hostile action is limited to Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Serbia, Hungary has 
actually, in so breaking the armistice terms, resumed the conditions prevailing prior to 
the signature of the armistice on 13th November 1918, and is actually at war with the 
Entente Powers. 
Unless, however, or until, this condition of affairs is recognised in Paris, I cannot 
myself give you instructions upon those lines, and must confine myself to directing you 
on the lines previously determined, namely to ensure the personal safety of Allied 
Missions and subjects according to your own discretion. 
It is evident that by the time you receive these orders3 the situation may be completely 
changed, or that I may be able to convey further directions to you through Budapest or 
by other means. 
You should endeavour to set up communication with Baja by telephone or telegraph, 
and so to keep in touch with me, if necessary sending an M.L. down to Baja or to the 
nearest telephone or telegraph office to keep me informed of your actions. 
You should remember that the High Authorities at Paris will use their utmost 
endeavours to avert an outbreak of hostilities in which all Europe may well be involved. 
No action on your part, therefore, should precipitate hostilities. 
At the same time the will of the Paris Conference must, it is plain, be enforced upon 
the Hungarian Government sooner or later, and firmness of action without vacillation is 
condition demanded of All Allied Officers in their dealings with recalcitrant nations, 
such as is Hungary at this moment. 
Immunity from Allied hostile action was granted to Hungary on 4th November 1918 
upon certain conditions. That advantage should have been taken of such immunity to 
prepare forces, and ultimately resume hostilities against the Allies, is the outstanding 
fact with which the High Authorities at Paris have now to deal. Consequently you must 
be prepared for all emergencies, including hostile action with the force under your 
command against the enemy and also attack by the enemy. 
I am confident that in this difficult situation I can rely upon your discretion as you can 
rely upon my support. 
(Sd.) E.T. Troubridge 
Admiral 
Commanding on the Danube. 
2 Not printed. 
3 The editor has not been able to trace when Captain V. Haggard received this letter. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 99 
No. 55 
Telegram from Sir C. des Graz. (Belgrade) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 24 March 1919) 
No. 117 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 46092/W3] 
Belgrade, 24 (?) March 1919 
My immediately preceding telegram.1 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs2 informs me that Revolutionary Government at 
Budapest has declared Bolshevik war against Serbia and surrounding countries, and is 
said to have opened frontier towards Russia. 
From another source I hear that Belakoun [Bela Kun] has become dictator, and has 
got into wireless communication with Lenin announcing that he has proclaimed war 
against all external enemies. 
There has been some skirmishing at Szegedin between French troops and 
Hungarians. 
1 See No. 53. 
2 The person referred to is most likely to have been Mihailo Gavrilovic, Serbian historian and diplomat, 
appointed Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1917, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1918. Envoy 
of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom to London, 1919-1924, but only took up his post in London in 
1921. 
No. 56 
War Office, Summary of Intelligence, 19th Series, No. 17 (Extracts. Received by the 
Supreme War Council in Paris 27 March 1919) 
[PRO CAB 25/117] 
24 March 1919 
Hungary.—Resignation of the Government.—On the 22nd March1 Lieut.-Colonel 
Vyx, head of the Allied Military Mission in Budapest, presented to Count Karolyi a 
note laying down a new line of demarcation between Roumanian and Hungarian 
troops,2 considerably farther west than that previously held. Karolyi forthwith resigned 
the presidency of the Republic, and issued a proclamation, in which he handed over the 
government to the proletariat. 
Representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Hungarian Communists 
(Bolsheviks) decided to combine both parties under the name of the Hungarian Socialist 
Party, and this organization has taken over the administration of the country. 
1 The note was presented to Count M. Karolyi on 20 March. The Government resigned on the same day, 
and the Republic of Councils was proclaimed on 21 March. 
2 The following remark is recorded on the margin of the original beside these lines by an unidentified 
official: “presumably the neutral zone”. 
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Martial law has been proclaimed and the council has decreed the socialization of large 
estates, mines, big industries, banks and transport. Further, it declares complete accord 
with the Russian Soviet Government, and is said to have offered to conclude an armed 
alliance with proletariat Russia. A Vienna message adds that a state of war is 
considered to exist between the Entente and Hungary; though it is the desire of 
Hungarians to conclude an early peace which will assure the well-being of the 
Hungarian labouring classes and the possibility of their living in harmony with their 
neighbours. 
Sandor Garbai has become President of the new Government. 
The new War Minister is Jozsef Pogany, who has been acting as liaison between the 
Soldiers’ Councils and the late Government. He was formerly President of the Soldiers’ 
Council, but appears to have been afterwards taken into the Ministry of War. He 
succeeded in obtaining the release of Bela Kun, in December; but took a leading part in 
the reform of the army, and one of the official party accompanying Count Karolyi on 
his presidential tour at the beginning of March. 
Bela Kun, People’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs, was formerly a prisoner of war 
in Russia, where he is reported to have done secretarial work for Lenin. He has been 
leader of the Communist (Bolshevik) movement in Budapest since December. He is a 
Jew {see the Summary for the 22nd March).3 
Vilmos Bohm, War Minister in the late Government, now appears as People’s 
Commissary for Socialization. He was an Under Secretary of State for War in 
November, 1918, and became de facto Minister of War under Karolyi on the 
resignation of Bartha,4 on the 16th December, and actual Minister on the 20th January 
on the resignation of Count Festetics.5 He has shown himself to be a capable 
departmental chief with a strong character. His personality was most clearly revealed in 
the reception of deputations from Soldiers’ Councils, which he told bluntly to go away 
and not waste the time of the Government. [....] 
Note.--The resignation of the Karolyi Government was only to be expected, if the 
Roumanians and Czechs continued to alter the lines of demarcation laid down in the 
original Military Convention with Hungary. [....] The Bolshevik movement has hitherto 
not received any great measure of support, and the present conditions might easily have 
been avoided if the Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak governments had taken up a more 
reasonable attitude [....]. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[The following minutes were originally attached to “War Office, ‘A’ Branch Summary 
of 28/29 March 1919 (not printed)] 
[To] C.O.S. 
The Note at the foot of page 2 under “Hungary” is practically a literal quotation 
from the War Office Blue Summary of Intelligence of 24th March, 1919. From this it 
would appear that the War Office is unaware of the existence of a neutral zone in 
Hungary between the Roumanians and the Hungarians, since the note in question refers 
3 See No. 52. 
4 See No. 24, note 4. 
5 See No. 27, note 2. 
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only to the Military Convention with Hungary drawn up by General Franchet d’Esperey 
in November, 1918.1 am not aware that Gen. Franchet d’Esperey ever fixed a frontier 
in Czecho-Slovakia.6 
In view of the fact that this note is most misleading as to the real state of affairs in 
Hungary, would it not be desirable to draw the attention of the War Office to the 
proceedings of the Military Representatives’ meeting at Versailles on 25th and 26th 
February, 1919, (S.W.C. 379/1).7 
M(?) Thomson(?) 
Brigadier-General, G.S.8 31/3/19 
The War Office Summary is rather misleading but the first paragraph under the 
heading “Hungary” must, I think, refer to the neutral zone established on the 
recommendation of the MR’s [Military Representatives]. 
H.C.O.S. [Chiefs of Staff?] 
2/4/19 
6 The note in italics was inserted in handwriting into the text after its completion, presumably by Brig.- 
Gen. Thomson. See note 8. 
7 Not printed, see PRO CAB 21/129. 
8 The editor has not been able to establish the identity of the signatory of this document beyond doubt. It 
may be Sir B.H. Thomson (see Glossary). On the other hand, there is the following record in the relevant 
British Army List: “THOMSON, Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Andrew Graham. 1st grade 
General Staff Officer. Retired in February 1919.” 
No. 57 
Letter from T.H. Jones (London) to Sir M. Hankey (Paris. Extract) 
[HNKY 4/11] 
London, 24 March 1919 
[••••] 
There was heated discussion at the War Cabinet this morning (War Cabinet 450 
Minute)1 on the question of equipping the Roumanian army as you will see by reading 
between the lines of the very full minute. 
Churchill grew very hot and prophesied vast and immediate disaster as the result of 
the dilatoriness of the Peace Conference. Curzon took much the same line. Bonar Law 
was most unwilling. 
1 Not printed. 
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No. 58 
Memorandum by D. Lloyd George and Sir M. Hankey, 
Known as the “Fontainebleau Memorandum” (Extracts)1 
[HNKY 8/12] 
25 March 1919 
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE BEFORE THEY 
FINALLY DRAFT THEIR TERMS 
What I have said about the Germans^qually true of the Magyars. There will never be 
peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a 
large Magyar Irredenta within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle 
of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to 
their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over 
considerations of strategy or economics or communications which can usually be 
adjusted by other means. [....] 
If Germany goes over to the spartacists it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot 
with the Russian Bolshevists. Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into 
the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of 
nearly three hundred million people organised into a vast red army under German 
instructors and German generals equipped with German cannon and German machine 
guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe. This is a prospect 
which no one can face with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary 
yesterday shows only too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. And what are the 
reasons alleged for this decision? They are mainly the belief that large numbers of 
Magyars are to be handed over to the control of others. If we are wise, we shall offer to 
Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the 
alternative of Bolshevism. 
It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peace with Germany. If 
we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism we must make the League of 
Nations into something which will be both a safeguard to those nations who are 
prepared for a fair dealing with their neighbours, and a menace to those who would 
trespass on the rights of their neighbours, whether they are imperialist empires or 
imperialist Bolshevists. An essential element, therefore, in the peace settlement is the 
constitution of the League of Nations as the effective guardian of international right and 
international liberty throughout the world. [....] 
1 The full memorandum is printed in LINK, vol. 56, pp. 259-270. Also see the minutes in No. 49. 
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No. 59 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
Paris, 25 March 1919 
The Hungarian situation is trying. Of course it’s not disinterested Bolshevism, but 
largely obstructive, anti-Rumanian & — Chekh Magyar tactics. If we had troops 
available we could settle it quickly. But have we? 
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No. 60 
Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 27 March 1919) 
No. 533 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 48000] 
Berne, 26 March 1919 
My immediately preceding telegram.1 
In speaking of situation in Hungary, Professor Lammasch shares view, apparently 
held by a considerable section of Entente Press, that accession by a Bolshevik 
Government to power at Budapest is result of a nationalist manoeuvre engineered by 
Count Karolyi. 
I am informed that Hungarian Minister here who is a nominee of Karolyi expresses 
himself as well satisfied with turn of events in Hungary. 
Sent to Peace Conference No. 44. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
I think it is now clear that the position in Hungary is not Bolshevist in the accepted 
sense of the term, but nationalist Magyar. 
C.H.S[mith]. 
27/3/19 
Which however may develop in the direction in the direction of ordinary Bolshevism, 
if matters are allowed to drag on too long. 
1 Not printed. 
G.S[picer]. 
28/3/19 
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No. 61 
Memorandum by Major-General W. Thwaites 
[Ll.G. F/23/4/45] 
Paris, 27 March 1919 
THE OUTBREAK IN HUNGARY1 
Captain Roosevelt, of the United States Army, had a long conversation with Colonel 
Cornwall and myself late this afternoon. Captain Roosevelt only arrived yesterday from 
Buda Pest, where he had been attached to the Political Section of the American Military 
Mission and had witnessed the outbreak of the revolution. 
About this he told us several very interesting details. He was himself, as were his 
colleagues, not ill-treated by the revolutionary authorities or their supporters, allowed to 
remain in his hotel and subsequently to leave with four other members of the Food 
Mission; and on one occasion the new People’s Commissioner, Verga [Varga],2 
interfered to prevent Red Guards arresting a member of the American staff on the 
ground that no Americans or British were to be interfered with. 
Captain Roosevelt was strongly of opinion that the revolution was not a spontaneous 
outburst of Bolshevism, but was considered a trump card by Hungarian authorities to 
force the Entente powers to withdraw from their plans to assign non-Magyar portions 
of what they considered the historic State of Hungary to other peoples. Feeling was 
intensely bitter against the Tchecho-Slovaks and Rumanians — the Tchecho-Slovaks 
because they were feared, the Rumanians simply because they were disliked. He 
observed no animosity against the Serbs. We asked him whether in his position it was 
fair to suppose that the opportunity of the presentation of the new military ultimatum 
had been chosen because it served the purposes alike of Magyar Nationalists and 
Bolsheviks, and whether it was rather the Nationalists who were using the Bolsheviks 
or the other way round. He was inclined to think that the cause of the outburst was 
above all Nationalist, but that the Nationalists, feeling that there was no other way of 
protesting, hoped to put pressure on the Entente to withdraw its decision by releasing 
the pent-up forces of disorder in Buda Pest. 
When asked what, in his opinion, was the situation in Buda Pest and the country 
generally before the outburst of the revolution, Captain Roosevelt replied that as a result 
of various conversations with Count Karolyi at intervals of three weeks, he observed 
that Count Karolyi had become desperate. He impressed him as a man worn out 
mentally and physically. The Government had, however, succeeded in keeping a fairly 
tight hold over Bolshevik agitation in Buda Pest up till that date. In the country, so far 
as he had been able to judge, there was no enthusiasm for Bolshevik theories, and the 
peasants were even, in many cases, largely hostile to communist ideas and to the 
splitting up of the big estates. Bolshevism seemed practically unknown except in Buda 
Pest and other large towns. 
Captain Roosevelt was inclined to discredit altogether the stories of a Russian 
Bolshevik invasion of Hungary over the Carpathians, or of any active co-operation 
between the two; and he told us that every hour new wireless messages were coming in 
1 For Captain N. Roosevelt’s own account of the take-over, and his analysis of the first few days of the 
new regime in Hungary, see Capt. N. Roosevelt to Prof. A.C. Coolidge, Memorandum, 20 March 1919, 
FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 413-416, and Capt. N. Roosevelt, Memorandum, 27 March 1919, LINK, vol. 
56, pp. 331-334. 
2 Presumably JenS Varga, People’s Commissar for Social Production. 
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to the effect that Lemberg, Jassy and various other important centres had been occupied 
by the Bolshevik forces. He regarded it all as merely inventions to impress opinion 
generally. (In the course of some very interesting remarks on the situation among the 
Ruthenes of Hungary, Captain Roosevelt pointed out that it was most unlikely that real 
acceptance of the revolution should come from such a quarter where it is alleged that the 
Russian Bolsheviks have been welcomed.) 
Captain Roosevelt had been in close relations with British officers present in Buda 
Pest. Among these were Commander Freeman, R.N., Captain Pommerel [Pommerol] 
and a Major whose name he could not remember,3 who had casually arrived at Buda 
Pest the morning of the revolution, coming from Warsaw. The Allied Missions are said 
to have left Buda Pest on the 26th. Captain Roosevelt did not know anything further 
about their movements. Colonel Granville Baker, of the British Food Mission, 
disappeared on the night of the revolution and had not been heard of since. 
Captain Roosevelt had seen something of the Italian representatives in Buda Pest. The 
chief of these was Major Pentamalli and Prince Borghese, the new Italian Minister to 
Belgrade, who — it will be remembered — had left the country because the Serb-Croat- 
Slovene Government were not prepared to accept the footing on which he wished to be 
accredited. Prince Borghese impressed Captain Roosevelt has [as] having anticipated 
the outbreak of the revolution and as not being particularly displeased at it. It appeared 
to Captain Roosevelt as though the Italian representatives had inside information of 
what was coming. Prince Borghese was extremely opposed to the idea of the Allied 
Mission leaving Buda Pest and urged that if necessary the good offices of the Italians 
might be used, as benevolent “neutrals”. Captain Roosevelt did not disguise the fact that 
in his opinion the Italian representatives were favourably inclined to the Hungarians and 
not over-anxious to see the territorial integrity of Hungary tampered with. The idea was 
tentatively put forward from the Italian mission that in the event of an Allied occupation 
of Hungary being necessary, they would have no objection to sending Italian troops. In 
passing Captain Roosevelt remarked that Prince Borghese’s presence in Buda Pest was 
somewhat mysterious, as he admitted he had no official mission there and it was 
obviously not the most convenient route from Belgrade to Italy. 
Captain Pommerel [Pommerol], in saying goodbye to Captain Roosevelt, expressed 
the opinion that 10,000 Allied troops would be adequate to deal with the situation. This 
was also Captain Roosevelt’s opinion. He felt strongly that these troops should, if 
possible, be British. Next to these he would put French, Italian and Serbian in that 
order. In no circumstances, in his opinion, should Tchecho-Slovak or Rumanian troops 
be employed as their presence would simply make matters worse. He felt that vigorous 
and immediate measures would certainly be successful, as the revolution was largely of 
artificial origin and should not be allowed time to gain hold of the country. 
Copies to C.I.G.S. 
W. Thwaites 
J This presumably refers to a Major Peters, whose further identity the editor has not been able to 
ascertain. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Prime Minister 
Mr. Balfour 1 
Of great interest and importance. 
M.P.A. Hankey 
29/3/19 
(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/5544] 
What has happened in Hungary has been foreseen & predicted. Karolyi sent 
messages in December saying that this would happen, & asking for help & advice. The 
only thing that surprises me is that he has held things together so long. 
J.W.H[eadlam-].M[orley]. 
28/3/19 
This confirms the impression that the Hungarian appeal to the Bolshevists is nothing 
but a black-mailing manoeuvre. Count Karolyi was never worth anything. 
The activity of Prince Borghese (until recently Italian councillor of embassy in 
London) at Budapest is most significant. He has strong family ties with Hungary 
through his mother, and has never made any secret of his strong pro-Magyar 
sympathies. 
In all the frontier commissions here, the Italian delegates openly take the Hungarian 
side wherever there is an opening. It seems to me exceedingly likely that there is a 
secret understanding between the Italian Govt, and the Magyar party in Hungary. 
E. Crowe 
28/3/19 
[To] Prime Minister. 
A.J.B[alfour]. H[ardinge]. 
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No. 62 
Telegram from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Admiralty (London. 
Received 16 April 1919) 
No. 923 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 59082] 
Belgrade, 27 March 1919 
Allied Mission arrived at Belgrade tonight Thursday from Budapest. Captain 
Haggard and two Motor Launches remained at Budapest to organise withdrawal of 
Neutrals if necessary. In my opinion there is still time to prevent Hungarian National 
Movement becoming purely Bolshevist; if I could be authorized by Paris to go to 
Budapest immediately with an outlined policy as regards territorial delimitation; also 
allowed to carry out my plans for amelioration of economic conditions by means of 
Navigation of Danube transport of coal and relief stores and general resumption of 
Normal conditions throughout Hungary. I am convinced of possibility of arresting a 
Movement which will otherwise ?involve all Europe in Military ?operations on a large 
scale.1 
Minutes attached to the document: 
We cannot deal with this matter here. 
D. [?] 
16/4/19 
1 No immediate reply has been traced for Admiral Troubridge’s request to be allowed to proceed to 
Hungary. However, shortly after the fall of Bela Kun’s regime, in early August 1919, Admiral 
Troubridge was posted in Budapest for a period as one of the organizers of the Allied relief programme 
and the effort to re-establish trade among the Danubian countries. In connection with this see No. 229, 
note 4. 
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No. 63 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty 
(Londonf 
No. 322 [PRO FO 371/3535 No. 59528] 
Belgrade, 28th March 1919 
Sir, 
In continuation of my despatch of the 18th instant, No. 290,* 2 I have the honour to 
acquaint you, for the information of their Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that 
on the morning of the 20th instant General de Lobit, Commanding the Allied Armies in 
Hungary, informed me that he had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Vix, Chief of the Allied 
Mission at Budapest, to hand to the Hungarian Government an ultimatum requiring 
them to withdraw their army in Transylvania to a new line of demarcation. 
The General was apprehensive of the result of this communication on the fate of the 
Mission. I suggested I should send two monitors to be at the disposal of the Mission 
upon which they could if desirable, embark. He did not, however, at that time agree, but 
the next morning, 21st March, upon learning of the cold reception of the ultimatum by 
the Hungarian Government, he asked me to send the monitors without delay to 
Budapest. 
I accordingly directed Captain Vernon Haggard, R.N., commanding a small flotilla 
then lying at Baja, 100 miles South of Budapest, to proceed to Budapest.3 
The flotilla under his orders consisted of 
Monitor “BOSNIA” — Senior Officer, flying the British flag. 
2nd in command Commander Bozidar Mazuranic. 
Lieutenant Henry B.S. Beresford R.N. on board. 
Monitor “ENNS” — Flying the French Flag. Lieutenant 
Mate Marusic in command. Second 
Maitre Le Bohec. on board. 
Motor Launch 210 — Lieutenant R.S. Bird, R.N.V.R. 
Captain Haggard proceeded with the above force at 4 a.m. in the morning of 22nd 
March. His telegraphic orders are attached. His further orders are also attached.4 These 
latter he did not himself receive in time. I include them as defining the policy I desired 
should be followed in so far as it was possible at the time to define a policy under the 
confused conditions and with the uncertain intelligence of which I possessed. 
* This formal address probably refers to the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir Oswyri A.R. 
Murray. 
2 Not printed. 
3 In connection with Captain V. Haggard’s mission see dispatches by Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge on 22 
March and 3 April in Nos. 54 and 77 respectively. In No. 77 Admiral Troubridge gives a significantly 
different account of Captain Haggard’s mission to Budapest. In the absence of clear evidence it is 
suggested that the version given in No. 77 may be the more accurate one, as it was based on more up-to- 
date information. See also No. 77, note 2. 
4 None of the orders mentioned are printed, but their content is similar to that of Admiral E.C.T. 
Troubridge’s letter to Captain V. Haggard, dated 22 March, printed as No. 54. 
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Approaching BUD A FOK, 10 kilometres South of Budapest, during the afternoon, 
the ships were fired upon by soldiers. Commander Mazuranic, 2nd in Command, was 
severely wounded. The soldiers were dispersed by fire from the monitors. 
Captain Haggard proceeded up the river; arriving at Budapest he passed up beyond 
the railway bridge and anchored off the Citadel. 
In order to fulfil the first part of his Mission, namely to place himself in 
communication with the head of the Allied Mission, Captain Haggard landed in M.L. 
210 but was presently arrested by Revolutionary Guards. He was, however, released 
by the Minister of War5 and returned on board for the night. 
The following morning, 23rd March, he again landed and was again arrested. By 
noon he had not returned. 
Commander Mazuranic, who was now in command, being desirous of establishing 
communication with Captain Haggard, demanded that a deputation be sent to him from 
the Government; and an officer and some men having been sent, he procured from them 
a safe conduct for Lieutenant Beresford and Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander L.F. Cope 
to visit Captain Haggard and return. 
During the day persons came on board and endeavours were made to seduce the 
crews from their allegiance. The enclosed proclamation was received on board by W/T. 
Further, it was observed that military preparations were being made to prevent the 
flotilla leaving: guns were placed in position in the Citadel, boats were observed placing 
mines, while infantry were posted on the adjacent shore and on the bridges. 
The officers duly returned on board, bringing orders from Captain Haggard for the 
monitors to leave during the night (copy enclosed).6 
Commander Mazuranic, who was in bed with his wound which had caused paralysis 
of both legs, directed the necessary preparations to be made. Slips were put on the 
cables, steam raised for full speed, and preparations made for blowing the ships up 
should a mine be struck and the ship beached, while the masts, which should have been 
lowered to enable the ships to pass under the bridge, were kept standing to avert 
suspicion. 
After 1 a.m. on 24th March the enemy’s searchlights, which had continuously been 
kept on the ships, became fitful and presently ceased. The infantry guards remained. 
At 3 a.m. Commander Mazuranic caused himself to be carried on to the bridge and at 
3.15 the cables were slipped, the ships turned, and the flotilla proceeded at full speed 
towards the bridge. 
As they passed down the river there was much shouting and rifle fire, but the noise of 
the masts of the leading ship crashing against the bridge speedily cleared the infantry 
away from the vicinity and the vessels passed through without loss. The rapidity of the 
movement doubtless preventing the use of the enemy’s artillery. 
The flotilla then proceeded as directed to Baja, where they anchored at 10.45 a.m. 
Captain Haggard remained at Budapest with Motor Launch 210 at his disposition. 
Lieutenant-Commander F.A.P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., also remained, and is still at 
Budapest organising the withdrawal of members of the various communities. 
Captain Haggard and the two Motor Launches arrived at Baja on 27th March, the 
Allied Mission having been permitted to leave Budapest and his presence being 
therefore no longer necessary there. 
I beg you will acquaint Their Lordships with my satisfaction at the correct conduct of 
the officers and men engaged in this affair. 
Captain Haggard acted with admirable judgment and discretion in the execution of his 
orders, under circumstances of great difficulty. 
5 V. Bohm. 
6 Not printed. 
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I approve of the conduct of Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman, who insisted 
upon receiving the same treatment as the French officers, with whom he declared the 
solidarity of the British, to their great satisfaction. 
I particularly desire to bring to the notice of Their Lordships the gallant conduct and 
sustained devotion to duty of Commander Mazuranic, of the Royal Serbian Navy, 
Second in command of the Flotilla. Owing to the scarcity of British or French Officers, 
I employ these Serbian Officers in ships flying the British or French flag, and look on 
them as our own; they conduct themselves on His Majesty’s service with the greatest 
zeal and loyalty. 
Wounded severely on the afternoon of the 22nd instant by a tracer bullet fired at 100 
yards and causing paralysis of both legs, he nevertheless in the absence of Captain 
Haggard took charge, from his bed, of the situation, for which his intimate knowledge 
of these waters particularly fitted him: he made the necessary preparations for breaking 
the blockade with great professional judgment, and at the moment of departure caused 
himself to be carried on to the bridge, when he directed the manoeuvres of the flotilla 
with high courage and skill. 
To indicate the severity of his injuries, it is worthy of observation that the tracer bullet 
with which he was wounded was extracted at Belgrade on 27th March, and upon 
extraction burst again into flame. He is still paralysed in both legs. 
I beg to recommend this gallant officer to Their Lordships for some mark of 
distinction. 
All the Flotilla is now assembled at Baja, with the exception of the Monitor 
“KOROS” [KOROS], which I have despatched to Szergedin [Szeged], in the river 
Theiss, to act in co-operation with the French army. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge 
Admiral 
Commanding on the Danube. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 63 
W/TMessage Received on Board Monitor “Enns” at Budapest, 23rd March 1919.7 
Comrades — Sympathizers: 
We call upon you in friendly fashion to give peacefully back the ship which was 
robbed from us by the Imperialistic Entente. Every attempt to escape is useless. Think 
well what you do and do not rush into misfortune. We do not wish for your lives, we 
wish to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Therefore we warn you to abstain from any 
attempt at flight and to give back the ships won by politics of the Imperialistic Entente 
without bloodshed and sacrifice of life. We ask you to communicate this appeal to our 
Jugoslav and English brothers. We await an answer. 
The Commander of the Fleet. WULFF. 
7 Enclosure No. 3 with letter No. 322 in the original file. 
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No. 64 
Letter from Sir W. Townley (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (London. Extract. 
Received 31 March 1919) 
No. 81 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 47/2/1/6744] 
The Hague, 28 March 1919 
My Lord, 
I HAVE the honour to report that Dr. Leipnik, who, as your Lordship was informed 
in my No. 53, Confidential, of the 27th ultimo,1 has recently been to Hungary, has just 
returned to The Hague. He tells me that he did not take up the work in connection with 
the Fiume Food Distribution Commission, which was the reason for his going to 
Hungary, because he found that the conditions were such that he did not think that he 
would be able to do useful work. 
He says that he had numerous interviews with Count Karolyi, from whom he 
gathered the impression that the French demands, put forward in a highly dictorial 
[?dictatorial] way by Colonel Vix, were the cause of the upheaval which has just taken 
place. Dr. Leipnik says that all Hungary was deeply incensed by the dragooning attitude 
adopted by Colonel Vix, which has made France hated in Hungary, where the British 
are proportionately popular. He is of opinion that the movement in Hungary is in no 
sense a Bolshevist one, but thoroughly national, with the full support of all the leading 
aristocratic parties. 
Count Karolyi told Dr. Leipnik that he had been forced to resign because he felt that 
the limit of Hungarian patience had been reached, and because Colonel Vix continued to 
put the frontier back daily, in violation of the conditions of the Armistice, until at length 
Hungary was becoming so squeezed between the claims of Roumania on the one side 
and those of the Czecho-Slovaks on the other that she felt she had no economic 
breathing-room left. The national spirit of the Hungarians then asserted itself, and the 
people were determined to die rather than surrender all that is best of their country. Dr. 
Leipnik says that he rather gathered, though he has nothing but an impression to go 
upon, that some sort of arrangement has been made with the Serbians. 
He says that the French are as bitterly hated in Austria as they are in Hungary, and he 
much doubts if the French Mission, which has just been sent out, with M. Allize, the 
French Minister here, at its head, will have much success. He thinks that a British or an 
Anglo-American Mission might succeed, but only if it were made quite clear that such a 
mission was not in any way subservient to the French Mission. He thinks that the trend 
of the peoples who formed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire is to reunite themselves 
into a confederation of independent States, and he does not believe that the Austrian- 
Germans have any wish to unite themselves with Germany. 
[....] 
I have, etc., etc., 
Walter Townley 
1 Not printed. The editor has not been able to learn more about the identity of Dr. Leipnik. 
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No. 65 
Telegram from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) 
to A. J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 April 1919) 
No. P.202 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/5964] 
Belgrade, 28 March 1919 
Following for General Thwaites, repeated to General Bridges. 
Major Peters and Captain Pommerol arrived Belgrade report as follows:- On March 
30th [?20] Delobit [de Lobit] note showing new demarcation line in Transylvania was 
handed to Hungarian Government for reply by 6 p.m. March 21st. Karolyi and 
Government called in Communists with whom they conferred all 21st. Karolyi resigned 
misrepresenting Delobit [de Lobit] note as permanent frontier and calling on Proletariat 
of world to help. Communists played on patriotic fervour of country and established 
Government on pretence of resisting further encroachment [of] Czechs and Roumania. 
Later Allied Mission denied Karolyi’s statement as to frontier in all daily papers. This 
calmed people vast majority of whom including even Red Guards are anti-Communist. 
Their action results from lack of clothing coal and therefore of unemployment also they 
are in a fever of patriotisn [sic] owing to seeing their country gradually engulfed by 
Roumania and Czechs. They expect to lose Transylvania proper and Slovakia but not 
such purely Hungarian places as Pressburg and Komarom. Majority of country would 
welcome English American or French troops with open arms especially two former. 
There is movement in West and South-West to overthrow Communists and quick 
support of this is essential. Some help and food from us would suffice — latter is most 
important of all. If present distress in Hungary is alleviated they shortly overthrow 
Bolshevism themselves. At present they hope to get food by spreading Bolshevism in 
all countries and so washing out Peace Conference and all consequences of defeat. 
Pommerol leaves (?April 9th) for Paris to report to you. 
No. 66 
Minutes on Two Letters by an Unidentified Clerk in the Foreign Office1 
[PRO FO 371/3529 No. 45259/W3] 
[These comments were attached to two memoranda received from the United Free 
Church of Scotland on 19 March 1919, regarding the welfare, and assistance to be 
given to the Reformed Church of Hungary. They specifically asked for assistance from 
the British authorities in delivering relief supplies to the Reformed Church in Hungary.] 
When the second letter was written the situation brought about in Hungary by 
Count Karolyi’s resignation had not arisen. I gather from the first letter that the Jews as 
well as members of the Reformed Church allege that excesses have been committed 
1 The letters are in the same file, but are not printed. For other documents concerning the welfare of the 
Hungarian Protestant Churches, also see Nos. 28, 32 and 44. 
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against them by the Rumanians & others. Whether this is so or not it is apparent that the 
relations between Rumanians & the members of the Reformed Church are far from 
friendly, and that the Reformed Church probably inspires a good deal of Magyar 
nationalist sentiment which is markedly hostile to Czecho-Slovakia & Rumania. For 
these reasons alone the despatch of goods to people whose chief aim is the support of 
the Reformed Church is a matter requiring careful consideration unless we are to run 
the risk of giving offence to our allies. When one adds to these considerations the 
present state of Hungary, the wisdom of sending these goods is even more open to 
doubt, particularly as it would appear that the allied missions in Buda Pesth are interned 
there & that there is nobody to supervise the disposal of such goods on arrival. In these 
circumstances I venture to suggest that we cannot afford the United Free Church of 
Scotland the facilities desired.2 
W.H.B. (?) 
28/3/19 
2 A reply was sent to the United Free Church of Scotland along the lines here suggested. 
No. 67 
Memorandum by Sir M. Hankey for A.J. Balfour 
[BALF Additional 49704] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 29 March 1919 
Secret and Personal 
Dear Mr. Balfour, 
I enclose a copy of a very important communication in regard to the situation in 
Hungary handed round by M. Orlando at the Meeting of Four this afternoon. The 
Prime Minister asked me to let you know that he, personally, was rather inclined to ask 
General Smuts to go. Perhaps I ought to mention that M. Clemenceau seemed to feel 
doubt about General Smuts. No decision was taken. 
The question is to be raised again on Monday and in the meanwhile each Prime 
Minister is to consult his foreign Minister on the subject. 
President Wilson, at M. Clemenceau’s suggestion, undertook to consider the name of 
an American who might perhaps go to Buda Pesth to make enquiries on behalf of all 
the Allies. 
I ought to make it clear that there is no question, at the present moment, of entering 
into diplomatic relations with Hungary but merely to probe the matter further in order, if 
possible, to prevent them falling into Bolshevism. I think the idea is to send a sort of 
Lockhart.1 
Yours sincerely, 
M.P.A. Hankey 
* This is a reference to R.H. Bruce Lockhart, an unofficial British envoy, sent to Russia by D. Lloyd 
George at the end of February 1918. After having been arrested and deported by the Bolsheviks, his 
mission ended at the beginning of October 1918. 
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P.s. I meant to see you about this this evening but had no time. 
M.P.A.Hfankey]. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 67 
Aide-Memoire for Prince Borghese1 * 
Budapest, 24 March 1919 
The New Government of Hungary, the Council of the Commissioners of the People, 
recognise the validity of the Treaty of Armistice3 signed by the former Government and 
do not think that the non-acceptance of the note presented by Colonel Vix has infringed 
it. 
By asking Russia to enter the alliance with the Republic of the Councils of Hungary, 
the Government has not thought that this step might be interpreted as an expression of 
its desire to break all diplomatic intercourse with the Powers of the Entente, and still 
less as a declaration of war on the Entente. The alliance with Russia is not a formal 
diplomatic alliance, it is at the most — if we may use the expression — an “entente 
cordiale”, a natural friendship justified by the identical construction of their respective 
constitution^], which in the thought of the Hungarian Government does not in any way 
imply an aggressive combination. The new Hungarian Republic, on the contrary, has a 
firm desire to live in peace with all the other Nations and to devote its activities to the 
peaceful social re-oganisation of its Country. 
The Hungarian Socialist Party has been driven by the force of the events to take hold 
of the executive power. It wishes to organise a new social State, a State in which every 
man will live of his own work, but this social State will not be hostile to other Nations. 
It wishes on the contrary to co-operate for the great human solidarity. 
The Government of the Republic of Councils of Hungary declare themselves ready to 
negotiate territorial questions on the basis of the principle of self-determination of the 
People, and they view territorial integrity solely as in conformity with that principle. 
They would gladly welcome a civil and diplomatic mission of the Entente in Budapest 
and would guarantee to it the right of extraterritoriality and undertake to provide for its 
absolute safety. 
Bela Kun 
Commissioner of the People 
for Foreign Affairs 
^ Communicated to the British Prime Minister by V. Orlando on 29 March 1919. The Aide Memoire is 
also reproduced in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 18, and LINK, vol. 56, pp. 242-243. For the debate on 29 and 
30 March following the reading of the communication in the Council of Four, see FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 
16, or LINK, vol. 56, p. 414. 
3 It is not clear whether the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918, or the Armistice of Belgrade 
of 13 November 1918, is meant here. The Editors of FRUS, PPC are probably correct in assuming that it 
is the former. For the significance of the difference between the two see No. 73, notes 3 and 4. 
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No. 68 
Letter from General J.C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George1 
[LI. G. F/45/9/31] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 31 March 1919 
Dear Prime Minister, 
If you are thinking seriously of sending me to Buda-Pest to probe into the situation, 
may I make a suggestion which I hope will give the mission a chance of even greater 
usefulness? It is that the Russians also should be invited to meet me at Buda-Pest 
within the next fortnight to discuss the situation in a similar way to the Austro- 
Hungarian. I feel sure that, unless Bullet [?Bullitt]2 misread the Russian situation, I 
could make recommendations to you after meeting the Russians which will also lead to 
peace with Russia and thus round off the work of this Peace Conference. And without 
a Russian peace our work here will be but half done. I might therefore be entrusted with 
the double mission. 
Yours sincerely, 
J. C. Smuts 
1 This letter is also reproduced in W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers , 
vol. IV, Cambridge, 1966, No. 927. 
2 This reference is most likely to be to William C. Bullitt, a member of the American Peace Delegation, 
who was sent on a mission to Russia, 8-25 March 1919. In Hancock and Van der Poel, op. cit., the text 
here reads as “Butler”, and a footnote suggests: “Probably C.K. Butler.” C.K. Butler was a British 
member of the Allied Relief Commission in Austria, and is unlikely to have been referred to by Gen. 
Smuts here. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 117 
No. 69 
Letter from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to Earl Curz.on (London. Extract. 
Received 3 April 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/16 No. 6113] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 1 April 1919 
Dear Lord Curzon, 
The aide memoire for Prince Borghese1 communicated in my previous letter was 
considered last night by the Council of Four with the four Foreign Ministers, with the 
result that it was agreed that General Smuts should be sent to Hungary on behalf of the 
Allied and Associated Powers.2 
Last night Mr. Balfour drafted the instructions, which were passed this morning by 
the Council of Four.3 
1 See the enclosure with No. 67. 
2 For the debate on 31 March preceding the decision in the Council of Four see LINK, vol. 56, pp. 458- 
464. On the mission itself, including Gen. Smuts’s dispatches sent from the mission, and his final report, 
see Nos. 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, and 86; FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, p. 669, vol. V, pp. 39, 41-43, 59, 61-63, 
vol. X, p. 103; LINK, vol. 57, pp. 73, 77-79, 108-109, 136-137, 167-175, 274-275; Francis Deak, 
Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, New York, 1942, pp. 431-434. For a lively eyewitness account 
of the mission see Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, London, 1933, pp. 292-308. 
3 See No. 70. 
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No. 70 
Resolution by the Council of Four1 
[PRO FO 608/11 No. 6113] 
Villa Majestic, Paris, 1 April 1919 
RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY 
The following action is agreed to:- 
(1) That General Smuts should be invited to undertake, on behalf of the Allied and 
Associated Powers, the following Special Mission:- 
To proceed to Hungary in order to examine the general working of the armistice 
concluded at Villa Giusti on November 3,2 1918, and in particular the arrangement 
made by the Supreme Council for providing a neutral zone between Roumanian and 
Hungarian troops in Transylvania. In this connection it will be the duty of General 
Smuts to explain to the Hungarian Government the reasons for which the zone was 
established, and to make it clear that the policy was adopted solely to stop bloodshed 
and without any intention of prejudicing the eventual settlement of the boundaries 
between Hungary and Roumania. This subject has not yet been adequately considered, 
and will not be finally settled till the signature of the Treaty of Peace. 
General Smuts may make any adjustments in the boundaries of the neutral zone or the 
method of its occupation by allied troops which he thinks will further the objects of the 
allied and associated governments. 
It will further be the duty of General Smuts to investigate the treatment of the Allied 
Missions in Budapest since the recent change of Government. 
General Smuts has full discretion to proceed to any place whether in Hungary or 
elsewhere, and to take any steps which may enable him to carry out these objects or 
others closely connected with them. 
He will report fully to the Supreme Council. 
(2) That M. Clemenceau shall write a letter, on behalf of the Allied and Associated 
Powers, authorising General Smuts to undertake this Mission. 
(3) That M. Clemenceau shall notify the scope of General Smuts’ Mission to the 
General Officers Commanding the Allied troops in South Eastern Europe, and shall 
instruct them to comply with such directions as he may give for adjustments in the 
boundaries of the neutral zone, or in regard to the method of its occupation by Allied 
troops, and generally to give him every facility for carrying out his Mission. 
(4) That M. Orlando shall instruct Prince Borghese to inform the Hungarian 
authorities of General Smuts’ Mission. 
1 A shorter version of the resolutions is also reproduced in LINK, vol. 56, pp. 465-466. For the 
amended instructions to Gen. Smuts see No. 73. 
2 For the text of the Armistice of Villa Giusti see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 175. 
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No. 71 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extracts) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
Paris, 1 April 1919 
Dear Weego, 
I’m leaving Paris tonight with Smuts, Harold & a party.1 Objective — Vienna, 
Budapest, Bucarest & Heaven knows where. We’ll be away about a fortnight — 
perhaps more. I don’t suppose you’ll hear from me at all, so don’t feel anxious if you 
don’t. Isn’t it an extraordinary adventure? I simply don’t know what to make of it. 
Hardinge summoned me this morning & told me. I was most fearfully surprised & 
thrilled. The whole idea is to see what can be done, & at once, to put the situation right 
in Hungary & elsewhere. I suppose Smuts has full powers. You may imagine I have 
many misgivings as well as many hopes; my hopes are that Harold & I together may 
keep things straight. 
It’s not yet absolutely certain Harold is coming. I do hope he is. 
Later now (3 o’clock) it seems to be certain. Laus deo! Not merely for my own 
pleasure, but because together we may do something. We start at 9 o’clock for Vienna, 
whether after that we go to Bucarest or Budapest, no one knows. I hope Bucarest first 
because there we shall see Madge2 from whom I had most interesting letters last night 
— of which I send you a copy. 
The party is: Smuts, Capt. Lane (A.D.C.), Dr. Engelberg [Engelenburg] (his medical 
attendant). Col. Heywood (a very nice fellow), Harold, I, Butler (Food Mission), a 
decypherer & perhaps some soldier servants. 
Hardinge spoke to me about the possibilities of my talking with both Hungarian & 
Russian Bolsheviks. I was very shy about it. Keep this & everything about the mission 
absolutely to yourself. It’s supposed to be very hush, tho’ I daresay the papers will get 
hold of it. 
[••..] 
Crowe was an angel to let us both go. It’s an awful bore to him: Vansittart will do our 
work. 
[....] 
Later 4 p.m. 
It’s not yet certain that Harold is going. Mr. Balfour feels that he may be needed for 
the critical work here. 
1 The members of the Smuts mission were: Lt.-Gen. J.C. Smuts; Colonel T.G. Heywood of Military 
Intelligence; Cyril K. Butler of the Food Control Commission; A.W.A. Leeper; Harold Nicolson; Captain 
E.F.C. Lane, a Financial Officer, Gen. Smuts’s aides de camp; Captain C. Grant; Dr. Engelenburg, Gen. 
Smuts’s medical attendant; Lieut. L.S. Law, a cipher clerk; an American officer; an Italian officer; and a 
French officer. (PRO FO 371/3515 No. 55028) 
2 Edward W. Madge, personal physician to Queen Marie of Romania. Also interested and well-informed 
in Romanian politics, Secretary of the Anglo-Roumanian Society (set up in 1917). Frequently discussed 
various issues with R.W. Seton-Watson. A close friend of Take Ionescu, and a severe critic of I.C. 
Bratianu. 
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5 p.m. 
Hooray: he is going. 
Best love. 
Allen 
No. 72 
Telegram from Sir W. Townley (The Hague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 2 April 1919) 
No. 15 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/5989] 
The Hague, 1 April 1919 
Secret. 
Following for Lord Hardinge from Leipnik.1 
I recently discussed with Count Karolyi at Buda Pesth a scheme for providing for a 
friendly solution of Hungarian questions on basis of important cessions of territory to 
Roumanians Jugo Slavs and Czechs provided economic unity of late Austria [sic] 
Hungarian Monarchy except Galicia be maintained. All details of this scheme were 
agreed to by Hungarian Government and I was authorized by Count Karolyi to submit 
it to Entente with request for appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission to preside 
over a meeting od [of] members of late monarchy to be summoned for the purpose of 
settling whole Austria [sic] Hungarian problem. In view of new situation created by 
revolution in Hungary I caused a telegram to be sent to Bolshevik leaders in Buda Pesth 
asking whether they were prepared to act on scheme. 
My object was to discover if present Government were seriously bent on introducing 
Bolshevism or whether their action was merely intended as a threat. Leaders replied that 
Inter-Allied Commission indicated would be welcome. I have details of scheme 
extending over all questions economic financial and political. They are at your disposal 
and I am ready to explain them to you and answer all questions if desired. I believe if 
Allies would consider appointment of a Commission new Government might take place 
of present Bolshevik rule. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This, if serious, confirms the news that the revolution was primarily a political 
manoeuvre. 
It wld be presumably unwise as yet to instruct Sir W. Townley to inform Leipnik 
confidentially of the despatch of General Smuts’ mission and we must wait until we can 
communicate with the latter. 
1 See No. 64, note 1. 
E.G.F. Adam 
2/4/19 
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The scheme obviously offers no basis for a settlement. There is no means of 
preserving the economic unity of the several new States which, together, formerly 
composed the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Nor does the phrase “important cessions 
of territory” to the neighbouring States reveal any intention to accept the complete 
territorial rearrangement contemplated by the allies. 
I do not think we should accept the suggestion of an inter-allied commission 
presiding over an assembly of Austro-Hungarian delegates. 
Qu: 
So reply. 
E. Crowe 
2/4/19 
I think we should repeat this to General Smuts as soon as we hear of his 
whereabouts, and ask his views pointing out that we do not consider that the proposed 
scheme meets the intentions of the Allies. 
H[ardinge]. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 72 
Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts (Budapest. Nos. 7 and 8)2 
Paris, 5 April 1919 
Hague telegram No. 15 of April 1st. 
While we do not consider that the proposed scheme meets the intentions of the Allies, 
we should be glad of your views. 
z No trace has been found of Gen. Smuts receiving this telegram. Most probably he never received it, as 
it was dispatched from Paris at 11 p.m., and the mission left Budapest around 8 p.m. on the same day, 5 
April. 
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No. 73 
Telegram from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts (Vienna and Budapest) 
Nos. 1 and 2 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 6113] 
Paris, 3 April 1919 
No. V.M. 27. Amended instructions1 signed by Council of Four are being sent you by 
Major Bonsol [Bonsai] who leaves Friday evening.2 The only alteration is the addition 
in the first sentence after “November 3, 1918” of the following words: 
“and of the military convention of November 13, 1918”.3 
This is a military convention concluded by General Franchet d’Esperey with the 
Hungarian Government and is the actual document on which his relations with the 
Hungarian Government have been based. The clause in this convention pertinent to 
your mission reads as follows: 
“Right of occupation by the Allies of all localities or all strategic points which 
the General Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies shall have the right to 
fix permanently.” 
The text of this convention is being sent to you by Major Bonsol [Bonsai]. This 
alteration makes no substantial difference to your mission.4 So far as I can learn this 
convention was never communicated to Allied and Associated Powers. I saw it for the 
first time this morning. 
1 For the original instructions see No. 70. 
2 2 April 1919. 
3 For the text of the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918 see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 175; for 
the text of the Military Convention (also Armistice) of Belgrade of 13 November 1918 see FRUS, PPC, 
vol. II, p. 183. 
4 The editor feels it necessary to contest this argument. The Supreme Council resolved to establish a 
Neutral Zone between the Hungarian and Romanian forces in Transylvania on 26 February 1919. This 
was necessitated by the advance of the Romanian army north-westwards from the River Maros. The latter 
move was explained by various acts of provocation against the Romanians on the part of the Hungarians. 
The River Maros, till its confluence with the River Tisza, formed part of the line behind which the 
Hungarian army was required to withdraw according to Article I of the Belgrade Convention of 13 
November 1918. The advance of the Romanian army beyond this line, presumably with the aim of 
occupying Transylvania and districts west of it up to the line established in the Treaty of Bucharest of 17 
August 1916, was regarded by the Romanians as compatible with Article IV of Section “A” of the 
Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918, i.e. that “armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such 
strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct 
military operations or to maintain order”. The Romanians considered themselves an Associated Power at 
the end of the war. This, at first, met with resistance from the Big Four. Their resistance was gradually 
dropped by about the late summer of 1919. Therefore, from at least the Romanian point of view, the latter 
Article significantly differed from the relevant clause of the Belgrade Convention quoted in Sir M. 
Hankey’s telegram in that it did not specifically require the consent of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Allied Armies, i.e. Marshal F. Foch, for actions by an Allied army of the character described in the text of 
the Armistice of Villa Giusti, and, in fact, no such specific undertaking had been issued by Marshal Foch 
before the move in question was made by the Romanian army. 
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ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 73 
Letter from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts (Vienna and Budapest) 
Paris, 2 April 1919 
My dear General, 
I think it will be as well to send you a private letter in explanation of the curious 
alteration in your formal instructions which I have communicated to you officially by 
telegram and by letter. 
General Albi [Alby], the Chief of Staff at the French War Office, came to the meeting 
at President Wilson’s house with M. Clemenceau this morning to insist on the insertion 
of the words which have been added. The question of this addition was remitted to me 
to discuss with General Albi [Alby] and I made some rather curious discoveries. In the 
first place I had never seen the Convention of November 13th. Moreover, I have looked 
up the Cabinet Minutes (I had influenza at this time) and I can find no trace of it. In fact, 
I do not think it ever was officially communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers 
and Count Aldrovandi, the Italian Secretary, confirms this. So far as I can make out, 
General Franchet d’Esperey did not like negotiating on the basis of the Villa Giusti 
Armistice of November 3rd, because this was signed only by Italians on behalf of the 
Allied and Associated Powers. Consequently, he concluded a separate Armistice or 
Convention with the Hungarians. You know enough of Franco-Italian relations to 
understand what animated this. Anyhow, it is on the Armistice of November 13th, and 
not on that of November 3rd on which General Franchet d’Esperey has conducted all 
his business with the Hungarian Government. 
I have carefully looked up the records of the Quai d’Orsay Meetings to see if I could 
find any reference to it. I find only one. It was referred to in the original draft of the 
Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles, when they recommended the zone 
between the Roumanian and Hungarian Armies. In the final report, however, as 
approved by the Council of Ten, all reference to this Armistice was excised on the 
motion of Marquis Salvango Raggi, the Italian Representative. Aldrovandi thinks that 
the reason for this was that the Italians did not recognise the Armistice of November 
13 th. 
By carefully examining the document I ascertain that the addition of these words 
would make no material difference whatsoever to your negotiations.5 Moreover it 
seemed to me absolutely indispensable that you should have this document since, 
according to General Albi [Alby], General Franchet d’Esperey has worked entirely on 
this document and has ignored the Villa Giusti Armistice. Hence, if your instructions 
were only to examine the Villa Giusti Armistice, which neither General Franchet 
d’Esperey nor the Hungarian Government have been working on, serious 
misunderstandings might arise and your Mission might become abortive. 
The Italians had first objected to any mention being made of the Armistice of 
November 13th but they agreed to the reference to it provided it was termed a Military 
Convention and not an Armistice. 
I think this gives you all the information in my possession on the subject. 
Wishing you every success in your enterprise. 
I am, 
Yours very sincerely, 
M.P.A. Hankey 
5 See note 4 above. 
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No. 74 
Tele gram from Sir C. des Graz. (Belgrade) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 11 April 1919) 
No. 138 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 56548] 
Belgrade, 3 April 1919 
My immediately preceding telegram.1 
Telegram referred to states report given to Belakun [sic] by go between2 who came to 
Belgrade and had an interview with General Officer Commanding3 has convinced 
Hungarian Government of existence of misunderstanding as to communication made to 
Karolyi by order of Paris Conference having been taken as final decision as regards 
frontier. 
Telegram adds that Hungarian Government are therefore quite ready to negotiate on 
whatever basis may be proposed by Allies. Referring to Banat telegram says present 
Hungarian Government have entirely broken with policy of former Government and 
their own policy is not based on principle of territorial integrity as they view question as 
one for Banat itself (i.e. no doubt for a plebiscite). 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This tel. is dated Ap. 3 & is therefore prior to Genl. Smuts’ visit to Budapest. 
G. [?]. 
12/4/19 
1 Not printed. 
2 Prof. P. Brown. 
3 Gen. P. de Lobit. 
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No. 75 
Letter from I.C. Bratianu to M.P. Dutasta 
W.C.P. 466 [PRO CAB 21/150]* 
Romanian Delegation, 
Paris, 3 April 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to enclose copy of a telegram received from Bucharest regarding 
the action of the Bolshevik troops at Odessa, and the urgent measures to be taken in 
Hungary. 
I beg that you will be so kind as to bring this telegram to the notice of the Supreme 
Council of Allied and Associated Prime Ministers. 
I have, etc. 
(Signed) [I.] C. Bratiano 
The original is a translation from the French. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 75 
Telegram from Bucharest 
Bucharest, 31 March 1919 
A new powerful attack by Bolshevist troops has taken place 80 kilometres north east 
of Odessa. French and Greek troops at Berezov have been forced to retire after 
resistance. 
It is absolutely indispensable to hasten the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops 
beyond the neutral zone established by the Peace Conference, and to insist on their 
complete demobilization. 
This is the only way in which Roumanian troops can usefully operate towards east. 
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No. 76 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Vienna) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extracts) 
[LEEP Polder 2] 
Vienna, 3 April 1919 
Dear Weego, 
[....] After a quite uneventful journey we got to Vienna this morning at 10.30, We 
were very comfortable on the train — about eight of us: I shared a wagon-lit 
compartment with Hey wood1 & slept quite well both nights. Very good meals on the 
train! I had a long talk with Smuts, who is charming, & also with Hillard (Times man 
going to Transilvania [sic] & Bucarest), Fluera^ (a Transn. Socialist with whom I had a 
long conversation in Rumanian) & Profr. Coolidge, head of the American Mission of 
Enquiry here. 
[....] 
We leave by the 10 o’clock train to-night for Budapest. The Hungarian “Bolshevik” 
Ambassador here2 accompanies us & I gather they’re keen to receive us & talk with us. 
I think a good deal can be done by assurances of food supplies, self-determination & 
guaranteed rights of minorities. Hungary hasn’t really gone Bolshevik at all yet except 
in Budapest. The peasants are fairly hostile & the Govt, is very cautious towards them 
& not attempting to confiscate their lands. I wish we’d march in British & American 
troops & occupy the country — only 30,000, I believe wd. be required — but 
unfortunately that seems to be out of the question. The French are, unfairly, very 
unpopular & the Italians doing pro-Magyar intrigues. Perhaps we can do something on 
the lines I say. If so, we shall also have to go to Prag, Bucarest & Belgrade — at least I 
hope so (& Smuts agreed with me it wd. be worth while). Then I may see Madge3 & 
Roland!4 We’re to live in our train — three saloon carriages & I suppose will not go 
about Budapest at all. As for wider schemes, I daresay you feel anxious. But you know 
my views (which are yours): Harold & Heywood are the same. I don’t think therefore 
you need feel anxious. Of course we are under orders & must & will loyally carry them 
out but you can be sure we’ll see that the truth is found out & no mere plausible 
assurances accepted. That’s all I can say. 
I don’t know how long we shall be away — perhaps a fortnight, perhaps a month. 
Intensely interesting, though pretty tiring because a bit of a strain. But I wdnt miss it 
for worlds. I wish you were in Paris to hear the news quicker. I hope I don’t have to 
meet Russian Bolsheviks in Budapest. I hope not Litvinov, for instance. How I dislike 
them. 
Well, we’ll do our best. Best love Weego old thing. Be discreet about things I tell you. 
[....] Don’t expect to hear from me except very irregularly. 
Your loving brother 
Allen 
1 See No. 71, note 1. 
2 E. Bolgar. 
3 See No. 71, note 2. 
4 Reference to Roland Bryce, son of the 1st Viscount Bryce, formerly James Bryce, a Liberal M.P. 
A Serbophil, who later became secretary of the Anglo-Jugoslav Society. In 1919 he was serving at the 
British Legation in Belgrade, and in 1920 acted as British observer of the elections in Montenegro. 
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No. 77 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty1 
(London. Copy received by the Foreign Office 18 April 1919)2 
No. 332 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/7670] 
Belgrade, 3 April 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty, of the circumstances attending the seizure, by revolutionary guards at 
Budapest, of H.M. Motor Launches Nos. 210 and 228, and of the arrest by them of 
Captain Vernon Haggard, R.N., Commanding the Flotilla, and of Lieutenant- 
Commander F. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N., of my staff. 
On the 22nd March, in the early morning, Motor Launch 228, Lieutenant O.T. 
Bauscher, R.N.V.R., in command, was lying alongside at Budapest embarking the 
personnel attached to Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman; she was suddenly 
rushed by armed Revolutionary Guards and some of the machinery was removed and a 
guard put on board. 
Captain Haggard arrived at Budapest with two monitors (despatch No. 322 of 28th 
March),3 proceeded alongside in M.L. 210, and landed. He explained his mission to 
the leaders of the mob consisting of armed soldiers, sailors and civilians wearing red 
badges, insisted that the guards should leave the boats, that the stores should be 
returned, and pointed out the serious consequences of the insult to the flag. 
He was told that no disrespect was intended, that the guards were for protection only, 
and that the Motor Launches must stay where they were. 
Proceeding to an hotel, representatives of the People’s Commissary visited Captain 
Haggard, to whom he explained his mission, and notified that any outrage to the flag 
would be deeply resented, and demanded freedom of movement for the Motor 
Launches. 
A reply was received that the mob was not yet in hand, that the outrage was regretted, 
that the guards would be removed and the Motor Launches not be molested. 
Captain Haggard later returned to the Motor Launches and found the guards had been 
removed and the stores and arms sent back to M.L. 228. 
On 23rd March, during the forenoon, the Red Guards again invaded the two Motor 
Launches and insisted that they were subject to danger and must remove to the harbour 
of O-Buda, 4 miles above the town. 
1 See No. 63, note 1. 
2 For Admiral Troubridge’s previous dispatches on the same subject see Nos. 54 and 63. In No. 63 
Admiral Troubridge gives a significantly different account of Captain Haggard’s mission to Budapest. In 
the absence of clear evidence, it is suggested that the version given here provides a more accurate picture 
of the events, as it is based on more up-to-date information. The major difference between the two 
accounts concerns the detention of Captain Haggard. On this point, though without decisive clarity, and 
without mentioning Captain Haggard by name, Section 2 of Enclosure 5, dated 8 April, of Gen. J.C. 
Smuts’s Report of 9 April 1919 (see No. 84) says the following: “On the 23rd, two British motor 
launches which still remained at Budapest were rushed by armed sailors and an order was shown from 
the Government that the boats were to be taken to a point above Budapest. This order the officers and 
sailors on board refused to obey, and the Hungarian sailors thereupon appear to have disembarked 
the British crews and to have interned them in the Ritz Hotel.” 
3 See No. 63. 
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Captain Haggard, who was now at the headquarters of the Mission, on learning of 
this gave orders that the Motor Launches were not to move, but hearing again that they 
were leaving for O-Buda, demanded an audience with the Minister of War,4 and 
proceeded to the Ministry in company with Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman 
at 5 p.m. 
Captain Haggard related the incident, protested most strongly against the outrage and 
demanded the return of the boats and assurance for the future. The Minister of War 
replied that he would be sorry to insult the British flag, that he had been informed that 
the boats were moved at the request of the crews who did not want to fight the 
Hungarians, and that the boats would return. 
By 3 a.m. 24th March the boats were once more returned, intact and with ensigns 
flying. Nothing had been touched. 
On 25th March Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman accompanied the Chief of 
the Allied Mission, Colonel Vix, to interview with Bela Kun, head of the Revolutionary 
Government prior to the departure of the Mission. 
During the interview he formally protested against the outrage on the British flag and 
the interference with the crews. 
Mr. Bela Kun replied regretting the circumstances and expressing his apologies, 
while stating that they had not control of the Red Guards and civilians who were in 
revolution, and that was the cause of the incident. 
On 26th March Captain Haggard sailed with both Motor Launches at 1 p.m., leaving 
Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman behind to arrange for the evacuation of 
neutrals or Allies desirous of leaving Budapest. 
I am of opinion that Mr. Bela Kun gave the true reason for this incident. There was 
evidently no control over the revolutionists in the streets, soldiers, sailors or civilians, 
during the first days of the revolution, and Captain Haggard and Lieutenant- 
Commander Williams-Freeman acted with a proper judgment in the matter in recording 
their strong protests to the Government authorities, who on their part expressed their 
regret. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(signed) E.C.T. Troubridge 
Admiral 
Commanding on the Danube 
4 V. B<3hm. 
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No. 78 
Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to 
Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extracts. Received 9 April 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8657] 
Belgrade, 4 April 1919 
My dear General, 
[....] 
Unfortunately we cannot take the course which would probably be welcomed by all 
Hungarians, that is, to send a British Division, or failing that an American Division, to 
Budapest. Practically everyone I have spoken to here agrees that such a measure would 
be welcomed by the Hungarians and would do much to settle the difficulty. Lt. Col. 
Granville Baker a member of the Inter-Allied Food Mission at Trieste, recently came 
through here from Budapest with the Inter-Allied Mission of which Colonel Vix is 
Chief. The plan which he and the French advocate is to advance slowly as soon as 
possible from the line Baja-Szeged-Arad, and to bring up behind the troops supplies to 
feed the population, thus showing that though we intend the Hungarian Government to 
accept our decisions, we have no hostile intentions towards the inhabitants. It is rather 
like holding out a piece of sugar to get a canary back into its cage, but in the absence of 
a considerable force here there is not much else that we can do. 
[....] 
Your information also about Roumania is probably more up to date than mine, but a 
watch on the Roumanian situation is carefully kept by men here who know the Balkans. 
For Roumania is generally regarded as the weak point in the front against Bolshevism, 
owing to her exposed position and to the unfavourable condition of the peasants as 
compared with Serbians and Bulgarians. If Bolshevism got a hold in Roumania it 
would mean a severe menace to Serbia, and consequently, in spite of all they have done 
for us and important as I think it is for us adequately to equip the Serbian Army, I 
advocate in the first place sending locomotives, food, and clothing and equipment to 
Roumania. When the Roumanian army is in a position to make a firm stand against 
Bolshevism, the Serbians should be helped as rapidly as possible. But this is of 
secondary importance in my opinion, for Serbia stands in the second line of defence 
against Bolshevism with a weaker country in the first line. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Signed) E.A. Plunkett 
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No. 79 
Letter from I. C. Bratianu to D. Lloyd George 
[LI. G. F/57/8/5] 
Romanian Delegation, 
Paris, 4 April 1919 
Sir, 
As I have let you know, the communication you were kind enough to send me after 
our last meeting has rendered me confident as regards the possibility for Roumania of 
avoiding the danger of a new disaster. 
I read now in the papers that the Conference have sent General Smuts in a mission to 
Hungary and — it is added — also to Roumania. 
I can not believe the second part of his mission should be accurate, unless the head of 
the Roumanian Government and representative of this Government at the Peace 
Conference should be informed of this mission. 
However, encouraged by the friendly interest you have shown in my country during 
our last conversation, I beg leave to call your attention upon the fact how serious the 
advantage would be if Roumania would not be ignorant of the measures dictated by the 
situation in Hungary which depends so directly on the attitude taken in time by the 
Allies towards that country. 
I am hopeful that in order to soothe the anxiety which will produce in Roumania the 
character ascribed by the newspapers to General Smuts’ mission at Budapest you will 
be good enough to give me some information about it. 
Thanking you beforehand 
I have, etc., etc., 
Ion I.C. Bratianu 
No. 80 
Telegram from General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 5 April 1919 f 
No. 1 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6429] 
Budapest, 4 April 1919 
I arrived at Budapest this morning and had long conversation with Bela Kuhn who in 
consequence of change in Hungarian Government yesterday is now Chief Commissary 
both for War and Foreign Affairs and probably most important man in Government. I 
pressed him to order withdrawal of troops to line notified by VIX and I explained 
A paraphrase of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, pp. 41-43, and in LINK, vol. 57, pp. 
77-79. For Gen. Smuts’s further report from Budapest see No. 81. 
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selection of that line was not (grp. undecipherable)2 political frontier and that 
withdrawal and creation of neutral zone under allied occupation would not in any way 
prejudice Hungarian case but was necessary for maintenance of peace and good order. 
He replied that withdrawal was impossible mainly for two reasons. First; defence of 
territory in question was conducted by local troops who were mostly Szekler (group 
undecipherable) and over whom hold of Budapest Government was but small. 
Government could not enforce order to withdraw which could not be obeyed. They 
could not therefore undertake liability which they knew they were not in a position to 
fulfill [sic]. I have ascertained from many reliable sources that authority of Government 
is confined in main to town of Budapesth and is but slight (? in) provinces and above 
difficulty against evacuation is probably well founded. 
Secondly although present Hungarian Government did not attach much importance to 
territorial boundaries large section of population did, and compliance with VIX’s orders 
would mean immediate fall of Government just as mere demand proved fatal to Karolyi 
Government. 
If Entente insisted on withdrawal Government would resign and chaos would ensue 
as there is no party capable of forming another Government Entente must in case be 
prepared to occupy not only neutral zone but also Budapesth and other parts and run 
country on their own responsibility. I pointed out advantages to Hungary of removal of 
blockade and establishment of friendly relations with Entente Powers which would give 
country chance to live and recover. But armistice had to be carried out and final political 
frontiers could be settled at later stage. Bela Kuhn said they adhered to armistice and 
wished for friendly relations with Powers but evacuation at present stage not possible 
for above reasons. With regard to future territorial boundaries Hungarian Government 
did not adhere to former Hungarian Imperialist (and former?) ideals of territorial 
integrity. 
They recognised that Wilsonian principles of nationality and popular self- 
determination should govern situation. But instead of yielding to constantly growing 
demands of evacuation they preferred to have whole question of frontiers definitely 
settled at meetings of Governments of Hungary, Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Serbia 
and Roumania under say my presidency. 
To such meeting Hungarian Government would come in accommodating spirit and be 
willing to make territorial concessions. Karolyi suggested Prague or Vienna for 
meeting. He further pointed out that for Hungarian Government frontiers were not as 
important as food and similar questions with which meeting should also deal the 
economic position of new countries would probably necessitate some arrangement of 
Danubian States, such as Masaryk had advocated. 
As it will be necessary in any case before signing of Preliminaries of Peace to (group 
omitted?)3 Germans, Austrians and Hungarians to Paris for the purpose it appears to 
me that Bela Kuhn’s suggestion would conveniently be at once acted upon and all 
parties concerned in partition of former Austria Hungary be called together for the 
purpose of settling definite boundaries or at least principles on which they should be 
decided ultimately and Preliminaries of Peace could be signed on that basis. As all other 
parties are already represented at Paris Conference I would suggest that meeting be held 
forthwith in Paris and representatives of German Austria be invited to Paris for the 
purpose. Hungary is naturally very anxious to appear at a Conference and would 
probably swallow much and submit to terms which it would be difficult to make her 
agree to otherwise. 
2 Gen. J.C. Smuts attached a paraphrased version of this telegram to his final report of the mission, 
prepared on 9 April 1919, (see No. 84) as Enclosure 3. There, the missing group is given as 
“permanent”. 
3 Given in the version described in note 2 above as: [invite representatives of]. 
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Invitation to Austria and Hungary might be merely to state their case to Peace 
Conference if there is objection to biller invitation. 
If proceedings are expedited it might be possible to sign this preliminary Peace at 
same time or even before, preliminary German Peace is signed. 
There is nothing further to be achieved by my continuing here and I therefore request 
leave to return to Paris on receipt of this telegram, I await an answer here or in Vienna. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
But if this Hungarian Govt, cannot enforce its will in the country districts, there 
seems no reason to suppose that any frontier lines which its representatives might 
accept in Paris would be accepted by the population affected and it would still remain 
necessary to enforce evacuation on the latter. 
(Incidentally the Szeklers though Magyars are scattered in the midst of the 
Transylvanian Roumanian population on the extreme eastern frontiers of Hungary). 
E.G.F. Adam 
7/4/19 
I have sent up to Mr. Balfour an advance copy of this tel. with a minute, pointing out 
the dangers involved in approving General Smuts’s proposal. 
E. Crowe 
7/4/19 
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No. 81 
Telegram from General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 7 April 1919f 
No. 3 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6581] 
Vienna, 6 April 1919 
Very Urgent. 
For Mr. Balfour. In continuance of my telegram of April 4th.1 2 I remained in 
consultation with Hungarian Government yesterday April 5th associating also Garbai 
Prime Minister and Kunfy [Kunfi] Commissary for Education with Conferences as two 
important members of Government. At one time I had practically succeeded in 
persuading them to accept a new armistice line behind which Hungarian troops should 
withdraw, not so far West of Colonel VIX’s line but still far enough to more than cover 
all the territory attributed to Roumanianin [sic] report of territorial Sub-Committee of 
the Peace Conference. Agreement was drafted and ready for signature but after further 
consultation their other colleagues Hungarian Ministers said signature would mean civil 
war along neutral zone and immediate downfall of their Government and they therefore 
declined to sign. They handed in instead document which agreed to new line only on 
condition that Roumanian army withdrew behind line of Maros river which had been 
line of withdrawal in Franchets (? group omitted)3 of November 13th and the 
occupation of whole of neutral zone by Great Powers. This I refused to accept as it 
would lead to immediate trouble with Roumania. Hungarian attitude is that they are at 
peace with Great Powers and wish to remain so, that they wish Blockade removed and 
facilities given for importation of most urgent necessities such as coal and fats and this I 
had undertaken to recommend to Great Powers in lapsed draft of agreement. They 
adhere to armistice of November 3rd, and military convention of November 13th and 
have so far obeyed increasing demands for withdrawal of their line. VIX line however 
or even one proposed by me which was necessary to satisfy fair Roumanian territorial 
claims was impossible for them to carry out owing to opposition of their Scekler 
[Szekler] troops on frontier or to accept without Nationalist reaction and downfall of 
Government. They continue however to assert that as (2 groups undecipherable].) 
stable Government they are more interested in Economic than territorial questions and 
will come in accommodating spirit to any Conference of neighbouring states under 
presidency of Great Powers before which they would lay their case before final 
decision. I am convinced that attitude of Hungarian Government is not unfriendly to 
Great Powers. But they are weak, internally divided and heading for an early fall and 
they are too frightened to agree to line unless on conditions insulting to Roumania. 
Hungary if wisely handled is by no means (? hostile) to Allies and on the whole 
consideration of case I am still of the opinion that wise course is to decide final political 
frontiers after hearing Hungarian statement at Paris or elsewhere instead of provoking 
what may be unnecessary conflict over armistice terms. Without raising Blockade at 
present trainload of fats bought and paid for with our consent but now held up by 
Allied authorities at Agram should at once be allowed to go to Budapest as earnest of 
Benevolent intentions of Great Powers as Economic questions are so important to 
1 A paraphrased version of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, pp. 61-62, and in LINK, vol. 
57, pp. 108-109. 
2 See No. 80. 
o 
J The reference is to Gen. L. Franchet d’Esperey. In the original, the word “Convention” is written in 
handwriting above “(? group omitted)”. 
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future of Hungary. I proceed to-day to Prague to exchange ideas with Masaryk and 
shall leave for Paris as soon as possible.4 
4 For Gen. Smuts’s notes of his conversation with President T.G. Masaryk in Prague on 9 April 1919 
see FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, p. 669, or F. Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference , New York, 1942, 
pp. 431-432. The original is in LI. G. F/197/2/1. For excerpts from the minutes of a meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, held on 3 May 1919, where Gen. Smuts’s notes of this conversation were 
discussed, see F. Deak, op. cit., pp. 432-433. 
No. 82 
Telegram from A. J. Balfour (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts1 
No. 9/10 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6581] 
Paris, 7 April 1919 
Urgent. 
Following from Prime Minister to General Smuts: 
Your Telegram No. I.2 was considered by the Supreme Council to-day.3 It was 
agreed that you should visit the French and Roumanian headquarters and ascertain the 
whole situation in all aspects before returning. 
Repeated Vienna, Budapest, and Prague. 
1 Also printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 39. See also FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 59, where D. Lloyd 
George expresses his hopes that this telegram will reach Gen. Smuts at a meeting of the Council of Four 
on 8 April 1919. However, the telegram arrived too late to be received by Gen. Smuts. (See No. 83.) 
2 See No. 80. 
3 For the discussion in the Supreme Council see LINK, vol. 57, p. 73. During the discussion on the 7 
April both of Gen. Smuts’s telegrams (dated 4 and 6 April, Nos. 1 and 3, here printed as Nos. 80 and 81) 
were examined. D. Lloyd George expressed the view that the Smuts mission had failed as the 
Government in Hungary had no authority. 
No. 83 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
Paris, 9 April 1919 
Dear Weego, 
We got back by special train from Vienna at 9 o’clock this morning, safe & sound, 
after an exceedingly interesting week. I’ve dictated a long letter to you which you must 
be careful to lock up in some very confidential place as it deals with all our negotiations 
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& my opinions on them.1 We had bad luck in starting just before the wire arrived 
ordering us on to Bucarest, Belgrade & Constantinople.21 tried hard to get the General 
to go there but he felt he ought to get back. 
I am more than satisfied & much relieved with our result. I hope it may do great good. 
It was an intensely interesting experience. We were an extraordinarily happy party — 
all twelve of us — & there wasn’t a single hitch in the whole thing. Above all one is 
glad of having got to know such a splendid man & such a thoroughly able one as 
Smuts. He is really a wonderful person. 
Your loving brother 
Allen 
1 There is no trace of this letter in A.W.A. Leeper’s papers. 
2 See No. 82. 
No. 84 
Memorandum by General J.C. Smuts1 
[PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6836] 
Paris, 9 April 1919 
THE MISSION TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
(.Report by General Smuts.) 
The mandate which I had from the Great Powers was principally concerned with the 
working of the two Austro-Hungarian Armistices of the 3rd and 13th November, 1918 
and the regulation of a neutral zone between the Hungarian and Roumanian forces. It 
was, however, impossible to enquire into these subjects without hearing and seeing 
much about other matters more or less closely connected with them. The advance of 
Bolshevism into the territories of former Austria-Hungary, the position and attitude of 
the new Governments, and the urgent economic questions arising out of the carving up 
of the old Empire and the drawing of new economic and political frontiers — all these 
and similar matters were continually pressed on my attention. As I was asked to report 
generally I shall therefore, in this report, deal as briefly as possible with all the matters 
which are of special interest to the Great Powers, or which call for urgent action. 
I left Paris on the 1st April, spent the 3rd April in Vienna, mostly in discussions with 
the Allied Military Missions, and spent the 4th and 5th April in Budapest, holding five 
meetings with members of the Hungarian Government, besides seeing the Allied 
1 This memorandum is printed, without the enclosures, in LINK, vol. 57, pp. 165-175. 
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Representatives still remaining in the Hungarian capital, and many other people. On the 
6th April I was again in Vienna making further enquiries during which the Chancellor, 
Dr. Renner, and the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Bauer, came to see me; on the 7th April I 
saw President Masaryk at Prague, and had a very helpful exchange of ideas with him;2 
and on the evening of that day I left Vienna for Paris, after having an interesting 
conversation with Dr. Schumpoter [Schumpeter], the Finance Minister of the Austrian 
Government. All my time was thus fully occupied, mostly in conference by day and 
travelling by night. 
I. The Armistices and the Neutral Zone 
When I left Paris it was not quite certain what had become of the Allied Missions at 
Budapest after the accession to power of the Communist or Soviet Government, and 
whether the new Government was at war with the Allies or still adhered to the 
Armistices of the 3rd and 13th November. On these questions I was soon reassured. 
Our Missions had mostly left Budapest, and those members who had remained behind 
were quite safe and still in communication with the new Government. A memorandum 
on the treatment of the Allied Missions prepared by the members of my staff from 
information collected at Budapest, as also a memorandum regarding the political 
conditions in Hungary, is annexed hereto. (See Enclosures V and VI.) The Government 
considered itself as still at peace with the Allies and professed to adhere to the two 
Armistices, but was in considerable doubt and fear as to the future attitude of the Allies 
towards the Soviet Government and whether war would not be declared against them. 
They were, therefore, very much elated and even amazed that an emissary of the Great 
Powers had come to speak to them, and as the fact was obviously of great significance 
to the new Government they have in their numerous Press communiques exploited it to 
the full. This risk was, however, well worth running, as it is certain that an important 
change has been brought about in the attitude of the new Government. 
Before my arrival they were seriously apprehensive of the attitude of the Great 
Powers towards them, and although they had concluded no alliance with the Moscow 
Government, they were leaning heavily towards Russia for support against a possible 
hostile movement by the Great Powers. Now that this fear has been removed from their 
minds they are obviously more inclined to stand well with the Great Powers, and the 
danger of their joining with the Russians in an attack upon Roumania has not only been 
minimised but probably definitely removed. 
The Hungarian Government are anxious to attend conferences with us, and to work 
out their future relations under our aegis, and have probably by our wise and 
conciliatory attitude been definitely deflected from any pro-Russian course. It is also 
certain that we could by wise counsel considerably modify the excesses of their 
communist policy, and thus prevent them from doing too much harm during the more 
or less short period of their power in Hungary. For there is no doubt that they will have 
to go. As a Government they are weak. They consist entirely of Jews and do not 
represent more than the large Jewish proletariat of Budapest. Outside the capital their 
authority is very small, if not practically non-existent, and in Budapest itself they 
represent only a minority. 
Hungary is not a Bolshevist country, and with wise handling on the part of the Great 
Powers will not long persist in a Bolshevist policy. The Government is sharply divided 
into a moderate Socialist element and an aggressive Communist section, of which Bela 
Kuhn [sic], at present Chief Commissary both for War and Foreign Affairs, and a 
personal friend of Lenin, appears to be the leader. The Communists are in the ascendant 
2 See No. 81, note 4. 
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for the moment, but the excesses of their confiscatory policy in Budapest are already 
leading to a change of feeling, and a reaction is certain to follow, although perhaps not 
before the Communists have tried their hands at some more disastrous social 
experiments. In spite of these temporary aberrations and excesses, however, it seems to 
me clear that the wise course for the Great Powers to pursue is to keep Hungary in 
hand and away from Russia, and this can best be done by the steady following of the 
policy initiated by my Mission. 
The bourgeoisie and moderate elements are cowed to-day, but they are sure to revive; 
and if we remain on the spot this revival will come all the sooner and be all the 
healthier. 
After these general remarks I proceed to deal with the Armistice negotiations. As I 
have said, the Hungarian Government appear to adhere to the two Armistices, and more 
particularly to that of the 13th November which especially concerns them. Indeed they 
assumed throughout the discussion that they were bound by the Armistices, and the 
only difficulty with them was as to the extent of our constantly growing demands for 
further withdrawals of the Hungarian forces culminating in the final request of Colonel 
Vyx which precipitated the fall of Count Karolyi. The Vyx line had been settled by the 
Military Representatives at Versailles after hearing the Roumanian case. But it was 
drawn so far back in national Hungarian territory, and included so much more than the 
Powers are ever likely to demand from Hungary, that I was prepared to curtail it 
considerably in order to arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement. 
I therefore took as my basis the future political frontier between Hungary and 
Roumania which had been agreed upon in the Territorial Sub-Committee of the Peace 
Conference dealing with these questions, and drew a line well to the west of this 
frontier, and thus covering all the Hungarian territory which the Powers are likely to 
demand for cession to Roumania. To this line I induced the Hungarian Government to 
agree, and I also agreed to their insistent request that the neutral zone thus created 
should be occupied not by Roumanian but by French, Italian, British and, if possible, 
American contingents. On this basis an agreement was drafted and ready for signature. 
At the last moment, however, the three Ministers negotiating with me (Garbai, Prime 
Minister, Kunfi, Commissary for Education, and Bela Kuhn [sic]) asked for time to 
consult the remainder of their colleagues. 
The result of this consultation was that on the evening of the 5th April they returned 
to me with a document, which, while agreeing to the proposed line and neutral zone, 
made it a condition of their withdrawal that the Roumanians should also withdraw to 
the line of the River Maros which had been provided for in the Armistice of 13th 
November. The Roumanians had, as a matter of fact, advanced far beyond this line, and 
my acceptance of this condition would have meant trouble with the Roumanians. I 
could not possibly agree to it; and I declined therefore to accept the document preferred 
by these Ministers. They have since published it, and I annex a copy, together with a 
copy of my draft agreement which was not agreed to (see Enclosures 1 and 2). I also 
annex copies of my telegrams of the 4th and 6th April (see Enclosures 3 and 4)3 which 
explain the course of my negotiations with the Hungarian Government. 
Although no agreement was thus reached in regard to the central zone, it is clear that 
the Hungarians agreed to it, but attached an irrelevant condition which I could not 
accept as being insulting to the Roumanians. 
It is, therefore, probable that if the ultimate political frontiers were fixed along the 
lines advised by the territorial sub-committee, which follow the ethnological line as 
closely as possible, we shall have no great difficulty in inducing the Hungarians to 
accept it. 
3 These do not follow here as they are printed as Nos. 80 and 81. 
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They are, however, very much upset at our continually increasing demands under the 
Armistice which, while thoroughly antagonising their people, appear at no stage to 
approach finality and therefore combine all possible disadvantages. They prefer a 
definite and final settlement once for all of political boundaries, so that they may know 
the worst and adjust themselves to it. 
I consider this attitude in all the circumstances justified, and would recommend that 
steps be immediately taken for the settlement of the future political frontiers between 
Hungary and Roumania. 
In order that what has happened may not appear like a rebuff to the Great Powers I 
would — subject to the reservation mentioned below — be in favour of the policy 
embodied in my draft agreement being carried out, in spite of the refusal of the 
Hungarian representatives to sign it. That is to say, I would favour the occupation of the 
zone adopted by me by troops of the Great Powers, but not by Roumanian troops, and 
the raising of the blockade as soon as the zone has been occupied. The trainload of fats 
now held up at Agram should be allowed to proceed to Budapest as an earnest of our 
benevolent intentions. The Hungarian Government in that case to be notified that the 
draft agreement is being carried out as an Armistice measure, but that political 
boundaries will be settled by the Peace Conference at Paris. If it could be added that the 
Hungarian case would first be heard, so much the better. 
I am, however, loth definitely to recommend the execution of the draft agreement and 
the occupation of the new neutral zone because I am not conversant with the local 
military situation, nor do I know what troops would be required for the operation, and 
whether, apart from the Roumanian forces, the Great Powers have sufficient troops left 
on that front to undertake the operation with safety. I, therefore, make the reservation 
that this question should be submitted for the advice of the Allied High Command at 
Constantinople. 
II. —An Economic and Territorial Conference 
The Hungarian Government were at great pains to explain to me that, as a Soviet 
Government, they were not so much interested in territorial questions. Hungary had had 
an imperialist policy in the past which was one of the causes of its present downfall, 
and the national sentiment among the people was still strong. The present Government, 
however, occupied a somewhat different standpoint, and would prove more 
accommodating on the question of territorial boundaries than a Government inclining 
more to the Right could be expected to be. They were, however, profoundly interested 
in the economic questions which were arising from the great territorial readjustments. 
As it was now proposed to cut up Hungary, the country would cease to be an economic 
entity and would, indeed, become economically impossible, unless its position was 
safeguarded by economic arrangements with the neighbouring States. They were 
completely cut off from the territories occupied by the Czecho-Slovak, Jugo-Slav, and 
Roumanian forces, and both from a food and an industrial point of view the position 
was becoming impossible. 
They, therefore, pressed very strongly that the settlement of political frontiers should 
be accompanied by a simultaneous arrangement of urgent economic questions, and they 
pointed out that an economic settlement would help to render the territorial settlement 
palatable. This view was so obviously reasonable and sound that I was not surprised to 
find the members of the German-Austrian Government, who saw me, urgently pressing 
for it. I therefore decided to go to Prague in order to ascertain the views of President 
Masaryk. He agreed that a settlement of urgent economic questions would be most 
necessary, and that a Conference of the neighbouring States, comprising the former 
territories of Austria-Hungary, should be called immediately for the purpose. President 
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Masaryk considered it, however, essential that this Conference should meet under the 
aegis and presidency of the Great Powers. 
In view of this general agreement, the necessity for such a Conference needs no 
further argument from me. It is, indeed, not only Hungary’s position which will become 
economically impossible under the new territorial arrangements. German Austria is in 
as difficult a plight, and unless she can obtain suitable economic arrangements with her 
neighbours she must inevitably be driven into the arms of Germany. Besides the 
drawing of new lines across the old Austria-Hungary, and the prevention of intercourse 
and communications in which the various States are freely indulging, destroy all chance 
of the resumption of normal industrial and commercial life, strangle the economic life of 
these large areas, and by rendering impossible all production and industry, are making it 
a sure breeding place for Bolshevism and anarchy. As it is both the duty and interest of 
the Great Powers, without any further delay, to put an end to this intolerable situation, it 
is incumbent upon them to call the economic Conference for which these States are 
clamouring. 
By assuming their proper role of guidance and help in this grave emergency the Great 
Powers will not only contribute to the salvation of the suffering peoples of this part of 
Europe, but they will establish their moral authority and enhance the prestige of the 
League of Nations, which will in its early stages be mostly an expression of the joint 
action of the Great Powers. 
The question is what form this Conference should take. As I have said, the Hungarian 
Government were most anxious that economic arrangements should be settled and 
announced pari passu with territorial frontiers, and they, therefore, asked that the 
neighbouring States should be called together under the presidency of a Representative 
of the Great Powers to discuss both boundary and economic questions. They suggested 
Vienna or Prague as the place of meeting. 
The Great Powers will have to decide whether and where such a Conference should 
be held. To my mind, the balance of convenience is in favour of Paris as the meeting- 
place. In the first place, the Hungarian and Austrian Representatives will, in any case, 
have to be invited there for the signature of the Peace Treaty. In the second place, the 
Prime Ministers of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, as well as the Representatives of 
Jugo-Slavia are Delegates to the Peace Conference, and it would in many respects be 
inadvisable to call them away from their duties at Paris in order to attend a Conference 
at, say, Vienna. In the third place, this meeting should be held not only under the 
presidency of a Representative of the Great Powers, but also under their influence and 
general control, and for that purpose Paris is obviously the only suitable place. 
If the Conference idea is accepted I would suggest that business be expedited by the 
parties being called together not in a general debating conference but in pairs (Roumania 
and Hungary, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, German Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, 
&.) with the Representative of the Great Powers as chairman and umpire, and that 
all questions be rapidly disposed of. The countries represented would state their 
respective territorial cases, and in the absence of agreement between them the chairman 
or the Great Powers on reference from him could finally decide on all points of 
difference. The economic questions could, at the same time, be agreed upon between the 
parties and could probably be announced simultaneously with the signature of the Peace 
Treaty. The economic questions to be dealt with should be those of most urgent 
necessity, such as freedom of inter-communication and exchange of necessary raw 
materials and urgent currency questions. 
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III.- A Mandatory of the Great Powers for Austria-Hungary 
I have said enough to show that a sufficient community of interests will remain 
among the new States arising from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire to call for a 
common handling of them by the Great Powers. The new Governments are mostly 
weak, and some of them are sadly deficient in administrative experience. The peoples 
are actuated by old historic feelings of hostility towards each other. Without the helping 
hand and the wise guidance of the Great Powers, I am doubtful whether any of them 
would achieve success in the immediate future, and their failure will involve grave 
dangers to the peace of Europe. I, therefore, consider it advisable that for the present, 
and for some time to come, the Great Powers should, in addition to their individual 
Representatives with the several States, have a common representative of high standing, 
under whom all the missions of the Great Powers should work, and who would be 
responsible for advising the Great Powers and later on the Executive Council of the 
League of Nations, on all important questions involving the common interests of the 
new States. Such an official would not only represent the Great Powers, but also be the 
symbol of the surviving unity and the common interests which would continue to bind 
together the new States. His experience and authority would be necessary to help them 
to solve the very difficult questions of common concern which otherwise might well 
prove beyond their powers. He would inaugurate a policy of Conferences between 
them to discuss common interests which, while teaching them new habits of co¬ 
operation, would help to allay the old historic bitternesses which still survive. 
In that way German Austria might be kept away from union with Germany, and 
Czecho-Slovakia might thus be secured from the danger of being outflanked by such a 
union. Co-operation among the new States under the beneficent unifying guidance of 
the Great Powers would raise a happier temper among the peoples, and in this 
atmosphere the load of despair, which is now one of the most fruitful sources of 
Bolshevism, would be lifted from the minds of the peoples. Nothing has impressed me 
more in all my enquiries on this Mission than the urgent need of common action by the 
Powers in all these countries and of their joint representation through a mandatory of 
wide experience and authority. 
On a number of special points brought to my attention in the course of my enquiries I 
shall circulate separate notes. 
I summarise the foregoing report by making the following recommendations: - 
I. - (1.) That subject to (2) a force representative of the four Great Powers 
should at once be sent to occupy a neutral zone as defined in the draft 
agreement with the Hungarian Government. 
(2.) That the military question whether, apart from Roumania, 
the forces of the Great Powers available on that front are sufficient for 
the purpose should first be submitted to the advice of the High 
Command at Constantinople. 
(3.) That the Hungarian Government should be notified that this 
occupation is being carried out as an Armistice measure without 
prejudice to the future political frontiers. It should, if possible, be added 
that the Hungarian Government will be given an opportunity of stating 
their case to a Conference before their frontiers are finally laid down by 
the Great Powers. 
(4.) That, as an earnest of our good intentions, the trainload of 
fats now held up at Agram should at once be sent to Budapest. 
(5.) That so soon as the occupation of the neutral zone has been 
pacifically accomplished, the blockade against Hungary should be raised 
by the Allied Powers. 
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II. - That a Conference should at once be summoned to meet, preferably in 
Paris, under the direction and guidance of the Allied Powers, at which 
the component States of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should 
meet together to discuss territorial adjustments and to arrive at an 
agreement regarding mutual economic and financial problems. 
III. - That apart from their respective representatives in the several component 
States of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Allied Powers should 
be represented by a joint representative of high position and experience 
under whom all the Missions of the Great Powers would work. This 
representative to advise the Great Powers and later on the Executive 
Council of the League of Nations on all important questions involving 
the common interests of the new States, and to assist the States 
themselves in reaching and maintaining agreement on questions of 
mutual interest and necessity. 
J. C. SMUTS 
ENCLOSURE NO. 1 
Draft Agreement submitted to Hungarian Government 
[Budapest, 5 April 1919] 
1. THE Hungarian Government agree to withdraw all Hungarian troops and 
armed forces west of a line drawn as follows: - 
Leaving the River Maros 3 kilometres east of Mako, passing 3 kilometres east 
of Totkompos, 3 kilometres east of Bekesc[s]aba, 3 kilometres east of 
Bekes, 3 kilometres east of the road junction at Berettyoszentmarton, 15 
kilometres east of Debreczen, and from there in a north-easterly 
direction passing 5 kilometres west of Nagyeczed and reaching the river 
Szanos [Szamos] to the north of the latter place. 
2. All Roumanian troops will be ordered not to advance beyond the positions 
which they now occupy. 
3. The area between the line described in paragraph 1 and the line now forming 
the front of the Roumanian Army is to be considered a neutral zone, and is to be 
occupied by an Allied force composed of representative contingents of Great Britain, 
France, Italy, and, if possible, America. 
4. The Hungarian Government accepts and adheres to the terms of the Military 
Convention concluded by the late Hungarian Government with the representatives of 
the Allied and Associated Powers on the 13th November, 1918, as well as those of the 
Armistice concluded on the 3rd November, 1918. 
5. It. is clearly understood that the line of demarcation now agreed on is without 
prejudice to the territorial adjustments which may be embodied in the eventual Terms of 
Peace. 
6. General Smuts will recommend to the Great Powers assembled in Paris that 
the blockade against Hungary shall be removed forthwith and that facilities be given for 
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the immediate importation into Hungary of commodities of urgent necessity, 
particularly fats and coal. 
7. General Smuts will further recommend to the Great Powers assembled in 
Paris that before the political frontiers of Hungary are finally settled in the Peace Treaty, 
accredited representatives of the Hungarian Government shall be invited to state their 
case as regards those frontiers and any economic arrangements arising therefrom at a 
meeting, to be held under the chairmanship of a representative of the Great Powers, 
with representatives of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and German Austria. 
ENCLOSURE NO. 2 
Note handed in by Hungarian Government, but returned to them by General Smuts 
General, 
ON behalf of the Revolutionary Soviet Government of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic, we give expression to you of our gratitude for the distinguished way and the 
good feeling with which you have conducted with us the negotiations authorised by the 
Entente. However, we feel constrained to make the following declaration: — 
The conditions submitted to us are of such a nature that those who were willing 
to undertake the Government of the country under those conditions 
could only accept them as a command; meanwhile, encouraged by the 
good feeling shown to us in such an unusual way by the General, we 
request you to put before the Governments of the Entente Powers the 
following proposals: 
The present Government of the Soviet Republic of Hungary also is prepared to 
institute a neutral zone, but only in the case that the frontiers of the neutral zone will be 
extended not only to the west of the present line of occupation indicated by the General, 
but also to the east to the Maros line, which has been indicated by the Military 
Convention of November, 1918, as the line of demarcation, which line has been 
arbitrarily and one-sidedly put aside through Order No. 938 of General Besan to the 
irreparable damage of our economic life. (Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Vix, No 
384 D.D., 16.12.18.)4 
(a.) In this part of the neutral zone which should be evacuated by our troops and 
should be according to the proposal of the General a line occupied by 
International, i.e., by English, Italian, French, eventually American, troops, the 
constitution of the Hungarian Soviet Republic remains in force, and no 
interference in any form whatever in the thereby shaped economic and social 
conditions will follow. It is understood, naturally, that at Szegedin and Arad the 
constitution of the Soviet Republic is to be reintroduced. In accordance with the 
principles underlying the constitution of the Hungarian Soviet Republic there 
can, of course, be no objection against the administration of the country being 
conducted in the language of the population. 
4 Not printed. 
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(.b.) Complete intercourse, free of any limitation, from the territory of the neutral zone 
in the direction of the Hungarian Soviet Republic as well as of the Kingdom of 
Roumania. 
(c.) Free transit communication in the Siebenberger [Siebenbtirger] territories 
occupied by the Kingdom of Roumania. 
2. We request the simultaneous and complete raising of the blockade and the 
providing of the Soviet Republic with coal and fats. 
3. We request the calling together of the Conference, as recommended by us and also 
proposed by the General, which Conference should sit parallel with the negotiations of 
the Peace Conference, and should consist of representatives of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic, Bohemia, Roumania, Serbia, Jugo-Slavia and German Austria, and should be 
held, if possible, in Prague or in Vienna, and should urgently meet in order not only to 
settle the political frontiers but also the whole complex of economic questions which 
may arise between these countries. In connection with this we decidedly state that the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic is based not on the foundation of the principle of territorial 
integrity, but takes position only against the solution of territorial problems on the 
ground of imperialistic conquest. 
4. We request that it might be made possible to us to maintain in the above-named as 
well as in the other countries an economic representation, and we at the same time 
request that the above-named countries will also take measures for their respective 
economic representation in the territory of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. 
5. We request that the Entente Powers will immediately take measures to put a stop to 
the barbaric persecutions to which the different types of labour activity in occupied 
countries are being subjected. Whilst respectfully submitting all the above, we take the 
liberty to attract the attention of the General to the circumstance that our Government 
has not only promulgated a Regulation on the special protection of the personal security 
of foreign subjects, but has also shown itself prepared to extend particular protection to 
the property of foreign subjects. 
We pray you, General, to accept the sincere expression of our particular respect. 
KUHN [KUN], 
People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. 
GARBAI, 
President. 
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ENCLOSURE NO. 55 
Memorandum regarding Treatment of Allied Missions and Subjects by 
Hungarian Authorities 
Apart from certain minor incidents, such as the seizure of wireless apparatus, the 
stoppage of telephone and telegraph communications, which can be attributed rather to 
the general confusion and excitement prevailing than to any ill-intention on behalf of the 
new Government, the main causes of complaint centre round the capture of certain 
French detachments on the Transylvanian frontier, the treatment of the British motor 
boats in the Danube, and the difficulties which were placed in the way of the French 
Mission when they signified their intention of leaving Hungary. 
1. — The Capture and Internment of Certain French Units 
On the 25th March, a French troop train proceeding from Eszek [today Osijek] to 
Arad was led into an ambush and forced to surrender. On the same day, an armoured 
car detachment proceeding along the Maros was also surrounded and the men taken 
prisoners. Both these detachments, in all 600 strong, were forced to surrender their 
arms and equipment, and were taken up to Budapest, where they were interned on 
reduced rations. An attempt was made by the Hungarian Ministry of War to separate 
the men from the officers, and it was evidently hoped that the men would throw in their 
lot with the Communist Authorities. These French troops remained apparently some six 
days in internment, and it was only upon the energetic protest of M. Noiseux,6 a 
prominent French resident in Budapest, to whom Colonel Vyx had entrusted the 
unofficial charge of French interests after his departure, that the Government consented 
to release them. After considerable procrastination on the part of the Hungarian 
Government, the detachments left with their officers for Bekes Szaba [Bekescsaba] on 
the night of Monday, the 31st March. 
2. — Treatment of British Motor Boats in the Danube7 
3. Departure of the Allied Military Mission 
On the 21st March Colonel Vyx informed the new Government that it was impossible 
for him to stay in Budapest and be subjected to the indignities to which he and his 
officers were being exposed. The Government answered that they would consider the 
matter, but no answer was returned for two days. On the 23rd March, however, an 
officer came on behalf of the Government to request the Mission to remain in Budapest. 
This Colonel Vyx refused to do, and demanded that immediate and adequate 
arrangements should be made for the departure of the whole Mission. On the 24th 
March M. Bela Kun, accompanied by two other Commissaries, called upon Colonel 
-* Enclosure Nos. 3 and 4 are not printed, see note 3 above. 
6 Edmond Noiseux, Count M. Karolyi’s one-time French teacher. 
n 
The text of this paragraph is not printed. The account of the British motor boat mission to Budapest 
(22-26 March 1919) is given in Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge’s letters to the Admiralty, dated 28 March 
and 3 April. The latter are printed in Nos. 63 and 77 respectively. Also see No. 77, note 2, where the 
present (not printed) paragraph is partially quoted. 
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Vyx and handed him a note apologising for the incidents which had arisen, throwing 
the blame on the unruly elements of the population and guaranteeing full protection and 
facilities if the Mission would consent to remain in Budapest. M. Kun even stated that 
the Government were themselves prepared to accept the wishes of the Allies in regard 
to the demarcation line in Roumania, but that the Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Councils 
would not empower them to do so. They added that no alliance with Russia existed, but 
that as the two Governments had been formed on an identical basis, they were naturally 
in full sympathy and agreement. The Hungarian Government, however, wished to 
remain in the closest touch with the Allied Governments, and it was for this reason that 
they were anxious that the Allied Mission should not depart. Colonel Vyx replied that 
although he was quite prepared to believe in the good intentions of the Government, yet 
he mistrusted their ability to give effect to their promises, and he again pressed for 
facilities for departure. After a further delay of 48 hours a train was eventually 
provided, and the Allied Mission left on the 26th March without, however, having 
recovered all the material which had been confiscated in the first days of the revolution. 
4. — Mining of the Danube 
It will be evident from the above that it was the desire of the Hungarian Government 
to avoid all possible friction with the Entente Mission, and that the incidents above 
recorded were due, in the first place, to the behaviour of the Szekler troops on the 
Roumanian frontier, and, in the second place, to independent action on the part of the 
Danube sailors. They merely go to prove that the Budapest Government is not in a 
position to have its orders or wishes obeyed. 
A more serious matter, and one in which the responsibility of the Government 
appears to have been more directly involved, was that connected with the mining of the 
Danube. On the 23rd March, Lieut.-Commander Williams-Freeman was informed by 
an agent that the Danube was being mined below Budapest. An official protest to the 
Minister of War met with no answer, but a further protest addressed by Lieut.- 
Commander Williams-Freeman on the 31st March, giving particulars as to where the 
mines had been laid, was answered by the Hungarian Government that the mines had 
been laid as a precaution against interference with the Danubian shipping and as a 
protection against a possible Allied disembarkation at Budapest. On the 4th April, after 
the arrival of General Smuts in Budapest, a further official note was addressed to 
Lieut.-Commander Williams-Freeman, reporting that orders had been given for all 
mines to be removed and for all ships flying the British flag to pass undisturbed. 
5. — Position of Foreign Subjects and Citizens in Budapest 
The present position of foreign nationals and interests in Budapest gives cause for 
some anxiety. In the first place, the general policy of communism affected Allied 
interests and nationals in the same way as it affects Hungarian citizens, and the several 
British and foreign residents in Budapest are exposed to the confiscation of their 
personal property and to the violation of their domicile. General Smuts took occasion 
during his conversations with Bela Kun to protest most energetically to him in regard to 
the treatment being accorded to foreigners in Hungary, and to inform the Hungarian 
Commissary that unless he would undertake that no foreign subjects or interests should 
be molested he could scarcely hope that the Allies would treat with him on any amicable 
basis. Bela Kun professed his entire readiness to accept General Smuts’ point of view, 
and agreed even to sign the general undertakings annexed at the end of this 
memorandum. Copies of these undertakings on the part of Bela Kun were at once 
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communicated to the Swiss and Spanish consuls at Budapest, to M. Noiseux,8 and 
Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman. It must be admitted, however, that only a 
limited importance should be attached to the fact of Bela Kun having signed these 
undertakings, and that it will be inevitable that foreign interests in Hungary will suffer 
severely from the course of recent events and from their future development. 
The services rendered in circumstances of exceptional difficulty to Allied interests in 
Hungary by M. Noiseux,8 the Swiss and Spanish consuls at Budapest, and Lieutenant- 
Commander Williams-Freeman, merit special commendation. 
[Copy.] 
[Budapest, 4 April 1919] 
The Government of Hungary undertake that all foreign subjects at present resident in 
Hungary will, if they desire to do so, be given every facility for leaving the country. 
They will not be molested, and will be permitted to take with them all money, valuables, 
securities, personal effects, and other movable property which they may possess. 
Foreign subjects who elect to remain in Hungary will be guaranteed security of life 
and property and will not be molested. Foreign banks, commercial undertakings, and 
companies will not be liquidated by the Government pending an economic convention 
between the Government and the foreign Governments concerned. 
In acceding to the above arrangements, the Hungarian Government accept 
responsibility for all acts committed by the forces or authorities under their orders, 
whether Red Army or others. 
The Hungarian Government undertake to publish in the public Press a summary of 
the undertakings above recorded.9 
G. [?] BELA KUN 
ENCLOSURE NO. 6 
OBSERVATION ON GENERAL SITUATION IN HUNGARY 
1. — Causes which led to the Fall of the Karolyi Government 
It is at first sight somewhat surprising that in a town like Budapest, with its large 
proportion of propertied classes, a Communist Government could have established 
itself in the space of a few hours, and have been accepted, apparently without 
opposition, and certainly without bloodshed. 
It must be remembered, however, that long before Count Karolyi’s fall the extreme 
left wing had already gathered into its hands the reins of Government, and that the 
Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Councils were already acting independently of any central 
8 See note 6 above. 
On 13 April 1919 Lt.-Cmdr. Williams-Freeman reported that the Hungarian Government did not 
comply with this agreement (see No. 88). On 21 April, in a telegram to Paris, Bela Kun offered once 
again to comply (see No. 94). 
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authority. At the same time, the more moderate and experienced elements in Budapest 
felt themselves absolutely incapable of coping with the economic, industrial and 
national problems which threatened to overwhelm their country, and they saw no other 
course but a complete confusion of the issues by a surrender to Bolshevism. Their 
motives were not, however, merely those of despair and hopelessness, since they 
cherished also the conviction that through Bolshevism alone could they exert pressure 
on the Entente Powers. 
This somewhat cynical attitude requires, perhaps, some further explanation. It must be 
remembered that when Count Karolyi declared a Hungarian Republic in November last, 
the general opinion in Budapest was that the Western democracies would welcome this 
final breach of Hungary with Austria and Germany under the leadership of a statesman 
who has always been known for his Entente sympathies. The people of Hungary felt 
confident that they would now be treated not as enemies, but at least as neutrals, and 
that they could expect an unbiassed application to their case of the doctrines of self- 
determination and the rights of every nation to full economic vitality. It was not long, 
however, before this optimistic attitude was succeeded by an increasing wave of 
disillusion and discouragement. The apparent slowness and disunion of the Conference 
of Paris, the constantly increasing military pressure exercised under the Armistice 
Convention, the stern behaviour of the Allied Military Missions, and the frequent 
rumours of Czech and Roumanian pretensions and arrogance, all tended to increase this 
reaction and to produce a feeling bordering on despair. 
The situation was precipitated towards the end of March by two unfortunate 
incidents, full details of which have as yet to be elucidated. The first of these events was 
the publication of the alleged intention of the Entente Governments to hand over to the 
Czecho-Slovaks the whole Danubian fleet between Pressburg and Baja. The second 
was the decision of the Paris Conference to allow the Roumanians to extend their 
Armistice line in Transylvania, and the statement said to have been made by Colonel 
Vyx, of the Allied Military Mission, that this extended line was not merely a temporary 
military arrangement but represented the final political frontier. 
It was this latter request which furnished the immediate occasion for Count Karolyi’s 
resignation, as will be seen by the terms of the proclamation issued by him in the Press 
(see Annex to this memorandum). 
2. — Composition and Political Opinions of the Commune 
As has already been indicated, the present Communist Government of Budapest came 
into power in a general atmosphere of apathy and despair, but the circumstances of their 
accession rendered, and still render, it necessary for them to profess the tenets of 
patriotism and nationalism, with which tenets they do not themselves by any means 
sympathise. 
They were obliged, therefore, at first to proclaim a nationalist policy in apparent 
alliance with Russia, and it is only now when they have nearly completed the 
disarmament of the bourgeoisie that they have dared to modify their programme by 
referring to the Russian alliance as of a spiritual nature only, and by disclaiming any 
insistence on the territorial integrity of Hungary. 
The real political inspiration of the present Government is based on the most complete 
communism. They have already decreed the nationalisation of all private property 
whatsoever; all dwellings, shops, personal effects, labour, education and experience are 
regarded as State property, and in order to enforce this they are constituting the absolute 
dictatorship of the proletariat. 
To this extent, their tenets are identic with those of the Russian Socialists, but they 
differ from the latter in two important aspects, which, from a purely Socialist point of 
view, cannot but constitute a weakness. In the first place, they are bound, as has already 
148 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919 
been said, to adopt at least the semblance of a nationalist policy. In the second place, 
they are at present determined to refrain, if possible, from actual bloodshed or 
wholesale executions. For the first they are without an army and have little prospect of 
being ever able to create one. For the second, their complete communistic programme 
can only be put into complete effect by the exercise of the most extreme terrorism of the 
great antagonistic mass of small property holders and the agricultural population. 
Apart from the above internal weakness of the Communist Government, the 
economic situation is extremely menacing. The peasants no longer bring their produce 
into Budapest in view of the low prices established by the Government, and it is 
estimated that the city only possesses supplies for one month more. At the same time, 
the Government is enrolling with no practical success a large number of unemployed 
into the the Red Guard, and the terms offered for this enrolment are sufficiently 
attractive to entice a large number of unemployed to the capital, who, having once 
received their enrolment fees and clothes, immediately disband and constitute a 
permanent and increasing element of disturbance. 
3. — Future Development 
It can be confidently stated that none of the present Communist leaders possess either 
the force or the genius necessary to cope with the present chaos and famine. For the 
present the power rests chiefly with Bela Kun, but even he does not appear to be in the 
least capable of coping with the vast economic and industrial problems with which he is 
faced. It is probable, therefore, that the Government will shortly take a new direction, 
either to the right or to the left. For the moment, Bela Kun, Kunfi, and Bohm appear to 
be supreme, but according as the existing economic chaos increases it is probable that 
Samuelli [Szamuely], an avowed terrorist, will render his influence predominant. 
It is generally agreed by competent observers that the Government have only the 
support of some 20 per cent, of the Budapest population, whereas their authority in the 
Provinces is almost negligible. There are also many indications of an impending 
counter-revolution on the part of the middle class and the ex-officers, but the general 
disarmament effected by the Government has been so complete that it is doubtful 
whether any such counter-revolution could materialise without outside assistance. 
Although, therefore, it is not probable that the existing Government will be able to 
maintain itself for much longer, yet there is small prospect of any early or successful 
coup on the part of the more stable elements, and it is probable that the present Jewish 
clique will surrender their power only to the more extreme members of their own 
faction. 
As regards the extent to which the Hungarian Communists are in touch with the 
Bolsheviks of Russia, it is clear that this connection is by no means as close or effective 
as might have been supposed. It is true, of course, that Bela Kun is on intimate terms 
with Lenin, and it is probable that frequent communications by wireless and other 
means are maintained between them. It is not, however, likely that any active or 
practical alliance exists between the two Governments, although their relations are 
necessarily intimate owing to the identity of their ideals and the similarity of their 
methods. 
The Hungarian Communists are extremely optimistic in regard to the propagation of 
their doctrines abroad. They have, indeed, instituted an elaborate department for 
propaganda in Central and Western Europe, and they openly maintain that Austria, 
Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, and Roumania will come over to them within the 
next few weeks, and that Italy and France will also succumb within a short period. The 
Minister of War10 admitted recently to a British correspondent that all his British 
10 V. Bohm. 
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propaganda was now complete, and that he had obtained an enormous quantity of 
forged British and French banknotes for this purpose. He also boasted that the war had 
been won by Communism, and that the Entente Powers, who had beaten the Germans 
in the field, were afraid even to tackle the Communist problem. 
ANNEX TO ENCLOSURE NO. 6 
Count Karolyi 's Proclamation11 
[Budapest, 22 March 1919] 
To the Hungarian People. 
THE Government has resigned. Those who until to-day have governed by the will of 
the people, and with the support of the Hungarian proletariat have realised that the 
compelling force of circumstances requires a new direction. 
Continued production can only be guaranteed if the the proletariat takes the power 
into their own hands. 
In addition to the impending chaos in production, the external situation is also critical. 
The Paris Conference has secretly decided that practically the whole territory of 
Hungary shall be militarily occupied. The Entente Mission in Budapest has declared 
that it henceforward regards the line of demarcation as a political frontier. 
The obvious aim of this further occupation of the country is to make Hungary the 
base of offensive operations against the Russian Soviet forces on the Roumanian 
frontier. The territory robbed from us will be the compensation paid to the Roumanian 
and Czech troops, by means of which it is hoped to destroy the Russian Revolutionary 
Army. 
I, therefore, the Provisional President of the Hungarian Republic, in face of this 
decision of the Paris Conference, appeal to the proletariat of the world for justification 
and assistance. I resign and give the power into the hands of the proletariat of the 
Hungarian people. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Harold Nicolson 
10/4/19 
This report which I understand is now being considered by the Council of Four,12 
might meanwhile with advantage be printed. 
Copies should go to Lord Curzon as soon as possible. 
E. Crowe 
11/4/19 
Copy should go before being printed. 
11 V. Bdhm in his Ket forradalom tiizeben (In the Fire of Two Revolutions), Budapest, 1923, [1946], 
pp. 198-199, asserts that this proclamation has never been signed by Count M. Karolyi, and was written 
and published against his will. 
12 The report was not officially endorsed or repudiated by the Supreme Council. Its recommendations, 
however, were refused. It died a natural death as some of its clauses could not be reconciled with official 
policy, and events on the field eventually overtook many of the proposals contained in it. 
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H[ardinge], 
[To] Mr. Balfour 
I trust that General Smuts’ proposal to start meetings with German and Austrian 
Representatives in Paris at once, without waiting for the definite decision of the Allied 
and Associated governments as to the terms of peace to be demanded, will be 
categorically rejected. 
If it were adopted, the utmost confusion would be created and the door opened wide 
to every form of intrigue. 
Moreover it could drive the Roumanians, Czechs, and Yugo Slavs really to despair if 
the Great Five, after refusing to admit the Representatives of those countries to the 
deliberations in which their future frontiers are discussed — and intended to be settled 
— were now to admit that the settlement was to be negotiated with the enemy before the 
allies have arrived at any conclusions. 
Nor would the effect of such a decision when it became known, be calculated to have 
any but the most deplorable effect on public opinion both in France and in England. 
Seen by Mr. Balfour. 
10/4/19 
E. Crowe 
10/4/19 
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No. 85 
Memorandum by General de Lobit (F)1 
No. 2. 649/2B. [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8112] 
Army Headquarters, 
Armee de Hongrie, 10 April 1919 
La genese du bolchevisme en HONGRIE peut etre donnee en exemple de la fa$on 
dont le parti bolcheviste international, sous les ordres de LENINE, semble vouloir 
operer pour s’implanter dans un pays. 
Apres une revolution accomplie sous le pretexte de creer une anarchie telleque [telle 
que] les decisions du Congres de la Paix ne puissent 6tre appliquees un Ministerere 
Communiste preside par l’ancien secretaire de LENINE, BELAKUN [sic], a pris 
virtuellement le pouvoir. Des la Debut grande incertitude. Une armee rouge est cree 
sans grande consistance car elle est melangee a l’ancienne armee qui n’est pas 
bolcheviste. Les soviets locaux se fondent, mais au debut n’ont aucune autorite et 
agissent timidement. Des conversations T.S.F.2 en clair puis par chiffres s’engagent 
entre BELA KUN et LENINE.3 
Tout a coup l’organisation generate prendre de la consistance. Un envoye de 
LENINE, SZAMUELY, vient a BUDAPEST soutenir de ses conseils le 
Gouvern[e]ment. II aurait avec lui de nombreux agents qui ont appris dans une ecole 
speciale etablie a MOSCOU la Doctrine du bolchevisme et la fa9on de l’appliquer. Ces 
agents le repandent dans tous les centres importants et fortifient les soviets locaux. 
A BUDAPEST, sous l’egide du Gouvem[e]ment, se cree un embryon d’armee rouge 
intemationale autour de laquelle s’incorporeraient egalement les Hongrois volontaires. 
Le Gouvem[e]ment Communiste Hongrois cherche avant tout, pour constituer la base 
que doit etre son armee, la qualite plutot que la quantite. 
II s’en suit que le mouvement qui des l’abord avait eu le bolchevisme comme point 
d’appui du mouvement nationaliste toume nettement au communiste pur. 
Le Gouvern[e]ment de BUDAPEST dirige par LENINE veut se constituer 
methodiquement un reseau de Commandement administratif bien assis, obeissant a une 
meme doctrine, ainsi qu’une armee sur laquelle il pourra compter. 
Pour cela il lui faut gagner du temps et ne pas entrer en conflit direct avec les allies, 
c’est pour cette raison que les delegues envoyes par BELA KUN avec l’intention de 
traiter avec nous refusent de repondre categoriquement a toute question relative a 
l’occupation d’une zone neutre, proposant simplement l’envoi d’autres delegues qui 
essaieront eux-m6mes de gagner quelques jours. 
Il ne faut a aucun prix faire le jeu du Gouvem[e]ment Communiste Hongrois. Par 
ailleurs, il est necessaire d’agir vite, sinon le bolchevisme s’implanter comme en 
RUSSE; debordera en Roumanie, en AUTRICHE, en YOUGO-SLAVIE et au- 
dela.l’heure actuelle, au contraire, il est facile, si on le veut reellement, de tuer le 
serpent dans l’oeuf, et ceci pour les raisons suivantes:- 
D’abord, la liaison effective n’est pas encore realisee entre les CARPATHES, entre 
Hongrois et Ukrainiens bolchevistes. 
1 This memorandum was forwarded to the British Peace Delegation in Paris by Brigadier-General E.A. 
Plunkett on 18 April 1919, and was received there on 23 April. 
2 Telegraphie sans fil (wireless telegraphy). 
2 Examples for such telegraphic communication between the two communist leaders can be found in 
Nos. 151, 158 and 159. 
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D’autre part, le fond de la population hongroise n’est pas bolcheviste et ne demande 
qu’a secouer le joug a condition qu’on l’y aide. Une contre revolution est mGre. 
Enfin, une partie des troupes hongroises, representee principalement la division 
SHECKLER [SZEKLER], est reste fidele aux anciennes idees, et se declare prete a 
marcher sur BUDAPEST pour y retablir l’ordre. Cette force est pour le moment 
superieure aux forces bolchevistes organisees. Si Ton attend elle deviendra inferieure. II 
sera trop tard et il n’y aure [aura] plus remede. L’opinion unanime des officiers fran^ais 
qui connaissent la question, et de tout les Hongrois, civils et militaires, qui veulent 
sincerement retablissement de l’ordre dans leur pays est la suivante: la Hongrie, sauf 
une minorite est prdte a accueillir les Allies qui voudraient retablir l’ordre et a les y aider 
par tous les moyens, mais a une condition expresse que les roumains n’avancent a 
aucun prix et que les hongrois qui ne peuvent vivre sans une partie des ressources 
industrielles de la TRANSYLVANIE soient admis a defendre leur cause au Congres de 
la Paix. Si Ton continue a abonder dans le sens de tous les desirs roumains sans vouloir 
se mettre en face de la situation reelle et de la verite, la cata[s]trophe sera inevitable et le 
bolchevisme s’implantera en HONGRIE et en debordera. II faut done choisir entre la 
complete satisfaction des appetit roumains et le danger bolcheviste. 
Et pour faire le choix les minutes comptent car il sera bientdt trop tard. En particulier 
les SHEKLERS qui represented le seul element organise hongrois susceptible de 
retablir l’ordre ne marcheront pas si on ne leur donne pas l’assurance absolue de 1’arret 
des roumains. Meme dans ce cas ils s’opposeront par le force, ce qui serait loin d’etre 
negligeable, aux efforts faits par les Allies pour realiser les decisions de Congres de la 
Paix. Or si cette division SHEKLERS est solide et bien encadree les forces alliees sont 
uniquement representees par les serbes qui hesitent a marcher, des roumains et des 
tcheques qu’il est impossible de faire avancer sous peine de soulever le pays et enfin par 
deux divisions fran9aises. Celles-ci ne comprennent chacune que 6 bataillons a 90 fusils 
par compagnie; les groupes sont de deux batteries malservies, mal encadrees, et n’ayant 
que 240 coups par pieces sans rien derriere a l’heure actuelle 1’aviation se reduit a un 
avion pour toute l’armee. En resume si, sortent enfin des hesitations et des etudes, on 
veut reellement antter le bolchevisme il est necessaire:- 
1. De donner l’assurance au peuple hongrois et en particulier aux SHEKLERS que 
les roumains n’avanceront pas, au moins jusqu’a ce que les premiers aient ete entendus. 
2. De permettre aux SHEKLERS, ainsi liberes de la crainte des roumains, de marcher 
sur BUDAPEST pour y retablir l’ordre. 
3. De prescrire aux forces alliees, a l’exclusion des roumains et des tcheco-slovaques, 
d’operer une diversion mena9ante en occupant une grande partie de la zone neutre et de 
rentrer ainsi en liaison avec les SHEKLERS. 
4. De renforcer par les moyens les plus rapides les forces alliees en hommes, 
materiel, munitions et aviation. 
5. De se rappeler enfin que toute minute perdue pour l’accomplissement de ces 
mesures est un pas de plus vers le consolidation du bolchevisme qu’on ne pourra plus 
etouffer. 
P.O. le Chef d’Etat-Major. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
It seems highly dangerous to encourage movements like the Szekler — or to give any 
encouragement to any anti-Roumanian elements. 
H.W. Temperley Maj. G.S. 
24/4/19 
This was written on April 10, since then the situation has materially altered. 
We need take no action on this and can await any communication which the French 
may wish to address to us hereon. 
E. Crowe 
25/4/19 
No. 86 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
Paris, 13 April 1919 
I can’t understand how you haven’t yet got the long letter I sent by confidential bag. 
Perhaps, however, it arrived yesterday. I hope so. It was a very long & detailed account 
of all we’d done.1 You don’t need to convert me to your views. You know I share them 
fully. Harold’s2 & my one aim (which was realised) was to prevent a disastrous result. I 
daresay the whole mission3 was bad but at least by going we prevented it ending in 
catastrophe. 
[....] 
1 See No. 83, and note 1 to No. 83. 
2 Harold Nicolson’s. 
3 Gen. Smuts’s mission to Vienna, Budapest and Prague (1-9 April 1919). 
No. 87 
Letter from G.N. Barnes to D. Lloyd George (Extract) 
[LI G. F/4/3/11] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, cca. 13 April 1919 
[....] 
General Smuts has recently been to Hungary where he met the Bolshevist leaders. 
Nobody seems any the worse for it. Probably if he went again he could improve upon 
the occasion by getting something said by the Hungarians on behalf of, or from, their 
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fellow Bolshevists in Russia. If we can meet the one, I see no reason why we should 
not treat in respect to the other so long as the approach is made to appear to come from 
the other side. By that means it seems to me there might be found a way of protecting 
the sections of the Old Russian Empire which have been co-operating with us, for the 
settling down of Russia into ordered life and the bringing away of our own men in 
safety and, as I think, with honour. 
G.N. Barnes 
No. 88 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty1 
(London. Received 8 May 1919) 
No. 388 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9379] 
Belgrade, 14 April 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to forward herewith a report on the condition of affairs at Budapest. 
Lieutenant-Commander F.A.P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., has been at Budapest 
since December 1918 as my representative on the Armistice Commission and also for 
the Navigation of the Danube. He is in close touch with all the authorities at Budapest, 
with whom he has considerable influence. His actions in relation with affairs are 
characterised by judgment and determination, and his presence at this junction [sic] is 
valuable. 
He returns this day to Budapest. He has full permission to leave the city at his own 
discretion. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Signed) E.C.T. Troubridge 
Admiral 
Commanding on the Danube 
1 See No. 63, note 1. 
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ENCLOSURE 1 WITH NO. 88 
Letter from Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman to Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge 
Belgrade, 13 April 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to inform you that I left Budapest on 11th [?10th] April, and to 
forward the following report: - 
Present situation at Budapest. 
The communisation of every sort of property actively continues. All banks have been 
seized by the Government, who are now taking away all foreign money, Valuables, 
negotiable securities, etc., from the safes. No-one is allowed to possess foreign money, 
jewellery, etc., above a value of 2000 kronen, the remainder has to be given up without 
compensation. Searching of houses for valuables by the Red guards is commencing and 
leading to robbery, pillage and violence. 
Arrests of so-called counter-revolutionaries on the information of agents are getting 
more numerous. These are supposed to be tried by tribunals from which there is no 
appeal, and proceedings are secret. Executions are beginning, but I can only obtain 
certain evidence of two executions — one for spreading rumours of an Allied advance 
on Budapest and the other for counter-revolutionary activities. 
A large majority of the population are anxiously awaiting Allied Intervention and 
occupation. 
The town is generally quiet. 
Effect of General Smuts’ visit. 
The Government made a very great deal of capital out of this visit. All the papers, 
who are of course under very strict Government control, published long articles to the 
effect that the Proletariat Government had been recognised by the Allies, who now no 
longer gave them orders but were willing to treat with them, a thing that Karolyi had 
been trying to accomplish for six months and which they had done in 10 days. 
Messages were sent to the same effect to Germany, Bavaria, etc., pointing out the 
advantage at the present time of declaring Proletariat Governments and the Allies’ fear 
of them. 
The same capital was made out of the arrival of a train of fat on 8th April. 
Both these facts strengthened the Government’s position in Budapest. 
Laying of Mines in the Danube. 
Thirty-six mines were laid in the Danube, about 23rd March at Deneskei Pus[z]ta, 
and 32 more were laid later near Uszod. Many protests were made, and I was informed 
on 2nd April, by the People’s Commissary for War (Pogany), that orders for their 
immediate removal had been given. 
Up to date a channel extending from the right bank of the river for 80 metres towards 
the centre has been swept in the Deneskei minefield, but the lower one has not been 
touched. 
I am informed by a reliable agent that Mr. Tombor (Chief of General Staff to Ministry 
of War) has stated in a report to the Government that nothing less than an ultimatum 
from the Allies should induce them to remove these mines. 
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I am unable to say what the final intentions of the Government with regard to these 
mines will be, but their policy, as in all other matters concerning the Allies, is one of 
delay. 
Military situation. 
The Czekler [Szekler] troops are certainly not Bolshevist, and I think it probable that 
if the Roumanians and Tehees were held rigidly where they are at present, the 
Hungarian Czekler [Szekler] troops would themselves march against Bolshevist 
Budapest. 
I have not been able to obtain sufficient information about the Red troops in the 
country, but they are short of ammunition and all materiel, and it is unlikely that they 
would put up any serious resistance to an Allied advance. 
In Budapest the recruiting for the Red Guard has been a failure and they consist of 
only about 5000 men. Possibly there are about another 8000 workmen who have arms 
but are quite unorganised. As a fighting force the Red Guards and workmen are 
negligeable [s/c]. 
The exact numbers and disposition of Hungarian troops on 2nd April I gave to 
Colonel Heywood, who accompanied General Smuts, on 5th April. This information 
was accurate and was copied from a report made out by the then Minister of War 
(Pogany). 
The majority of the population of Budapest await and hope for an Allied intervention. 
It is very unlikely that any serious opposition would be met with by troops advancing 
from the South. 
Bolshevism is at present confined to Budapest and the country is practically 
untouched by it. 
In Budapest the French are for the moment unpopular, but the British are very 
popular. 
A British military command of Budapest would be welcomed by a large majority of 
the people. They wish for a British occupation which would control police services, 
etc., and when everything is again ordered, to hold proper elections, which would 
certainly establish a stable social Government with which the Bourgeoisie would join. 
A counter-revolution is ready to break out at any moment, but owing to their almost 
complete lack of arms, and difficulty of organising to an adequate extent, it is not certain 
of success without Allied assistance, and unless its success be immediate and complete 
it would lead to a very great deal of bloodshed and pillage. 
Only a minority of the people in Budapest are Communists of Proletariats, and the 
majority, and a fairly large proportion of the Government, are Socialist and not 
Communist. 
I have, etc., etc., 
Sd. F. Williams-Freeman Lt.Cdr., R.N. 
ENCLOSURE 2 WITH NO. 88 
Letter from Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman to Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge 
Belgrade, 13 April 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to submit the following report of my proceedings since the 
departure of General Smuts from Budapest on the evening of Saturday, 5th April. 
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On Saturday, 5th April, General Smuts left, his negotiations about the neutral zone 
having failed of acceptance by the Hungarian Government. Bela Kun had, however, 
signed a declaration to the effect that foreigners wishing to leave Hungary would be 
given facility to do so, and could take with them all their moveable property, and that 
banks, commercial undertakings, etc., would not be liquidated pending an economic 
convention between the Hungarian Government and the foreign Governments 
concerned. This agreement the Government later in effect repudiated.2 
The departure of General Smuts immediately the negotiations had failed caused keen 
disappointment to Kun and the Government, but was looked on in the town as a happy 
augury of early Allied intervention. 
After the departure of the General, on arrival back at my hotel at about midnight, I 
found a dinner had been given by the Government to the foreign newspaper 
correspondents, Boehm, Pogany and S[z]anto, amongst others, being present, and at 
that time were all rather drunk.3 
On Sunday, 6th April, I received information that two steamers belonging to the 
Francis Canal Company, which had been used during the war as patrol boats, were 
being re-armoured and re-armed with machine guns. I saw Mr. Argoston [Agoston] 
and protested, and received his assurance that the work would be stopped. This order 
was in fact given but was not obeyed or enforced. It caused considerable annoyance to 
the Proletariat sailors, who wanted to immediately arrest me. Hearing of this I went to 
the barracks and told the Chief of the Sailors’ Council that I was very annoyed with 
these rumours and hoped they had no foundation in fact. They were very surprised at 
this manoeuvre but it was very successful and has made me very popular with this 
element. 
I also again asked for the immediate removal of the mines in the Danube, and received 
from Mr. Kun the usual reply that it was being done, but owing to technical difficulties 
was not completed. I seriously doubt the Government’s intention of clearing the lower 
minefield. They are, however, extremely anxious to re-open the navigation of the 
Danube, for the revictualling of Budapest, and to give employment to the 8000 river 
employees. This wish I intend to exploit to the utmost, to obtain the removal of the 
minefield, and all obstructions on the river. 
Monday, 7th April. Owing to the unlikelihood of the “GISELLA”4 arriving in the 
near future, I made arrangements for a special train to leave Budapest on Saturday, 12th 
April. The Government begins to place every obstacle in the way of Allied and neutral 
subjects leaving, chiefly by means of objections to their taking away money, clothes, 
etc., and the most unnecessary delays and difficulties over passports. They use every 
endeavour to get me to leave the 200 odd passports in their hands, using the most 
childish excuses to induce me to do so, and their intention is very obvious, viz: that they 
wish to lose or otherwise make use of them for getting their agents into the various 
countries. 
In the evening, about 7.30 p.m., a detachment of 12 Red Guards arrived at the Hotel 
Dunapalota to search all rooms for valuables, money, jewellery, etc. The two top floors 
were searched and all jewellery confiscated. The men then returned to the kitchens for 
supper, leaving sentries on the two lower floors. They apparently got drunk over their 
meal and went to sleep, the sentries getting tired of their watch joined them, and the 
search was never completed. 
2 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. 
A detailed account of this dinner is given in E. Ashmead-Bartlett, The Tragedy of Central Europe 
London, 1923, pp. 110-121. 
4 The name of a depot ship for officers and mines (see No. 103). 
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Elections took place during the day, which was therefore declared a holiday, to elect 
the “soviets” of the various districts. Lists of 40-60 names were given to each 
proletariat soldier or worker (Bourgeoisie class etc., were not allowed to vote). Each 
would cross out what names he wished and the lists were handed in to the various 
centres. No check of any sort was kept on the voting, most of the names were quite 
unknown and little or no interest was taken in the ‘election’. 
Tuesday, 8th April. The Austrian Consul informed me that Kun had repudiated his 
agreement5 ‘property which they may possess’ would be interpreted by the Government 
to mean the ‘Property which they actually had on them’, and that no money, securities, 
etc., could be drawn from the bank. I informed the Government that this was not the 
interpretation of the Allied Governments, and coupled with the no-execution of the rest 
of the declaration amounted, in my estimation, to a repudiation of the declaration. 
(Protocole of the above was forwarded on 10 April through Vienna).6 
Owing to my having received no communication since 4th April, and my inability to 
send any, I decided to proceed to Baja, on the pretext of making arrangements for the 
re-opening of navigation on the Danube, in order to get into communication with 
Belgrade. 
Thursday, 10th April. Left Budapest at 6 a.m. in a motor car, accompanied by Liaison 
Officer, Colonel Dormandy People’s Commissary for Shipping, Mr. Zerkovitz, and the 
Proletariat Commanders of the Danube Flotilla, an ex-naval stoker and an ex-seaman 
gunner. 
Budapest 
Friday, 11th April. Arrived at Baja at 11 a.m. and received orders to proceed to 
Belgrade.7 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Signed) F. Williams-Freeman 
Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. 
5 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. 
6 Not printed. 
7 Sir C. des Graz had a conversation with Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman during the latter’s absence 
from Budapest, at which the same information was conveyed to him as in the present two enclosures. Sir 
C. des Graz in his telegram No. 162, dated 14 April, sent an account of this conversation to Paris (PRO 
FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8254). H. Nicolson recorded the following minutes on the file on 25 April: “I 
fear that this means that Bela Kun realizes his departure is imminent. 
Qu. (1) Bring up again on May 1, by which time we may see more clearly what government is likely to 
establish themselves at Buda Pesth. 
(2) Publish this reply through our Press Bureau. 
General Smuts to see this [....].” 
On 13 April Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge sent a forward copy of a summary of Lt.-Cmdr. Williams- 
Freeman’s report (Telegram No. 524, PRO FO 371/3515 No. 59087). An unidentified official in London 
minuted the following on the file on 16 April: “The Smuts Mission is reaping the inevitable harvest. 
D[?]” 
On another summary of the report (PRO FO 371/3515 No. 60660) another unidentified official in 
London recorded on 22 April: “General Smuts’ visit has doubtless been of much assistance to the 
bolshevist party in Hungary.” 
See also No. 89. 
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No. 89 
Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to 
Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extract. Received 24 May 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/10791] 
Belgrade, 15 April 1919 
[....] 
Yesterday (13th)1 I had a long talk with Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman 
who has been at Budapest throughout all the trouble. His views may be summed up as 
follows:- 
(a) A small contingent of British troops under a senior officer would be welcomed 
now in Budapest. The Commander would be able to organise the Hungarian Police 
Force, take military command of the town, restore order and supervise distribution of 
food supplies sent. A British contingent, if sent, might be supported by French and 
Serbians following in rear, but these troops should not approach the town until the 
British have assumed complete control. 
1 This part of the letter, therefore, was written on 14 April. 
No. 90 
En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 19 April 1919) 
No. 631 [PRO FO 371/3515 No.60605] 
Paris, 16 April 1919 
BY BAG. 
Following identic telegram from four Ministers at Bucharest1 April 13th:- 
“Le President du Conseil par interim nous a fait savoir que, sur la demande du 
Conseil National Transylvanien, le Gouvernement a donne l’ordre aux troupes 
roumaines d’occuper les territoires de Transylvanie, dans la limite de la decision de la 
Conference de Versailles du 16 Fevrier, afin d’y proteger les populations roumaines 
contre les violences hongrois. 
“Depuis quelque temps, l’impunite des attentats Hongrois et leur aggravation 
constante soulevent une profonde emotion dans tout le pays. Une delegation des 
femmes de toutes les parties de la Transylvanie s’est rendue a Bucarest pour exposer au 
Roi, au Gouvernement et aux minist[e]res allies la situation intolerable faite a leur pays 
et nous demander une protection immediate. 
“La Mission du General Smuts a Budapest ou, d’apres les radiogrammes, il a negocie 
avec le Gouvernement Hongrois Bolchevique et lui aurait propose des concessions au 
1 Representatives of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers. 
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detriment des roumains a produit ici la plus deplorable impression, et les roumains on 
ont conclu qu’ils n’avaient plus rien a attendre que d’eux-memes. Cette impression a ete 
aggravee par le fait que, contrairement aux assurances qui avaient ete donnees, le 
General Smuts est rentre a Paris sans venir en Roumanie. On recuse done les conditions 
de cette enquete unilateral. Nous attirons une fois de plus l’attention de nos 
Gouvernements sur la situation tres critique ou se trouve le Roumanie par suite de 
faction evidemment concertee des Bolcheviks Russes et Hongrois.” 
Communicated to Peace Delegation. 
No. 91 
Telegram from Earl Curz.on (London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 18 April 1919) 
No. 2323 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/9/7682] 
Foreign Office, 
London, 17 April 1919 
Immediate. 
Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the Earl of Derby’s despatch, No. 384, of the 9th 
instant,1 relative to the steps taken by the French Government to ensure the supply of 
coal to Buda Pesth, has the honour to enquire whether Mr. Balfour sees any objection 
to the Hungarian Government being approached, through Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame, 
in the sense of the Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs of April 5th, 
enclosed in Lord Derby’s despatch under reference. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
It is not quite clear whether Lord Curzon’s proposal aims at a separate step on the part 
of HMG. or whether a joint Franco-British demarche is intended. If the latter, there 
would appear to be no objection. Budapest badly needs coal & to supply it is a means 
of restoring normal economic conditions there but it would seem strange to confer these 
benefits on the Soviet Govt, at a time when they have taken no steps towards carrying 
out the Allies’ demands. I am unaware whether the proposals of Gen. Smuts in this 
connection2 are approved or have been considered. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
19/4/19 
1 Not printed. 
For Gen. Smuts’s report, containing his recommendations after his mission to Hungary, see No. 84. 
M1KL0S LOJKO 161 
Refer to the Supreme Economic Council. 
[To] Mr. Hugessen. 
E. Crowe 
[To] Mr. Hanson3 
H. K[natchbull-].H[ugessen]. 
[To] Mr. Hugessen 
Genl. Smuts was to have made a statement about Hungary to the Supreme Economic 
Council yesterday, but he was unable to be present, and that Council has nothing before 
it on the subject. 
Can Genl. Smuts’ proposals3 be produced and referred to the S.E. Council? 
B. [?] Hanson3 
23/4/19 
I annex 56/1/1 6836, which gives General Smuts’ report including his proposals for 
dealing with the Hungarian situation.4 I understand that these proposals were discussed 
by the Council of Four but were not accepted. Presumably therefore the S.E.C. cannot 
act on them. 
[To] A.W.A. Leeper. Is this right? H. K[natchbull-].H[ugessen]. 
24/4/19 
Yes, in view of the fact that Gen. Smuts’s proposals for food relief followed & 
depended on his demand for an acceptance by the Hungarians of a new demarcation 
zone — which they have not done — I would urge that it is impossible to proceed 
further in the matter at present without authorisation from the Council of Four. 
Moreover the present hapless state of the Red Sovyet Government at Budapest hardly 
justifies our support of them. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
24/4/19 
I agree. 
Harold Nicolson 
24/4/195 
Q 
J The editor has not been able to establish further details about the identity of Mr. Hanson. 
4 See note 2. 
5 The editor has not been able to trace A.J. Balfour’s answer to this communication by Earl Curzon. See, 
however, LINK, vol. 57, p. 398, where Balfour, in a report dated 16 April 1919, views the question of 
economic assistance to Hungary essentially in agreement with the minutes quoted here. 
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No. 92 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour 
(Paris. Received 20 April 1919) 
No. 218 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/7895] 
Vienna, 19 April 1919 
Hungarian group representing all parties including Socialists wish to know if His 
Majesty’s Government will tacitly support enterprises by Hungarians to recognise 
peasants against Communists. Immediate needs are permission to separate for [?from] 
Yugo Slavs from Pees [Pecs] and Zombor. Grants of arms and ammunition and food 
release of officers and other ranks prisoners of war held in Italy. 
I informed French Commissioner1 of this request who requested me to consult 
French General2 and draw up proposal in detail for submission. This will be done 
tonight. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
I am not clear as to what “tacit support” means. No doubt we should prefer to see the 
Communist regime in Budapest overthrown, but this is likely to happen in any case & 
no decision appears to have been taken as to what steps, military or otherwise, the 
Allied Powers are able to take. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
23/4/19 
Col. Cuninghame has been instructed to restrict his political activities at Vienna & 
Budapest to observation and report. 
Cornwall 
24/4/19 
1 H. Allize. 
2 This is probably a reference to Gen. Hallier, member of the French Military Mission in Vienna. 
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No. 93 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to 
A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 21 April 1919) 
No. 557x [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/7974] 
Vienna, 20 April 1919 
Commander Freeman arrived here from Budapesth states counter-revolution 
Budapesth planned for Monday, or Tuesday1 night if leaders escape arrest. Military 
situation in Hungary desperate no resistance to any advance of Allies possible. Vital to 
know if Government will recognize counter revolutionary Government which will be 
socialist liberal and will help them retain power if attempt initially succeeds. Counter 
revolutionary leaders intend to ask H.M. Government for military mission to control 
police in Budapesth. 
Please reply by clear line telegram ends. 
Addressed Astoria repeated D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
A decision of the Allied Govts seems urgently required. A small Allied military 
mission might be able to control re-establishment of order as suggested. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
21/4/19 
I do not see how we can give in advance an assurance that some nebulously 
foreshadowed government that may or may not establish itself at Budapest, will be 
recognized by the Allies. 
As for an English military mission to control the local police, we should certainly 
have to wait for the request which it is intended to make for our assistance. 
Proposals are, I believe, under consideration for sending a British Representative of 
standing to Vienna. If this will [be] done, I think we should get a clearer insight into the 
situation than can be gathered from Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegrams. 
E. Crowe 
22/4/19 
Sir T. Cunningham [s/c] is not a person in whose discretion one can have much 
confidence. How can we help a counter-revolutionary Govt, to retain power? I would 
suggest that no reply be sent. 
H[ardinge]. 
1 21 or 22 April 1919. 
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No. 94 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 22 April 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8254] 
Budapest, 21 April 1919 
In reply to your telegraphic message dated April 10th1 I desire to state that Hungarian 
Soviet Government accepts full responsibility for fulfilment of their undertaking to 
permit foreign citizens to withdraw their money and securities from Banks in Hungary 
and to refrain from taking over foreign commercial establishments and Banks. If any 
incident has occurred contrary to this undertaking the Hungarian Soviet Government is 
ready to (?make)2 redress. Suggest that Entente Economic Commission be sent to 
Budapest to discuss and settle question referred to. 
(Sd.) People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs 
Bela Kun 
1 The communication referred to (see PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/7354) is dated 18 April 1919 (not 
10th). In it, A.J. Balfour reminded Bela Kun of the responsibilities of the Hungarian Government under 
the agreement they had signed with Gen. J.C. Smuts (see Section 5, Enclosure 5 to No. 84) with regard 
to the safeguarding of the property of foreigners in Hungary. The agreement was repeatedly reported to 
have been broken by the Hungarian Government. 
2 This telegram is also located in PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8436, where this missing word is given 
as: “offer redress”. 
No. 95 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to 
A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 23 April 1919) 
No. 240 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8126] 
Vienna, 22 April 1919 
Hungarian Minister1 who left Buda Pest yesterday came to me and gave me to 
understand that Hungarian Government are much concerned at events and desire British 
Representative to go to Buda Pest to discuss situation. 
He gave me the impression that Kun Bela does not hope to be able to continue 
Government. 
Commander Freeman, Professor Brown of the American Mission, and Austrian 
Minister2 return by special train to-day. 
1 E. Bolgar. 
2 Baron Hans Cnobloch, the representative of German-Austria, as it was then officially called in 
Hungary. Bela Kun’s regime was only recognised as the legitimate government of Hungary by Austria 
and Soviet Russia. 
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I am going to Buda Pest to-morrow night. 
Addressed to D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Sir Thomas Cuninghame intends, apparently, to leave for Buda Pesth tonight. I 
venture to suggest that, if possible, he should be told to defer his visit & that in any case 
he should be intimated [?] by telegraph to confine his action to observation and report. 
Harold Nicolson 
24/4/19 
I agree. 
E. Crowe 
24/4/19 
Ask Mily. Auths. to tel. urgently to him to defer his visit till he receives further 
authority. 
H[ardinge]. 
Telegram in the above sense instructing Col. Cuninghame to restrict his activities with 
political parties in Vienna & Budapest. 
[Unidentified] 
No. 96 
Telegram from A. J. Balfour (Paris) to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna. Extracts) 
No. 8 (?) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8126] 
Paris, 24 April 1919 
Very Urgent 
Following from General Thwaites. 
Reference your 240 of 22nd inst.1 You should defer your visit to BUDA PEST until 
you receive authority from PARIS. 
You should confine your action to observation of situation and reporting same to me. 
You must refrain from becoming involved in or being party to any negotiations or 
arrangements with political parties at VIENNA or BUDAPEST. 
[....] I do not wish you to take action on the lines suggested in your No. 2222 or 218.3 
Cornwall 
1 See No. 95. 
2 Not printed. 
3 See No. 92. 
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No. 97 
Telegram from Earl Curzon (London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extracts. 
Received 25 April 1919) 
No. 553 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8350\ 
Foreign Office, 
London, 25 April 1919 
Following is summary of reports received from Buda Pest this week by Sir C. 
Kennardf] [....] 
10 to 12 million Hungarian population disarmed under armistice terms continue to be 
terrorized by dictatorship supported by 20 to 30 thousand armed guards, leaders of 
political parties have been nearly all arrested. 
Dictatorship have informed General Glats [Smuts] who has been negotiating with 
then Die], that Peace Conference has recognised them, and consequently development 
of Bolshevism has been rather advanced than otherwise. Dictatorship assert that Peace 
Conference attempted a compromise but that all overtures had been refused by them. 
Bulk of population had hoped in consequence to see strategical occupation stated to be 
necessary commenced by Allies at once or further Allied negotiations. When no such 
steps were taken they lost confidence, and are almost prepared to believe statement of 
dictatorship that they are recognised by the Peace Conference. In Hungary it is also 
believed by people that Serbian, Czech, Italian and Roumanian Governments view the 
growing prestige and power of dictatorship with approval, believing that if Hungary is 
captured by Bolshevism it will be easier to annex her territories. 
[....] 
No. 98 
Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to 
Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extracts, Received 7 May 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9273) 
Belgrade, 25 April 1919 
NOT SENT TO FOREIGN OFFICE. 
My dear General, 
[....] The Roumanian advance through Transylvania has been successful so far, and 
goes to prove that action on our part would not have been opposed while it would 
undoubtedly have had a salutary effect. 
The Jews running the Hungarian Government are not great men. They are reported to 
be extremely nervous about their own safety and a military advance on Budapest would 
probably result in the whole lot bolting. 
[....] The tame retreat of the Sechlers [Szeklers], supposed to be the best Hungarian 
troops remaining, before the Roumanians whose military reputation is none too high 
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would seem to show that the Hungarians have no discipline left. This is the Serbian 
point of view.1 
[....] 
In my opinion steps should be taken to control the American Food people and prevent 
them from over-riding the military. Just after the outbreak of the revolution at Budapest, 
the French Command held up a train load of food bought from the Americans and 
destined for Budapest. HoovePs representative fought the question and got his way; the 
food went to Budapest. 
Now we have clear proof that the arrival of this train load of food was a great help to 
Bela Kun, whose position was not at that time very secure, for it was first food the 
Hungarians had got from the Entente. A nice object lesson for incipient Bolshevists. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) E.A. Plunkett 
1 More light is thrown on the role of the Szeklers at this juncture by a telegram from Col. Sir T. 
Cuninghame to A.J. Balfour, dated 21 April 1919 (received 22 April): “Austrian War Office informed 
me that they have positive information that Szekler division is now marching with Roumanians against 
Hungarian Government. [....]” (PRO FO 608/9 No. 45/1/5/8066) 
No. 99 
Letter from General Sir H. Wilson to A.J. Balfour 
[PRO FO 608/8 No. 39/1/1/7262] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 2 April 1919 
[To] Mr. Balfour, (through Lord Hardinge) 
In March 11th I asked for permission to withdraw a Battn. we have at Fiume. This 
proposal was not agreed to. 
Now I want to raise rather a larger issue. We have still 4 Battalions under Commando 
Supremo. Is there any reason why all these should not be withdrawn? I understand all 
the American troops have been withdrawn although they are not required for other 
theatres whereas I may be called on for troops at any moment for Turkey or Egypt and I 
have no Reserve available in any theatre except in Italy. 
May I not therefore be allowed to copy the example set by the Americans? 
Henry Wilson 
C.I.G.S 
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Minutes attached to the document:1 
Sir Henry Wilson proposes to withdraw the last 4 British battalions from the Italian 
theatre. 
It is not for me to judge of the military requirements necessitating such a withdrawal. 
It seems to me, however, unfortunate to proceed with this before we have come to a 
clear understanding with Italy as to 
(a) the territorial settlement on the Adriatic coast, including Fiume; 
(b) the general policy to be adopted toward Austria and Hungary in the matter of 
supporting the forces operating, or capable of operating, against the Bolsheviks who are 
using those countries as bases of an offensive against our allies. 
E. Crowe 
8/4/19 
This should innly [?] [? instantly] go to the Supreme War Council. — The policing of 
Middle Europe during the transition period is a burden common to all the Associated 
Powers. Are the Americans having their fair share ? 
[Unidentified] 
[To] Lord Hardinge 
The P.M. has ordered the Fiume battalion to remain and a wire has been sent to W.O. 
to that effect today. 
W. Thwaites 
26/4/19 
I am very glad to hear this. 
H[ardinge]. 
1 This is only a selection of the various comments recorded on the original file. 
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No. 100 
Telegram from Sir C. des Graz. (Belgrade) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 28 April 1919) 
Unnumbered [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8618] 
Belgrade, 26 April 1919 
Very Urgent. 
Following sent to Foreign Office today No. 182. 
Lieutenant-Commander Freeman has communicated to Admiral T[roubridge] by 
wireless today that situation at Buda Pest is rapidly becoming critical. 
There have been (? been) two thousand arrests and about 20 executions of 
Bourgeoisie.1 Bela Kun is seeking to give up Government to more moderate Socialists 
but extreme element make it difficult to do so without further bloodshed. 
Commander Freeman considers Roumanian offensive should continue and that 
advance from south should be made and that serious resistance by Hungarians is 
impossible. 
Admiral has informed Admiralty and General officers commanding French and 
Serbian troops. Military Attache requests above may be communicated at once to War 
Office. 
1 The text of Sir C. des Graz’s telegram No. 994 (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8914) is very similar to 
that of the present one. There the end of this sentence reads: “... of the Bourgeoisie in the last 4 days”. 
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No. 101 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 28 April 1919) 
No. 249 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8597] 
Vienna, 27 April 1919 
Commander Freeman, R.N. reports night of April 26th quiet in Budapest. 
Special agent returned from Pecs1 states villages in neighbourhood are inflamed 
against communists owing to murder theft and pillage by Red Guard detachments. Only 
waiting for advance of Allies to rise against Communists. 
Strong anti-Soviet feeling arising in Western Hungary. Communist leaders in 
Budapest continue to make speeches inciting crowd to murder political prisoners in the 
event of Allied advance. 
Addressed Astoria, D.M.I. & General Greenly. 
1 The word “Pesth” is inserted above “Pecs” [Pecs] in the original. 
No. 102 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 29 April 1919) 
No. 254 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8708] 
Vienna, 28 April 1919 
This afternoon Bela Kun stated to Phil[l]potts here that Bolsheviks were considering 
the following. Acceptance of Socialist Government with two portfolios for Burghers 
and two for moderate Communists, cessation of propaganda, security for political 
prisoners, freedom of the press, calling of National Assembly, cessation of robbery 
from banks. 
Addressed D.M.I. London. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
I doubt whether the extremist group (Mr. Samuelli [Szamuely] & Co) will allow Bela 
Kun to move to the right in this way. 
Harold Nicolson 
30/4/19 
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No. 103 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty1 
(London. Received in Paris 24 May 1919) 
No. 442 [PRO FO 608/8 No. 36/2/1/10887] 
Belgrade, 2 May 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty, of the situation on the Danube. 
A Flotilla is assembled at Baja, 100 miles South of Budapest, under the command of 
Captain Vernon Haggard, Royal Navy, consisting of the following ships:- 
“Bosnia” (Monitor) 
“Save” (Monitor) 
“Enns” (Monitor) 
“Barsch” (Scout) 
“Gisella” (Depot ship for Officers and mines) 
Armed tugs 
Motor Launches 
On 7th April, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in South Eastern 
Europe2 came to Belgrade. At a conference held on that day he requested me to keep 
the Flotillas at Baja ready to co-operate with his armies should he be ordered to advance 
on Budapest. Further, he desired me ot [to] organise services for the evacuation of 
wounded; supplying the army with provisions and ammunition; and for the transport of 
troops, all these by river. These services have been organised, as also a mine-sweeping 
service, the Hungarians having mined the river in many places. The arrival of 20 
officers from England has enabled me to organise these services with such efficiency as 
the materiel at disposal permits. 
It is reported that the Hungarians have armed and protected 6 Tugs which were 
similarly used during the war. They have at Budapest a number of Officers and men, 
late of Austro-Hungarian Navy, who are now actively employed in these operations of 
mining and preparing extempore war vessels. 
In the river Theiss are the monitors “Koros” and “Temes”. 
Should an advance be ordered, the Flotillas in the Danube will support the wings of 
the Allied Armies which rest on the Danube, moving with the armies while clearing the 
mines before them. 
The monitors in the Theiss will act in co-operation with the right wing of the French 
Army that is situated between the Danube and the Theiss. 
I am requested to keep the Flotillas in readiness for these operations until further 
orders. 
British Monitors. 
1 See No. 63, note 1. 
2 This is probably a reference to Gen. L. Franchet d’Esperey, the Commander of the Allied Armies in the 
Orient 
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The “Ladybird” is at Belgrade, but will proceed to Baja shortly. The “Aphis” is 
proceeding to Novi Sad. The height of their funnels preventing these ships passing 
under the bridges, I am having them, and the masts, made moveable, as are the masts 
and funnels of all the river craft on the Danube. They will then be able to proceed to 
Budapest or to Vienna if necessary. 
Navigation of Danube. 
Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N., my Flag Lieutenant, is at 
Budapest. On 12th April he returned to Belgrade via Baja.3 Three officials of the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Government accompanied him, as a “Parlementaire”, Mr. 
Zerkovitz People’s Commissary for Navigation, the Secretary to Mr. Bela Kun, and a 
Colonel Dormandi [Dormandy], Liaison Officer. 
They urgently desired to meet me to invite me to come to Budapest and open the 
navigation of the Danube in Hungarian waters. 
On 15th April I returned with Lieutenant Commander Williams Freeman to Baja and 
interviewed these representatives. 
I had already received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief that Hungary is 
subjected to a rigid blockade. I confined myself to informing them that there could be 
no navigation of the Danube so long as they kept it mined contrary to the conditions of 
the Armistice, and informed them of the blockade orders. They returned with Lieutenant 
Commander Williams-Freeman to Budapest. 
I have since received a communication from Mr. Bela Kun through Lieutenant 
Commander Williams-Freeman. It is of interest as illustrating the attitude of the 
Revolutionary Government and their presumption in demanding terms of the Allies on 
the question of the mines. 
The situation is complicated by the advance of the Roumanian Army into Hungary. 
Hungary is in fact engaged in active operations of war against all the Allies. 
Mr. Williams-Freeman reports there is great discontent with the Revolutionary 
Government in Budapest. If the country is isolated he believes that the extremists will 
be replaced by a Socialistic Government of a more reasonable nature. 
At present it is purely a Red Guard Government by force and terrorism, based on the 
fact of the population being without arms and therefore easily subjected to the will of 
the armed few. 
Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman has full liberty of movement. He is 
furnished with a certificate as a “First Class Workman”, which entitled [entitles] him to 
every privilege, to provisions, cigars, free entry into theatres, etc. etc. and carries passes 
to permit him to have money and to be immune from searching and interference. 
The restoration of a normal condition of law and order in Hungary is so important to 
Europe, and is so closely allied with the question of the navigation of the Danube, by 
means of which coal, food and raw materials can be received in Budapest, that his 
presence there is very valuable. Should the evolution of the political conditions, by 
means of a counter-revolution, permit, at any moment, of the Allies resuming relations 
with Hungary, the whole question could be rapidly changed by the opening of 
navigation, to the great advantage of peace in South East Europe. 
The section of the Danube from the mouth to Tumu Severin, under the French and 
Roumanian authorities, is now working. Admiral Exelsmans, of the French Navy, has 
been appointed to control it and also as French representative on the Danube 
Commission. His instructions are to act in close co-operation with me. 
3 For Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s own account of his departure from Budapest, see Enclosure 2 
with No. 88. 
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The section under my control, from Turnu Severin to Baja, is also now completely 
organised. 
Navigation is thus actively progressing from Sulina to Baja. It is remarkable how 
unrest is allayed, and tranquility prevails, in all the territories contiguous to the Danube 
and tributaries within which normal fluvial communications and commerce are 
instituted. 
Directly I can open the Upper Danube, through Hungarian and Tcheco-Slovak 
waters, to Vienna, I anticipate with confidence a similar result. But while at war with 
Hungary, and the Danube is mined, it is necessarily inevitable that that section remains 
closed. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge 
Admiral, 
Commanding on the Danube. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 103 
Note from the Hungarian Government to Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman 
Budapest, 19 April 1919 
Sir, 
We have the honour to inform you, that the clearing of the Danube of the mines had 
been already ordered and this work is going on. 
In connection with these orders given by the Hungarian Government of Counceils 
[s/c] we have the honour to ask you whether you are in a position to give [s/c] us 
sufficient guarantees that:- 
lst. Armed vessels of the Allied Danubian Flotilla shall not trespass the line of 
demarcation. 
2nd. that the Allied Danubian Flotilla has no hostile intentions against the Hungarian 
Republic. 
3rd. that commercial ships hired by the Allied Powers from the Hungarian Republic, 
have to sail under British flag, and ought to be at the disposal of the Hungarian 
commerce and supplying of foods. 
(sd.) Bela Kun 
Commissioner of 
Foreign Affairs 
Yours truly, 
(sd.) Bohm 
Commissioner of War. 
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No. 104 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 3 May 1919) 
No. 264 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9061] 
Vienna, 3 May 1919 
Urgent. 
Brown and Freeman report that situation in Budapest is fast becoming critical. 
Organized element will do best to maintain order but extreme element may get out of 
hand, and start massacre if driven to desperation. Government have asked that I on 
account of personal knowledge and influence with leading men should go to Budapesth 
to maintain order (2 groups undecipherable). Reference to your Cipher telegram No. 8 
April 24th1 I have told Freeman (?) that I cannot [proceed to Hungary ?] unless (a) 
matter urgent and of immediate necessity. 
French Commissioner has asked me to deliver invitation for Hungarian delegates to 
attend Peace Conference to Government at Budapest as he cannot send French officer 
and cannot make Demarche here as Hungarian representative2 has left Vienna for 
unknown destination. 
I am sending another officer as courier. 
M. Allize requests me to instruct them if necessary to postpone for 24 hours 
presentation of invitation if, as seems likely, fall of Government is imminent.3 
Instruct me by priority telegram. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Advance copies to 
Prime Minister 
Mr. Balfour 
Sir M. Hankey 
Mr. Campbell 
1 See No. 96. 
2 E. Bolgar. 
3 For the further history of the invitation which was stated to have been issued for Hungarian delegates 
to the Peace Conference see Nos. 106, 108, 109, 110 minutes, 112, 113, 114, 115, 127 and Enclosure 1 
with No. 130; FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, pp. 693-695; vol. V, pp. 392-393, 406, 427, 451, 494; vol. XII, pp. 
368-369, 455-456; LINK, vol. 58, pp. 264-265, 283-284, 315, 369-370, 415 and 486; Colonel Sir 
Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, Dusty Measure, London, 1939, pp. 335-336. From No. 110 
minutes; FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, pp. 693-695 (notes of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 9 May 1919) 
and Cuninghame, op. cit, it appears that the invitation was the result of a misunderstanding. Cuninghame 
writes: “Next morning [presumably 3 May] [....] the French Commissioner, M. Allize, came to me and 
told me that he had been ordered by Paris to invite the Hungarian Government ‘tel qu’il soit’ to St. 
Germain-en-Laye to receive the Treaty of Peace. As this treaty was for Austria only it was evident that 
some bright spark in Paris had mixed up Austria and Hungary with Austria-Hungary.” 
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(1) As regards Sir T. Cuninghame’s desire to proceed to Buda Pesth, I submit that his 
presence there would be of little advantage. Either the moderate elements will maintain 
order, or the reds will break loose. If the first, Sir T. Cuninghame’s presence will be 
unnecessary. If the second, his “personal influence” will certainly be of no avail. 
The question is, however, largely for the Military Section to decide. 
(2) As regards the postponement of the invitation to the Hungarian Government, I 
venture to urge that this invitation should certainly be deferred, not only for 24 hours, 
but “pending further instructions”. 
The situation at Buda Pesth is evidently in process of liquidation, and whether a stable 
or an anarchical government emerges, the existing Ministry will be sure to dissolve. 
Harold Nicolson 
3/5/19 
[To] C.I.G.S. 
We have no official representative in Vienna & any action would therefore have to be 
taken through Col. Cuninghame; but Mr. Balfour thinks that in view of the Press 
reports today4 Col. Cuninghame should be instructed to take no action as regards the 
invitation till the situation is clearer & can be reconsidered tomorrow morning by the 
Supreme Council. 
A.J.B[alfour]. 
3/5/19 
War Office 
Very Urgent. 
[To] Mr. Balfour (through Lord Hardinge) 
I am not sure whether you have a diplomatic representative in Vienna. If you have I 
will wire to Colonel Cuninghame that all political invitations to Paris or conversations 
on other matters must be done through such representatives. If on the other hand you 
have no such person and wish to employ Colonel Cuninghame in that capacity, will you 
let me know what answer I am to send to his telegram.5 
H.W[ilson]. 
C.I.G.S. 4/5/19 
4 In early May false press reports were released in Paris about the fall of the Government in Hungary, 
and the occupation of Budapest by Romanian forces. (See H. Nicolson’s minutes in No. 110, and notes 1, 
3 and 5 to 110.) 
5 For Gen. Sir H. Wilson’s answer to Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram No. 264, see No. 106. 
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I understand that the Hungarian delegates are not being invited. But as I am not any 
authoritative information either on what has been done or what it has been decided or 
intended to do, I cannot account for the request of the French Commission to Sir T. 
Cuninghame. 
[To] Military Section 
E. Crowe 5/5/19 
[To] Sir Eyre Crowe 
Col. Cuninghame, on arrival at Vienna of an Assistant (Capt. Barber), has wired 
expressing his opinion that it is essential for him to come to Paris to explain the 
situation to D.M.I. Sanction has been given.6 [....] 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.Col. 
5/5/19 G.S. 
6 For Col Sir T. Cuninghame’s own account of his subsequent visit to Paris see Cuninghame, op. cit., pp. 
336-338. After describing how he failed to obtain a fair hearing from various British leaders in Paris, 
Col. Sir T. Cuninghame relates the conclusions that he arrived at by the end of his visit: “[....] I had by 
that time realized that there was so much buzzing going on inside the Paris hive, that nothing outside it 
had a chance of getting a hearing. I felt that, far, far away in Vienna, I could do as I pleased as long as I 
did not stir up too much dust. I determined to act accordingly.” 
No. 105 
Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 14 May 1919) 
No. 77A. [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 73481] 
Prague, 3 May 19191 
Czech detachments have advanced South across line of demarcation and have 
occupied a line roughly through following places. 
Munkac[s] and station and bridge at Csap and network of railways route about 
Alsomihalyi thus securing use of Kosiche [KoSice] Alsomi Haly [Alsomihalyi] 
Mihalovce systems. Also Bajda and Czendro in Bodva Valley. Railways about 
Banrevo in Sajava Valley and Rimaszecs to west and Putnck [Putnok] to east of 
Banrevo. Line thence to Darocz. 
They have met Roumanian detachments at Munkacfs] and Aban(?)szanto. 
Addressed to Foreign Office No. 77 repeated to Paris. Please repeat to Military 
Intelligence Branch War Office from Captain Cartwright No. H.C. 19. 
1 The telegram was only dispatched on 4 May. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 111 
No. 106 
Draft of a Telegram from General Sir H. Wilson (Paris) to Colonel 
Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9061] 
Paris, 4 May 1919 
Priority. 
To Col. Cuninghame re No. 264 May 3rd1 
from C.I.G.S. 
Take no action with regard to invitation to Hungarians without further instructions 
from here. 
Meanwhile you should remain at Vienna but transmit urgently any reliable 
information you can obtain as to situation at Budapest. 
Astoria 
1 See No. 104. 
No. 107 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 5 May 1919) 
No. 267 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9187] 
Vienna, 4 May 1919 
Commander Freeman telephoned last night situation in BUDAPEST calm, politically 
very strained fall of Government still expected. Professor Brown of American mission 
has gone to ZZOLNOK [Szolnok] as envoy to extract answer from Roumania to last 
note of BELA KUN which has so far been left unanswered.1 
1 In connection with Prof. P. Brown’s talks with Allied military commanders see Nos. 116 and 122, note 
1 to No. 116, as well as note 1 to No. 122. 
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No. 108 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 May 1919f 
No. 268 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9326] 
Vienna, 5 
Commander Freeman reports evening May 4th. Begins. Italian Colonel2 sent by 
General Segre Vienna formally asked Kun if he would consent to occupation by Czech 
troops under Italian officers of Budapest but Kun refused. Professor Brown could not 
get in touch with Roumanians at Szolloik [Szolnok] and is going to (groups 
undecipherable). States that east Theiss Roumanian advance was stopped. 
Communists much elated at stopping of Allies, unwilling to agree to change of 
government and state will maintain as centre for working propaganda for Bolshevism 
what is left of Hungary. 
Inhabitants of Budapest surprised at turn of events and maintain (sic) Communist 
terror. Presentation of note of invitation will increase this effect. 
Major Borrow arrived with note at Budapest but will not present it until he receives 
direct orders to do so from M. Allize. Ends. 
Effect of stoppage of advance and recognition of Communists will be? itself very 
serious in Vienna and will be certain to lead to renewed outbreak in? German Austria of 
Bolshevist effect which has lately ceased. Strongly urge that presentation of note of 
invitation be postponed if possible having in view especially the present political crisis 
in the existing coalition. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
* The receipt of this telegram was acknowledged in Paris on 7 May. 
2 This is probably a reference to Lt.-Col. G. Romanelli. 
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No. 109 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 May 1919f 
No. 272 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9268\ 
Vienna, 5 May 1919 
Commander Freeman reports at noon to-day Budapest quiet. 
“Bela Kun gone to Komarom to speak with Czech representative.1 2 Arrest of hostages 
continue and their condition, treatment and state of mind is such as to demand the 
interest of the Entente in their fate and some warning to Bela Kun as to their security.” 
Ends. 
M. Allize has directed me to order Major Borrow to present the note of invitation at 
noon May 6th unless instructions to the contrary are received from Paris. 
Repeated to D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This means, I suppose, that the invitation has been given. 
Harold Nicolson 
9 [?10]/5/19 
1 The receipt of this telegram was only acknowledged in Paris on 7 May. 
2 In connection with Bela Kun’s negotiations with Czechoslovak representatives also see Nos. 117, 123 
and 127. 
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No. 110 
Tele gram from Earl Curzon (London) to the British Peace Delegation (Paris) 
No. 629 (R.) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 68411] 
Foreign Office, 
London, 5 May 1919 
Sub-Committee. 
Colonel Wedgwood asked a private notice question today in the House: Whether any 
information could be given as to alleged suppression by Allied troops of Revolutionary 
Government in Hungary and whether Count Apponyi was the Allied nominee for head 
of the new counter Revolutionary Government.1 
We could only reply that we had no official news. Colonel Wedgwood intends to put 
another question to the same effect on Thursday and is not unlikely to raise the question 
on the adjournment if not satisfied with answer.2 
Please furnish any information available as to actual position and policy of Allied 
Governments. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Colonel Wedgwood’s Question. 
As no reply had come from Paris this morning I telephoned to Mr. Nicolson to 
enquire.3 
I understand from him that there is practical ignorance as to what is happening in 
Hungary, but that so far as is known the Bolchevist Govt, is still in existence. The 
whole difficulty has arisen over the question of the invitation of the “Austro- 
Hungarian” Govt, to send delegates to Paris to receive the peace terms on May 13th. 
The Council of three agreed to this being done, and an invitation has been sent to the 
Austrians, but that to Hungary has been held up owing to the anomalous position in 
that country, and thus no one knows whether they will come. 
It appears, however, that there is no doubt that the Govt, of Bela Kun in [is] still in 
power in Buda Pesth, and this is borne out by the mysterious telegram from Col. 
1 The question originated in false press reports published in the West in early May 1919. See note 5 
below. 
2 Col. J. Wedgwood raised the same question in the House of Commons on Thursday, 8 May 1919, and 
received the following answer from C.B. Harmsworth, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs: “So far as my information goes, the revolutionary government in Buda Pesth is still in 
power. I am not aware of any ground for the suggestion in regard to Count Apponyi.” (The 
Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 115, London 1919, columns 1095- 
1096.) Col. Wedgwood accepted the answer. 
3 The delay of the reply was due to the mutilation of the telegram as it was transmitted to Paris, and also 
the need to clarify the situation in Hungary. See H. Nicolson’s minutes, and note 5 below. 
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Cuninghame, which cd. not be explained yesterday.4 The best reply would therefore be 
something as follows:- 
“So far as my information goes, the Revolutionary Government in Buda Pesth is still 
in power. The second part of the question does not, therefore, arise.” 
C.H.Sfmith]. 
8/5/19 
(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9233] (F.O. to Astoria No. 629) 
Urgent 
This telegram, especially the last paragraph, is extremely obscure. It was only by 
telephoning to London that I could make certain that Hungary was the country referred 
to:-5 
Qu. Reply: - (by telephone) 
“There is no confirmation of the alleged occupation of Buda Pesth by the Rumanian 
forces. The fall of Bela Kun’s government was due entirely to the fact that he had 
ceased to command the confidence of the country.” 
The Allied Governments have no intention, so long as the requirements of the military 
situation are met, of interfering with the liberty of the Hungarian people to choose their 
own form of government.” 
Harold Nicolson 
6/5/19 
I think we must ask the Prime Minister to answer this question. No-one else knows 
what we are doing or intending, or instructing our agents to do. 
E. Crowe 
6/4/19 
I do not think the reply suggested above will do. We have so far neither encouraged 
nor discouraged the Roumanians, but Bela Kun’s Govt, was losing ground all the time. 
H[ardinge]. 
4 This is probably a reference to Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram No. 268 from Vienna, dated 5 May 
1919 (see No. 108). 
5 See notes 1 and 3 above. At the time when H. Nicolson recorded his minutes false press reports were 
current in Paris and London about the fall of Bela Kun’s Government. (For the background of these 
reports see Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s report to Admiral Troubridge, dated 14 May, in the 
Enclosure with No. 125.) The process of clarifying the reports may also have contributed to the delay in 
answering the Foreign Office’s telegram. It seems that both C.H. Smith from London and H. Nicolson 
from Paris made telephone calls, and by the time of C.H. Smith’s call a clearer picture of the situation in 
Budapest had been obtained, i.e. that the Government had not fallen. As can be seen from the minutes 
below, H. Nicolson’s suggested answer was not sent to London. The only reply was conveyed through 
the telephone conversation referred to by C.H. Smith above. 
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[To] Prime Minister 
A.J.B[alfour]. 
No knowledge. 
P.H.K[err]. 
We are — fortunately — dispensed from answering Lord Curzon’s request owing to 
the lapse of time. 
This paper has come back with Mr. Philip Kerf’s dictum today. 
E. Crowe 
13/5/19 
No. Ill 
En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 8 May 1919) 
No. 692 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 70055] 
Paris, 6 May 1919 
By bag. 
Following identic telegram received from four Ministers at Bucharest:1 
Par une note dont nous envoyons le texte par le courrier, le Gouvemement roumain 
expose les raisons qui font oblige a chasser les hongrois de la Transylvanie et a les 
poursuivre jusqu’a la Tisza. II signale en meme temps finterdt qy’il [sic] y a a prefiter 
[profiter] du desarroi actuel des troupes hongroises pour faire occuper Budapest par les 
troupes alliees. 
Cette operation qui, dit-il, ne presenterait aucune difficulty, aurait l’avantage 
considerable d’empdcher la reconstruction de l’armee hongroise, de prevenir toute 
cooperation entre elle et les bolcheviks russes, et enfin de permettre a l’armee roumaine 
de concentrer tout son effort sur le Dniester, ou la situation peut devenir rapidement 
menafante. 
Afin d’avoir toute liberte d’action de ce c6te, le Gouvemement Roumain demande 
outre foccupation de Buda-Pesth, par les troupes alliees, le desarmement de la Bulgarie. 
Cette mesure dit-il, est necessaire pour premunir la Roumanie contre le danger d’une 
attaque dans le sud, alors qu’elle a besoin de toutes ses forces pour lutter contre les 
Bolcheviks russes. II declare d’ailleurs que le desarmement est pleinement justifie par 
les violences dont la Roumanie aurait ete l’objet de la part de la Bulgarie. 
1 See No. 90, note 1. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
This throws some light on the situation. Apparently the Roumanians have stopped 
their advance at the Theiss owing to the situation in Bessarabia, but they suggest that 
the Allies shd. continue and occupy Buda Pesth. I can only assume that the American 
professor Brown went to encourage the Roumanians to proceed and failed to get into 
touch with them: but on whose instructions this was done is not clear. 
[..••] 
We can get no information from Paris as to the policy which is going to be adopted 
towards Hungary, and I would suggest reminding Astoria again with ref. to this 
telegram. 
C.H.S[mith], 
8/5/19 
The Roumanian proposal to be allowed to occupy Budapest seems hardly in keeping 
with the invitation to the Peace Conference of Hungarian Represes [Repesentatives]. 
H. K[natchbull-]. H [ugessen]. 
8/5/19 
No. 112 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 May 1919) 
No. 277 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9299] 
Vienna, 6 May 1919 
Reference your number F.O. 9061.1 
Invitation has not been presented. Major Borrow has been ordered to return to 
Vienna. M. Allize has been informed and acquiesces. 
No further action will be taken until further instructions received. 
1 See No. 106. 
No. 113 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 8 May 1919) 
No. 1 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9474] 
Vienna, 7 May 1919 
Major Borrow returned to Vienna this day leaving note of invitation with Commander 
Freeman. Borrow reports that Bela Kun much stiffened by Reuters report from Paris 
that Hungarians have been invited streets are placarded to this effect. 
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Non-Bolshevist dismayed as they believe that an anti-Communists [sic] 
administration is marching with the Roumanians. 
In spite of constant arrests there is still important counter-Communist Party at 
Budapest who are expected to act shortly. 
Arch-Duke Joseph received reply from H.M. the King. He is ill and will be arrested 
soon as hostage. His son Joseph Franz already arrested whereabouts not known. 
Count Albert Apponyi reported to have escaped. Italian Mission in Budapest now 
consists of 9 officers more are being sent. 
Troops sent to the front desert in great numbers, on their return are disarmed as far as 
possible but sufficient retain arms to make situation in town and country perilous to 
ordinary citizens. 
News that Szolnok has been retaken by Roumanians has been withheld by Bela Kun. 
Bela Kun expresses his determination to resist to the end if necessary and to fall back 
into hilly country east of Lake Bala..n [Balaton] as this country is anti-Communist he is 
sending advanced parties to prepare the way by terrorizing the peasants. Further he is 
sending special party Agram with false passports and money. 
Yugo-Slavs have been informed of names. 
Number of hostages reckoned now 800 disappearances are of daily occurrence. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
No. 114 
Letter/Memorandum by Major E. Borrow (Extract)] 
[LI G. F/23/4/65] 
Vienna?, 7 May 1919 
I have just returned from a visit to Buda-Pesth, where I gathered much information at 
first hand which will be of the utmost importance to the efforts of this Commission1 2 in 
sealing the Austro-Hungarian frontier. I went partly on behalf of Col. Cuninghame, 
taking letters to Lt. Commander Freeman at Buda-Pesth. 
The situation in Buda-Pesth is for the moment appalling and reminds one of stories of 
the French Revolution in 1789; the organization of the Terror Battalion, the utter 
ignorance of everybody as to the intentions of the Powers in regard to Hungary and as 
to whether the Czechs, Roumanians and French Colonials are going to continue their 
advance to Buda-Pesth — all make the situation desperate for anyone unhappy enough 
to belong to the bourgeoisie or who may be suspected of anti-bolshevik tendencies. The 
“Battalion of Terror’s” nightly house-to-house visits have caused the arrest of some 800 
hostages, (or, as Kun Bela prefers to call them, political prisoners) and disappearances 
after arrest are frequent; for this super- “Red Guard” there are no laws of humanity; 
with impunity they murder and rob, so when the crisis arrives, as arrive it must before 
long, the fate of the hostages is not enviable. 
To the amazement of everybody in Buda-Pesth who still pin their faith on the Entente 
to save them from death and destruction, the Buda-Pesth papers yesterday announced 
1 Both in the Lloyd George Papers and the Public Record Office this memorandum is preserved as an 
extract from a letter written by Major E. Borrow on 7 May 1919, presumably to Sir William Mitchell- 
Thomson, member of the British Blockade Delegation in Paris. The copy in the Lloyd George Papers 
was originally sent by Sir W. Mitchell-Thomson to Sir M. Hankey on 19 May 1919. 
2 Major E. Borrow was British Representative on the Inter-Allied Commission in Vienna. 
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and later placarded the walls in the town with the announcement that the Entente had 
invited the Hungarian Bolsheviks to Paris to discuss the Peace Terms ... As some non- 
Bolsheviks pointed out there is another Government in Hungary other than Bolshevik, 
i.e. in Eastern Hungary, now in possession of the Roumanians; this non-Bolshevik 
government was founded at Arad some time ago and is reported to have declared for a 
Kingdom of Hungary with the popular Arch-duke Joseph of Hungary as their 
sovereign. I went to see the Arch-duke and found him ill in bed, confined to two rooms 
and under perpetual surveillance in his own house which had been robbed by them of 
everything of value; his fortune of Kr. 30,000,000, lodged in the Credit Bank at Buda- 
Pesth, had of course vanished in the same way; his son Joseph Franz, a 20 year-old 
boy, was taken prisoner a week ago, present whereabouts unknown, and the Arch-duke 
himself, though ill, expected to be arrested to-day. Fortunately my companion, Lt. 
Commander Williams-Freeman, R.N., D.S.O., managed to distract the attention of the 
detective who accompanied us, so that I could again slip upstairs to the Arch-duke’s 
room for a private interview with him and the Arch-duchess. His situation is pitiable in 
the extreme, but, Hungarian to the backbone and beloved by the Hungarians, he still 
does not wish to leave Hungary, but desires with all his heart the occupation of the 
country by the Allies, as does everyone else except the Bolsheviks. He impressed on 
me the necessity of instant action, otherwise the whole country would be reduced to the 
present condition of Russia. I may add that Lt. Commander Freeman had considerable 
difficulty in securing permission from Bela Kun to visit the Arch-duke, but as Freeman 
had an official errand he insisted; we later heard that part of the delay was caused by the 
necessity of returning to the Arch-duke one of the 30 uniforms they had stolen from 
him, in case he should be well enough to get up. 
Italian Mission in Buda-Pesth. There are now in Buda-Pesth 9 Italian officers and 
more are expected. Their Colonel informed Freeman last night just before I left that they 
were there to secure the occupation of the city by the Czechs under Italian command 
before the French or British got there; there are however no British nearer than Italy or 
Imst; their eventual object is of course to so occupy the country as to take the Jugo¬ 
slavs in the rear. But as regards Buda-Pesth, although Italo-Czech occupation is 
repulsive to all Hungarians, even this would be preferred by them to the present state of 
affairs — with no security to life, no right to possess property, no food or employment 
unless one is a Bolshevik; and compulsory enlistment to fight for the Bolsheviks 
whether you want to or not. This Italian Mission will also no doubt develop into a trade 
mission, as soon as a responsible government has been established, as has been the 
case with Bulgaria and Austria. 
Food in Buda-Pesth is scarce, scarcer than in Vienna, but the Bolshevik Government 
is looking ahead; I saw a huge pig-farm just outside Buda-Pesth containing thousands 
of pigs “for next wintef s fat” as I was told; the crops are coming along much better 
than I thought possible and unless the minority Bolshevik Government is overturned 
within a month they may get too strong a hold, as I think there will be much more food 
in the summer. Can you therefore prevent any wavering of the resolution to exclude 
food from Hungary? The admission of Entente] food trains just now would be [? of] 
course be an irretrievable disaster. 
Much of this letter will not interest you as the British Representative on the C.B.O., 
but it will I trust, give you some idea of the conditions on the other side of the frontier. 
(Sd.) Edward Borrow 
Major. 
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Minutes attached to the documents: 
[To] Prime Minister 
Very interesting. 
[Sir M. Hankey] 
29/5/19 
(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/10442] 
Major Borrow’s letter appears to me very hysterical, nor does his information tally 
with what Professor Brown of the American Service has just brought from Buda Pest. 
Best for us is to await developments and keep out of counter-revolution plans. 
J.C. Smuts 
23/5/19 
No. 115 
Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
London, 8 May 1919 
[....] 
The invitation to the Magyars is held up temporarily pending the constitution of a 
proper government there. 
[....] 
No. 116 
Note by Major-General W. Thwaites for General Corvisarf 
No. ? E.L.S. 6404 [PRO FO 608/13 No.46/1/12/10704] 
War Office, 10 May 1919 
General Franchet d’Esperey reports that American Professor Philip Brown “Attached 
to the American Commission for the Negotiation of Peace” presented himself at the 
* A copy of this memorandum is also located in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 74873/W3. It was received in 
Paris on 23 May, and in London on 17 May 1919. The editor has not been able to establish any further 
details about the identity of Gen. Corvisart. 
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advanced posts of the Allied Army in HUNGARY, before SZEGEDIN; he had come 
from BUDAPEST as an Ambassador of Bela-Kun, and was authorised to put the 
following questions. 
(a) What were the intentions of the Entente towards the Communist 
Government on the subject of the previous proposals (recognition of 
national aspirations and the territorial demands of ROUMANLA). 
(b) What guarantees would be given that neither he nor the members of the 
Communist Government should be disturbed, in particular by the 
Roumanian Government. 
If such a guarantee could be given, KUHN [s/c] would be ready to lay 
down office, otherwise he would advocate resistance to the end and it 
would be difficult to prevent the Red Guard from committing excesses. 
Professor Brown declared that a prompt occupation of BUDAPEST by the Allies 
was desirable, and that it would be easy and welcome to the Socialist workmen. 
Professor Brown intended to return to BUDAPEST, where there are with him the 
members of the American Mission, also Major [Lieutenant-Commander] Freeman and 
Prince Borghese. 
The General Commanding the Allied Army in HUNGARY2 asked Mr. Brown to 
come to BELGRADE and discuss the matter with him.3 
2 Gen. P. de Lobit. 
3 For Prof. P. Brown’s own report on his mission, written for Prof. A.C. Coolidge, dated 12 May, see 
FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 462-468. The report also includes points on Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s 
negotiations with various parties in Hungary, and Prof. Brown’s endorsement of Gen. J.C. Smuts’s 
recommendations after the latter’s mission to Hungary (see No. 84). 
No. 117 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 11 May 1919) 
No. 11 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9702] 
Vienna, 10 May 1919 
Commander Freeman reports from Buda Pest. 
Message begins — On May 6th Bela-Kun [sic] met Czech Socialist Minister Srobas 
[Srobar] at Komstaun [Komarom] and asked for Hungarian Soviet to be recognised by 
Czechs. 
In return offered present demarcation line as final boundary (1 grp. undecypherable) 
and promised to treat Slovaks as foreigners under declaration given General Smuts on 
April 4th.1 
Also offered 300 locomotives in return for 300 trains of coal. 
Czechs apparently promised to send coal at the rate of one train per day. 
Bela Kun not satisfied but accepted this. 
1 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. 
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Italians are very active, wish to establish Italian Commandant de Ville and are 
promising to send through motor cars, tyres, food and clothes. 
Also offered to recognise army and production of munitions of war. 
Counter revolution preparing under great difficulties may yet be attempted. 
Government ignorant of2 Bela [Kun]-Smuts declaration as regards foreigners property 
and commercial undertakings.3 Hostages still being taken and imprisoned. Hostages 
still fairly well treated but great danger of their being killed by (?) Republican guard in 
the event of counter revolution. Hostages in country badly treated and frequently 
murdered. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
2 In the original “? ignoring” is inserted in handwriting above “ignorant of’. 
3 For the text of the declaration see No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. See also No. 94 for Bela Kun’s 
telegram to A.J. Balfour, dated 21 April 1919, in which the former undertakes to abide by his obligations 
under the agreement after repeated remonstrations regarding the Hungarian Government’s failure to 
comply with the terms of the declaration. 
No. 118 
Memorandum by Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Extract. 
Received in the Foreign Office 14 May 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9953] 
Vienna, 10 May 1919 
1. Relations of Hungary and Austria 
If Kun Bela can be overthrown the Peace of Austria can be maintained without any 
great difficulty. 
If Kun Bela is not overthrown it will be excessively difficult to save Austria from 
riot. 
Kun Bela can be overthrown - 
(a) By negotiation 
(b) By force. 
(b) has the disadvantage of involving in all probability the massacre of hostages of 
which there are about 800. 
(a) can be secured by a simple authoritative statement that the Allies will not treat 
with an usurping authority such as the Hungarian Communistic Regime. 
(b) has the further objection of obliging the Communist Army to base itself upon 
Easter Austria, that is the regions of Wiener-Neustadt, Glognitz, Graz, Kapfenberg etc. 
which are the seats of Austrian Communism and which therefore are now being 
attacked by intensive propaganda. 
The Buda Pesth Government has recorded its intention of abandoning Pesth and 
falling back into Western Hungary in case of necessity. 
This involves the danger of co-operation by the Austrian Communists and 
provocation of a conflict between the armed peasants of Austria and the armed 
proletariat of Austria. 
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The Communist element in Hungary responds to no political need of the country; is 
based upon no expressed desire of any section of the community, but is the tyrannical 
expression of a Jewish Mafia. 
There is a universal desire in Hungary for its abolition, but self deliverance is 
impossible owing to lack of arms, lack of organization, and lack of courage on the part 
of the oppressed people. 
In addition the situation in Western Hungary is an international scandal. The peasants 
are being murdered, robbed, forced into military service against their will, and their 
women are subjected to rape at the hands of the returning Red soldiery. And on account 
of this, since there are many German Austrians in Western Hungary, there is an appeal 
to Austria for aid, which the Austrian Government in face of the public indignation may 
not long be able to resist. 
There is great tension between the two Governments. 
The Christian Socialists are in favour of the invasion of Western Hungary. The 
Socialists fearing the defection of the Communist Bolsheviks hesitate to do anything 
that would justify the accusation of destroying a Workmen’s Government. 
If the Entente would declare against the Hungarian Communists, the Socialists of 
Austria would be freed from this difficulty and would act. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section. 
(1) Sir T. Cuninghame suggests that we should rid ourselves of Bela Kun by 
publicly declaring that we cannot treat with him. Such a method would spare us the 
disadvantages of military intervention & would react favourably upon Austria. 
(2) The suggestion is a good one, & might be strengthened by a simultaneous 
declaration that the blockade will be raised so soon as a properly constituted Hungarian 
Government have accepted our terms. 
(3) The one thing not to do, is to defer action. 
Harold Nicolson 
16/5/19 
I have already submitted minutes recommending action on the above lines. 
E. Crowe 
17/5/19 
[To] Prime Minister 
A.J.Bfalfour]. 
P.H.K[err]. 
Since when is Mr. Philip Kerr the Prime Minister? 
E. Crowe 
23/5/19 
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No. 119 
Letter from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris. Extracts) 
[PRO FO 608/7 No. 35/1/12/10028] 
The Hraddany, 
Prague, 11 May 1919 
Dear Headlam, 
[-.] 
M[asaryk]. has of course always been quite frank about the Ruthenes, whom he 
regards as a burden to the C. state, but would accept in order through them to obtain a 
common frontier with Roumania & probably Russia. 
[....] 
I hope it is known in Paris, among those inclined to be impressed by the Magyar 
“elder statesmen”, that Count Apponyi has addressed a formal petition to the Czecho¬ 
slovak Republic, asking to be allowed to become its citizen, and promising, not only 
formal loyalty, but that he will make public profession of his good resolves. This to me 
is simply disgusting, in view of his previous record. N.B. His castle is in the 
Grosse Schtitt. 
My first glimpse of Slovak government was distinctly favourable, but I am not going 
to express myself as yet. 
Yours sincerely, 
R.W. Seton-Watson 
One quite definite impression I already have — that all serious Slovaks want as few, 
not as many, Magyars as possible, & that the definite policy between M[asaryk]. & 
Srobar (Minister for Slovakia, with virtually the powers of a P.M. & 13 “Referents” or 
heads of departments, under him) is, when once the Treaty is an accomplished fact, to 
negotiate with the Magyars direct & to cede back most of the border Magyar districts in 
return for various concessions. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Exceedingly interesting — not least the postscript. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
15/5/19 
MIKLOS LOJKO 191 
No. 120 
Austrian Relief Commission Report, Sent by Sir W. Goode (?) (Vienna ?) 
[LI. G. F/198/2] 
Vienna (?), 13 May 1919 
1. The Bolshevik Regime in Buda Pesth is an outpost of ‘Leninism’, and means to 
attack, and is attacking, other countries. 
2. When the Blockade of Austria was lifted, “Bolshevistic Russia” and “Hungary” 
were excluded. But it was not made sufficiently clear that the reason for this exclusion 
in the case of Hungary was Bolshevism. A statement to this effect is required. 
3. The Administration of Bela Kun will fall when it is made clear beyond any doubt 
that the Allies will not treat with him, and will not raise the Blockade, as long as he 
remains in power. 
4. The Trades Unions are opposed to him, as are all industrial and commercial 
groups. The Socialists, who originally joined him from patriotic motives, can now be 
detached. 
5. The continuation of Bolshevism in Hungary is dangerous to Austria, where there 
is at present a political conflict between the Peasantry and the Proletariat. Should this 
develop into armed action the Workmen and the Volkswehr will unite with Hungarian 
Bolshevists. 
6. It is therefore suggested — 
(a) That an authoritative statement be made to the effect that the Blockade of 
Hungary will be maintained until the ‘Lenin’ Communists retire. 
(b) That an emissary — preferably Sir T. Cuninghame — be sent to Buda Pesth to 
detach the Socialists from the Communists, and to facilitate a change of 
Administration. 
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No. 121 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 14 May 1919) 
No. 17 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9972] 
Vienna, 13 May 1919 
Austrian War Office reports only artillery activity on Theiss front. 
Hungarian Soviet Headquarters have issued orders to the effect that former 
instructions with regard to discipline are cancelled and Unit Commanders in future may 
use arms to put down acts of insubordination. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Bela Kun’s control of his own troops has practically ceased. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
15/5/19 
No. 122 
En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London. 
Received 14 May 1919) 
No. 721 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9952J1 
British Embassy, 
Paris, 14 May 1919 
By Bag. 
Following identic telegram from British, French, Italian and United States 
Representatives at Bucharest, dated May 6th: 
“Le Gouvernement bolchevik de Budapest a fait au Gouvemement roumain des 
ouvertures de paix. En meme temps, le commandement hongrois a envoye des 
parlementaires pour negocier un armistice. Le Gouvemement roumain ne compte faire 
aucun reponse aux ouvertures de Budapest. Elies n’ont d’autre objet, dit-il, que du 
gagner du temps jusqu’a ce que les troupes hongroises aient pu se reconstituer et 
assurer une cooperation plus etroite avec les bolcheviks msses. 
“Cette cooperation en effet est demonstree par l’ultimatum que les bolcheviks 
ukrainiens viennent d’adresser au Gouvernement roumain et par les documents qui 
viennent d’6tre saisis sur un courrier russe charge de la liaison avec la Hongrie. 
1 This telegram can also be found in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 73688. 
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“Quant a l’armistice, le commandement roumain, a formule des conditions qui 
impliquent le desarmement complet de la Hongrie et dont l’execution comporterait une 
occupation plus etendue du territoire hongrois. 
“Le Gouvemement roumain considere que l’occupation de Budapest qui actuellement 
s’accomplirait sans difficult^ est necessaire pour obtenir le desarmement de la Hongrie: 
mais en raison de la menace des Russes sur le Dniester, ou des agressions locales se 
sont deja produites, il hesite a entreprendre par ses seuls moyens cette operation, tout en 
declarant qu’il s’empressera d’y participer si elle est decidee par les Alliees. Notre 
collegue d’ltalie telegraphie a son gouvemement dans le meme sens.” 
Copy sent to Peace Delegation. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This telegram explains many points where we are in doubt. 
Harold Nicolson 
14/5/19 
The first sentence of the last para, contains the only practical proposal possible for 
dealing with the situation in Hungary, according to the opinion of Profr. Brown who 
has just come from Budapest. Profr. Brown insisted on the necessity (1) of an 
immediate Allied military occupation (presumably French) of Budapest: this would, in 
his opinion, require extremely few troops & the occupying forces would be welcomed 
by all sections of the population — Socialist & “bourgeois” alike; (2) of the coincident 
despatch of an Allied political mission, under a British officer,2 to report on the political 
situation & the value of the new Govt, which succeeded the Bolsheviks. 
Profr. Brown confirmed the fact that the bourgeois at Debrecen had welcomed the 
Rumanian army. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
15/5/19 
Prof. P. Brown held the view that Gen. J.C. Smuts would be the most suitable person for this task. 
Prof. Brown, Gen. J.C. Smuts and A.W.A. Leeper had a conversation about the situation in Hungary on 
16 May 1919 in Paris (LEEP Folder 2, A.W.A. Leeper to R.W.A. Leeper, 15 and 16 May 1919), where 
A.W.A. Leeper also voiced his strong support for the use of Allied troops to occupy Budapest, but it is 
not known whether this conversation resulted in any concrete agreement or proposal. 
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No. 123 
Telegram from D.E.M. Crackanthorpe (Madrid) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 16 May 1919) 
No. 2 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/10086]] 
Madrid, 15 May 1919 
Minister of State communicated to Mr. Crackanthorpe this morning following 
telegram received from Spanish Charge d’Affaires at Vienna:- 
“Spanish Consul at Buda-Pest has informed me that Hungarian Government is 
engaged in secret Peace Negotiations with Czecho-Slovak Government and that former 
would be disposed to grant every kind of concession if it could thereby remain in 
power. Hungarian Government is offering inter alia to hand over 300 locomotives in 
exchange for a daily train-load of coal for provisioning of Hungary. Further if 
Government at Prague recognised Bela Kun latter is prepared to accept frontier line 
fixed in Armistice. Consul stated above conditions have been revealed to him for 
private communication to Freeman as representative of Entente. He has not however 
communicated with Freeman but has telegraphed them to me for transmission to you.”1 2 
Spanish M.F.A. informed Mr. Crackanthorpe that he was entirely ignorant of source 
whence Spanish Consul derived above information and that Spanish Consul had 
evidently refrained from communicating with Freeman through desire not to involve 
Spanish Government in matter. Minister of State begged no mention should be made of 
Spanish Consul’s name in connection with above information. 
Repeated to F.O. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Commander Freeman is not in Buda Pesth at present.3 
Qu. Repeat to Prague, asking for observations.* 
Harold Nicolson. E. Crowe 
16/5/19 17/5/19 
1 This telegram can also be found in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 74784. 
2 For other reports concerning the negotiations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments 
see Nos. 109, 117 and 127. 
3 Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman was in Vienna from 14 till 23 May 1919. 
* For C. Gosling’s dispatch from Prague, dated 22 May, concerning the question of negotiations see No. 
127. Gosling could not confirm the reports. 
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No. 124 
Letter from Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extracts) 
[BALF Additional 49745] 
Rome, 19 May 1919 
At present there is, only second to the excitement about Fiume, a very strong feeling 
here against the supposed French design of a Danubian Confederation which is 
regarded as a sort of resuscitation of Austria — the Italian Delegates are being attacked 
for having accepted the principle of vetoing the union of German Austria to Germany. 
Of course all the arguments which can be made available to show that this is a violation 
of the principle of self determination are brought forward, but there is little real attempt 
to disguise the real reason for the dissatisfaction with that veto. It is felt that German 
Austria cannot stand alone, and that the alternative to joining Germany is a gravitation 
towards Jugo-Slavia, and a powerful Danubian combination which will be hostile to 
Italy, and which will become a channel for German penetration into the Slav States and 
towards the East. 
While the Italian Delegates are secretly criticised for their passive attitude it is realised 
that they have definitely accepted the decision to veto the union of Austria with 
Germany and cannot go back on it. But they are enjoined to oppose vigorously 
anything tending to facilitate an Austro-Slav rapprochement. 
[....] 
I think if one looks a good way ahead there is much to be said for the argument that - 
such a Danubian confederation, so far from segregating and isolating Germany, as is 
perhaps contemplated by the French, would only become a channel for Germany to 
penetrate once more, as economic relations must eventually develop across frontiers 
which are contiguous. 
[....] 
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No. 125 
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary 
of the Admiralty (London. Received in the Foreign Office 14 June 1919)] 
No. 513 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 88784] 
Belgrade, 22 May 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to forward herewith a letter, and report on the conditions prevailing 
at Budapest, forwarded to me by Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., 
R.N. 
This officer has been at Budapest as my representative since December 1918, with the 
exception of four weeks in January-February 1919. He returns there on 23rd instant. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge 
Admiral 
Commanding on the Danube 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 125 
Report by Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman (Vienna) 
for Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade)1 2 
Vienna, 14 May 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to submit the attached report. I propose remaining at Vienna until 
orders are received from you. 
I feel that my presence at Budapest is valuable in the way of keeping in touch with the 
situation, trying to obtain the execution of the Kun-Smuts declaration,3 exercising a 
restraining influence with regard to hostages, prisoners &c. 
I also feel that as an Italian mission has arrived and is remaining at Budapest that it 
would be a mistake to leave the whole field open to them without knowing what exactly 
they are doing. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) F. Williams-Freeman. 
Lieut. Comdr. 
1 See No. 63, note 1. 
2 Lt.-Cmdr. Williams-Freeman’s report was also sent to Paris (see PRO FO 608/13 No. 
46/1/12/13094), where it arrived on 20 May 1919. 
3 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 197 
Political 
On May 3rd owing partly to the Roumanian advance and the idea then prevailing that 
it was an allied offensive and partly to the disappointment occasioned by the 
comparative failure in other countries of expected outbreaks on May 1st, it was 
seriously discussed at a full meeting of the Government whether the actual Government 
should resign and place the power in the hands of a purely socialist Government. This 
at one time appeared probable, but Kun prevented it by a speech in which he pointed 
out the indecision of the Allies, weakness of the Roumanians, and said that it only 
required 2 or 3 weeks to produce Bolshevism in the neighbouring countries (including 
Roumania) and pointed out the almost certainty of Bolshevism breaking out in 
Germany when she received the peace terms. 
The Government then decided to remain in power and this decision they of course 
easily made the council of Soviets confirm. 
The Roumanians did not continue their advance beyond the Tisza and the 
Government has gradually got stronger and continues to do so, not because it is in the 
least degree more popular but because its organisation is getting better and the most 
casual or slightest expression of disagreement is merciles[s]ly punished, and its terror 
becoming more general. The Socialist element is by force of circumstances becoming 
more communistic and I consider that there is now little chance of eliminating the 
extreme and communistic element without a total change of Government. A definite 
statement that the Allies were going to occupy Budapest would bring about this change, 
but the statement should be followed quickly by the occupation. 
Propaganda is being most actively carried on and very large sums mostly in gold and 
foreign money are going out of the country. This money is being taken from the banks 
as required. The present Government are absolutely without scruples, no lie or 
subterfuge is too mean for them, and no circumstance is neglected if by untruths or 
subterfuge it can be turned to their advantage in making their position more strong or 
delaying in any way any interference. The Kun-Smuts declaration is not being carried 
out, and as regards foreign commercial undertakings the Government have no intention 
of carrying it out.4 Hostages and Political prisoners have been taken and are being kept 
without charge or reason in large numbers. — In general they are fairly well treated, but 
there have been many cases of the grossest abuse. In Budapest few of them have been 
murdered (probably only 3 or 4) but in the country and on their journey from the 
country to Budapest a good many more have been killed, always by Red Guards and 
“terror” or “Sons of Lenin” troops who have got out of control. In addition to this there 
have been a certain number of disappearances. In the country where communism and 
the present Government is universally detested many counter revolutions have broken 
out, and have always been followed 4 or 5 days later by arrival of red troops when the 
heaviest reprisals and murders take place. 
The great object of the Government appears to be to at all and any cost save time and 
so enable them to consolidate their position, and get their roots into Budapest, the 
meanwhile developing their propaganda to an intense degree in the neighbouring 
countries and also the rest of Europe. They greatly fear an Allied occupation which 
would be very popular (most especially if it were British) in the whole country and also 
in Budapest itself. 
In short the Government is a Government of adventurous opportunists who are quite 
untrustworthy in the smallest matter and impossible to deal with. 
4 See note 2. For Bela Kun’s telegram, dated 21 April 1919, undertaking to abide by the terms of the 
declaration, see No. 94. 
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Propaganda 
A large Propaganda Department has been organised and working since the revolution 
and is most active. — Large numbers of agents and money are continually being sent 
out of the country, and being used in the country districts. Some poor samples of their 
Propaganda leaflets are attached.5 
On April 11th, a man employed in the Foreign Office as typist and secretary to an 
Under-Commissary approached the Persian representative in the Spanish Consulate and 
eventually offered him any sum he asked for original foreign Passports, most especially 
American and English. Their efforts are especially directed against the French Troops 
round Szeged, Croatia, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. 
Military 
The Military position of the Hungarians is improving principally owing to the 
cessation of all offensives against them, all ex Officers and men are forced to join the 
Army, and discipline is gradually improving. 
A most important point is that all the ex Officers are very anti-communist and only 
join by force of circumstances. Few of them would fight against any offensive of the 
Allies, and the administrative and supply staffs would all cease work en bloc 
immediately an offensive known to be authorised and approved by the Allies 
commenced. 
They have little artillery (about 120 field guns, 7.30 cm. howitzers — 12.15 cm. 
howitzers) but very little ammunition. At this moment there are 4000 men on the south 
front between the Danube and Tisza and 18 field guns. 
The fighting quality of these troops is very poor as a large proportion of them are 
very much against the present regime. — They would make little or no resistance to an 
Allied offensive most especially if they were informed that it was the Allies[‘] intention 
to occupy Hungary while a Government representing the wishes of the people was 
established.— 
The Government are at present concentrating as many of their forces as possible 
against the Czechs near Salgotarian [Salgotarjan] (coal mines) and also wish to retake 
Miskolcz.— 
The counter revolutionary element in the Army is quite strong enough to ensure little 
opposition to an Allied occupation, and is probably strong enough to prevent serious 
killing, looting and pillaging in Budapest during the last two days before the troops 
entered. 
A counter revolution organization exists in Budapest. It is not very well organised as 
yet, and it is realized that its certain success depends on what assistance can be obtained 
from the Allies. The assistance of the counter revolution element can be obtained in any 
direction or detail desired, and could undoubtedly be very valuable to the Allies if it was 
only known what the policy and desires of the Allies were. 
Economical 
The food situation in Budapest is becoming very bad. There is probably enough flour 
to last another 6 weeks but meat fat, eggs, milk are very scarce. The peasants refuse to 
send food into the town because they are against the present regime and also because 
they cannot use the money obtained for their goods. 
5 These are not enclosed with the original file. 
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Large quantities of 200 Kronen and 25 Kronen “white” notes are being printed, but 
they are universally regarded as false money. In the country they are not accepted at all 
and in Budapest, despite the regulation that they are to be accepted their presentation 
usually elicits the reply that the shopkeeper has no change. 
Almost all shops are closed, and only the munition factories on Czeppel [Csepel] 
Island are working. All men with previous military experience have to join the Army, 
as well as all unemployed men. 
There is a shortage of coal and all railway service is greatly restricted, but Budapest is 
still fully lighted, the trams are running, theatres are open, and there is always hot water 
in the hotels. 
Order in Budapest has on the whole been well maintained though there have been 
many abuses, in isolated cases. The revolutionary tribunals consisting of 3 workmen 
administer summary “justice”, their power extending to the death penalty. Their sittings 
are secret. No counsel for the defence is allowed and no witnesses may give evidence at 
the “trial”, all the material for prosecution and defence being supposed to be collected 
before hand by the Public Prosecutor whose evidence cannot be questioned, examined 
or disputed. 
The vast majority of the population is eagerly awaiting an Allied intervention, and the 
whole are expecting it and unable to understand why it is so long delayed. 
During the last week it has been confidently believed in Budapest that a British 
occupation of Hungary for l'/2 years has been decided upon, and this has given great 
satisfaction. 
The British are universally popular, the French not so popular but would be 
welcomed as a relief from the present regime. The Italians are not trusted. A mission of 
about 10 Italian Officers arrived in Budapest on May 5th and tried to persuade the 
Government to accept an Italian occupation of the town. This was not accepted and they 
are now trying to do this by peaceful penetration. They are having considerable dealings 
with the Government and there is strong evidence of their trying to supply the 
Hungarian Government with materials even to the extent of ammunition and artillery. 
The whole situation demands immediate action by the Allies and a statement of 
policy. 
It would be impossible to recognise the present Government as it does not in the least 
represent the wishes of the people and it cannot be trusted in any way. 
The present inaction of the Allies strengthen the Government, exasperate the people, 
will undoubtedly lead to fighting and revolution in a few weeks. 
(Signed) F. Williams-Freeman. 
Lieut.Comdr., R.N. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This letter only recounts events prior to May 14th and is thus a little out of date. Since 
then Bela Kun consolidated his position and has attacked the Czechs. It is interesting to 
note that the Italians were suspected of coquetting with the Bolshevists even at this date. 
C.H.S[mith]. 
16/6/19 
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The report is interesting if rather old, & shows the futility of trying to have any 
dealings of any kind with Bela Kun. 
[Unidentified] 
17/6/19 
No. 126 
Telegram from Sir W. Goode (Vienna) to the British Peace Delegation (Paris) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/10675] 
Copy of a cablegram received from Butler, Trieste, 22 May 1919. 
In code “Priority” A. Despatched from Trieste 21 May 1919. 
Number 100. 
May 21st. Following from Butler, Vienna [Trieste?]. The whole economical [sic] 
position in this country would be materially helped by some further military action 
being taken in Hungary. Consider that if military advance the position in Buda-Pest 
would at once clear up and that would improve the position for traffic. Can you bring 
pressure on Hoover to take up this matter. Gregory and I are in full agreement on this 
subject. 
Butler 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 126 
Telegram from Sir W. Goode (Vienna) to C.K. Butler (Trieste) 
Vienna, 22 May 1919 
Number 120. 
Your 100. Am taking this up with Hoover and our highest authorities. 
Goode. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This view was also strongly urged by Profr. Brown, the representative at Budapest of 
the American Commission of Inquiry. He was of opinion that in the present state of 
incertitude & despair even Rumanian troops (to take an extreme instance) would be 
welcomed with relief by the bulk of the population. British & American military 
representatives should however accompany any army of occupation. I venture to urge 
that in the interests of a speedy peace, of the Hungarian people themselves & of the 
' The date of dispatching and reception of this telegram is not marked on the original file. 
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relief of the prevalent distress, everything possible should be done to facilitate such 
occupation, whether carried out by (preferably) French or by Rumano-Chekh troops. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
23/5/19 
Everyone is agreed; but nothing is done. The matter is supposed to be in the hands of 
Marshal Foch. 
E. Crowe 
24/5/19 
[To] D.M.I. 
I attach a letter from Mr. Butler, confirming his telegram to Sir William Goode.2 
In my opinion the immediate overthrow of Bela Kun’s Government is of the greatest 
importance, and the continuation of a Bolshevik regime at Budapest constitutes a 
serious danger to the peace of Europe. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
28/5/19 General Staff 
[To] C.I.G.S. 
I am in entire agreement as long as British troops are not concerned. It is entirely a 
matter for Marshal Foch. 
W. Thwaites Maj. General 
28/5/19 D.M.I. 
2 This letter is not enclosed in the original file. 
No. 127 
Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to Earl Curzon (London. 
Received 26 May 1919) 
No. 100 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 79539] 
Prague, 22 May 19191 
Very Confidential and Urgent. 
Your telegram No. 40 May 20th.2 
I do not believe there is any truth in report that Czech Government is accepting 
negotiations with Bolshevist Government of Belakun [sic].3 The only member of 
1 The telegram was only dispatched on 26 May 1919. 
2 Not printed. 
3 For examples of these reports see Nos. 109, 117 and 123. 
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Saryks [Masaryk’s] Government who might lend himself to intrigue of this nature is 
Monsieur Vrbensky Minister of Food Supplies who is I believe (? a) Jew and was 
formerly anarchist. I have however no reason to believe he is implicated in any such 
movement and I should be disposed to think that report in question has been circulated 
by Bolsheviks with intention of prejudicing Czech Government.4 
Czech Government received yesterday report from their representative in Vienna to 
the effect that agents of new Magyar Government which is being formed at Arad are 
attempting to obtain Czech support against Hungarian Bolsheviks. Allise [Allize], 
French representative in Vienna, is in touch with Smerecsany late Hungarian Governor 
of Pres[s]burgh [sic] and other agents of new Hungarian Government which it is 
reported he is contemplating inviting to Peace Conference. 
The Croatians are stated to be taking active part in this [? a] movement with it is said 
object of [?the object of which is] either overtaking5 Government of Karupenorgscz 
[Karadordevic] in Croatia and forming a separate Croatian Slovene Republic (? or a) 
federation of three Yugo Slav Republics. Klobucevicz an (? agent) is stated to be 
prominent in this movement. Doctor Gagliardi a friend of Klobucevicz has visited 
Presspresg [Pressburg] with object of conferring with Doctor Srobar, the Czech 
Governor of that city and of inducing Czechs to give military aid to new Magyar 
Government. This will be refused in all probability as (? Masaryk) is definitely opposed 
to any military intervention outside this Republic against Bolsheviks owing to strong 
opposition of Socialist party here. I will forward when possible documents relating to 
above by messenger6 but would again urge the necessity for regular courier between 
Paris and Prague as I do not consider it is prudent to send confidential matter under 
present system. (Group undecypherable) my telegram No. 97 of May 20th.7 
Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Paris (group undecypherable). 
4 C. Gosling’s impressions are wrong. Negotiations did take place between Bela Kun and Dr. Vavro 
Srobar, Minister for Slovakia in the Czechoslovak Government, mainly concerning economic questions, 
in Komarom on 5 May 1919. They, however, could not come to an agreement, as the Czechoslovak 
Government refused to rule out their participation in a future intervention against the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. 
5 In the original “? turning” is written in handwriting above “overtaking". 
6 See No. 130. 
7 Not printed. 
No. 128 
Letter from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris. 
Received 29 May 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/11210] 
The Hraddany, 
Prague, 26 May 1919 
Dear Headlam, 
I have just returned from a week’s tour in Western Slovacia, most agreeably 
impressed with what I found there. Of this anon. I have just time in this letter, which 
will leave this afternoon, to tell you the result of a long & interesting conversation I had 
with Mr. Semjan, the unofficial confidential agent of the Czecho-Slovak Government in 
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Budapest, who had come over to Bratislava (Pressburg) under a special safe conduct, to 
confer with Dr. Srobar, and who returned yesterday. He holds the very definite view 
that unless the Entente makes an end of the Kun regime within the next 4 to 5 weeks, it 
will be able to survive till December or so, thanks to the harvest, which though 
probably never so bad in Hungary since Turkish times (40 p.c. less than usual is under 
cultivation, according to serious calculation* bn the original] stave off absolute 
starvation. He considers the only possible solution to be an Entente military dictatorship 
in the 1st instance, supported by civil advisers drawn from those Roumanians, Slovaks 
& Yugoslavs who are acquainted with the Hungarian language & conditions. 
I ought to add that though in the abstract everyone here has an interest in avoiding 
further warlike complications, especially on the South border of the Republic, yet in the 
concrete there is much to be said for the view that the longer Hungary’s misfortunes 
continue, the more assured will be the position of Czecho-Slovakia & especially 
Slovacia finally be. Some of the best men among the Slovaks quite seriously consider 
that Hungary’s recent misfortune has been Slovacia’s salvation. The Slovaks are not 
Chauvinistic, & I found this view among the most moderate, & those who had had the 
closest relations with honest Magyars. I am convinced that this view is just. Hungary’s 
present plight has frightened the Clericals (the only party who could make trouble for 
the Republic), rallied the Socialists (not numerous anyhow) to their Czech colleagues, 
discredited the Magyarones & Jews even further & above all provided the plain man 
with a flagrant contrast between his own & his neighbour’s position. 
I hold very strongly that if the present situation is allowed to continue (& only outside 
interference can improve it, for the old governing classes are for the moment down & 
out) Hungary will be reduced to a state of such complete ruin & exhaustion as to be 
scarcely capable of a separate existence. In short, only her worst enemies can wish her 
to be left to her fate. Little as I love the Magyars or regret the fate they have brought on 
themselves, I do not wish to see them destroyed altogether, and at present their whole 
resources are being squandered ruthlessly in every department of social & political life. 
Another point is quite clear to me as a result of my conversations with Semjan & 
others. Anti-Semitic feeling is growing steadily in Budapest (which is not surprising 
considering that not only the whole Govt, save 2 and 28 out of the 36 ministerial 
commissioners are Jews:preponderance of in the Hungarian government; large 
proportion of the Red officers). S. & others are convinced that a Pogrom in Budapest in 
the not very distant future is certain & that it will far outdo Russian records. The Jews 
themselves — the rich middlemen & war profiteers, the smaller shopkeeping class and 
the freebooters who are now in control, but have taken care to send abroad large sums 
for their own use when the crash comes — are keenly alive to this & getting more & 
more anxious. Here again only intervention (under Allied control) can save the 
situation. I would put it to those international cryptic elements which are at least credited 
with so much influence behind the scenes, that they have a special interest in hindering 
such a development. Personally I do not think that anything on earth can stop the Anti- 
Semitic movement in Hungary but sheer massacre at least can be stopped. 
S. hopes that it is realised in Paris that as soon as the Entente troops get near 
Budapest, they will be joined by the 5000 odd ex-police who have been dismissed & by 
considerable numbers from the old gendarmerie: that all the numerous lower post office 
officials in particular are hostile to the Bolsheviks, & that the iron-industry workers, the 
best organised & wealthiest of the Hungarian working class, are also anti-Bolshevik, 
though of course Socialist. 
* [in the original] contrasts most happily with Bohemia & Slovacia, where every field is in use & 
where harvest prospects are on the whole admirable. Studeni Maj, stodola raj. Cold May, Paradise of 
granaries. [The last sentence is R.W. Seton-Watson’s translation of the previous one, which is a Slovak 
proverb.] 
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He is anxious that the pro-Magyar activity of an American representative in Budapest 
should be put a stop to. According to him Brown is making a policy of his own. One 
concrete grievance adduced against B. is that he used his influence successfully to 
prevent the Slovaks of Budapest being included in the category of Allied citizens whose 
property must be respected.1 
He tells me that army discipline, which was altogether hopeless, has now distinctly 
improved, as the result of wholesale terror (disobedience being punished by death) and 
the abolition of election of officers. They are now nominated by the colonels, the latter 
being nominated by the High Command. 
It is known that Pogany (one of the chief members of the Govt.) and Heltai were the 
actual murderers of Tisza. 
In certain other directions there is an increase of order. Alcohol is rigorously 
forbidden, & this rule is really enforced, drunkards being punished with 2 years’ 
imprisonment. A “Sperrstunde” has been enforced, & no one can be in the streets after 
10 p.m. without a special pass. Large patrols of Red guards enforce this & arrest 
anyone not provided with the necessary pass. 
Morgary [Morgari] the Italian Socialist deputy, is working actively in Budapest; & 
there is talk of an alliance between Bolshevist Hungary & Russia & Italy. This is 
doubtless fantastic, but provides certain interesting clues. I am assured that Capronis 
arrive every few days from Italy in Budapest, & although Prince Borghese is no longer 
there, intigues of some kind still go on. 
There is extreme bad feeling under the surface between the Czecho-Slovaks & the 
Italian officers, despite the fact that Gen. Piccione himself is very popular & has played 
the game thoroughly. There have been fresh incidents 2 or 3 days ago at KoSice 
(Kaschau), the Italian officers being boycotted, with the exception of General Zinconi. 
In Ludenec (Losoncz) there was another incident, the CS.’s having captured 
locomotives and trucks from the Magyars & being ordered the Italians in command to 
restore them!! This they evaded by spiriting them all away in the night to other parts of 
Slovacia. And so on. Now the Italians are being bowed out with extreme politeness & I 
was present at the review in Piccione’s honour, to which KlofaC as War Minister came 
officially from Prague. 
In Budapest there is great fear of the Roumanians, as they have so much to avenge, 
and also (though less) of the Serbs, whose treatment of their Magyar prisoners is 
known to have being [.sfc] quite tolerable. A Czecho-Slovak occupation would — from 
this particular angle — be the least objectionable, but I find no eagerness whatever on 
their part to undertake such a responsibility, tho’ many regard it as inevitable. Personally 
I should like to see the Czechs involved as little as possible, in their own interests. 
I am strengthened in the view which I already mentioned to you, that the great 
majority of Slovaks do not want any superfluous Magyars — especially in the 
Miskolcz district — tho’ some are tempted by the Salgotarjan coalfield & the Tokaj 
vineyard and salve their conscience with the (perfectly true) argument that these districts 
were Slovak one (or sometimes 2) generations ago. But most of them freely admit that 
these Magyarised districts S.E. of the ethnographic line offer a tougher problem than 
those of Nitra which will very quickly recover their Slovak character, or even Schutt 
JR.W. Seton-Watson, in a letter to J.W. Headlam-Morley from Prague, dated 29 May 1919, wrote that 
there was indignation in Czechoslovakia also about the activities of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, the British 
Military Representative in Vienna, who was thought to have moved on the old plane of Austrian- 
German-Hungarian supremacy in the area rather than embracing the new system of independent states: 
“In this connection Sir T. Cunninghame’s [stc] activity in Vienna is highly mischievous & causing 
considerable uneasiness here.” (R.W. Seton-Watson Papers, School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies Archives, General Correspondence.) 
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Island where the inhabitants are pure Magyar but desire union for economic reasons. 
Please tell Nicolson that I am converted on the subject of Schiitt. 
You may remember that 3 weeks ago or so Bela Kun made a speech criticising the 
Army & declaring also, “My business is to lie, when I speak with the bourgeoisie. I lie 
in the interest of the proletariat, & sometimes I must blush at my own statements”. This 
was formally denied a little later on. But Semjan tells me that he himself was actually 
present & heard Kun make this statement. 
S.’s information is that there is a lot of smuggling from Serbia into Hungary — even 
of tyres, munitions & clothing. I am sceptical, but it ought to be investigated. Otherwise 
his information seems to me extremely reliable. 
Last week numerous Budapest workmen declined to accept the new Hungarian 
money (“white notes”): but when S. left, the matter was not yet settled, & he expected 
them to be terrorised into submission for the time being. He says there are enough black 
flour & sugar for 3 months in Budapest, & meatcards providing 30 deca. per week per 
head (but meat is not available). He says that at Raab (Gyor) they have 1500 guns & are 
capable of finishing 10 a day, with the exception of guncarriages (but these also are 
being turned out more slowly), & that handgrenades are plentiful and machineguns 
fairly numerous. 
I have collected interesting 1st hand gossip about Kun & his colleagues, but this will 
keep. You don’t need to be told that they are many of them thieves & brigands in the 
most literal sense of the word. 
One characteristic detail. On 1st May the whole city was draped with red, & the cloth, 
(mainly imported from Vienna in return for pork!!) is estimated to have cost 20 million 
crowns. This must obviously be absurd, but gives some idea of the lavish scale & of 
the way in which figures grow! Needless to say, my informant neither guaranteed nor 
believed the estimate. 
In all this I have confined myself to Hungary, and being pressed for time (the bag 
leaves in half hour) have merely tossed out my information haphazard, without waiting 
to reduce it to order. 
The gist of it all is — impress upon people in Paris the fact that to leave Hungary to 
her fate may be in the momentary interest of her neighbours as assuring them against 
her political or financial recovery, but will endanger her whole future by sapping the 
very foundations. 
Yours very sincerely, 
R.W. Seton-Watson 
Don’t take the rioting here on Thurs. and Fri. too seriously! It is not a sign of real 
Bolshevism at all tho’ hooligans came in the 2nd day (& Prague has been famous for 60 
years for its hooligans). It was a very natural outburst against the altogether outrageous 
profiteering prices. I gather our Legn. [Legation] is unduly jumpy, of this anon. 
CP [Cf. ?] Gosling’s alarmist reports 
608/16/48.2.1/10866, 11347 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
I am not sure if Mr. Semjan is right about about Profr. Brown. Otherwise the letter 
contains extremely valuable information & I venture to submit that the proposed policy 
towards Hungary is the only way of saving that country. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
29/5/19 
It is most unfortunate that it seems impossible to decide on any action in Hungary. 
Whenever the question is raised of encouraging the Roumanians or Serbs or Czecho¬ 
slovaks to enter Budapest, or even of finding a small detachment of French, Italian, or 
British troops, we are told that Marshal Foch is studying the question. But no decision 
ever emerges. 
The situation at Budapest calls for action and all our information goes to show that on 
the slightest sign of determined allied intervention, Bela Kun’s government will totally 
collapse. 
E. Crowe 
30/5/19 
It seems difficult to imagine how negotiations for peace with Hungary are to be 
carried on unless there is some change in the political situation in Buda-Pesth; & if there 
is to be a change there, surely it ought to be provoked at once. Otherwise the Peace 
Conference must continue indefinitely. 
H[ardinge]. 
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No. 129 
Letter from General J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George 
[LI. G. F/45/9/38]1 
Paris, 27 May 1919 
Dear Prime Minister, 
Thank you very much for your letter of yesterday,2 which makes your policy quite 
clear. But I feel that, however much we may affirm abstract principles of liability in 
respect of the countries carved from the former Austria Empire, we shall in effect get 
from them just nothing but trouble, friction, and economic floundering. And we are fast 
shaping a policy which must drive all afflicted Central Europe into league with 
Germany against us in future.3 
If my advice had been followed after my visit to Austria-Hungary, and an Economic 
Conference of all those States had been called (as they were unanimously asking for), 
we would today have had a scheme, evolved on the spot, on which a statesmanlike 
basis could have been laid for the economic co-operation and reconstruction of those 
countries. A Customs Union of those States might have emerged, and part of the 
proceeds of their external tariff might have gone into a Reparation Fund. Now we are 
working absolutely in the dark, with the risk that any scheme adopted in a hurry may 
prove nugatory, except as a source of friction and economic paralysis. 
It is clear to me from the tenor of your letter that our representatives on this 
Commission should be the same as our representatives on the Supreme Economic 
Council, who have the economic facts as regards these countries before them, and who 
are actually working with the representatives of other Powers at a scheme for the 
rehabilitation of credit in these countries. I would, therefore, suggest that Lord Robert 
Cecil be substituted for me on this Commission. However willing to help, I fear I shall 
be the wrong man on this Commission. I come to this conclusion with great regret.4 
Yours very sincerely, 
(Sd.) J.C. Smuts 
1 This letter is also printed in W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, vol. 
IV, Cambridge, 1966, No. 995. 
2 See W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit.. No. 994, in which the Prime Minister elaborates on the 
reasons why war reparations are to be paid by countries which were formerly part of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. 
3 Gen. Smuts made his position even clearer in connection with the emerging German Treaty at the end 
of a letter to D. Lloyd George, written 4 June 1919: “This Treaty breathes a poisonous spirit of revenge, 
which may yet scorch the fair face—not of a corner of France, but of Europe.” (LI. G. F/45/9/41, or 
W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit., No. 1011.) 
4 Also see Gen. Smuts’s letter to D. Lloyd George, dated 26 May 1919, which is very similar in content, 
and which ends with: “I have discussed the matter with [J.M.] Keynes who appears to be exactly in the 
same position as myself.” (W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit.. No. 993.) 
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No. 130 
Letter from C. Gosling (Prague) to Earl Curzon (London) 
No. 65 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 90551V 
Prague, 28 May 1919 
My Lord, 
With reference to my Telegram No. 10079539 .1 2 of May 22nd I have the honour to 
enclose herewith copy of a report sent by Dr. Tusar, Czecho-Slovak representative at 
Vienna to his government; also a memorandum by Monsieur Smerecsany to Dr. 
Svehla, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
I have, etc., etc., 
Cecil Gosling 
ENCLOSURE 1 WITH NO. 130 
Report Written by Dr. Tusar for the Czechoslovak Government 
Vienna, 20 May 1919 
The question of the Hungarian chaos stands in the forefront of interest here. I already 
reported that the Germans intend to support with their troops, the separation of the 
Comitats of Western Hungary from the Magyar Republic. These Comitats would for 
the present declare themselves independent, but would later join German-Austria. It 
was ascertained that German-Austria is mobilizing; it seems that the mobilization is to 
serve the above purpose. It was also ascertained that a train-load of arms and machine- 
guns was sent to the Hungarian frontier from Graz. 
The Magyars are making attempts to get our support against the Bolsevist 
Government. An influential landowner and manufacturer of Raab came to us last 
Thursday with Dr.., a Czech lawyer of Vienna, and asked our Government to equip 
two thousand Magyar officers living now in Vienna and allow them to attack the 
Magyar Soviet Republic from Slovakia. This Magyar in presence of Dr. A. also stated 
that he presented a memorandum to the French Representative Allise [Allize], giving a 
plan of how to bring about an overthrow of the present regime in Hungary, and asking 
that the Czecho-Slovak Government be given the mandate to attack in the direction of 
Raab and lead Magyar troops to Budapest. Allise [Allize] is said to have sent this 
memorandum to Paris and also to have told its contents to General Pelle, but answered 
the Magyar in the negative, adding that “Les Tchecoslovaques n’osent pas bouger”. In 
the meantime our representative received the Magyar Socialist, Mr. DeneS and arranged 
an interview of Mr. DeneS with Minister Srobar. The interview will take place in 
Bratislava in the next few days. 
Agents of the new Magyar Government, which is being formed in Arad, are 
developing a strong agitation in Vienna. They are in communication with Allise [Allize] 
and the British. Smercsany [Szmrecsanyi] declared that Allise [Allize] has in his hands 
an invitation to the Peace Conference for the Magyar Government, that he will keep it 
1 The enclosures with this document can also be found in PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13312. 
2 See No. 127. (The Foreign Office reference number was inserted by hand.) 
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back for some time, so as to avoid a necessity of presenting it to the Bolshevist 
Budapest Government. He asked the Magyar politicians here to have the new 
Government establish itself on a place of really Magyar territory, so that he can present 
the invitation to this new Government. 
It appears that in this affair the Croatians also take an active part, namely that fraction, 
which is working here in Vienna for the overthrow of the Government of 
Karageorgevichs in Croatia, and the formation of either a separate Croato-Slovenian 
Republic, or a federation of three Jugoslav Republics. The Magyars obtained one 
Klobucevich, a Croatian, to plead for them with us, to enable them to depart for Prague. 
Later Klobucevic came with Dr. Gagliardi.3 
Both — under the impression that I am a particular friend of the Croatias [Croatian?]] 
idea — stated that the victory of the Magyar plan would mean also their victory, as they 
have a promise of Magyar aid to carry out their plans. 
Dr. Gagliardi invited me to dine with him in Hotel “Sacher”, where he brought the 
former Pressburg Governor /Nad-ispan [Nadorispan ? sic?]/ Smerecsany 
[Szmrecsanyi]. 
The latter made an exposition of the plans of the new Magyars [m'c] Government; he 
declared that the government which was established in Arad, is only provisional, and 
will, as soon as the Bolshevist regime falls, and Budapest is taken, call both Houses of 
“Parliament, as they were before the Armistice, i.e. the deputies of all Hungary, 
including the parts of all Hungary, which the Magyars consider to be under 
Occupation”, — Slovakia, Transylvania, etc. The parliament will then appoint a new 
Government from the delegates of all parties. Smerecsany [Szmrecsanyi] is also to be in 
the Government, as the representative of the Christian Socialist Party. Smerecsany 
spoke to Mr. Stodola4 a few days ago, and tried to prove to him that the Czechoslovak 
Government should take interest in the success of the prepared change in Hungary, as 
its failure would mean a strengthening of BolSevism in general. At the same time the 
Czecho-Slovaks have a rare opportunity to gain the respect and friendship of the 
Magyar nation, by getting it out of the terrible situation. In concrete he asked that we 
allow the 2000 Magyar officers of whom mention was already made, to gather at some 
convenient point in Slovakia and from here with our support, or under our leadership to 
attack the Soviet Government, he is convinced that they will be received everywhere 
with joy. They are even willing that Budapest be occupied by the Czecho-Slovak or any 
other troops, and the commander of the army of occupation turn over the civil 
administration of the German Austrians to occupy the three western Comitats of 
Hungary, which fact would create enmity between the Germans and the Magyars and a 
favourable situation for the Czechs. Smerecsany [Szmrecsanyi] also asked that we 
allow them to send arms to Slovakia. In this connection he indicated that the Poles are 
informed of the whole affair, as he said, when asked how they would get the arms out 
of here, that they would go as a Polish transport. Smerecsany [Symrecsanyi] is the 
centre of a widely spread agitation in Vienna, and has large sums of money at his 
disposal. It seems that the Vienna Entente representatives, with the exception of the 
Italians, are taking an active interest in the matter, only they cannot get the support of 
their respective Governments, so that the attack from Slovakia remains the only way of 
action against the Bolshevist Government. Smerecsany [Szmrecsanyi] [asked?] why he 
is so distrusted by the Czecho-Slovak government and said that, should his person in 
any way be the reason for our refusal to help, he is willing to declare that he would not 
accept a post in the Government that is to be appointed by the Parliament after the 
occupation of Budapest. Asked how the new Government imagines the future of the 
3 See No. 127. 
4 Komel Stodola, referent responsible for Railways and Posts in the regional Slovak administration led 
by V. Srobar. A close associate of the Slovak politician, Milan Hod2a. 
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Magyar State to be, he answered, that if, according to his view, the Magyar State is to 
be confined to the territory delimited by the present lines of demarcation, it would be far 
better to divide the whole of Hungary among the newly formed National States. 
Otherwise it seems that they, together with the British and French, will work for the 
formation of a Danube Federation; only the Italians are against such a federation. 
The Croatians are working in Vienna against the present regime in Jugo-Slavia. They 
follow the Magyar action with great interest, as they hope that if the Magyars are 
successful they will help them to emancipate themselves from the Serbian influence. 
Smerecsany [Szmrecsanyi] stated that he received the former Vice-President of the 
Austrian Lower House, Zazvorka, who declared that although he was not coming 
officially on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government, he has sufficient influence to be 
able to render considerable service to the Magyar cause. He asked the three gentlemen 
who are taking part in the preparation of the new action in Hungary, [to?] call in Prague 
where he will prepare ground for them and try to have the Czecho-Slovak Government 
support their military operations. From what Dr. Gagliardi said, it appears that the 
Croatians who are opposed to Jugoslavia hope to gain the support of the Montenegrins 
and Bulgarians against the Serbs. 
ENCLOSURE 2 WITH NO. 130 
Memorandum by Mr. Smerecsany* 5 
The formation of a Government by Count Julius Karoly[i] at Arad6 has caused much 
pleasure, and it may now be expected that the Allied Powers will invite Hungary to the 
Paris Peace Conference. 
Magyar politicians, many of whom are residing now in Vienna, have worked for the 
recognition of this Government and support it by every possible means. 
The first task of Karoly[i]’s Government is to prepare order and after that to arrange 
for the elections of the National Assembly. 
The formation of the Government has been very much discussed; the constitutional 
way would be the best, because the Government would acquire better reputation if it 
was started on a constitutional basis. 
There are many Magyar politicians, who are so persecuted at home, that they have 
been forced to fly to Vienna. There are doubtful elements who announce that they are 
political refugees but misuse this title; to stop this, it was decided to establish an office 
of concentration in Vienna, which has started work already to collect evidence about all 
refugees. By this work, help is given for the military operations against the Soviet 
Government. 
As it was impossible to use the German-Austrian territory as a starting point for 
military action, and there was no possibility of organising a military action from here on 
Hungarian territory, it was decided to ask the Czecho-Slovak neighbouring state, which 
has an imminent interest in the suppression of BolSevism, to place at their disposal, 
concentration ground on the occupied Slovak territory; at this place, the army which is 
going to be recruited against the Soviet Government, all the person[n]el minitions 
[munitions] should be concentrated. 
The acting Committee is prepared to give the Cecho-Slovak State all guarantees that 
the forces, concentrated on the Czecho-Slovak territory, should only be used for the 
This memorandum was presented by Dr. Gagliardi to Dr. Svehla, the Czechoslovak Minister of the 
Interior on 21 May 1919. 
6 In connection with the establishment of this government, see No. 141. 
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suppression of the Soviet Government; the whole organisation should be under 
Czecho-Slovak control. This action is not the result of any chauvinistic standpoint. 
If the Czecho-Slovak Government would be willing to support the military operations 
against the Soviet Government, the acting Committee is prepared to give every desired 
guarantee, which would put the coming Government under obligation. The Vienna 
Committee has the approval and support of the Allied Missions for its intended action, 
so that no complications can arise from this side. 
The following plans for the intended military action may be stated herewith:- 
1. All war material will be procured by the Acting Committee. The Vienna 
Committee will control recruiting for the first military operations. 
2. The Czecho-Slovak State will control the transports in their own territory and will 
allow the recruited Magyar officers and non-commissioned officers to concentrate at the 
appointed district. 
3. The Czecho-Slovak Government will nominate the officers and trustees who have 
control of this action. 
4. The Czecho-Slovak Government will determine the place where the auxiliary 
army, recruited against the Soviet Government, shall concentrate. 
5. The Czecho-Slovak State will also support this action by supplying war-material. 
6. It is expected that after operations begin, legionaries will be recruited in the 
districts freed from Bolsevist regime and that these reinforcements will help in the 
military operations. 
7. If the Czecho-Slovak State will allow recruiting of Magyars in the occupied 
territory, this action would be a great help. 
An immediate decision is necessary that this action may be carried out at once if it is 
to be successful. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Extraordinarily complicated. Vienna now seems to be the centre of all intrigues, 
including the Croat-Slovene separatist movement. Since this was written the 
Bolshevists have defeated the Czechs and we have not heard what the effect of the 
Allied reaction from Paris addressed to Bela Kun has been. 
C.H.S[mith]. 
18/6/19 
The effect has been nil. 
[Unidentified] 
19/6/19 
(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13312] 
The Czechs would be ill-advised to support this Arad Government which is 
composed of Magyar Chauvinists. Once Bela Kun is got rid of Hungary can settle 
itself. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
23/6/19 
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No. 131 
Letter from Captain B.H. Barber (Vienna) 
to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts) 
No. T.C. 480 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/11664] 
Vienna, 29 May 1919 
The defeat of the Czech troops in Slovakia has greatly elated the Hungarian Red 
Army and constitutes at the present moment a real danger for German Austria. 
The force available in Hungary consists of 7 tried Divisions and certain garrison and 
reserve troops. Against regular forces the standard of efficiency cannot be rated high, 
but this army at the present moment is under the impression of a danger escaped, and of 
national enemies defeated, and is therefore comparatively speaking formidable. 
Of these 7 Divisions, 4 are concentrated against the Czechs, 2 are facing the 
Roumanians across the Theiss, and one is in reserve. Against the Jugo-Slavs and facing 
Austria are at present only garrison troops. 
The Czechs have admitted the necessity for the abandonment of the important centres 
of Kaschau1 and Miskols [Miskolc] and from reliable information it is clear that their 
troops have shown a disinclination to fight against the Communists. Further there have 
been serious nationalist risings in Slovakia against the administration of Prague, and 
moreover the Czech forces in Slovakia are much strung out in a country poorly 
provided with communications. 
The present plight of the Czech army is to be attributed for the most part, to the 
disjointed nature of the attack by the Roumanians and Czechs. The former stopped on 
the Theiss, when the Red Army was in full flight, and gave time for the latter to rally 
and to make use of the interior lines to concentrate against the Czechs. 
The plans and dispositions of the Roumanians, and of the Franco-Jugo-Slav Group 
were betrayed to the Red Army by Italian agents, allowing the Hungarians to count 
upon the inactivity of the Southern Entente forces. 
[..»] 
It is desirable, in order to direct the attention of the Hungarian divisions from the 
North, to encourage the Franco-Jugo-Slav group, which are disposed in the Szeged and 
Arad area, to march to the North, and generally to recommend military operations 
against the Hungarian Army with a view to the occupation of Budapesth; otherwise 
there may be an unwelcome and serious extension of the Bolshevist area, including not 
only Styria and Lower Austria, but possibly also Czecho-Slovakia. 
(Sd.) B.N. [H.] Barber. Captain, 
for Lieut.-Col., Genl. Staff. 
1 The name of this town is “Kaschau” in German, “KoSice” in Slovak, and “Kassa” in Hungarian. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] D.M.I. 
Five weeks ago the Hungarian Army was demoralised, and the Bolshevik 
Government at Buda Pest on the verge of collapse. The Rumanians had reached the 
Theiss, and could have taken Buda Pest in a few days — when their advance was 
stopped. 
The present situation is: — 
(a) The Rumanians still have 5 Divisions inactive on the Theiss. Meanwhile the 
Russian Bolsheviks have crossed the Dniester, & are advancing into Bessarabia, where 
there are French & Greek troops, who do not appear to be offering much resistance. 
(b) The French and Serbians are inactive in Southern Hungary. 
(c) The Austrians are reported to intend joining the Hungarians if their peace terms are 
too severe. 
(d) For the last 3 weeks the Hungarians have been conducting offensive operations 
against the Czecho-Slovaks. These operations have been attended with a good deal of 
success, mainly owing to the inefficiency or treachery of the Italian Mission with the 
Czecho-Slovaks. 
(e) Reports from various reliable sources show that the Italians are intriguing with the 
Hungarians, & are supplying them with food, arms and ammunition. 
(f) The Hungarian Red Army has had 5 weeks to refit and re-organise. This respite, 
together with the successes against the Czecho-Slovaks, Italian help and the natural 
fighting value of the Magyar, has greatly raised its morale and efficiency. Bela Kun has 
now at his disposal a compact force of 7 divisions. He is in close touch by wireless 
with Lenin and Trotzky. 
The continued existence of Bela Kun’s Government is a real danger to Europe at the 
present stage. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
General Staff 4/6/19 
[To] Lord Hardinge 
You have already sent a memorandum on the Hungarian question to Mr. Balfour. 
This appears to be an additional argument for early action. 
W. Thwaites Maj. General 
4/6/19 D.M.I. 
Everything points to the necessity of occupying Buda-Pesth & of upsetting Bela 
Kun’s Govt. 
H[ardinge]. 
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No. 132 
Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley 
[LI. G. F/23/4/75) 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 30 May 1919 
It appears that at the Plenary Meeting yesterday M. Bratiano, speaking in the names 
of the Governments of Greece, Poland, Serbs-Croats-Slovenes, Czecho-Slovaks and 
Rumanians, asked for a delay of 48 hours so that they might look closely at the clauses 
interesting each of them. 
In connection with this request it is necessary to call attention to the correspondence, 
copy of which is attached.1 From this it will appear that M. Bratiano was asked by M. 
Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission for the Protection of Minorities in the New and 
other States, what proposals the Rumanian Government had formulated for dealing 
with this matter. In answer M. Bratiano stated in general terms that Rumania 
“guaranteed to all her citizens without distinction of race or religion full equality of 
rights and of political and religious liberty”, and would apply similar principles to the 
districts to be annexed. He concluded in his letter, however, with the following 
paragraph: 
“In a general way Rumania is prepared to accept any provisions which all the 
States which are members of the League of Nations would demand as applying 
to their territories in this connection. Under other circumstances Rumania could 
not admit the interference of foreign governments in the application of her 
internal legislation.” 
This answer is a clear refusal on the part of Rumania to accept any such special 
provisions for the protection of Minorities as have hitherto, as for instance in the Treaty 
of Berlin, been applied to New States or to existing States in the East of Europe when 
they received considerable accession of territory. In view of the past record of Rumania, 
it is clearly impossible to accept general expressions of good intentions if they are 
accompanied by a refusal to accept the necessary guarantees for their performance. 
In consequence, the Commission for the Protection of Minorities in New and other 
States communicated the correspondence to the Council of Four and asked them to 
insert in the Treaty with Austria a clause binding Rumania, similar to the clause 293 in 
the Treaty with Germany binding Poland, to grant the necessary guarantees. The 
Council of Four sent instructions to the Drafting Committee to insert this clause and I 
presume it has therefore been inserted and will be read by the Rumanians when they 
receive the draft of the Treaty. 
It is probable, therefore, that at the Plenary Session tomorrow, the Rumanians may 
bring up the matter and deliver a vigorous protest, and it is possible that there may be 
associated with them in this the other States concerned. If they adopt this procedure a 
very serious situation will arise for which it is necessary to be prepared.2 
1 Not enclosed in the original file. 
2 For the minutes of the Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference, held on 31 May 1919, Protocol 
8, see FRUS, PPC, vol. Ill, pp. 394-410. During the Session, I. Bratianu the Romanian Prime Minister 
was opposed to the entirety, and K. Kramar and A. Trumbic of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav 
delegations objected to certain points of special clauses in the planned Peace Treaty with Austria, relating 
to specific guarantees to be given as to the rights of the minorities to be assigned to the states represented 
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I venture to suggest that it is absolutely essential that the principles adopted should be 
maintained at whatever cost. In a general way the Allies have incurred a very serious 
responsibility in handing over these very large Minorities of Alien and hostile peoples 
to the Government both of the New States and of old States such as Rumania and 
Greece, and they must insist on having special guarantees. It is clear that these 
guarantees to be effective must be put under the protection of the League of Nations; it 
is however of the utmost importance that it should be understood that the League of 
Nations in being asked to undertake this duty does so in virtue of its general functions 
to provide means for the peaceable solution of international difficulties and the 
maintenance of Treaty obligations, and does not undertake a general responsibility for 
the good internal government or the observance of the principles of justice in all the 
States of the League. 
In this connection it is important to lay stress on the point that the principle is not a 
new one; all that is new is the machinery by which the principle is to be enforced. I 
think in every case in recent years when new States have been established in Eastern 
Europe, obligations of this kind have been imposed upon them. In the old days, 
however, the guarantee for the fulfilment of the obligations was, as has been proved by 
experience, extremely unsatisfactory; all that we are doing is to improve the machinery. 
As regards Rumania, it must be pointed out that under the Treaty of Berlin, clause 43 
makes the recognition of the independence of Rumania conditional on the observance of 
general principles of religious liberty. It is necessary that Rumania should be reminded 
of these clauses by which she is still bound, for no doubt she will strongly protest 
against any proposal to bind her as regards not only the new, but the old territories. She 
is in fact bound as to the old territories. It might then be pointed out that it is obviously 
indicated that at the time when she accepts the new procedure, she will be released from 
this clause in the Treaty of Berlin. We shall therefore not be imposing new obligations 
on an existing State but changing the form of existing obligations. 
Supposing that Rumania, as is to be anticipated, still shows herself obdurate, it would 
then be necessary to refer to the notorious fact that she has succeeded in evading her 
obligations under clause 44 of the Treaty of Berlin. On this point a very strong case 
could be made against her. It would be desirable not to have to use this weapon, but it 
should be made clear that we are prepared to do so, and a public discussion on this 
matter would clearly be very detrimental to the reputation of the Rumanian State and the 
Rumanian Government. 
In matters of this kind, though one hopes that the necessity will not arise, it is always 
desirable to keep clearly in mind what are the ultimate sanctions and forces which we 
have. If necessary Rumania would have to be reminded that the cessions of territory 
have not yet been made and that it is still always open to the Allied and Associated 
Powers to alter the terms of the draft Treaty with Austria so as to transfer the Bukowina 
not directly to Rumania but to the Allied and Associated Powers; it would be necessary 
also to remind them that the future boundaries of Hungary have not yet been 
irrevocably determined and the final decision might have been adversely affected if the 
Rumanian Government refused to accept such conditions of transference as the Allied 
and Associated Powers consider necessary. 
J.W. Headlam-Morley 
by them. G. Clemenceau and President W. Wilson urged them to accept these provisions. As no decision 
was reached, it was agreed that further discussions were necessary to resolve the differences. 
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No. 133 
Special Report Compiled by Sir Basil H. Thomson1 
[PRO CAB 24/80 (G.T. 7385)] 
Directorate of Intelligence, 
Home Office, 
Scotland House, S.W.l, 
31 May 1919 
THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY 
(Circulated by the Home Secretary)2 
Information and documents have now been received from Budapest on which an 
estimate can be formed of the real aims of the new Communist Government and its 
chances of stability. With the exception of the brief and partial experiment in France in 
1848 [? 1871], it is the first time in history that the modem Communist doctrinaire has 
been put in a position to try his experiments on a machine in full working order; for 
when the Bolsheviks assumed control of Russia, the machine was already dislocated. 
The experiment, therefore, deserves to be studied with care. 
The Communists believe that Germans were behind the Buda Pesth riots as agents 
provocateurs. Three weeks before the Revolution sham agitators provoked a storm at 
one of the newspaper offices. They were repulsed by Government troops, but seven of 
the Police were killed and forty-seven persons wounded. There was immediately a 
demand that the Communists should be imprisoned as a public danger, and thirty were 
arrested, including Bela Kun, [Gyula] Alpari, and Bela Vago. These three men were 
seized by the Police and beaten with the butt end of rifles. Vago and Kun were thought 
to be dead when they were carried to the cells. 
It was, however, soon established that the outbreak had nothing to do with the 
Communist Party, and there was a revulsion of feeling in their favour. They were 
removed to a better prison and later were released. 
1 Three days before this report was compiled the Directorate of Intelligence had prepared its “Weekly 
Review of the Progress of Revolutionary Movements Abroad”. The following is an extract from the 
introductory summary of that review: “While the Bolshevik Government in Russia is hard pressed an the 
Spartacists are under control in Germany, the Bolshevik disease appears to be taking root in more distant 
countries wherever the soil is congenial. 
The position in Europe this week is certainly more stable. In Norway, Holland and Switzerland no 
immediate outbreak is probable. In Bohemia, where it was thought that the example of Hungary might be 
infectious, Hungarian Communism has had the opposite effect, and though Bela Kun’s Government 
appears for the moment to be more secure, it has certainly lost such popularity as it ever had. [....]” The 
section dealing with Hungary reads as follows: “Information regarding the Communist Government in 
Hungary will be given in a special report this week [i.e. the present document]. The little Oligarchy in 
Budapest is probably stronger than it was a month ago in its power to hold on, and weaker in respect of 
the violent dislike it has excited in all classes. This dislike has been the most effective anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda in Bohemia. At the same time, no one seems to have the spirit to organise a counter¬ 
revolution, nor the courage to carry it out, but if a Roumanian or any other force were to invade Hungary, 
it is believed that the greater part of the Red Army would go over to the invaders. 
The country is undergoing an epidemic of strikes. One is no sooner settled than another breaks out. The 
cost of living is constantly rising.” {PRO CAB 24/80 (G.T. 7368)} 
2 The Rt. Hon. Edward Shortt, M.P. (Liberal). 
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When Count Karolyi resigned, he had really no other course open to him than to hand 
the country over to the Socialists. He is a vain and rather stupid man, who was regarded 
as so pro-Entente that at one time he was suspected of being an Entente agent. He came 
into power on promises that he could not perform, and when he could no longer face 
the storm of public criticism he took the line of least resistance. The Socialists declined 
office unless they had the co-operation of the Bolshevik leaders, and these men, having 
accepted office, at once went in for a Communist Government in its most extreme form. 
To do them justice, the Communist leaders made no secret of their aims. As in 
Russia, they poured fourth a flood of declarations of policy, propaganda and legislation. 
Their main scheme was simple enough: the State was to take over the ownership of all 
public and private property, every citizen was to receive a fixed wage and to pay a fixed 
rent and a fixed price for every commodity; no one was to be persecuted. On the other 
hand, since it was necessary to have a “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” until people had 
ceased to yearn after the old order, or, to use the words of Alpari — a member of the 
Government — “until they had ceased to be blinded by the glorious light of the new 
free life”, there must be unquestioning obedience to the Government on the part of 
every citizen on the pain of death. Thus, as will presently be seen, the workman must 
do the work prescribed for him rapidly and efficiently without idling or striking; the 
civil servant must be content with his salary and with such promotion as might come 
his way; the shopkeeper must make a faithful inventory of his stock and turn it over to 
the Government; the bourgeois must take what was allowed him out of his former 
income and be thankful for being allowed anything at all. 
Three or four weeks ago, the new Communist “Ten Commandments” were placarded 
all over Budapest. They were as follows:- 
1. Defend the power of the Proletariat, which has led you out of the land of 
captivity, from oppression by counts, bankers, factory owners and generals. 
2. Have no foreign ideals and do not make to yourselves idols. Fight for Red 
Hungary always that it may be as strong and perfect as possible. 
3. Honour the Republic of Soviets and follow its commandments. The 
Republic of Soviets is working for you and you must fight for the Republic. 
4. Do not lose courage. On the day when you lose courage, your former 
oppressors will regain their strength. 
5. Do not disturb order. If you step out of the ranks you are a mere drop of 
water, your enemy can destroy you with two fingers of his hand. If you 
remain with your comrades you are a victorious sea that swallows up the 
old world and brings on the new one. 
6. Maintain discipline. 
7. Do not forget that you are surrounded by enemies within and without. 
March with strong feet, grip your weapons with strong hands, and the 
sword shall fall from the hands of your adversaries and national frontiers be 
swept away. 
8. Do not allow in your ranks anyone who incites you to riot, for he is 
speaking the speech of the enemy. 
9. Do not allow in your ranks any disturber of order or provocateur. 
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10. Do not take away the rich man’s house, his ox, his land or his jewels; let this 
be the business of the Council. Only thus can everything be yours and your 
brethren’s — the inheritance of the working men and the agricultural poor. 
THE PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
Attached to this report are photographs of the Communist Office Holders,3 of whom 
25 out of 32 are Jews. It will be observed that several Commissaries are assigned to 
each Department. It may be well here to give a brief account of the more important of 
them:— 
BELA KUN 
Bela Kun, though so prominent in the newspapers, is perhaps the least important 
member of the Government. He is described as a clever self-advertiser. In the hope of 
impressing the workers that in the eyes of the world the issue of the revolution hangs 
upon his life, he is always to be seen with a personal bodyguard of six armed soldiers, 
an armed guard is made to stand outside his bedroom door day and night, and a 
machine-gun motor is posted outside his hotel. The more serious Ministers smile at this 
play-acting, for Kun’s life is in no danger whatever. Some of them apologised for him, 
saying that he was an illiterate man and deserved great credit for having done as well as 
he has with no equipment but that of a third-rate orator. They are nervous and 
uncomfortable when when Kun goes to see foreign Ministers by himself; he likes it but 
they dread it, for he gets into difficulties when he tries to explain the Communist 
doctrines.4 
EUGEN HAMBURGER 
This man is believed to be an Emissary of the German General Staff, but is now the 
principal Commissary for Agriculture. He is a German from the Virchow Institute, 
Berlin, and he first came to Hungary two years ago. He settled in a small village in 
Somogy, where he preached the simple life and doctored people for nothing. Later he 
worked as a doctor on the troop trains, but having taken part in a mutiny, he was 
imprisoned until the Armistice. Though not a declared Communist, he started a peasant 
rising a fortnight before the Communist Revolution and helped to seize one of the big 
estates. At this time, the other leading Communists were in prison. 
GEORG LUKACS 
Georg Lukacs was formerly Professor of Philosophy at the Heidelberg University 
and is also an art critic, now Commissary for Education. Being the son of a banker, he 
3 Not printed. 
4 Compare this description of Bela Kun with that provided by Prof. P. Brown in his letter to Prof. A. 
Coolidge, dated 17 April 1919 (FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, p. 437), where he is described as outwardly 
“unimpressive” and “even repellent”, but more credit is given to his intellectual abilities and political 
integrity: he is characterized as being “shrewd” and “not a terrorist”. 
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had a fortune of some three millions, which he spent on the Communist Party or gave 
up under the new laws. He is the author of the ambitious education scheme, under 
which children are removed from their parents and educated in the confiscated palaces 
until they are twenty-four; he tried to compel nine or ten thousand bank clerks out of 
employment to act as schoolmasters. He is an amiable dreamer. 
JOS[Z]EF POGANY 
Jo[z]ef Pogany, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, is now openly accused by the Red 
Army of being a sham Bolshevist in the pay of the German General Staff. He was 
Commissary for War until a few weeks ago four of five thousand soldiers assembled 
outside the War Ministry for the purpose of lynching him. They accused him of 
intending to overthrow the Revolution by bringing back the entire Staff of the Officers 
of the old regime. They were pacified with difficulty, and Pogany was made 
Commissary for Foreign Affairs. This was done to show the mob that the lynching of 
Commissaries, whenever an adverse rumour of their conduct was circulated, must be 
discouraged. The other Commissaries admitted, however, that some incidents in 
Pogany’s career did require explanation, and that they were watching him. 
JULIUS HEVESI 
This man was formerly an engineer in an electric light factory. He is in an advanced 
state of consumption. He has always been full of academic theories about Socialism, 
and now, as Commissary for Social Production, he has an unique opportunity for 
putting them into practice. His ideas are that qualified engineers are the salt of the earth, 
the real kings of creation, and that the revolution is really to rest upon their shoulders. 
These men now are strutting about the factories clothed in authority and bursting with 
self-importance. 
JOSEPH SAXE [SACHSE] 
This Hungarian Jew was a member of the Socialist Party at seventeen. He spent three 
years in Berlin as correspondent to a Hungarian Socialist newspaper, and about 1904 
he was appointed London correspondent to the “Vorwaerts”. He spent ten years in 
London, and left a little before the outbreak of War. He has an extraordinary belief in 
his powers. He was very active at the Socialist Conference at Berne, and was also in 
Amsterdam at the time of the Communist accession to power. On his return to Buda 
Pesth he found that the Communists had telegraphed to Holland for him, and he 
described himself as being in the quandary because he did not wish to tie himself up in 
Hungary when there was a chance of his being offered an important post in the British 
Cabinet on the outbreak of revolution, which he believed to be imminent. After some 
consideration, he decided to take office in order to gain experience, and after a week or 
so he was good enough to confess his surprise at finding that departmental 
administration had had surprises for a man even of his intellectual calibre. Saxe 
[Sachse] hopes before long to come to London. Probably if he knew that under no 
circumstances would this be allowed, he would desert the Communists and try to 
rehabilitate himself. He is now the Press Propagandist and Controller of the Telegraph 
Bureau of the Communist Government. 
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TIBOR SZANINELLY [SZAMUELY] 
Tibor Szaninelly [Szamuely] is one of the Commissaries for War. He is a friend of 
Lenin and was one of Lenin’s organisers in Russia. 
KARL VANTUS 
Commissary for Agriculture. He came from Russia with Bela Kun. 
EUGEN VARGA 
Commissary for Social Production. Was a writer on Economics in the Karolyi 
Government. 
ALEXANDER GARLIO [GARBAI] 
This man surprised his friends by coming out as a Bolshevik. He was former leader 
of the Socialist Party and always kept himself in the background. 
PETER AGOSTAN [AGOSTON] 
Commissary for Foreign Affairs; was formerly a University Professor. 
ZOLTAN ROMAI [RONAI] and EUGEN LANDLER 
These men were both lawyers. 
THE EXECUTIVE 
There is a “Directorate of Five”, consisting of Bela Kun, Bela Vago, Sigmund Kunfi, 
Joseph Pogany, and another whose name is not known.5 The Secretary to the 
Directorate is ALPARI, of whom no photograph has been obtained. He is the brain 
behind Kun. He is a Jew of idealist views, and so extreme in his programme that he 
was expelled from the Hungarian Socialist Party before the War. He was also deported 
from Germany on account of his intimacy with Liebknecht, and he served several terms 
of imprisonment for his views. He freely admits what he calls “the ingratitude of the 
masses towards the Communists who had removed from them all causes of worry.” 
These ingrates now turned on the Communists, accusing them of having removed all 
the zest and hope in life. This, he explains by saying that they have lived so long in the 
dark that they are “blinded by the glorious light of the new free life.” In their ignorance 
they were agitating to go back to their “former state of slavery.” What the Communists 
intended to do was to eradicate capitalism so entirely that there would be no slave- 
5 The fifth member of this inner circle was Jen6 Landler. This information, however, is dated, as the 
body referred to was reorganized and renamed on 11 April. After that date, it was called “Political 
Committee”, and included Bela Kun, Vilmos BOhm, Sandor Garbai, Rezsd Fiedler and Jen6 Landler. 
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owners to whom they could return. Then they would be happy. His great scheme is 
housing, of which details are given below. 
The following is a list of the Commissaries as given in “Pester Lloyd” and the “Neues 
Pester Journal” 
President. 
People’s Commissaries: 
For the Interior, Railways ) 
and Navigation ) 
For Agriculture.....) 
) 
) 
For Military Affairs.) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
For Justice...) 
) 
For Public Feeding.) 
) 
) 
For Education.) 
) 
) 
) 
For Labour and ) 
National Welfare.) 
) 
For Germans.) 
For Finance...) 
) 
For Russians.) 
For Social Production.) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Alexander GARBAI (?) 
Eugen LANDLER 
Bela VAGO 
Eugen HAMBURGER, 
Georg MYISFTOR [NYISZTOR], 
Karl VANTUS. 
Bela KUN 
Wilhelm BOEHM, 
Rudolf [Rezsd] FIDLER [FIEDLER] 
Anton [Jozsef] HAUBRICH, 
Bela SZANTO. 
Zoltan RONAI, 
Stefan LADAI. 
Moritz ERDELYI (?) 
Arthur ILLES, 
Bernhard KONDOR. 
Sigmund KUNFI, 
Georg LUKACS, 
Alexander SZABADOS, 
Tibor SZAMUELLY [SZAMUELY]. 
Anton GUTH, 
Desiderius BOKANYI. 
Heinrich KALMAR. 
Bela SZEKELY, 
Julius LENGY[EL], 
August [Agoston] STEFAN. 
Eugen VARGA, 
Mathias RAKOSI, 
Anton DOVCSAK, 
Julius HEVESI, 
Jos[z]ef KELEN. 
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THE LAWS 
I have a translation of all the laws passed up to the second week in April. The 
following is a general summary 
The Constitution 
Supreme authority is vested in the National Congress, whose members are chosen by 
the Councils of Comitats and towns on the basis of one member for every 50,000 
inhabitants. The working people of each village elect for their Local Council one 
member for each hundred, (in towns, on member to each five hundred). The Local 
Council is limited to fifty for a village and three hundred for a town. The Central 
Council sits at Buda Pesth, and is limited to five hundred members. Each Council 
selects an Executive Committee of not exceeding five for a village and twenty for a 
town. The eighty members of the Executive Committee at Buda Pesth are ex officio 
members of the National Congress. The Local Councils have executive powers in local 
matters, but are bound to carry out the orders of the superior Councils, who have also 
power to vary or annul the resolutions of a subordinate Council. 
The Franchise 
The right to vote is limited to the workers of both sexes who are eighteen years old 
and are actually working. The following are disqualified:- 
Ernployers of labour, 
Persons with private incomes, 
Merchants, 
Priests, 
Lunatics, 
Criminals. 
Control of Ixmd 
There is a rather large number of laws on the taking over of the land by the State and 
the control and farming of large estates. The effect of these laws is to give a fixed wage 
to the peasant farmer, while the State takes all the profits. There is also an instructive 
class of enactment dealing with the suppression of disturbances and with persons who 
assume authority unlawfully or confiscate property in the name of the State. The 
following is an example:- 
“The Revolutionary Councils’ Government gives notice that anyone acting 
arbitrarily in affairs belonging to the sphere of the Revolutionary Councils’ 
Government, of the individual People’s Commissariats or the authorities 
subordinate to them, will be tried by the Revolutionary Court. 
Anyone unlawfully making use of an armed force (guard or military) is liable 
to a special penalty. The Revolutionary Councils’ Government may also enforce 
a death penalty”, 
or again 
“During the last few days it has happened repeatedly that armed individuals, 
wearing military uniform, and also other persons, have methodically visited 
dwelling-houses and business premises, have stated that they were functionaries 
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acting on behalf of the Authorities, and have requisitioned dwelling 
accommodation or business premises, or have extorted provisions and other 
articles from the alarmed inhabitants”. 
For this the penalty is announced to be:- 
“Hard labour up to ten years, a fine up to 50,000 kronen, or, in especially 
grave cases, death”. 
Restrictions on Travelling 
Travelling abroad or to other parts of Hungary is forbidden indefinitely, unless upon 
urgent and necessary business. Travellers are searched at the stations to prevent them 
from removing money or food, and a small sum is only allowed to them. 
Censorship 
All letters for foreign or home postage must be posted in open envelopes. Foreign 
representatives, diplomats, and others on official missions are to be accorded every 
courtesy and their dwellings and flags respected. 
The Food Laws 
The food laws are very much what one would expect. All raw material belongs to the 
State and is allotted by the Government, who also allots food supplies for hotels. 
Alcohol is forbidden. There are detailed laws for the cultivation of tobacco and sugar 
beet, which is compulsory in certain cases. The seed must be obtained from the 
Government and paid for, and all private stores of seed have to be surrendered. Heavy 
penalties are prescribed for the sale or giving away of tobacco. Agricultural machinery 
has to be surrendered and re-allotted by the Government. As in the case of other 
industries, all profits go to the State, and workers are paid a uniform wage. 
Transport 
All means of transport such as cars, accessories, and a proportion of horse transport, 
have been commandeered. The cars, in particular, are a great delight to the 
Commissaries, of whom each is allotted a car and a driver free, as well as free meals 
and lodging in the best hotel, and 1,000 kronen a month more than anybody else. With 
3,000 kronen a month, a free motor-car, and no expenses, it is not surprising that the 
Commissaries are thoroughly enjoying themselves. They are, in fact, the only class in 
Hungary of whom this can be said. 
The Administration of Justice 
Until the reorganisation of the Administration of Justice, the Commissary for Justice 
had power to suspend Judges and lawyers and to entrust “any persons whatsoever” 
with the provisional direction of Courts of Law and of the legal profession. 
Revolutionary Tribunals are to be set up wherever necessary. These consist of a 
President and two members, together with minor officials appointed by the Soviet 
Government; “such appointment shall not be dependent on any kind of qualification.6 
There shall be no right of appeal against or any other legal means of contesting the 
6 Dotted line in the original. 
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verdict of a Revolutionary Tribunal”. Not only is there no right of appeal, but even 
petitions for mercy are made futile, for we read, “A petition for pardon of a condemned 
person, made no matter by whom, shall not suspend the execution of the sentence, 
which shall be executed immediately after the announcement of the verdict”. As to 
procedure, the accused and his Counsel have the right of the last word. The verdict is 
given by secret vote after a secret deliberation, and for death sentence this vote must be 
unanimous. Accused persons are to be brought before the Tribunal immediately after 
arrest. There is to be no formal indictment, and whenever possible the whole 
proceedings are to be carried through at a single sitting. 
There is a power of “preventive arrest”, which is vested in the Commissary for 
Prosecutions, all People’s Commissaries, and the Political Commissaries with the Red 
Guard. 
The Labour Courts 
Courts for settling Labour disputes must have two Judges from the working class, 
and there is no appeal against their decision. 
Housing 
Something was said above about Alpari’s Housing Scheme. The laws include many 
enactments on this subject. All houses belong to the State, and everyone must pay rent. 
Moreover, no-one can have more or less than the number of rooms allotted according to 
the number of the family. The proletariat is placed first on the list for allotment as far as 
the Statute is concerned, but in practice Government officials take good care to house 
themselves before considering the proletariat. The principle of allotment is ‘One man, 
one room’, and for families of over eight, four rooms are allotted. There are, however, 
qualifications in respect of rooms used for professional purposes, such as doctors 
consulting rooms, etc. Even the former owners have to pay rent. The only people 
excused are workmen inhabiting houses which are their own property. These pay Land 
Tax only. When rooms are allotted in a house, the new tenant has the use of the 
furniture and joint use of the kitchen. The Housing Committee stands no nonsense in 
collecting rents. The rent must be paid within three days on pain of fine or 
imprisonment. Landlords are not allowed to make any enquiries about prospective 
tenants. They must put up with what comes. 
There were apparently some hitches in the working of the Housing Commission, for 
on April 8th the “Dwelling Office” announced a suspension of applications for three 
days, and added that “anyone who tried to introduce a new tenant into a dwelling, or 
requisition it forcibly, will be tried by the Revolutionary Court according to Martial 
Law”, but with this went an “Appeal to Buda Pesth Homeless Proletarians”, which 
promises to abolish the Dwelling Office of the “mad and mean Bourgeoisie 
Government” (Karolyi’s), and appeals to “Comrades” to have patience till the 
Revolutionary Council can get to work. “Comrades! The dwelling misery and the 
abuses of requisitions and confiscations of dwellings have of late attained such 
inconceivable dimensions that they must be met with the whole intensity of the power 
of the revolutionary proletariat”. The whole document is written in this oratorical strain, 
but if one seeks for facts or guidance one is disappointed. Alpari’s great scheme is to 
cover the hills round Buda Pesth with workmen’s villas and picture palaces. This, he 
thinks, will make everyone contented. There are to be nineteen to the acre as against 
thirteen in the English Scheme. All houses are to be on the same fixed plan:- 
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Metres 
Sitting room. ... 4.85x4.30 
Kitchen. ,.. 3.10x2.53 
Larder.... ... 1.40x1.30 
2 bedrooms.. .. 2.54 x 5.24 and 
2.22 x 3.25 
Verandah. 2.6 x 2.50 
The rent for these houses is to be 600 kronen a year (present rate £7. 10s. 0d.). Later on 
they hope to build houses at 1,000 kronen a year, with an extra bedroom and a bath¬ 
room. The rents are calculated at 2^2% on the cost of building, which is estimated at 
25,000 kronen per house (present rate £312 a year). They hope to build 500 to 600 of 
these houses at once, and eventually 20,000. Repairs are to be carried out by the State. 
“House Commissions”, composed of “confidential persons” elected one for every 
twenty-five dwellings, are to be established. They will buy provisions for their 
constituents, and certify every citizen who wishes to buy for himself clothing (including 
house linen), extra furniture, crockery, and eating utensils. The certificate must say that 
the proletarian has a real need of the article he wishes to buy. This buying permit must 
be produced to the shopkeeper before he is allowed to sell. It never appears to have 
occurred to the legislators that the “confidential person” may be open to monetary 
persuasion. 
Education 
Education is free. All schools have been taken over by the State, Workmen’s 
Universities are to be founded, and young workmen are to receive technical instruction 
at fixed times during working hours. “Culture is a property of the working classes”, 
and to ensure that it reaches them, most of the theatre tickets will be retained for the 
active working classes, and sold to them at moderate prices through the Trades Unions. 
School teachers are to be taken over with the schools, and their appointments 
confirmed, subject to “an examination as to their social views and capacities”. Provided 
that they undertake to “adapt themselves to the fellowship and spirit of the Republic”, 
and that ecclesiastics consent to become secular, all shall be employed and well treated. 
The law for the “Protection of the Proletarian Youth” (no other youth is recognised) 
provides for an examination, with a view to classing them for workshops. Once 
classified, they are to be quartered according to category in houses connected with the 
workshop. An important part of the Education Scheme is the Palace Scheme of Georg 
Lukacs. The State is to convert all the palaces, Royal and private, into luxurious schools 
which are destined to become very much like reformatories, since every child is to be 
taken away from its parents and kept in these Palace schools until he is twenty-four, if 
he shows aptitude, until 18 if he is dense. Schoolchildren are to have free dentistry; 
every dentist must give two hours daily to this work on his own premises and with his 
own instruments. He will be paid 1,000 kronen a month, and an allowance for material. 
If he refuses his diploma will be withdrawn. 
Labour 
The power of the Central Government over the workers is a power that would not be 
tolerated for a moment in any other country. Under Enactment 12 miners may not 
change their trade nor leave their places of work. They may not even enlist in the Red 
Army. No worker is allowed to throw up his job or strike. “When a difference of 
opinion occurs between the Workers’ Council of the Works and the ‘Commissioner for 
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Production’, the Council must not act independently, though it may lodge a complaint 
with the People’s Commissioner for Social Production, who will thoroughly investigate 
it and make an immediate decision. This decision is binding, and until it is arrived at, 
every order from the Commissioner of Production is to be observed”. The 
Commissioner for Production is appointed by the Central Government to manage the 
Works. Any breach of this enactment is apparently to be dealt with by the Red Guard. 
In other words, the Army is to be called in to settle trade disputes. 
There is compulsory insurance, half paid by the State and half by the worker, on a 
scale graduated according to pay. (Sick benefits are also graduated). Labour is 
compulsory, and, conversely, there is a right to employment. All unemployed or 
physically unfit persons must work where work is available, but are supported by the 
State. The rate of wages is as follows:- 
Agricultural labourers live rent free and have milk and bacon free. The men receive 25 
to 30 kronen a day, and the women 20 to 25; girls and youths from fifteen to eighteen, 
12 to 15 kronen a day, children under fifteen, 8 to 10 kronen a day. 20 per cent extra is 
given for special garden work and 10 per cent extra for harvesting. Wages in towns and 
factories range from 5 to 18 kronen an hour. A skilled labourer on piece work can earn 
from 2,000 to 2,500 a month. At the ordinary flat rate he earns 1,800 kronen in theory, 
but he can always make 2,000. The pay of the Red Army is really pocket money, 
because the men are housed, fed, and clothed by the State. 
FINANCE 
The financial adviser to the Government is a bank clerk, who admits quite cheerfully 
that he knows nothing of finance, but that this does not matter in the least because when 
the World Revolution is an accomplished fact, finance will be no more needed abroad 
than it is at present in Hungary. 
The first act of the New Government was to place 32 leading banks under the control 
of this Commissary. Any person may draw 10% from his current account up to a 
maximum of 2,000 kronen monthly; the remainder of his income goes to the State. In 
case of illness, an additional 1,000 kronen a month may be drawn. Land holders, 
provision dealers and certain central offices are allowed to draw more, with the consent 
of their respective Commissaries. Bank directors are limited to a salary of 3,000 kronen 
a month, and provided they are not dismissed by the Government, they must continue 
to perform their duties. On the other hand, for the wages and salaries of officials, 
money to an unlimited amount may be drawn, and generally speaking, banks are bound 
to comply with any demand from a People’s Commissary. 
All private safes in banks have to be opened in the owner"s presence, and if he refuses 
the key, the safe will be broken open and all the contents confiscated. If he opens it, the 
value of any money in foreign currency or gold is credited in Hungarian money to his 
current account, but all specie and foreign notes are handed over to the Central Banking 
Office. This is probably designed to steady the rate of exchange. 
TRADE 
All shops employing more than ten people and all wholesale businesses, as well as 
factories and warehouses have been taken over by the State, which pays the salaries of 
the employees. The business is carried on by the Commissary for Social Production, 
and the employees elect a council from among themselves to “establish working 
discipline, protect the property of the community, and control the methods of business”. 
All shops employing ten persons or less have to furnish an inventory of their stock, and 
if the inventory is incorrect, the shop is seized by the State and the former owner sent to 
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a factory. The State allows the small shopkeeper a proportion of the profits, provided 
that he sells only to persons producing tickets. Shops selling only luxury articles are to 
be closed, and it is illegal to sell luxuries of over a certain value. Each business may 
have a current cash balance of 2,000 florins, and no profits are to be made beyond the 
small percentage over cost price allowed to defray actual expenses. The penalty on a 
shopkeeper for concealing goods is death. The State claims all gold and silver articles 
and jewellery over the value of 500 kronen. 
It may be asked what safeguard there is against over-production, which proved the 
downfall of the municipal workshops in Paris. The answer given by the Commissaries 
is that a boot factory would only be permitted to make boots up to a stock sufficient to 
allow two pairs to every person. Boots are not to be graded, all of them must be of the 
best quality. When this stock is reached, the factory would be switched off on to 
making saddles or, if necessary, the workmen dispersed in other factories making 
leather goods. 
THE RED ARMY 
The men are to be recruited from among organised labour, excluding miners, on the 
recommendation of the Trade Union. On the 4th April, all men of the old regular army, 
including officers, were called up unless specifically exempted. Officers, from 
Company Commanders upwards, are appointed by the Military Commissary; 
subordinate officers are elected by the men.7 Nearly all the officers belong to the old 
Army. The candidate’s name is published, and within a week anyone is free to lodge 
information as to his “individuality, past career and political reliability”. A political 
representative is posted to each Unit by the Military Commissary. 
The Reserve consists of “Workmen’s Reserve Battalions”, whose officers are chosen 
exclusively from proletarians, under the instruction of officer-instructors, who have not 
the right to command or bear arms. 
In addition to the ordinary Red Army is a body called “The Red Guard”, whose duty 
it is to maintain internal order. It supersedes all police forces and its personnel is 
interchangeable with that of the Red Army. According to a proclamation by the 
Government, the Red Army is an arm of the Revolution of the Proletariat; founded on 
the principles of revolutionary discipline, it is the class army of the Proletariat. In this 
connection, it is interesting to note from the published scale of pay that there is a daily 
allowance of 10 kronen for “service outside the garrison (i.e. the suppression of 
disturbances and enforcement of laws)”. One of the duties of the Red Army is to deal 
with workmen who strike in defiance of the orders of the Labour Court. It is in fact a 
punitive battalion rather than a blackleg battalion. 
Clause 7 in the Red Guard Law dated 26th March sets up a Secret Service 
(Investigation Department) as a measure against “political intrigues”. 
The Commissaries say that the invitation to the old officers to rejoin was given on the 
advice of Lenin. They were assured on the one hand that if they refused, their allowance 
of 2,000 kronen would be stopped, and if they consented they would be treated with 
“perfect kindness and respect”. The men were enjoined to respect their officers and, in 
some particulars, the officers have fared better than they did under the old regime. They 
wear officers’ uniform, but without the badges of rank; they are saluted on parade, but 
not in the streets, because the officers discard the distinguishing armlets of their rank 
when off duty. They are, of course, anti-Bolshevik, but so, it is believed, is the rank and 
file, now that the men have been disillusioned after learning what Bolshevism really 
7 R.W. Seton-Watson, in his letter to J.W. Headlam-Morley, dated 26 May 1919 (see No. 128), reported 
that the practice of electing the officers in the Hungarian Army had stopped. 
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means. Nevertheless, it is not believed that any military rising against the Commissaries 
is to be looked for. The Hungarian newspapers have advertised so widely the outrages 
of the Russian Bolsheviks against counter-revolutionaries that all classes are thoroughly 
cowed. The poor dispossessed nobles scurry into their houses — or rather the rooms 
that remain to them, like frightened rabbits. The place is full of rumours of the arrest of 
counter-revolutionaries and no one trusts his neighbour. Experience seems to show that 
the Red Army will desert to the other side rather than fight an invader. If the mass of 
the people thought that the Allies had abandoned the idea of intervention, they would be 
in despair, for intervention is their great hope. 
CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA 
The Commissaries declare that they are in direct telegraphic communication with 
Lenin three or four times a week if not oftener; that Lenin is consulted about every 
detail, and that it is to Lenin that the Intelligenza [sic] owes its safety. He seems to have 
been insistent on this point, saying that he himself made the mistake of imprisoning 
them, until he found out too late that the workers could not do without them. This does 
not accord with the views of men like Saxe [Sachse], who would like to see them all 
killed, but Lenin insists that starvation would be the result. They must be coaxed into 
the Government, but in such a way that the people do not get suspicious. The name of 
Lenin carries enormous weight; when a rumour spreads that Lenin’s theories are to be 
put into practice, everyone shivers with fear. 
According to a wireless message received this week, Lenin has declared that Buda 
Pesth cannot become the centre of the World Revolution; that must be Moscow, and all 
other centres must obey her. Russia (that is the Soviet Commissaries) is deeply 
disappointed with the Hungarian Revolution, and considers Bela Kun greatly to blame. 
So far from being contagious, the Hungarian variety of the Bolshevik virus seems to 
have cured the early stages of the disease in Bohemia. A week after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, the Communists in Prague were about to have a trial of strength with the 
Majority Socialists, but the crowd of fugitives — workmen, peasants and soldiers — 
escaping from Bela Kun’s Government over the Bohemian frontier, seems to have 
caused a great revulsion of feeling all over Bohemia. 
The same thing has happened in Vienna. During the week of April 4th to 11th, when 
packed meetings were held by Hungarian agitators, everyone felt that Bolshevism 
would sweep the country and a revolution was expected about April 14th. The 
Commissaries in Buda Pesth were on the tiptoe of expectation, but when the news of 
what really happened in Vienna reached Buda Pesth, they were bitterly disappointed, 
for all that happened was a badly planned Bolshevist riot which was easily put down. 
LIFE IN BUDA PESTH 
The best hotel in Buda Pesth is, of course, occupied by the Commissaries, and they 
live there at the public expense. At the second best hotel you may have a bedroom and 
morning tea at 10/6 a week (43 kronen); lunch in the restaurant costs from 20 to 30 
kronen. A cab, even for the shortest distance, costs 25 kronen. The rate of exchange is 
at present 120 kronen for a £1 note; living is thus much cheaper in Buda Pesth than in 
Prague. 
The hotel staff tries to show its best side to visitors, though the waiters are 
disappointed men. They had been promised a division of the profits, but all they can get 
is 12% of the restaurant takings, and this is less than they were getting before the 
Revolution. All over the restaurant appear notices making it a penal offence to give or 
receive a tip, with a penalty of a long term of imprisonment, and each waiter is afraid to 
accept a tip lest a comrade should inform against him. The Soviet Administration makes 
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it impossible for them to steal anything from the hotel, for all the food that goes in has 
to be accounted for. Only one bath is allowed a week, owing to the lack of coal. 
No religious habits are seen in the streets. The Priests went into secular clothes or 
disappeared, and it is only lately that the churches are re-opening and that Communes 
are allowed to appoint Priests at their own expense. Army chaplains have been 
abolished. 
Life in the streets is perfectly safe, and there appears to be no open robbery; motor 
cars are to be seen rushing up and down carrying Commissaries and Government 
officials. 
The Commissaries complain that the upper-class have acquired some moral power 
over the workers. They found to their disgust that if you allow working men to choose 
between a Socialist leader and an educated bourgeois, they elect the latter, and until you 
eliminate the bourgeois they will always do so. 
On the question of the franchise they are quite explicit; a universal suffrage would not 
suit them at all. “If you allow everyone to vote you will have a sort of Kerensky 
Government. You have only to say that you are limiting the vote for a period of six 
months, and people will be satisfied”. It does not appear to occur to them that it may be 
difficult to satisfy people who are denied a vote, just at the time when their future 
destinies are being decided. The election of the present Government is not a 
conspicuous example of free institutions. A list of possible Commissaries was made 
out, about twice as long as the number of offices to be filled. Only Trade Unionists 
were allowed to vote, they were not allowed to add any names; all they could do was to 
elect from the list given them. Seeing the present office holders, one is inclined to 
wonder who the unfortunates were who failed to be elected. 
At any rate, there is one happy class in Hungary to-day, though it is a small one; the 
Commissaries are enjoying themselves to the full. They are exactly like a lot of 
mischievous schoolboys let loose in a shop of a scientific instrument maker, for it is 
remembered that they have the whole personnel and machinery of the old Civil Service 
to play with. The result is exactly the material that Lewis Carrol[l] and Gilbert would 
have loved — a sort of compound of “Alice of the Looking-Glass” and a bad dream, 
and, like a dream, it will pass. 
B [asil] .H.T[homson]. 
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No. 134 
Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London. 
Received 3 June 1919) 
No. 996 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 83063] 
Paris, 2 June 1919 
Following sent to-day to Bucharest. 
In reply to telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey reporting decision of 
Roumanian High Command to march upon Budapest Council of Allied and Associated 
Powers have telegraphed to effect that they formally disapprove of this decision. 
A similar notification has been addressed to Monsieur Bratiano. 
Addressed to Bucharest No. 6.1 
1 For F. Rattigan’s reply to this telegram from Bucharest see No. 137. In connection with the Allied 
attitude to the Romanian decision referred to in the telegram also see Appendix I to notes of a meeting of 
the Council of Four on 31 May 1919, FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, p. 133. 
No. 135 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 June 1919) 
No. 49 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/11746] 
Vienna, 3 June 1919 
Urgent 
Freeman returned from Budapesth, explains urgency of immediate answer to 
proposals of Hungarian Trades Unions if Entente desire to intervene.1 
1 For A.J. Balfour’s reply to this telegram see the Enclosure with No. 142. 
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ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 135 
Memorandum by Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman 
Commandement du Danube, 
Budapest, 30 May 1919 
From: Lieut. Comdr. Williams Freeman 
R.N. 
To: Col. Sir Thomas Cuninghame 
Vienna 
Sir, 
I have the honour to report that the following deputation visited me today. 
Mr. Mor Preusz 
Mr. Samu Jaszai 
Mr. Karolyi [Karoly] Peyer 
Mr. Ferencz Miakitz [Miakits] 
Mr. Imore [Imre] Szabo 
Printers Society 
General Workmens Society 
Miners 
Iron & Metal Workers 
Carpenters Society. 
These men represent over 900,000 workmen in Budapest. A general precis of the 
conversation is attached. 
A general discontent with the present Government is beginning to manifest itself, and 
the attached conversation shows on what lines this is developing. 
There is undoubtedly a great deal of force behind this movement, but it is too early yet 
to say how this will develop. 
The general situation here is strained. The food is very bad and scarce, and the 
Government are making the most strenuous efforts to ameliorate it. 
I consider it most important that the English General you mentioned to me (? Gorton), 
should be prepared to come here at a moments [sic] notice. 
Can the following questions be answered... 
1. What would be the immediate action of the Entente if a Counter Revolution 
should succeed, or the Government be made to fall. 
2. Would the Entente accept a Social Democratic Government, and help them 
by immediately sending food, raw materials, and a strong English Mission. 
3. Could 2000 troops accompany this Mission. 
4. How much and in what time could Food be sent. 
Military information of importance is attached.2 
It comes direct from Army Head Quarters, and is certainly accurate. 
The information both in regard to the attack towards Miskolcz and Kassa would 
appear to be certainly serious, and immediate. 
Please transmit to Belgrade as before. 
Lieut. Comdr. 
R.N. 
2 The information referred to is not enclosed in the original file. 
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Notes 
of conversation between Lt. Commander Freeman and Mess™... representing the 
Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (over 1,000,000 organized workmen). 
The gentlemen declared that they had appeared with the knowledge and approval 
(through the Confidential Committees of the respective Unions) of the Federation as a 
whole and with the knowledge of the present Sovjet Government of Hungary, to ask 
whether Commander Freeman was in a position to give them information respecting the 
feeling in Entente circles towards an eventual formation of a Government of members 
of the Trade Unions they represented. 
Commander Freeman informed the gentlemen that the conversation was unofficial, 
for the only forum authorized to negotiate officially was the Entente Mission in Vienna, 
but that he was willing to open the way for such negotiations provided it were 
understood that the following four points were essential: 
1) immediate cessation and disassociation with all propaganda movement carried on 
in foreign countries against the wishes of the people of those countries; 
2) immediate disassociation with the Bolshevism of Russia, which had proved to be 
no practical basis of Government and economically ruinous to the welfare of the 
country; 
3) as soon as complete order was restored and the situation made such a step 
feasible, a return to a Parliamentary system of representative Government 
approximating to that in force in England; 
4) restoration of the principle of private ownership as a “sine qua non” of economic 
consolidation, with power to tax private property as high as required by the situation. 
The Hungarian gentlemen asked whether Commander Freeman could assure them of 
a reception by the Entente Commission in Vienna, whether the said Commission would 
support a new Government in settling the problems of food and raw materials, and 
whether the Entente would so regulate the question of political frontiers as to ensure the 
new Hungary the possibility of independent existence. 
Commander Freeman said that he would telephone Vienna and ask for the deputation 
to be received there, and thought that every possible support would be given to a 
Government that could produce guarantees that they represented a power equal to 
carrying their programme through in the spirit of the four points above detailed. As 
regards frontiers, he could not give any definite information, as he did not know the 
latest decisions of Paris, but believed the situation was improved as against that of last 
February. He would point out however that any such deputation going to Vienna 
should request that the control be in British hands. 
The gentlemen said that the latter was their own wish too, individually and they 
believed, that of the organisation they represented. They pointed out however, that there 
were to be held, on June 12th, a Congress of the Socialist Party of Hungary and on 
June 14th a Sovjet Congress; and they could not well anticipate events. 
Commander Freeman thought the events would be a good test. 
The gentlemen then asked whether a settlement of the transitional period by 
compromise with the present Government would be agreeable to the Entente. 
Commander Freeman thought it might, provided the said four points were insisted on, 
and provided the colour of the new regime did not suggest to the outside world 
anything in the way of Bolshevism. 
The gentlemen thanked Commander Freeman for receiving them, asked him to regard 
the conversation as unofficial, and assured him that had they anything to tell him, they 
would call on him again. They took cognisance that the Entente would require 
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assurance that the negotiations were serious and were being carried on [in] the name of 
factors possessing the will and the power to take over Government on the principles 
detailed above, and that within a reasonable time names of probable leaders would have 
to be submitted to serve as a guarantee for the seriousness and permanency of the 
change, there is to be no bloodshed, no unnecessary upheaval or disturbance. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Lord Hardinge 
Entirely a question of higher policy, after the determination of which the military 
aspect of the case can be presented. 
W. Thwaites 
6/6/19 
The purposes of the Trades Unions appear to offer a very reasonable basis of 
settlement. 
But surely the question is one which the Council of IV alone can decide. 
Harold Nicolson 
7/6/19 
There is, so far as I know, no Hungarian policy, and all my efforts to solicit any 
instructions or guidance as regards our attitude towards Hungary have remained 
fruitless. 
I can therefore offer no comment or suggestions. 
E. Crowe 
7/6/19 
No. 136 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extract. Received 5 June 1919) 
No. 53 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/11822] 
Vienna, 4 June 1919 
[-.] 
On the other hand if attempts by trade unions in Buda-Pest to get rid of communists 
succeed, Hungary will be united and in possession of victorious army capable of 
opposing wishes of Entente in Vienna then many people will be ready to seek aid of 
Hungarians who now decline to act with Bolshevists. 
Only escape from dilemma is to uphold economic equilibrium of Austria to expel 
Bolshevik element of Hungary and disarm both countries before it is too late. 
Addressed Astoria and D.M.I. 
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No. 137 
Telegram from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to the 
Foreign Office (London. Received 11 June 1919) 
No. 314 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 87230] 
Bucharest, 6 June 1919x 
Urgent. 
Paris telegram No. 6 to Bucharest.* 2 
Rapid recrudescence of Bolshevists strength in Hungary since cessation of 
Roumanian advance is viewed with gravest apprehensions not only by Roumanians but 
also by British and French Military Authorities here. 
There is no doubt that at time of Roumanian advance Bolshevism was in desperate 
plight and only small effort was needed to crush them definitely. Now they have 
regained strength and courage sufficiently to inflict severe defeat on Czecho-Slovaks 
near Tokay [Tokaj]. Not only Allied Military Authorities but also my French colleague, 
United States Minister and myself are unanimously of opinion danger of leaving 
Bolshevists alone is incalculable. Czecho-Slovaks have asked Roumanians to join 
advance on Budapest and latter would be ready to accept if (? permitted). 
General Greenly tells me Lenin has published an order to Red troops to treat kindly in 
future all prisoners and that this has already had bad effect in causing serious desertions 
from Kolchak’s Army. If these continue he thinks latter may go to pieces and 
Bolshevists would then be free to deal with Roumania. For this reason he considers it 
essential to crush Hungarian Bolshevists before this can happen. In the circumstances I 
venture again to ask if some combined movement could not be made, such as I 
understand was recently proposed by General Franchet d’Esperey. Combined Czecho¬ 
slovak and Roumanian forces would in opinion of Military Authorities be sufficient in 
themselves at present for occupation of Budapest so that only a few French and 
possibly Serbian troops need be associated in movement to prove itself of 
representative character. My French and United States colleagues are (? telegraph-)ing 
in same sense to their Governments. 
I realise of course inadvisability of making enemy of Hungary but distinction can be 
made between Bolshevists and majority of Hungarians. From what one can ascertain 
here better elements in Hungary itself would welcome suppression of Bolshevism and 
in no sense be alienated by proposed action especially if latter is of representative 
character. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This seems unanswerable, and we have never had [? known] any reason why Genl. 
Franchet’s proposals were negatived. 
I think we must leave this to be dealt with by the by the P[eace], Delegation], 
[Unidentified] 
12/6/1 
* The telegram was dispatched on 7 June. 
2 See No. 134. 
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No. 138 
Telegram from G. Clemenceau (Paris) to the Hungarian Government (Budapest f 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12004] 
Paris, 7 June 1919 
Les Gouvernements Allies et Associes sont sur le point de convoquer les 
representants du Gouvernement Hongrois a Paris devant la Conference de la Paix pour 
y recevoir communication des vues qui concement les justes frontieres de la Hongrie. 
C’est a ce moment m6me que les Hongrois prononcent contre les Tcheco-Slovaques 
de violentes attaques non justifiees et envahissent la Slovaquie. 
Cependant les Puissances Alliees et Associees ont deja manifesto leur ferme volonte 
de mettre un terme a toutes les hostilites inutiles, en arretant a deux reprises les Armees 
Roumaines qui avaient franchi les limites de 1’armistice, puis celles de la zone neutre et 
en les empdchant de continuer leur marche sur Buda-Pest,— en arretant les Armees 
Serbes et Franfaises sur le front sud de la Hongrie. 
Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de Buda-Pest est invite formellement a mettre 
fin sans delai a ses attaques contre les Tcheco-Slovaques, faute de quoi les 
Gouvernements Allies et Associes sont absolument decides a avoir immediatement 
recours a des mesures extr6mes pour contraindre la Hongrie a cesser les hostilites et a 
se conformer a la volonte inebranlable qu’ont les Allies de faire respecter leurs 
injonctions. 
Reponse au present telegramme doit etre faits dans un delai de quarante huit heures. 
signe: Clemenceau 
President de la Conference de la Paix. 
1 The English translation of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 246-247. 
For Bela Kun’s reply see No. 144. For the initial debates on the Hungarian offensive in the north in 
the Council of Four see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 240-241, 254-258, 260-261; and LINK, vol. 60, 
pp. 255-260, 264-265, 299-300. 
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No. 139 
Joint Note Note No. 43 of the Military Representatives of the 
Supreme War Council (Extractf 
S.W.C. 419 [PRO CAB 25/124] 
Versailles, 7 June 1919 
[On the day, 7 June 1919, when G. Clemenceau’s telegram (see No. 138) was sent to 
Hungary, the Supreme War Council received from its Military Representatives Joint 
Note No. 43, titled: “MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO 
HUNGARY.” The Military Representatives were charged on 5 June to examine what 
action could be taken by the Allied Armies to put an end to the hostilities between the 
Hungarian and Czechoslovak forces. At the beginning of their Note they considered 
that the occupation of a part of Czechoslovakia by the Hungarian Red Army would 
hinder the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Hungary, which is clearly contrary to the 
aims of the Allied and Associated Powers. The Czechoslovak Army was in no position 
to carry on the fight against the Hungarians, therefore, they recommended that the 
Allied and Associated Powers should take measures to put an end to the Hungarian 
attacks. To achieve this, they suggested the strengthening of the Czechoslovak Army in 
various ways; the Note then continues:] 
[The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council are of opinion:] 
(3) That, should military operations against the Hungarian Army be decided on by the 
Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the general lines of action might 
be the following :- 
(a) The initiative would be taken by the Roumanian and Serbian Army supported by 
the French Army of Hungary. 
(b) The Serbian Army would take as a general objective the Hungarian capital of 
Buda-Pesth. 
On its right the Roumanian Army of Transylvania to cross the Theiss and operate in 
the general direction of Miskolsez [Miskolc] and Gyongyes [Gyongyos], an important 
district on account of the numerous railways and roads which cross it and which 
equally serve as the Hungarian Army’s communications. 
The French Army of Hungary to support this movement by linking up the 
Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Army and taking as general objective the railway junction 
of Hatvan (40 kilos: N.E. of Buda-Pest). 
(4) That to ensure the success of this operation it is indispensable that the troops to 
operate against Hungary should be under a single command which should be given to 
the General Commanding-in-Chief the Armies of the East,* 2 the only Commander who 
at the moment could give the necessary orders in time. 
' This document, together with its enclosure, is reproduced in full in LINK, vol. 60, pp. 255-260. 
2 Gen. L. Franchet d’Esperey. 
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NOTE:- 
The American Military Representative has submitted the reservation contained 
in the Note attached. 
The Italian Military Representative accepts these reservations with the addition 
of the following remarks:- 
“In accordance with information received from a sure source by the Italian 
G.H.Q., the Czecho-Slovak Government originally ordered its troops to cross 
the Armistice line with a view to the occupation of territories which the 
Magyars had been compelled to evacuate on account of the Roumanian 
advance. 
The violence of the Hungarian reaction may be fully explained from the fact 
that the Czecho-Slovak advance threatened the whole of the region lying to the 
South of the metal bearing mountains where are to be found the last mineral 
resources which, together with the coal basin of Pecs, remain to the new State 
of Hungary. 
This violent Hungarian counter-attack would not have taken place if the 
Czecho-Slovaks had not in the first place advanced, especially as a large portion 
of the territory of the new State of Hungary had already been invaded by the 
Roumanians. 
Taking the above facts into consideration, it may be doubted whether military 
action is absolutely necessary and it is a question whether political action alone 
would not be sufficient, combined with a guarantee to Hungary that the 
armistice line of demarcation, or the probable future boundary line of the new 
State of Hungary, shall be respected.” 
Sd. Gal. Belin. 
Military 
Representative, 
French Section, 
Supreme War 
Council. 
Sd. C. Sackville-West. 
Military 
Representative, 
British Section, 
Supreme War 
Council. 
Sd. Ugo Cavallero. 
Military 
Representative, 
Italian Section, 
Supreme War 
Council. 
Sd. P.D. Lochridge 
Military 
Representative, 
American Section, 
Supreme War 
Council. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 139 
Memorandum by General T.H. Bliss (Annex to S.W.C. 419. Extract) 
Hotel de Crillon, 
Paris, 6 June 1919 
MEMORANDUM 
3. If the wish of the Supreme Council to put an end to the attacks of the Hungarians 
against the Czecho-Slovaks is to be realised by military force, there appears but one 
way in which to accomplish it; i.e., the prompt military occupation of Hungary by 
Allied forces. But, the occupation of this territory by a force consisting largely of 
Roumanian and Serbian troops may have far-reaching political consequences. If these 
consequences are regarded by the Council of the Powers as of minor importance, the 
American Representative offers no objection to military occupation that would be 
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composed of these Roumanian and Serbian forces assisted by a French force; but the 
Council of the Powers should have the following facts in mind. 
At the time of the original armistice a line was fixed by General Franchet d’Esperey, 
commanding the Allied Army of the East, beyond which the Roumanians were not to 
advance. In defiance of this, the Roumanians continued their advance, with resulting 
disorders. General Franchet d’Esperey attempted to hold them on a second line. This 
attempt also they defied and continued their advance. Thereupon the Council of the 
Powers in Paris intervened and by their direction a neutral zone was established on 
February 26th last averaging about 50 kilometre in width. The Roumanians defied the 
Council of the Powers and continued to advance until now their forces are on the 
eastern bank of the River Theiss, which is west of the western limit of the zone which 
the Council of the Powers established with instructions that they remain on the eastern 
side of that zone. It was the establishment of this zone which caused the downfall of the 
Karolyi government, the only Hungarian government that has been friendly to the 
Allies. Therefore, the Council of the Powers will note the fact that the military force of a 
nation which hitherto has defied every effort to keep it within imposed limits may, in 
case it is allowed to occupy a considerable part of Hungary, prove equally recalcitrant 
if, at some future time, it is directed to withdraw. This is also true of a [? the] Serbian 
force which, like Roumania, is a claimant for partition of Hungarian territory. The 
Council of the Powers shall also keep in mind the possibility, if not the probability that 
the invasion of what has hitherto been considered as undisputed Hungarian territory 
may solidify that people in a resistance which otherwise would not occur. 
If these considerations appear of minor consequence to the Council of the Powers, I 
concur in the general plan of the occupation of Hungary by an Allied force consisting 
largely of Roumanians and Serbs supported by a French force, because, if military 
force must be used it must be used promptly and, therefore, by the only forces promptly 
available. 
4. In the absence of instructions from his government, the American Military 
Representative makes a general reservation as to participation by the United States in 
the occupation of Hungary.3 
(Sd.) Tasker H. Bliss 
American Military Representative. 
3 For the proceedings in the Supreme Council with regard to military measures to be taken against 
Hungary to enforce the terms of the Armistice between 5 and 18 July 1919, see No. 187, note 2. 
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No. 140 
Memorandum by E. Ashmead-Bartlett (Extracts)1 
[BALF Additional 49749] 
7 June 1919 
MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITION IN HUNGARY 
II. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 
[The Hungarian Bolshevists have been recently strengthened for the following 
reasons:] 
The Rumanians having been badly beaten about two weeks ago, the Czechs 
announced their intention to the Soviet Government of advancing to take up the new 
line of demarcation which I understand they were authorised to do by the Delobit [de 
Lobit] Armistice Note. They were shockingly handled by the Italian General —— 
[?Piccione] and moved in inadequate numbers. Bohm’s Red Guard Army2 was waiting 
for them three divisions strong. The Czechs were badly hammered, lost two thousand 
prisoners and fled some twenty five kilometres, being attacked in the rear by the 
Slovaks. 
This unfortunate incident has led to the break up of the alliance between the Czechs 
and the Slovaks. The former are in a state of panic and openly talk of being obliged to 
abandon Pressburg. The Red Army of Bohm is continuing its victorious march into 
Moravia which will shortly be turned into an independent Soviet Republic. In this 
connection it is interesting to recall the words of Bohm and Pogany on the night of 
April 4th at the dinner given to the Foreign Press in Budapest on the occasion of 
General Smuts’s visit,3 when, very much to worse for drink, they announced their 
future policy vis a vis to [sic] the neighbouring states which formerly comprised the old 
Habsburg Monarchy. These views are contained in the long memorandum presented by 
me to General Smuts.4 Bohm speaking said, “We are going to turn all our neighbours 
in [? to] Bolshevists. We shall start with the Czecho Slovaks. Don’t you see what a 
wonderful position Hungary is in geographically as the starting place for Bolshevism. 
We are surrounded by discontented peoples all ready to adopt our principles. The 
Czecho Slovaks, once we have kicked them out of Hungary will become Bolshevists 
right away.” 
[....] 
1 Copies of this memorandum, together with its annexure, were sent to several leading British politicians, 
including D. Lloyd George and A.J. Balfour. 
2 V. Bdhm was Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army from 5 May 1919 till 14 July 1919. 
3 See No. 88, note 2 (for Enclosure 2). 
4 The memorandum referred to has not been traced by the editor, however, see note 3 above. 
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III. DANGERS TO THE FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE 
The Bolshevist Army which will soon number two hundred thousand men or even 
more, as general conscription has been decided on, is completely triumphant in the field. 
That army is for the time being ringed in by French, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovakian and 
Jugoslav troops who are pursuing the policy of doing nothing. 
The Bolshevists have, however, very foolishly from their standpoint shown their 
hand prematurely by their invasion of Slovakia which will probably force the Entente to 
intervene. It was their original intention to play for time and not to arouse reprisals by 
indulging in military operations against their neighbours. But they have become 
emboldened by their successes against Rumania and the Czechs by the inacticity [sic] of 
the French Army and by the immense moral and material support given by [? to] them 
to [? by] the Italians. They intended to remain quiet to seek recognition and then to 
commence their immense propaganda campaign against their neighbours as soon as 
peace had been signed, the French withdrawn, and the troops of their immediate 
neighbours demobilised. Their full programme would take too long to state in this 
memorandum, but it is set out in great detail in the memorandum presented by me to 
General Smuts after the dinner of the night of April 4th, of which copies are available.5 
Part of that programme in so far as it affects Czecho-Slovakia has already been realised. 
Now unless Bolshevism is aliminated [sic] from Hungary before peace is signed and 
the French armies withdrawn, it will most certainly spread all over Eastern Europe. The 
frontiers of all the neighbouring states will then be open and a swarm of Bolshevist 
agents will descend like locusts to devour the new Constitutional Democracies armed 
with unlimited money and propaganda. An even greater danger has come into existence 
during the last two months. The Hungarians now have the strongest Army in Eastern 
Europe and unless this Army is disbanded before peace is signed and the French troops 
withdrawn they will start immediate military operations to kick the Rumanians out of 
Transylvania and the occupied Hungarian Hinterland. This they can do with 
consummate ease. I would also point out at this stage that if the Conference is hesitating 
to act in Hungary from a reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of another 
nation, they now have a fresh explanation with which to satisfy the extreme Socialist 
elements in England, France and the United States, namely this, quite apart from 
questions of Bolshevism, Hungary, as a hostile power opposed to the Entente in the 
war, has broken the terms of every armistice, commencing with the Diaz armistice 
signed on November 3rd, 1918, by raising and keeping in the field at least four times as 
many troops as she is allowed by the conditions contained therein. This is an open 
defiance of the Entente which constituted a fatal example not only to all the states of 
Eastern Europe, but also to Germany. 
IV. THE ONLY REMEDIES AND THE AVAILABLE MEANS 
There is in fact only one policy to be pursued at any cost by the Entente, namely, to 
smash Bolshevism and to establish a Constitutional Government in Hungary before the 
final peace is signed and the troops withdrawn. This in reality can easily be done. It 
only requires a simultaneous advance of the French, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovakian and 
Jugoslav troops under certain definite well defined provisions; viz: (a) It must be made 
clear to the Hungarian people that only French troops will be allowed in Budapest and 
kept there until General Elections have been held throughout the country, (b) That 
Hungary will be given a fair hearing at the Conference of Paris before her future 
political frontiers are definitely settled, (c) Any Anti-Bolshevist Government which 
5 See note 4 above. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 241 
receives the Entente’s support must definitely promise to refrain from all reactionary 
measures and to offer a sound Land Reform Policy to the Hungarian peasants. 
With these provisions the war would immediately cease to be regarded by all except 
the Red Guard Extremists as a national one and all experts are agreed Budapest could 
be occupied almost without opposition. We have received in fact the definite promise of 
innumerable officers now serving in the Red Guard Army including the majority of 
those on the General Staff, that they will never oppose a French advance and will at 
once join forces with any Constitutional Government supported by the whole of the 
Entente. 
[••..] 
VI. WHAT IS CERTAIN TO HAPPEN 
The position in Hungary is so delicately poised that it requires extremely little 
pressure to turn the scale against Bolshevism in spite of its outward appearance of 
strength. The situation of the government in Budapest in [is] extremely bad owing to 
the shortage of food, the bad paper money in which the workmen and soldiers are now 
being paid, and the general discontent produced by misery, conscription and terrorism. 
In the country the peasants are disgruntled by the failure of the Government to carry 
through the promised land policy, that is to say, one of individual ownership as 
opposed to communism. Bolshevism can in fact only thrive by making freak conquests. 
Left in isolated areas it consumes itself and nothing is left but the bare ashes of anarchy, 
bankruptcy and terrorism. They are for the most part cowards at heart and would 
eagerly surrender the reins of power if their personal safety could be assured. It is 
absolutely certain that if the Entente authorises a general advance they will immediately 
make proposals to this effect. It may be wise, to prevent disorders in Budapest and a 
possible massacre of hostages, to come to an arrangement whereby the Entente 
guarantees the personal safety of some of the leaders provided they leave Hungary 
altogether. When this situation arises it is of paramount importance to have an 
alternative provisional government ready to take over the administration of the country 
until the people have been given the opportunity of definitely deciding on their future 
form of government by the holding of free General Elections. I will now deal in detail 
with the political elements from which an alternative government must be formed. 
VII. COMPOSITION OF SOCIETY IN HUNGARY 
Hungary is a country which suffers from the misfortune of possessing no national 
middle class highly trained in politics and business and in consequence the available 
material from which men trained in state affairs can be drawn is extremely limited. 
There is however, a fairly numerous body of efficient permanent officials. The social 
strata of the state may be roughly divided as follows:- (1) the aristocracy and the great 
landowners, (2) the Jews who control all the finance and industries of the country and 
who take the place of the Middle Class in England, (3) the peasants, who must be 
divided into three categories (a) the rich peasant proprietors who farm their own land, 
(b) small peasant proprietors who cultivate from two to four acres for their own use and 
who also work on the large estates, (c) the labourers who are without land. 
Up to the downfall of Count Tisza the entire political power was in the hands of the 
nobility and great landowners who were divided into two bitterly opposed hostile 
groups, the Tisza and the Andrassy parties. It was the quarrels of these two parties 
which discredited the old regime in the eyes of the people. Strange to say there was no 
powerful opposition from any Socialist Party and the end of Tisza was brought about 
by the constant abuse which the Andrassy party hurled at him from the platform and in 
the press. 
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VIII. THE KAROLYI REGIME 
Count Mich[a]el Karolyi, the first President of the New Republic found his chief 
supporters amongst the small Jews of Budapest. He obtained a temporary and 
transitory popularity amongst the people by his colossal scheme of Agrarian Reform, 
the expropriation in fact of all the great estates and Church lands which were offered to 
all and sundry whether skilled in agriculture or not at a price which really amounted to 
confiscation of all property. By this ill devised scheme which would have lessened the 
agricultural production of Hungary by some fifty per cent he aroused the cupidity of the 
peasants and working classes and let loose on the country a flood of ill digested 
revolutionary schemes and ideas which have brought Hungary to her present state of 
ruin and chaos. Karolyi, a man of feeble intellect and devoid of principles, endeavoured 
to stave off Bolshevism by constant concessions to the ever increasing popular 
demands. He was in fact from the first merely a tool in the hands of the extremists who 
used the first opportunity which came their way, namely the presentation of the Delobit 
[de Lobit] Note, on the new lines of demarcation, to dismiss him from office and to 
seize the reins of power. Thus the entire power fell into the hands of the Kissjeddo [Kis 
zsido] (small Jews) trained in the school of Russian Bolshevism. The whole of the 
would be constitutional parties in Hungary surrendered without a fight. A kind of 
mental inertia settled over the former rulers of the country and they allowed themselves 
to be driven from office and terrorised over without raising a hand to help their country. 
It is almost impossible to explain this strange phenomenon, but it was probably due to 
the exhaustion produced by the war and to the crushing effects of the assassination of 
the only strong man in the old regime Count Tisza. On the downfall of Mich[a]el 
Karolyi the landowners fled the country or retired to their estates and the rich Jewish 
Bankers and industrial magnates did likewise. Thus the field was left free for the 
inauguration of the full programme of Bolshevism in its most virulent form. Even at 
this stage the constitutional elements might have rallied had the Entente occupied 
Budapest with a few troops a move which all parties wished for and if General 
Elections had been held throughout the country it is almost certain the constitutional 
elements would have found themselves in the majority. But the reign of terror and 
confiscation which was immediately started by the Soviet Government completely 
destroyed all organised opposition. 
IX. PRESENT POSITION OF BOLSHEVISM 
Budapest has been stripped bare. Everything has in fact been taken from the private 
houses and either stolen by individuals or confiscated for the use of the state. All 
money has been taken from the banks and valuables from the safes. The discontent 
amongst the mass of the people in the capital grows day by day but as the entire 
population has been disarmed there is little hope of a successful counter revolution in 
Budapest until assistance is forthcoming from outside. There have, however, been 
frequent demonstrations against the Soviet Government made by the organised Unions 
of Metal and Iron Workers and Ammunition Makers, who grew extremely rich in the 
war and who have no desire to see their property communised. Up to the present the 
Soviet Government has been able to hold its own chiefly owing to the causes I have 
already named [....] but on several occasions it has been on the verge of resigning. The 
discontent in the capital is daily augmented by the ever growing shortage of food for the 
peasants will not send in supplies from the country districts] to be paid in paper money 
issued by the Government. 
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X. FEELING IN THE COUNTRY DISTRICTS 
The evils produced by Bolshevism have not been felt to the same extent in the country 
as they have in Budapest. The Hungarian peasant is highly conservative at heart and is 
bitterly opposed to communism in any form. He was undoubtedly attracted by the 
Karolyi Agrarian programme because under it he would have obtained land for nothing. 
But after a short time a reaction set in and many peasants openly declared they would be 
unable to live by cultivating estates of ten acres, and would prefer to receive high wages 
by continuing to work on the great estates. The Soviet Government’s attempt to abolish 
individual ownership and to communise the land led to such a wave of discontent that it 
had to be immediately abandoned, as did also their proposed scheme of abolishing 
freedom of religious worship. [....] 
All classes of peasants are discontented with [the] Soviet Government for three 
reasons (a) The General unrest throughout the country; (b) Being forced to the colours 
by conscription; (c) By the bad paper money in which they are now paid. It is as well to 
note at this stage that during the last three weeks there have been over one hundred 
counter revolutions started in various villages in Western Hungary. But the rapid 
mobilisation of the Red Guards and the control of the railways it has been easy to 
suppress these isolated efforts which has been done with much bloodshed. 
XI. THE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 
The reign of terror in Budapest forced almost all the old political leaders who were 
able to get away to flee the country. The majority succeeded in reaching Austria and 
have established themselves in Vienna together with many hundred[s] of officers. The 
latter are an excellent class, patriotic and disinterested, who only wish to see some form 
of constitutional Government established in their country and who are prepared to offer 
their service to any party which can bring this about. It was extremely hard at first to get 
the counter revolutionists to unite on any fixed programme as the Hungarians 
unfortunately thrive on jealousies and petty quarrels amongst themselves. But now 
under the stress of sheer necessity these dissensions have passed away in fact it may be 
said that all the old parties have completely disappeared and that only the individuals 
who led them remain. It was the original intention to set up a counter revolutionary 
Government in Vienna but owing to the opposition of Bauer and the Austrian 
Bolshevist elements insurmountable difficulties prevented this. It was also almost 
impossible to communicate with the officers and political chiefs in the districts occupied 
by the French, Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs and thus for some time no co-ordinated 
action could be brought about. Under these circumstances Count Duyla [Gyula] 
Karolyi, a distant cousin and bitter enemy of Mich[a]el Karolyi, inaugurated a 
provisional government at Arad under the protection of French troops, with 
Bornemis[z]a as his Foreign Secretary.6 Duyla [Gyula] Karolyi is a big provincial 
magnate who has never played a prominent part in politics, but who has proved himself 
to be an excellent governor of province. He is quite disinterested and without any 
political ambitions, and of all the Hungarian leaders he is the one who impresses me the 
most favourably. He has established a provisional government mostly of men 
previously unknown in Hungarian political life all of whom are pledged to resign on the 
occupation of Budapest. The whole of the Hungarian political leaders now assembled in 
Vienna including Bethlen, Bathyani [Batthiany], Duyla [Gyula] Andrassy, Albert 
Apponyi, Paul Teleki, Dyuri [Gyuri (Gyorgy)] Pallavicini, and a host of lesser 
politicians and all the military officers have now sworn adherence to the Karolyi 
Government and are pledged to support it to the utmost of their power. Gorami 
6 In connection with the establishment of the provisional government, see No. 141. 
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[Garami], who is now in Switzerland also telegraphed his assent provided the new 
government is pledged to moderate Social-Democratic programme. 
The Karolyi Government issued a modest and sensible proclamation pledging itself to 
eliminate Bolshevism and to restore constitutional government. It has wisely refrained 
from embarking on a full political programme at this early stage. 
XII. PRESENT POSITION OF THE KAROLYI GOVERNMENT 
The Karolyi [Government] is now established at Szeged in Southern Hungary under 
the protection of the French troops. It has in fact been recognised as the only Counter 
Revolutionary Government by the French Generals who have promised to support it by 
every means in their power. Bauer has now changed his attitude in Vienna and is 
allowing all Hungarian officers and political leaders to go to Szeged to join Karolyi. 
Thus for the first time there is unity both of action and thought. 
XIII. PLANS OF THE KAROLYI GOVERNMENT 
The immediate programme of the Karolyi Government is to raise a force of some 
fifteen to twenty thousand men which could be easily done if arms and ammunition are 
only forthcoming from the Entente. A loan is also badly needed. This force could then 
act as the spearhead of a advance of the Entente troops between the Danube and the 
Tisza. This advance would take place over a flat country with two lines of railway 
leading direct to the capital. Szeged is 165 kilometres from Budapest so the distance to 
be traversed is extremely short. An advance of the Counter Revolutionary troops and 
the French would immediately turn all the Red Guards positions facing the Rumanians 
on the line of the Tisza, and would enable the latter to cross that river to co-operate in a 
general move in which the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav troops should also be 
employed. As I have already said there is no probability of any serious fighting as the 
majority of the officers and men in the Red Army are quite prepared to come under the 
conditions already named. 
XIV. KAROLYI’S GOVERNMENT AND THE SOCIALISTS 
The Karolyi Government is the only alternative one for the Entente to support at the 
present time as there is no other party in the field. It represents in fact every shade of 
Hungarian political feeling. It must be clearly understood that there is no united socialist 
party in Hungary. The so-called social democrats in the Soviet administration have long 
since become openly Bolshevist and have participated in the robbery, confiscation and 
terrorism which have brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Any attempt to 
reconstruct a social-democratic government from the political elements now assembled 
in Budapest would be a farce and would be unacceptable to the mass of the Hungarian 
people. The Karolyi Government may be said without exaggeration to represent some 
four fifths of the Hungarian people. It is pledged to a liberal programme of Agrarian 
Reform the exact details of which are now being worked out. But such is the ignorance 
in these matters that urgent help is required from experts versed in these matters from 
Entente countries. 
XV. [THE] KAROLYI GOVERNMENT AND THE ENTENTE 
The attitude of the Karolyi Government vis a vis to [Vc] the Entente is contained in 
the signed declaration brought by me to Paris and attached to this memorandum. 
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ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 140 
Declaration by the Szeged Government1 
(From) [LI. G. F/l97/4/5] 
Szeged, 29 May 1919 
Strictly Confidential 
QUESTIONS THAT WILL BE ASKED IN PARIS. 
(1) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be 
constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to 
accept as final and absolute the decision of the Conference of Paris in regard to 
the future political frontiers of Hungary, after the Hungarian case has been 
properly heard in Paris? 
Yes, because we are fully convinced, that we will find justice, after our 
case has been properly stated. 
(2) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be 
constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to accept 
without reserve the principles of a ‘League of Nations’ as laid down in the 
preamble of the Peace Treaty with the German Empire? 
Yes. 
(3) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be 
constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to 
refrain from entering into any alliance either political, military, fiscal or 
economic with the German Empire for a period of twenty years from the time 
of the signing of peace? 
Yes. 
(4) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be 
constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to enter 
into an economic and financial zollver[e]in with its neighbours, who lately 
composed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, viz, Austria, Yugoslavia and 
Czecho-Slovakia in the event of the Conference of Paris deciding in favour of 
such a plan? (Free Trade within the old Empire). 
Yes, it fully covers our intentions. 
1 In the original the questions are typed and the answers are given in handwriting. 
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Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be 
constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to accept 
the decision of the Conference of Paris in regard to all questions of indemnities, 
armament shipping material etc.? 
Yes. 
Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government constituted from 
it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared, in the event of French or 
other military intervention to pay the full cost of all military operations 
necessary for the elimination of Bolshevism and the restoration of 
Constitutional Government in Hungary and to make this a first charge on the 
finances of the state? 
Yes. 
Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government constituted from 
it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to re-establish 
constitutional government in Hungary on a basis commensurate with the 
democratic ideals of France, England and the United States, and to leave it to the 
free choice of the people to decide at a general election the future form of 
government under which they will choose to live? 
Yes. 
Count Gyula Karolyi 
Bomemissza [Baron Gyula Bomemisza] 
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No. 141 
Letter from Count G. Kdrolyi (Szeged) to General P. de Lobit (Belgrade)1 
[PRO CAB 21/150] 
Translation. 
Szeged, 7 June 1919 
Monsieur le General, 
I have the honour to inform you that I constituted on 5th May 1919 at Arad a 
Hungarian Government of a provisional character which announced as its aim the 
combating of Bolshevism in Hungary, the re-establishment of order and the taking of 
measures to prepare and render possible later a legal and constitutional administration. 
This Government wished to begin to enter on its functions at Szeged, and consequently 
left Arad on May 9th in order to proceed thither. In the course of this journey the 
members of the Government were arrested by order of the Roumanian military 
command and interned at Mezohegyes for two weeks. Owing to this delay, the 
Government only arrived at Szeged at the end of the month of May, where it set itself 
up: 
It is composed as follows: 
President of the Council and) 
) 
Minister of the Interior ) 
Minister for War. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Minister of Finance. 
Minister of Commerce. 
Minister of Agriculture. 
Minister of Religion and ) 
Public Instruction ) 
Minister of Justice.. 
Minister of Public Welfare.... 
Minister of Food. 
Count Jules Karolyi. 
Nicolas de Horthy. 
Count Paul Teleki. 
Baron Louis Solymossy. 
Louis Varjassy. 
Jean Kintzig. 
Bela Kelemen. 
vacant 
reserved for the Socialists. 
ditto.2 
1 In the original file this letter is enclosed in a letter by Gen. L. Franchet d’Esperey, dated 24 June 1919, 
forwarding it to G. Clemenceau. 
2 As reported by Col. Watts to the British Peace Delegation on 24 July 1919 (PRO FO 608/13 No. 
46/1/7/16194), the Szeged Government was reorganized on 17 July 1919, which resulted in the 
following redistribution of the offices: 
President of the Council and 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of the Interior and 
1 
Minister of Justice J 
Minister of War. 
Minister of Commerce. 
Minister of Food. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Minister of Agriculture 
Dezsfi Abraham 
Dr. Aladar Balia 
Gen. Sandor Belitska 
Dr. Lajos Varjassy 
Lajos Palmay 
} Count Pal Teleki 
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In order to publish its aim and duties the Government issued the annexed 
proclamation.3 The Council leans on all parties and all fractions of the country desirous 
of fighting Bolshevism and re-establishing legal order in Hungary. I wish to indicate by 
the very composition of the Government the fact that it does not represent one party or 
one political tendency only, but the whole country without distinction of party politics 
or religion and ardently desires the re-establishment of legal order. I have not hitherto 
been able to win over the Socialists to collaborate usefully with me but I hope to 
succeed, and two places are reserved for them in the Cabinet. 
Seeing that the object aimed at by the Government is in agreement with the interests 
and intentions of the Entente Powers, who likewise desire the suppression of 
Bolshevism, the re-establishment and maintenance of order, and that moreover the 
Government of Hungary does not only rely on some political parties but on the entire 
country, and proposes to pursue a liberal and democratic policy, I am of opinion that it 
may be hoped to be recognised by the Entente Powers and to obtain their assistance in 
the organisation of an armed force. 
The Government formed under my leadership will accept the decisions of the Paris 
Conference as soon as Hungary obtains a hearing thereat and has the opportunity of 
expressing her views, for that Government is firmly convinced that after we have been 
heard, such decisions can only be just and equitable. 
I beg therefore that you will be so good as to communicate the substance of this letter 
to the competent authorities, and 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) Count Jules Karolyi 
3 Not enclosed in the original. 
Minister of Public Assistance 
and 
... ■ ,, , • } Mihaly DdmOtdr. 
Minister of Public Instruction 
There was positive reaction among members of the Entente to these changes, it was generally regarded 
that the newly constituted Szeged Government was more representative of Hungarian society. 
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No. 142 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 8 June 1919) 
No. 59 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/12011] 
Vienna, 7 June 1919 
Delegates from Trade Unions in Budapest ask urgently for answer to projects made 
to Commander Freeman detailed in my despatch T.C. 503 June 2nd.1 Moment critical. 
Freeman still in Vienna. 
Repeated to D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Advance copy sent to Major Webster, Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, Sir Maurice 
Hankey. 
The proposals of the Trades Unions are still “on”. I gather that the Council of IV 
were to discuss the Hungarian question this morning. 
Harold Nicolson 
9/6/19 
The question of the Hungarian trades unions could not be answered without 
committing the allied govts, to a definite policy towards Hungary. I do not belive that 
such a policy can be formulated at present, but the previous telegrams in which the 
question was raised, have been submitted and have not yet returned. 
Technically, of course, the Hungarian Trade Unions are not entitled to any answer 
from the allied governments. 
E. Crowe 
9/6/19 
[To] Lord Hardinge 
Copy of proposed reply is attached for your approval.2 
W.L.O. Twiss Lt.-Col. 
General Staff for D.M.I. 10/6/19 
H[ardinge]. 
1 Not printed: for a similar dispatch see Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram No. 49, dated 3 June 1919, 
printed as No. 135. 
Instead of the draft, the Enclosure contains the actual telegram sent to Vienna, which is also attached to 
the original file. 
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ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 142 
Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
Paris, 11 June 1919 
Priority. 
Reference your teiegram No. 49 June 3rd (Hungarian Trade Unions).3 
Entente have no opinion to offer. 
3 See No. 135. 
No. 143 
Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel B. Coulson (Prague) 
to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris)1 
[LI. G. F/8/3/62/(b)] 
Prague, 8 June 1919 
Dear Twiss, 
The situation here is very grave: everywhere the Magyars are advancing, the 
resistance offered by the C.S. Army is most feeble and the general morale exceedingly 
low. 
I know that General Pelle is most anxious and does not think that the enemy can 
possibly be driven back without aid from the Entente, and this must not be delayed too 
long, as the most we can hope for is to hold them, and up to now, we have not been 
successful in this. The fall of Kosice, the crossing of the Danube at Parkany and steady 
advance towards Pressburg will illustrate the gravity of the situation. There is a terrible 
lack of rifles, ammunition and war material of every description, there are no reserves 
and the factories are only now commencing to cope with this lack. 
Can nothing be done? It is so very bad for the prestige of the Entente, naturally people 
here cannot understand it’s [s/c] attitude towards an Ally. Something should be done 
quickly, there is the Roumanian Army and two French divisions who would create a 
diversion to the East, which would immediately relieve the situation here as at present 
about three-quarters of the Magyar force is employed on the western front. 
We need not point out the danger of German-Austria becoming Bolshevist should the 
Magyar successes continue, and, above all, should Pressburg fall. 
Luckily we have General Pelle. He is the greatest asset, but he is quite frankly not 
optimistic and has a terribly hard task before him largely owing to the late Italian 
Command. 
I am afraid that this is not a cheerful letter, but I can assure you that I am not unduly 
pessimistic. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) Basil I [J].B. Coulson 
* D the Lloyd George Papers this letter appears as the second enclosure with a letter, dated 13 June 
1919, sent by Winston S. Churchill to D. Lloyd George. 
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No. 144 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris. 
Received 11 June 1919)] 
Very Urgent. 
[PRO CAB 21/150} 
Budapest, 9 June 1919 
It is with satisfaction that the Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils 
takes cognizance of the intention of the Governments of the Allied & Associated States 
to invite Hungary to the Peace Conference in Paris. The Republic of Hungarian 
Councils harbours no hostile feelings towards any nation and desires to live on terms of 
peace and friendship with everybody, all the more so as it does not take its stand on the 
point of view of territorial integrity; it did not mean to attack and in fact did not attack 
the Czecho-Slovak Republic with which it has always desired and still desires to live in 
terms of peace and friendship, and it always respected the lines of demarcation fixed by 
the Allied States, while acting in conformity with the clauses of the Military Convention 
of November the 13th. 
However, it has been obliged with regret to take note of the fact that the troops of the 
Czecho-Slovak Republic and of the Kingdoms of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania, acting 
under cover of the prestige attached to the Allied States and contrary to the Military 
Convention of November 13th, have broken into the territory of the Republic of the 
Hungarian Councils and have already threatened to strangle us, when, compelled by 
supreme necessity we had to take up arms. We take cognizance with satisfaction of the 
fact that the Allied States have ordered the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Kingdom 
of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania to cease their attacks against us, but we are obliged to 
note that the above mentioned States did not obey the Allies’ demand and their offensive 
was only checked by our counter-offensive and that their troops are still posted beyond 
the lines of demarcation fixed by the Convention of November 13th. 
In order to avoid useless bloodshed the Government of the Councils of the Hungarian 
Republic again declares itself ready at once to stop hostilities against all those States, so 
that the Allies may be enabled to see that their orders are obeyed by the Czecho-Slovak 
Republic and the Kingdoms of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania. With a view to the cessation 
of hostilities, the execution of the clauses of the Military Convention of Nov. 13th as 
well as to the settlement of the questions connected with it, and to the provisional 
solution of the economic questions, it seems necessary to us that the States concerned 
should send delegates to Vienna and that a committee consisting of these delegates 
should meet at once under the presidency of the representatives of one of the Allied 
States. The Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils are open to 
1 This dispatch is a reply to G. Clemenceau’s telegram to the Hungarian Government, dated 7 June 1919, 
printed as No. 138. 
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anything liable to promote a just and rightful peace and mutual confidence among 
nations and that will put an end to bloodshed for ever.2 
Bela Kun 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils 
2 For the debates in the Council of Four after the receipt of this telegram see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 
254-258, 260-261; and LINK, vol. 60, pp. 312-314. The telegram induced vigorous exchanges about the 
justifiability of the Hungarian action, and significantly accelerated the process of communicating the 
decision on the final borders between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and Romania, to the 
interested parties. For subsequent debates at the Paris Peace Conference on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak 
conflict see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 281-289 and vol. XI, p. 231; LINK, vol. 60, pp. 299-300, 343- 
344, 351-357, 363. On the communication of the new borders see FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, pp. 803-826, 
vol. VI, pp. 320-321, 351-352, 358-361; LINK, vol. 60, pp. 462, 478-479. 
The controversial issues mentioned in Bela Kun’s telegram remained unresolved until the fall of his 
Government at the beginning of August 1919. On 15 July G. Clemenceau received a long telegram from 
Bela Kun (date not indicated, see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 11, Appendix A). The telegram is very similar in 
content to the one printed here. On a copy received by the British Peace Delegation, A.W.A. Leeper 
recorded on 17 July: “As usual Bela Kun argues quite skilfully: no doubt the line of the Rumanian 
occupation was extended far beyond that of Nov. 13. He avoids however answering the Allies’ demand 
that he shall at once reduce his forces to the number permitted.” (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15428) 
No. 145 
Telegram from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 10 June 1919) 
Unnumbered [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12258] 
Prague, 9 June 1919 
Following for Mr. Headlam-Morley:- 
Military situation grave. Absolutely vital that all General Pelle’s wishes regarding 
guns, munitions and military exports should be fulfilled with minimum of delay. 
Magyars selected psychological moment when French had scarcely taken command 
and when moral of Czech army had been undermined by prolonged and deliberate 
Sabotage on the part of Italian officers. 
My suspicions of actual treachery find confirmation in highest political and military 
circles. 
Magyars unquestionably exaggerated recent Prague riots and reckoned on Bolshevist 
outbreak in Bohemia, also hoped to provoke local troubles in Slovakia behind front and 
cut main line at Rutteme by the help of Magyar railway officials. 
Widespread (group undecypherable) Budapest on part of Jewish population 
throughout Slovakia, only natural since new regime means end of their exploitation of 
peasantry. 
Signs are not wanting that Magyar action is part of far bigger design. 
Supreme attempt to establish connection with Russian Bolsheviks extends to Galicia 
and Anatolia across Carpathians and if possible establish contact with (Russian 
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Bolsheviks extends to Galicia and Anatolia across Carpathians and if possible establish 
contact with) Silesian mining districts. 
For the moment White and Red Guards are fighting side by side against Czechs. 
Attitude of the neighbourhood not satisfactory. 
Cracow Poles especially Bilinski Daszy. 
NOTE by cypherers — The last part of this telegram is unintelligible, we are trying to 
make something of it, if we are unsuccessful will ask for repetition. 
Telegram from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 
to A. J. Balfour (Paris. Received 10 June 1919) 
Prague, 9 June 1919 
Following for Mr. Headlam-Morley. 
Continuation of telegram dated June 9th. 
(Daszy) ski intriguing with Budapest and Rome, Warsaw too weak to stop them. 
Polish stoppage of Galician Oil consignments gravely complicates Slovak military 
situation. Budapest Government’s attitude here regarded as equivocal. 
Vienna’s refusal to supply munitions to Czechs has complicated situation and led to 
refusal of coal as reprisal. 
Please use utmost influence to secure, firstly, immediate (group undecypherable) 
definition of Czech’s bid against (group undecypherable) on moderate lines; secondly, 
open declaration of Entente’s solidarity with this republic; thirdly, stiff note warning 
Budapest. 
All this necessary to restoration of Entente prestige and destroy prevailing suspicion 
successfully (group undecypherable) disclosure of intrigue with Magyars. 
Naturally Czechs would also welcome immediate advance of General Francher 
[Franchet].1 
My view of internal situation optimistic, but only if Entente gives prompt material 
and moral support. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Sir Eyre Crowe first 
1. The situation, militarily is clearly desperate. 
2. Politically, the policy of choosing this moment to make up to Bela Kun and 
practically disarm our allies who are defending themselves against Bolshevism, 
is bound to lead to the complete failure of the design to set up free and 
independent States as a counterbalance to a German-Bolshevik combination. 
3. The triumph of the Bolshevist terror in Hungary, with the blessing of the Allies, 
will put an end to all hope of setting German Austria on her legs again. 
1 Gen. L. Franchet d’Esperey. 
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4. The treachery of the Italians ought to be brought to notice. It is an outrage to the 
Allied cause that Baron Sonnino should sit at the conference without being 
confronted with the disloyalty of his policy. 
E. Crowe 
11/6/19 
The situation is undoubtedly serious, and one wonders whether it is appreciated by 
the Council of Four. To give official countenance of the Allies to Bela Kun will be the 
death-blow to all anti-Bolshevist efforts in Europe and encouragement to Lenin and his 
scum. 
I agree also with Sir E. Crowe’s remarks about the underhand proceedings of the 
Italians which are the same everywhere. 
Hjardinge]. 
[To] Political Section (Sir Eyre Crowe) 
We are in full agreement with these views, & are doing our utmost to get military 
action taken against Bela Kun and his associates. 
Mr. Seton-Watson is wrong in his statement re Magyars acting “when French had 
scarcely taken command”; their offensive began while the Italians were still in charge, 
which was no doubt one of the principal causes of the Czecho-Slovak defeat. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.Col. 
19/6/19 G.S. 
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(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12385] 
Advance copy to Mr. Headlam-Morley. 
[To] Sir Eyre Crowe. 
This contains in a complete form 14 telegrams2 from Mr. Seton-Watson of which the 
first portion was sent to you yesterday. 
J.W. H[eadlam-].M[orley]. 
12/6/19 
Unfortunately the Council of Four have — so I understand — decided upon a policy 
diametrically opposed to the conditions which Mr. Seton Watson considers essential to 
a satisfactory settlement. 
E. Crowe 
12/6/19 
A.J.B[alfour]. 
H[ardinge]. 
2 Most of these seem not to have been preserved in the Public Record Office. 
No. 146 
Letter from A.W. A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract) 
[LEEP Folder 2] 
Paris, 9 June 1919 
[.».] 
We’re waiting for Council of Four decisions in order to plunge into the Hungarian & 
Balkan questions. Meanwhile the four have sent what I consider a most disastrous 
telegram to Bela Kun1 giving him the chance of saying he is being recognised and 
invited to Paris. I don’t think that was at all their intention but Fm afraid it’ll be the 
result.2 
1 See No. 138. 
2 After Bela Kun’s reply to G. Clemenceau’s telegram had been received in Paris (see No. 144), A.W.A. 
Leeper wrote in a letter to his brother on 11 June 1919: “This Hungarian business is as putrid as ever. 
Naturally, Kun Bela is delighted with his invitation. It’s insensate & heart-breaking.” (LEEP Folder 2) 
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No. 147 
Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to A. J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 12 June 1919) 
No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12375] 
Prague, 11 June 1919 
I am informed by General PELLE that in spite of Bela Kun’s reply1 to ultimatum of 
Entente,2 period of 48 hours granted has elapsed and Magyar attacks against Slovakia 
continue with much increased violence. 
He appears to wish to obtain decisive decision. 
General PELLE seems very anxious concerning situation which he regards as 
extremely grave.3 
Addressed to Foreign Office No. 118. 
1 See No. 144. 
2 See No. 138. 
3 Many more reports were sent to Paris and London until 21 June 1919 suggesting bad faith on the part 
of the Hungarian Government regarding the withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. These are two 
characteristic dispatches from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to A.J. Balfour: 
(1) “New Hungarian Minister [Em6 Czobel?] stated reply of Kun [No. 144] was to delay matters until 
Austrian [stc] turned Soviet and added forces to those of Hungary.” (Telegram No. 62, dated 13 June 
1919; PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/12497. Extract.) 
(2) “Speech of BELA KUN in BUDAPEST on June 12th shows that he has no intention of 
abandoning invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. 
He said he would negotiate but not obey command of Entente who were afraid to interfere. He hoped 
that Vienna, PRAGUE and Germany who have joined with a (? groups omitted) concentration of Red 
Troops is taking place in the neighbourhood of ESTERGON [ESZTERGOM] preparatory to attack 
on Pressburg.” (Telegram No. 68, dated 17 June 1919; PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12928.) 
Also see No. 148. 
No. 148 
Memorandum by C. Gosling (Prague), Sent to the Foreign Office (London. 
Received 18 June 1919) 
Enclosure to letter No. 76 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 90558] 
Prague, 12 June 1919 
Dr. Boh. Vydra, who was investigating ethnical problems in Upper Silesia, arrested 
by the Germans and held in prison at Ratibor for almost three months, states the 
following 
In the first half of May, about three weeks before my release from prison, which I left 
on the first of June, I had numerous talks with the leader of the Silesian Bolshevists, 
Horst Froehlich, who was in one cell with me. In one of such discussions Froehlich 
told me that the Bolshevists have their plans for domination of all Europe completely 
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worked out. The action is to begin by the attack of Magyar troops on the Czecho¬ 
slovak front, which must be broken to enable the Magyars to establish a connection 
with the Russians. In the meanwhile a revolution is to break out in Germany, which is 
to do away with the Ebert-Scheideman[n] Government, and set up a Bolshevist 
Government; after that a combined Bolshevik attack from the East and West against 
Poland is to take place, and the defeat of Polish armies serve as a signal for an attack 
against Western Europe. The Bolshevist Paradise is to prevail over the whole of Europe 
in a few years. 
Froehlich was generally well informed of the conditions in the neighbouring 
countries, especially Bohemia, but did not believe the present order of things would 
last. 
No. 149 
Telegram from G. Clemenceau (Paris) to the Hungarian Government (Budapestf 
[PRO CAB 21/150\ 
Paris, 13 June 1919 
GENERAL 
In their telegram of June 7th,1 2 the Allied and Associated Powers expressed their 
“firm determination to put an end to all useless hostilities”. To this determination they 
adhere; and they expect and require all Nations and Governments concerned to assist 
them in carrying it out. 
They have reason to think that the chief motive animating those responsible for what 
would otherwise seem senseless bloodshed is the belief that the future frontiers of the 
New States will be modified by the temporary accidents of military occupation. This is 
not so. No state will be rewarded for prolonging the horrors of war by any increase of 
territory; nor will the Allied and Associated Powers be induced to alter decisions made 
in the interests of Peace and Justice by the unscrupulous use of military methods. 
They desire therefore to declare:- 
1. That the frontiers described in the accompanying telegram3 are to be the frontiers 
permanently dividing Hungary from Czecho-Slovakia and from Roumania. 
2. That the armed forces of these States must immediately cease hostilities and retire 
without avoidable delay within the national frontiers thus laid down. 
1 This telegram is part of a series of telegrams sent to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian 
Governments, notifying them of the decision reached by the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the 
settlement of the territorial dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Hungary 
and Romania on the other. All the telegrams are reproduced in FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 411-416; the 
telegram quoted here is quoted on pp. 411-412. For the debate in the Council of Four concerning the 
difficulties of drafting this telegram see LINK, vol. 60, pp. 529-530. For the reply sent by B61a Kun see 
No. 152; for I. Bratianu’s reply see DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 47, note 2. 
2 See No. 138. 
3 Not printed. 
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The Allied and Associated Powers are aware that in certain places these frontiers cut 
railways necessary for the economic service of both the coterminous States: and also 
that there are a certain number of small frontier adjustments which can only be finally 
settled by impartial investigation on the spot. Provision for both these cases is made in 
the Treaty of Peace; and in the meanwhile, they should not be allowed to stand in the 
way of the policy insisted on by the Allied and Associated Powers. With the smallest 
goodwill they are capable of local arrangements; and, if differences should arise, these 
should be referred to Allied Officers on the spot, whose award must be treated as 
binding until Peace is finally declared. 
HUNGARY (SPECIAL) 
In accordance with these general principles the Hungarian Army now fighting in 
Czecho-Slovakia is required immediately to withdraw behind the assigned frontier of 
Hungary, within which all other Hungarian troops are required to remain. If the Allied 
and Associated Governments are not informed by their representatives on the spot 
within four days from mid-day on June 14th, 1919, that this operation is being 
effectively carried out, they will hold themselves free to advance on Buda Pesth, and to 
take such other steps as may seem desirable to secure a just and speedy Peace. 
The Roumanian troops will be withdrawn from Hungarian territory as soon as the 
Hungarian troops have evacuated Czecho-Slovakia. The Allied and Associated Powers 
must insist that, during this operation, the Roumanian troops shall be unmolested, and 
that no attempt shall be made to follow them across the Roumanian Borders. 
G. Clemenceau 
No. 150 
Letter from Captain G.H.L. Fitzwilliams (Vienna) to C.K. Butler (Trieste (?). 
Extract. Received 21 June 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13216] 
Vienna, 15 June 1919 
That the [Hungarian] Government is in a precarious condition is to be seen by the 
growth of the Anti Communistic movements instanced at every meeting of each 
workmen Guild and the fact that the members of the Government speaking at these are 
changing in tone. Further there are signs for the first time of union of these guilds 
which had formerly lacked and showed demonstrations of an Anti Jewish character. 
The suppression of the religious houses is causing local consternation and is starting 
the religious outburst directed against the Jews (of the Government members 34 in 
number 32 are Jews and even of the remaining two one an educated member and a 
Professor of the University is said to have now resigned.) 
The money question is a further cause of unrest. Sheets of notes 42 to a sheet are 
printed with the same serial number and white money now in forced circulation in the 
City is refused outside. All shops have been shut and private plundering is punished by 
public execution. Government requisitions have emptied all stores for use of Red 
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Troops and Communist people. Food is not to be bought except at price of joining the 
Red Army or working for Government and people who go out of town to country are 
allowed to bring only 50 kilos at a time and exchange and barter system prevails, 
matches, linen, leather and clothes. Money in country must be blue and this can with 
greatest difficulty only be obtained in the town. As an example of prices a goose costs 
1,600 blue Kronen. 
Discipline of Gendarmerie. The mounted Troops are in excellent order still beautifully 
mounted and under their old officers (the Commandant is a personal friend of mine). 
The infantry is less so, and the Soviet Body Guard (Lenin soldiers about 1000 mixed 
Russian and gailbirds [sic]) are out of hand the latter are quartered in the Parliament 
House and a source of danger and the Commandant de Ville (Hauptricht [Haubrich]) is 
powerless to control or disarm. 
The Government last week recommenced the taking of hostages and it is most 
significant that this time these were not chosen only from the Intelligence [sic] but also 
from the Workmens Guilds. 
The Rising in West Hungaria, it is stated, was started prematurely and possibly by a 
trick and was suppressed by an excess of bloodshed and cruelty. The railway strike 
which held up communications wholly in some places and partly in others for 8 days 
was suppressed by shootings and on other side in Budapest by concession in blue 
money. 
In my opinion the Government position is such that it might at any time be 
overthrown. The match only is required but it lacks a man to strike it. Any one found 
playing with the political matchbox would be shot at once without trial. If the 
Government falls two separate things may happen (and that separate only at the 
commencement) 
1st. If the Police under Hauptricht [Haubrich] do not hold, a pogrom will start and 
spread, massacre of the Jews on a scale hitherto unprecedented. 
2nd. If they hold, an unstable Social Democratic party requiring immediate outside 
assistance best rendered by food support and to do this properly a well organised relief 
train with food supplies and property filled up with military soup kitchens capable of 
being started at work within 6 hours of arrival should be held on the frontier. 
I am, etc.,etc., 
Gerald H.L. Fitzwilliams 
Capt. R.A.M.C. 
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No. 151 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) 
[LI G. F/197/4/4] 
Budapest, 16 June 1919 
It would be of the greatest importance if Comrade Bucharin were to come here. Now 
that we are in treaty with the Entente, although for the present only by wireless, we 
might, with Bucharin, inaugurate a foreign policy which would be of the greatest 
immediate advantage to Russia as well (as ourselves). I should require however, for 
this purpose, a man at hand like Bucharin. The matter is one of such great interest that I 
apply direct to you with this request. Please answer me personally.1 
1 There is, apparently, no record of either the receipt of this message in Moscow, or any reply to it 
received in Hungary. 
No. 152 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris. 
Received 16 June 1919f 
[FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 518-520 (Appendix II to CF-73)] 
Budapest, 16 June 1919 
(Translation from French) 
M. Clemenceau, 
President of the Peace Conference, Paris. 
We acknowledge receipt of your telegram sent in the name of the Allied and 
Associated Powers.2 The Government of the Hungarian Republic of the Councils 
expresses once more its satisfaction at the decision taken by the Allied and Associated 
Powers to put an end to all needless hostilities. We declare solemnly that our 
Government will help you with all its power to translate this intention into fact. The 
Hungarian Republic of the Councils, whose people has accomplished the greatest 
revolution in its history without, so to speak, having shed (literally “spread”) blood, has 
never been and never will be the cause of useless bloodshed. The Hungarian Republic 
of the Councils was not established for the purpose of making military conquests or 
oppressing other nations; its object is to suppress all kinds of oppression and 
exploitation. We are firmly convinced that it is not the momentary events of military 
conquest but the great interest of humanity — the common interests of the solidarity of 
workers — which will decide the frontiers of the new States, until the walls separating 
the peoples fall. Having made our fate depend on the fraternal solidarity of the workers 
1 This telegram is also reproduced in LINK, vol. 60, pp. 596-598. 
2 See No. 149. 
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of the whole world, nothing is further from our mind than a wish to prolong the horrors 
of war; every measure taken in the interest of Peace and of Justice will find a sure 
support in the Hungarian Republic of Workers. The Government of the Hungarian 
Republic of the Councils declares without hesitation, frankly and openly that not only 
will it satisfy but has already satisfied absolutely the demand of the Governments of the 
Allied and Associated Powers to cease hostilities immediately; it is not we who are the 
cause of the bloodshed which was continuing (sic) but the troops of the Czechoslovak 
Republic which, taking advantage of the fact that we forthwith suspended operations of 
war at the bidding of the Allied and Associated Powers, took the offensive; we were 
only able to repel that offensive by counter offensives the object of which was to render 
it impossible for them to continue their advance. In order to prove that we are not 
responsible for the bloodshed, we need only recall the fact that in the zone occupied by 
the Roumanians we have made no advance whatever nor even any attempts in this 
direction, the Roumanian army not having resumed its attacks against us. Nevertheless 
we must affirm that in view of the present Czecho-Slovak situation, the possibility of 
giving orders and carrying them out, the recall of our troops and the evacuation of the 
territories mentioned cannot be carried out within the period fixed by your telegram. We 
are still less able to do so in as much as we only received the telegram on June 15th at 
noon, although it was marked “Very urgent”. In order to carry out the recall of the 
troops and the evacuation of the territories without bloodshed, both on our part and on 
that of the Roumanians, we have to-day requested the Governments, that is to say the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and of the Kingdom of 
Roumania to send to our Headquarters, or to a place to be designated, military 
Delegates furnished with full powers who will be instructed to settle in agreement with 
our Chief Command the methods of evacuation. Nevertheless, we are bound to observe 
with regret that the Allied and Associated Governments have not yet given us the 
opportunity to let them know directly the vital desires of the Republic of the Councils in 
both political and economic matters, and that they have only partially let us know even 
the frontiers. We now observe that these frontiers, contrary to the declaration of the 
Allied and Associated Governments to the effect that military conquests could not serve 
as a basis for the frontiers of the new States, seem to us to be frontiers drawn solely 
with a view to the right of the strongest. Within these frontiers it is absolutely 
impossible to create a normal economic existence and productivity, since it is 
impossible, in view of the present economic situation of the world and of the 
international traffic to ensure the mere subsistence of the population living in the 
delimited territories. We await the occasion to demonstrate before the Peace Conference, 
with the support of full proof, the truth of this assertion. At the same time we call your 
attention to our demand contained in our last message to summon together the 
Governments of the Peoples of the former Monarchy to a Conference where they will 
be able to discuss the liquidation of the former Monarchy as parties equally interested. 
We do not accept the principle of territorial integrity, we leave on one side the fact that 
territories inhabited exclusively by Magyars are to be robbed from our Republic of the 
Councils as a consequence of the drawing of the frontiers: we only ask to emphasize 
one point, namely that under such conditions even a system of Government with 
foundations as solid as ours could not possibly prevent the struggle for existence 
degenerating within these frontiers into a war of every man against every man. We 
declare once more that not only have we stopped all aggressive operations on our side 
but also have taken the necessary measures to order our troops to act in accordance with 
your bidding and to make the technical preparations for that purpose; and we beg you to 
be so good as to take the necessary action with the Governments of the Czecho-Slovak 
Republic and of the Kingdom of Roumania so that they may accede to the demands we 
have addressed to them in this sense; we beg you to instruct the above mentioned 
Governments to come into direct communication with us for the purpose of carrying 
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out your orders and in particular to stop on their side also all needless bloodshed and all 
aggression, which only serve to prolong the horrors of war. 
Bela Kun 
Commissary for Foreign Affairs 
of the Flungarian Republic of the Councils 
No. 153 
Letter from Sir M. Hankey to General T.H. Bliss 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13136] 
Paris, 16 June 1919 
My dear General, 
I was asked this afternoon by President Wilson to let you know that the Council of 
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had decided to invite your views in regard 
to the proposal in the latest telegram from the Hungarian Government, dated 16th June 
noon, of which I enclose a copy,1 that a meeting should be arranged between the 
Officer commanding the Hungarian forces, on the one hand, and the Officers 
commanding the Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian forces, on the other hand, in order to 
arrange for the means of withdrawal behind the frontiers decided on. 
The Council would be glad if you would consult the Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian 
Delegations in Paris on this subject and report the result. 
To assist you in this enquiry, I enclose copies of the whole of the telegrams which 
have passed between the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the 
Hungarian, Roumanian, and Czecho-Slovak Governments on this subject.2 
Believe me, 
Yours very sincerely, 
(Sd.) M.P.A. Hankey 
1 See No. 152. 
2 Not printed. For the Council of Four’s views on arranging a meeting between the Hungarian, 
Czechoslovak and Romanian commanding officers see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 513-514; or LINK, vol. 
60, pp. 594-596. For E. BeneS’s telegrams to Gen. T.H. Bliss, dated 17 and 18 June, putting forward 
counter-proposals, i.e. that the Czech forces remain on the lines which they were then occupying, while 
the Hungarians retire, see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 555-557. For Gen. T.H. Bliss’s final report, dated 19 
June 1919, see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 552-555. In his report Gen. Bliss calls the demands made in 
Bela Kun’s telegram (No. 152) reasonable, nevertheless, he accepts E. BeneS’s proposal for a Hungarian 
withdrawal within a prescribed time limit, followed by a Czechoslovak advance to the new frontiers. In 
return, he promises that the Entente will secure the withdrawal of the Romanian troops from Hungarian 
territory in the same manner. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
Meanwhile the Hungarians are concentrating against Pressburg. 
Harold Nicolson 
21/6/19 
No. 154 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 18 June 1919) 
No. 616 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12926] 
Vienna, 17 June 1919 
Following is translation of communique by Magyar Chief Command dated June 17th. 
At the direction of the Allied Powers we have taken the necessary measures for the 
suspension of warlike operations. Nevertheless the Czechs have resorted to attacks with 
considerable force along the entire front and are ignoring the instructions of the Allied 
Powers regarding the suspension of hostilities under such circumstances our troops 
were forced to take energetic measures for defence. Vehement fighting is going on west 
of Eperjes in the Sajo valley in the Rima valley and in the neighbourhood of Leva. 
According to official Hungarian agency the Slovak rate Republic [Republic of 
Councils] has been declared.1 
Addressed Astoria and D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
This shows how important it is for Col. Coulson to be at the Czech front. I much 
doubt whether the Hungarian statements are true. 
Harold Nicolson 
19/6/19 
Nobody but an Italian would be likely to credit them. 
E. Crowe 
19/6/19 
1 A very similar dispatch (telegram No. 617) was sent by Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to Paris on 18 June. 
That, however, was accompanied by a copy of a telegram sent by the Czechoslovak Government to the 
Hungarian Government, accusing the latter of a similar degree of non-compliance with the wishes of the 
Peace Conference. (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13240) 
264 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919 
No. 155 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to General Sir H. Wilson (Paris. 
Extracts. Received 27 June 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/9 No. 41/1/7/13786] 
Vienna, 17 June 1919 
My dear General, 
I thought perhaps that you would like to have a private line from me on the situation 
at Vienna. 
We had a very serious crisis this week owing to a very determined effort by the 
Hungarian agitators to push the local Volkswehr1 into rebellion against the Socialist 
Administration. 
As soon as I returned I was able to discover the lines upon which they were working. 
There were two ostensible reasons given why the Volkswehr should side with the 
Communists, beside the moral general inducements comprised in the success of the 
Bolshevist Army in Slovakia, the impression made by the nature of the Peace terms and 
the appearance of recognition of a Bolshevist Regime by the Entente. These two 
reasons were first the demand of the Entente to reduce the Volkswehr by June 15th and 
secondly the continued residence in Vienna of Hungarian Counter-Revolutionaries. 
So I set myself to get rid of both these reasons before the day of crisis. I managed to 
get reinforcements to remove out of Vienna more than 2,000 Hungarian refugees 
including the dangerous elements represented by the politicians and ex-officers. They 
had acquired the habit of holding meetings of all sorts in offices and Hotels, they had 
carried out a raid against the Hungarian Legation, and an attempt to get into Western 
Hungary. Also a succession of attempts at gun running and risings in Western 
Hungary, all of which were so stupidly and inefficiently arranged, that the matter was 
becoming an open scandal and a target for Communist action. 
The Italian Mission did not like to tackle it officially but were glad that I should use 
my private influence to remove them which I successfully accomplished. 
Then I got all the Missions to agree to a postponement of order to diminish the 
Volkswehr, which removed that cause of complaint. 
Finally I managed through the Police and the Landeshauptmann of Vienna to get the 
Workmen’s Coucils harangued against any inopportune attempts at a coup. The 
Communists found no backing therefore in either group, and the Hungarian agitators 
having spent large sums of money gave it up in disgust. The Viennese themselves are 
opposed to all disturbance. The idea of making a “coup” at 3 a.m. did not appeal to them 
on Sunday morning, and they would’nt [sic] do it in the evening because they had to 
take their girls to the Park. This does not appear therefore to be a formidable crowd to 
deal with, but their very indifference and passivity makes them victims of more 
energetic interlopers. There was a certain amount of shooting on Sunday all the same, 
about 12 being killed and nearly 100 wounded. But the Socialists were so incensed 
against a Communist plot to kidnap the leading members of the Socialist Party that they 
will probably squash all further attempts for some time to come:- 
I am greatly puzzled at the Italian game. We know that they received 50 million 
crowns from Kun’s Government of which 15 million (£150,000 at current rates) was in 
gold. The principal evidence as to this was given by a German Count (Basselet de la 
Rose) to the Vienna Police. He stated that the money was for food “to be delivered after 
See No. 40, note 7. 
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the raising of the blockade”. Now Butler our Food Controller says that the Italians have 
no food, and certainly could not send 50 million crown’s worth. We know that a lot of 
arms of all sorts have found their way into Hungary and the Italians are suspected of 
complicity (though no case has as yet been definitely proved). As matters stand to-day, 
Kun — if he really does cave in, will lose his money and get neither food nor arms. The 
amount of money which the Bolshevists have spent is stupendous. Great sums have 
been spent in Slovakia especially among the Slovaks, also in Yugo-Slavia. We know of 
the 135 millions taken in the Hungarian Legation here, and that probably is only a drop 
in the bucket, the police have evidence of hundreds of people paid sums ludicrously 
large for the slightest of services, and I am quite sure myself that the men of the Italian 
Mission have not escaped contamination. We know that General Picciorni [Piccione] 
who commanded at Pressburg went frequently to see Kun Bela. [....] I think the French 
view that there is secret co-operation between Germany, Italy, Hungary, Austria and 
German Bohemia has certainly an element of truth, but it seems a perilous game for the 
Italians in view of the possibility of non-signature by Germany and a resumption of 
hostilities. 
I still hope that we shall find it possible to hold up Austria and to expel the 
Internationale from Hungary, otherwise we are in for trouble. Meanwhile Kun seems to 
have yielded, but he is very subtle, and I hope will not be trusted. 
Yours, etc., 
(Sd.) T. Cuninghame 
No. 156 
Letter from Sir C. des Graz. (Belgrade) to Earl Curz.on (London. 
Received 25 June 1919) 
No. 103 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 93699] 
Belgrade, 17 June 1919 
My Lord, 
TWO members of the Hungarian anti-Bolshevik Ministry formed at Szegedin, of 
which Count Julius Karolyi is the head, have paid a short visit to Belgrade and called 
on me yesterday. 
They were Vice-Admiral de Horthy, of the former Austro-Hungarian navy, “Minister 
of War” of the Szegedin Administration, and Comte Paul Teleki [Teleki], on whose 
card was written “Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Ministere de Szegedin.” 
These gentlemen gave a moving and terrible account of the horrors of Bolshevism 
which had been let loose in their country, and Comte Teleki gave very painful details of 
murderings often preceded by torture. Incidentally, he spoke of the present policy of the 
Italian Government in Hungary (and also Austria), which seemed not only 
incomprehensible but inconceivable, and of their action in supporting the Bolshevik 
regime and supplying them with both ammunition and cannon. Of this, he said, clear 
proof had been furnished to the British Military Representative in Vienna.1 Both 
gentlemen also laid stress on the requisitions and lootings of the Roumanians in the part 
of the country occupied by them. 
1 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame. 
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Admiral Horthy and Comte Teleki told me that they had come here to enlist the 
sympathy of this Government and to obtain certain facilities of transit which would 
enable them to make a start in operations against the Bolsheviks. From Szegedin the 
difficulties were too great, whereas the country to the west of the Danube would be the 
most favourable “jumping-off’ ground. To reach that from Szegedin, however, the use 
of the Serbian—Jugo-Slav railway by way of Szabatka [Szabadka] and on was 
necessary. Though with comparatively few men at present, they hoped, and indeed 
appeared to count on a very considerable number of officers and men, now forced by 
circumstances and threats from odious reprisals against their families to serve in the 
Bolshevik ranks, coming forward to meet and join them. 
I thanked these gentlemen for their visit, and confined myself to expressing fullest 
sympathy felt so universally with victims of Bolshevik terrorism. 
I hear that they were received by the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs,2 who 
was able to assure them on the part of the Government of all the sympathy against 
Bolshevism. I gather that this Government would acquiesce in the granting of such 
facilities, like those suggested, as would be approved of by the Commander of the 
French troops in that part of the country, feeling sure thus that the French General 
would only act in accordance with the desire and policy of the Allies. 
I have, etc., etc., 
Charles des Graz 
2 Mihailo Gavrilovic. Also see No. 55, note 2. 
No. 157 
Letter from Sir S. Hoare to A. J. Balfour1 
[BALF Additional 49749] 
Paris, 19 June 1919 
Dear Mr. Balfour, 
I understand from Ian Malcolm that if you had not been called to the Allied 
Conference you would have seen me for a few minutes. I should then have ventured to 
say to you the following. 
1. The essential condition of peace in Central Europe is the destruction 
of Bela Kum’s [Kun’s] Government at Buda Pesth. 
I have just returned from a fortnight’s visit to Masaryk, and have had the opportunity 
both on the Slovak front and in Prague of gauging the position. 
My conclusion after conversation with, I think every representative man in Prague, 
official and otherwise, and with General Pelle, the French Commander-in-Chief, is that 
Bela Kum [sic], having begun as an insignificant adventurer, is with the help of Magyar 
chauvinism consolidating his power. This power is of a doubly dangerous character. In 
the first place, it is an offshoot of Russian Bolshevism, its chief object being to link up 
* A longer letter, similar in content, was sent by Sir S. Hoare from Prague to Winston S. Churchill on 10 
June 1919. Churchill forwarded the letter to the Prime Minister on 15 June. It is now in Ll.G. F/8/3/63. 
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with Lenin through Galicia. In the second place, it is Magyar, and on that account 
Chauvinist in the extreme, its object being to restore Magyar domination by the 
destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. 
2. Both as an anti-Bolshevist bloc and an anti-Magyar power it is 
essential to maintain the strength and prestige of Cz.echo-Slovakia. 
The Magyar invasion has greatly shaken Czecho-Slovak prestige. Even more have the 
Allied communications to Bela Kum shaken it. Further negotiations with Bela Kum 
make it appear that Paris is prepared to recognise his Government. This will be an 
incalculable stimulus to Bolshevism first at Vienna and secondly in Slovakia. 
At present Bohemia and Moravia are strongly anti-Bolshevist. No one can, however, 
say what would be the effect of the strengthening of Bela Kum’s position through 
Allied negotiation and recognition. 
3. The Allies should insist without further delay on the Magyar 
evacuation of Slovakia. 
This must not be subject to negotiations between Masaryk and Kum. Masaryk will 
not negotiate with the Bolshevist adventurer as he knows that such negotiations would 
shake the prestige of the Anti-Bolshevists in Czecho-Slovakia. 
Within a fix period — 2 or 3 days — after Kum’s withdrawal Foch can order Pelle to 
withdraw the Czecho-Slovak forces to a determined line. 
If the Allies are satisfied that Bela Kum was the aggressor — and in my view the 
documents and evidence conclusively prove this — Bela Kum must be held responsible 
for the full cost of the Slovak invasion. 
4. If Bela Kum refuses, Franchet D'Esperey should be ordered to 
march on Buda Pesth with all the forces available. 
If no forces are available, the French, Americans and ourselves should pour 
munitions into Czecho-Slovakia, and leave it to Pelle to finish with the Magyars. In my 
view Pelle could organise a force large enough to do this. 
5. Prague is in my view the most important centre for Eastern and Central European 
questions. On this account I regard it as a calamity that we are not properly represented. 
Our whole Legation Staff is one Charge d’affaires,2 who is not only useless but 
positively harmful, and one Secretary. If no Minister is available, I consider it of vital 
importance that you should at once send a first-class Charge d’affaires, another 
secretary, and one or two Consuls or vice-Consuls. I am quite ready if you wish to 
elaborate this opinion to Curzon in London. I have, however, so often complained of 
inadequacies of our Foreign Service abroad that I am not much inclined to start a new 
campaign against it! Please, however, if you are not satisfied with the view I express, 
take steps to find out what is the real position of our Prague Mission, and if you agree 
with my criticisms, send a Charge d’Affaires in the next few days. 
I have written very hurriedly — but I hope not incoherently. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) Samuel Hoare 
2 The reference is to C. Gosling, who was British Charge d’Affaires in Prague, 13 January 1919 
24 January 1920. The first British Ambassador to be posted to Praguewas Sir G. Clerk in 1920. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
The appointment of a new Minister to Prague has already received the approval of the 
S. of State but I do not know how far the appointment of Sir G. [?C.] Young3 has been 
carried out by Ld. Curzon. 
H[ardinge], 
3 This is likely to be a reference to Sir Charles Alban Young, Bart., who became British Ambassador in 
Belgrade in September 1919 until his retirement in September 1925, and was not appointed to serve in 
Prague. 
No. 158 
Telegram from Lenin (Moscow) to Bela Kim (Budapest. Extract (?). 
Received in Paris 26 June 1919f 
[LI. G. F/46/10/5] 
Moscow, 19 June 1919 
It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a 
temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not 
trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting 
to gain time in order to be better able to crush you and us. 
Try and organise postal communication with us by aeroplane. 
* In the original file, this wireless message, together with Bela Kun’s reply (see No. 159), is enclosed 
with a letter from Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, for the 
information of the Prime Minister. An extract from the letter is printed as No. 172. The telegrams are 
preceded by the following comments: “The following correspondence has passed between Bela Kun and 
Lenin. We have obtained the information from a secret agent employed in the Hungarian Ministry at Buda 
Pest, whose reliability we are in a position to guarantee. It is essential to maintain secrecy as to this source 
of intelligence.” The message from Lenin is also preceded by the note: “(Includes the following)... ’. 
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No. 159 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow f 
[LI. G. F/46/10/5]2 
Budapest, 21 June 1919 
Dear Friend Lenin, 
I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. 
I am very proud of being one of your best pupils, but I think that in one point I am 
superior to you, namely, in the question of “mala fides”. I think I know the Entente very 
well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can 
occur, but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your 
note. 
Yours sincerely, 
Bela Kun 
1 Reply to Lenin’s telegram, dated 19 June, see No. 158. 
2 Also in Ll.G. F/197/4/4. 
No. 160 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 22 June 1919) 
No. 80 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13266] 
Vienna, 21 June 1919 
I am informed from reliable source that order issued by Bohm on June 17th and June 
18th to retire the Hungarian Army Corps to the line (? east of) Van [?Hatvan], 
Mischolz [Miskolc] was genuine but could not be carried out owing to opposition of 
Hungarian nationals [nationalists ?] and all idea of compliance with Entente demands is 
abandoned. Extremists hold position led by Samuelly [Szamuely] and orders have been 
issued to push attack as far as Brunn leaving Pressburg to north. Magyars crossed 
Neutra [Nyitra] yesterday but were set back again. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Magyar Bolsheviks & Nationalists have been accomplices on many occasions lately. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
23/6/19 
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No. 161 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 23 June 1919) 
No. 620 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13379] 
Vienna, 22 June 1919 
June 22nd. At yesterday’s sitting of Hungarian Soviet Congress devoted to 
consideration of Military situation Commander-in-Chief Boehm declared that despite 
succession of victories of Red Army present situation was not rose-coloured. Although 
yesterday Czechs were defeated near Margitfalu and put to flight north of Leva and 
although Red troops already standing far beyond Csisa and were advancing in direction 
of Aranyosmarot, victorious troops were not in high spirits as they were not properly 
supported by hinterland. Defaitism [sic] in Budapest circulation of wild rumours 
defective provisioning and bad treatment of soldiers’ families by new Bureaucracy were 
unfavourably influencing mood of troops. Attacks threatened from other directions 
apart from Czech Front. Hungary must make further preparations as with present small 
army war could not be waged on all fronts. 
Bela Kun remarked it was not object of Entente to bring peace to Hungarians but to 
throttle them therefore utmost must be done for maintenance of dictatorship of 
proletariat. During debate one member declared introduction [of] general compulsory 
military service would meet difficulties in province owing to defaitist and counter¬ 
revolutionary agitation another member saw in frontiers fixed by Entente death warrant 
for Hungary and People’s Commissary Vago demanded continuation of war against 
Czechs, Roumanians, and everyone attacking Hungary. 
Finally resolution unanimously adopted that as strong Red Army was only guarantee 
of rule of proletariat Congress ordered general mobilisation entrusting Government 
with execution [of] details. 
No. 162 
Memorandum by Major-General W. Thwaites for Lord Hardinge 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/13493] 
Paris, 24 June 1919 
Lord Hardinge. 
1. On May 30th, the C.I.G.S.1 pointed out the dangerous situation which had arisen in 
Central Europe owing to the Hungarian offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, and 
recommended that immediate military action should be taken to overthrow the existing 
Bolshevik regime in Buda Pest. 
' Gen. Sir H. Wilson. 
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2. An exchange of telegrams then took place with Bela Kun, and on June 14th he was 
told by the Supreme Council that, if the retirement of Hungarian forces had not 
commenced by noon, June 18th, the Allied and Associated Governments would hold 
themselves free to advance on Buda Pest. On June 16th, Bela Kun replied in terms 
which, in the opinion of the C.I.G.S., constituted a flat refusal of our ultimatum. Other 
counsels, however, prevailed, and our relations with Bela Kun have been re-opened, in 
spite of the fact that six days have elapsed since the expiration of the ultimatum on June 
18th and that the Hungarian attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks have continued on the 
whole front, with redoubled vigour. A new Division has been put into line, and a 
concentration of Red troops is taking place in Western Hungary, with the apparent 
object of attacking Pressburg, and possibly with a view to an ultimate advance on 
Vienna. 
3. The gravity of the situation has been pointed out repeatedly by our military and 
political representatives in Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Germany, Rumania and 
Jugo-Slavia, as well as by the political and military sections of the Peace Delegation in 
Paris. The position has now become far more serious, for the following reasons:- 
(a) The morale of the Czecho-Slovak troops is low, and they are short of arms and 
ammunition. 
(b) The town of Pressburg, containing the only Czecho-Slovak powder factory, is 
menaced, and its capture by the Hungarians is reported to be imminent. 
(c) The Hungarians have occupied a large portion of Slovakia. A Bolshevik 
Republic has been proclaimed there, and is in communication with Lenin. 
(d) Conditions in Austria, especially in Vienna, are dangerous, and the country may 
turn Bolshevik at any time, even without armed Hungarian intervention. 
(e) The Hungarian forces are well armed and equipped. Their factories are working 
at full pressure, turning out large quantities of guns, machine guns, rifles and 
ammunition. 
(f) The value of the Hungarian army has increased enormously. Its strength has 
doubled, i.e. has risen from 110,000 to 220,000 men in the last 7 weeks. In 
organization, discipline and morale, it has improved beyond all recognition. 
Nationalism has reconciled many Hungarians to Bolshevism, and the whole 
spirit of the people is changing. 
4. From a military point of view the potential danger of the situation is very great. Our 
information shows that the Italians have been assisting the Hungarian Bolsheviks: Bela 
Kun has defeated the Czecho-Slovaks and, if his power is not soon destroyed, will be 
in a position to crush the Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs in detail: there is the possibility of 
combined action between Germany, Austria and Hungary which, in view of the risk of 
a Polish-German conflict and of the Bolshevik peril further east, is a serious 
consideration: lastly, the political and economic settlement of Europe is being seriously 
delayed and even jeopardised by our failure to put an end to Bela Kun’s regime. 
5. There is no evidence of any intention on the part of the present Hungarian 
Government to accept our terms. At a sitting of the Hungarian Soviet Congress, held on 
June 21st to consider the military situation, Bela Kun asserted that the object of the 
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Entente is not to give peace to the Hungarians, but to throttle them.2 Amongst other 
speeches, all in a similar strain, was one by Vago, one of the Jewish Army Corps 
Commanders, demanding continuation of the war against the Czecho-Slovaks and 
Rumanians. As a result of these speeches a resolution was unanimously adopted 
authorising the Congress to order an immediate general mobilization, the Government 
to be entrusted with the execution of the details. 
6. In view of these considerations, I again urge the necessity of military intervention. It 
is more than likely that, as soon as the Hungarians realise that orders for a military 
advance on Buda Pest have actually been given, they will surrender, and yield to us the 
obedience which the despatch of telegrams has not succeeded in extorting. 
W. Thwaites 
Maj. Gen. D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Lord Hardinge 
I think the P.M. ought to see this. 
W. Thwaites 
D.M.I. 
24/6/19 
A just decision on the part of the Council of Four seems urgently required. 
E. Crowe 
25/6/19 
This seems to me to be now out of the hands of the civilians. Foch is in command. 
[Unidentified] 
[To] Sir Maurice Hankey 
Please bring this to the notice of the Prime Minister. 
W. Thwaites 
Maj. Gen. D.M.I. 
26/6/19 
2 See No. 161. 
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No. 163 
Letter from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to H. Nicolson (Paris. 
Received 3 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/14217] 
Bucharest, 24 June 1919 
My dear Nicolson, 
I have been trying to reply to your letter for some time but have been so busy that I 
trust you will excuse me. 
In my opinion, by far the most important question at the moment is the attitude of the 
Conference towards Hungary. To us here it is utterly incomprehensible. Presumably it 
is admitted that it is not exactly good for the health of Europe to have the open sore of 
Bolshevism so near its vitals as Hungary? A month or two ago, when Bela Kun’s 
imitation of Red Russian methods in Transylvania goaded the Roumanians into their 
advance, the the whole cancer of Bolshevism could have been cut out with one turn of 
the wrist. For some — to me inexplicable — reason the victorious Roumanian troops 
were stopped on the Theiss, when Bela Kun and his Bolsheviks were literally at the last 
gasp. I have authentic information as to the latter being unable to credit the news of the 
Allies’ prohibition to Roumania, as being too good to be true. Knowing their own 
intentions they could not believe that the Allies could be so foolish as to protect them 
from their impending fate, and give them the necessary time to organise for the carrying 
out of the nefarious schemes they had in hand. I wonder does any one in Paris have an 
idea of what Bela Kun’s ideas are. You are no doubt aware — it was reported from here 
— that a secret courier between Lenin and Kun was seized by the Roumanians. On him 
were found papers proving conclusively that the two Bolshevik leaders were acting in 
close accord. The idea is that as soon as Bolshevik Hungary is properly organised she 
should attack Vienna and install a Bolshevik Government there. An Austro-Hungarian 
Red force will then move towards Italy, where, according to Lenin, the country is ripe 
for Bolshevism, and is only awaiting such an opportunity as would be afforded by the 
approach of a Bolshevik force. The Russian Red forces are to look after Roumania, and 
Bulgaria is to do her part in this. Serbia will not be able to do more than look after 
herself, as trouble can, and will be arranged for her by means of the Croats. The latter 
are claimed to be well on the way to conversion. Czecho-Slovakia is very weak and 
may safely be neglected, especially if previously overawed by a few proofs of 
Bolshevik strength. 
Please don’t think there is any doubt about this scheme. It may not be realisable, 
though I think that, thanks to the infatuation for Bela Kun at the Conference there is 
now a fair chance of its success, especially if the Bolsheviks are given just a little more 
time. But that it is the firm intention of Bela Kun and Lenin to carry it out, I am 
convinced. 
Thanks to our kindness, the Hungarian Army is now reorganised and trained by 
German officers, and according to prisoners’ reports there are already 12 battalions 
composed almost entirely of German troops from Mackensen’s late army. The 
suppression of the Hungarian Bolsheviks is, therefore, a very different proposition now 
from what it was even a month ago. 
The folly of allowing this state of things to come about appears so stupendous that 
one is absolutely bewildered by it. I can only suppose that the Conference has been 
influenced by considerations of which I can have no knowledge. 
Of course Hungary has, no doubt, a non-Bolshevik majority. But one is making a 
very great mistake if one thinks that this majority can assert itself for some time to come 
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without outside assistance. Anyhow I should be most grateful to you if you could let 
me know what are the considerations which have influenced the Conference in taking 
up their attitude towards the Hungarian question. At present I am absolutely at sea, as 
the urgent necessity for the suppression of the Bolshevik element in Hungary appears 
to everyone here so patent, as to be hardly worth while pointing out. 
I have no time to write anything on the internal situation, but no doubt you know all 
about this, and you probably see my despatches on the subject. If Take Ionesco can 
unite with Maniu I think they should be able to establish a strong Government. 
Especially if we strengthen their hands by omitting the hated foreign minorities clause, 
and giving them certain concessions of a financial and economic nature. We should, of 
course, make it clear that we are only doing this on account of the more reasonable 
attitude taken up by these three leaders in regard to Roumanian claims than has been 
shown by the present Government. 
Yours ever, 
Frank Rattigan 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Mr. Rattigan’s information agrees with other information received: the para about 
Mackensen’s troops requires confirmation. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
3/7/19 
[To] D.M.I. 
Although I think Mr. Rattigan has exaggerated the number of German troops serving 
in the Hungarian army, the remainder of his letter is interesting, and it is easy to 
understand his point of view. We have, for 2 months, worked hard to overthrow the 
Bolshevik regime in Hungary, & to restore law & order, but our recommendations have 
not been adopted. The situation is far more difficult now than it was. 
W.L.O. Twiss 
Lieut. Col. G.S. 
4/7/19 
And the situation will continue to get worse as time is wasted in coming to some 
decision as to how to deal with it. 
W. Thwaites 
Maj. Gen. D.M.I. 
4/7/19 
The point as to the Minorities is being dealt with separately. 
J.W.H[eadlam-].M[orley], 
8/7/19 
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No. 164 
Letter from Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 24 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/16072] 
Vienna, 24 June 1919 
Sir, 
I have the honour to forward the following report on my departure from Budapest. 
For several weeks I have been in touch with the leaders of the various Trades Unions, 
meeting them openly in order to discuss with them their opinions on the policy and 
practical working of the present Government. This was necessary and of great value as 
there existed amongst the Trades Unions a large and rapidly growing dislike of and 
distrust in the future of the actual Communist Government. These men represented 
various Unions comprising approximately 700,000 men in Budapest and another 
500,000 in the country. They wished the overthrow of the present Regime and the 
establishment of a Socialist Government on moderate lines. They willingly and at once 
admitted: 
1) The complete disassociation of [? from] the Bolshevist Government of Russia. 
2) Stoppage and disassociation with all forms of propaganda. 
3) The re-establishment of the economic principle of private property. 
4) The establishment (immediately the country was in a state to ensure free and secret 
vote) of a house of representatives and, as they suggested and insisted on, a 
constitutional Government on the lines of the British Government excepting that their 
upper house should not be hereditary but elected or chosen from the leading men in all 
professions. 
They could not, however, throw out the present Bolshevist Government and establish 
this moderate Socialist Government without some assistance, or at least definite 
assurances of assistance, from the Entente, as the general terror established by Kun 
regime was too real and too great. Also if the Socialists did throw over the 
Government, the difficulties of straightening out the appalling tangle and 
disorganization produced by three months of Bolshevism was beyond their powers, 
unless they could receive very definite assurances of assistance from the Allies. These 
circumstances I reported personally and in writing to Col. Sir Thomas Cuninghame, 
and endeavoured through him to obtain some of the Allies’ policy with respect to these 
conditions. I was not however able to obtain anything definite. 
I have also for the last two months been obtaining and forwarding to Col. Sir T. 
Cuninghame important information on military subjects and operations, and to Major 
Vischer1 in Vienna equally important informations with regard to Bolshevistic agents, 
activities, and propaganda. I attached very great importance to these informations and I 
am informed by Sir T. Cuninghame that they have been of the utmost value. During the 
last two months the Hungarian Government have shown a growing disinclination to 
* The editor has not been able to identify this person beyond doubt. A (temporary) Major H. Vischer 
appears in the British Army List for February 1916 as a 3rd grade General Staff Officer. 
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respect foreign property and even foreign subjects and as the attempt to enforce this 
respect has always been my principal work, this attitude of the Government has given 
rise to continual trouble. 
At the beginning of June an order was issued and circulated confidentially by the 
Government that Kun’s declaration to General Smuts of April 4th regarding foreign 
property2 could be considered void, and that these persons and property were to be 
treated as Hungarian; and also all possible obstructions were to be placed in way of my 
attempts to uphold the rights of foreigners. My communication with Vienna were 
entirely obstructed and I had to organize such methods of communication as were 
possible. 
On June 5th I was placed on the political police list as “a known spy who holds 
communication with Anti-Communist elements, under continual surveyanceJX”. 
All the above circumstances made my position at Budapest which has always been 
undefined, and without practical backing, almost untenable, and increased my work to 
such a degree as to be impossible of execution. I was however particularly anxious to 
remain at Budapest until after the preliminary Soviet Council of June 12th and 13th and 
the General Soviet Council of June 14th onwards, when I hoped the Socialists would 
elect an entirely Socialist and non Communist group of Soviet Leaders. This actually 
occurred on June 12th, but was negatived by a trick and threat on the part of the 
Government. On the first vote (secret) all the Soviet Leaders (II) [?] were Socialist and 
non Communist. The Government immediately declared this vote a “formal error” and a 
group of the terror guard or “sons of Lenin” were introduced into the hall and another 
vote taken by a show of hands, so that, as Bohm said, the wishes of the voter might be 
seen. This vote then elected 75% Communists, and it is interesting to note that most of 
the principal men who voted Socialist were arrested that night. The Government after 
saying that they were unauthorized arrests by unauthorized persons, had not however 
released them by June 18th. At the General Soviet Council a very large quantity of 
pointless and unimportant speeches have been delivered and it is interesting to note that 
in nearly all these speeches it is admitted that the present regime is quite unpracticable 
without a world revolution. Kun by his various speeches and non compliance with the 
orders of the Entente, has many times shown that he has no intention of carrying out 
these wishes. 
The general public in Budapest who are dearly longing for Entente intervention, have 
almost lost all hope of any defined Allied policy in that direction and are exasperated at 
the Entente’s weak policy in allowing a small party of despicable and unscrupulous 
jews [s/c] to ruin Hungary financially and economically, and so disturb the commercial, 
political and economic situation of the whole of S.E., if not the whole of Europe, as to 
retard the development of the new small nations and the resumption of normal 
conditions to a most serious degree. 
On June 15th an order was issued by the Government that, as I was dangerous to the 
existence of the Dictature of the Proletariat, I was to be arrested as soon as any 
excuse could be found. The day after I learned from a sure source that this order 
coupled with the name of Oberlieutenant Groidl^who has been since December my 
liaison Officer) was communicated to the terror guard. The rather frequent 
disappearances of late have been all due to this troop. As my utility did not, I consider, 
warrant my remaining I decided to leave by the first opportunity consistent with dignity. 
On June 18th I had a train leaving for Vienna, with horses and cars (ex Vix Mission) 
and 150 refugees and I managed to leave quietly by this train without the Government 
being aware of my departure. I regret I could not inform anyone of my leaving, as this 
undoubtedly involved unnecessary risk of incident. Oberlieutenant Groidl succeeded in 
getting away disguised. 
2 
* 
See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. 
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I have been unable to report continuously and fully to you, but I have been so 
carefully watched, even to the extent of microphones in my room, that communication 
with Col. Sir T. Cuninghame was all that I could manage. I do not wish to give you the 
impression that my presence in Budapest was generally unpopular. This was very far 
from the case. Throughout I have always been very well known, liked, and very well 
treated by everyone in Budapest. From all points of view, (except personal comfort), 
my necessitated departure is unfortunate. 
I have, etc., etc., 
(Sd.) F. Williams-Freeman 
Lieut.-Cmdr. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
We have of course had all this information, and you have seen Commander Williams- 
Freeman. We have forwarded a report on his work, which, from our point of view, has 
been excellent. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.-Col. 
25/7/19 G.S. 
(From) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 104873]3 
Lieut. Commander Freeman has done wonderfully well, and we can only hope that 
this report will have some effect with the Peace Delegates. Mr. Balfour has already 
received a full exposition of Ld. Curzon’s views. See 101018.4 
C.H.S[mith], 
21/7/19 
3 The report was received in London on 18 July 1919. 
4 See No. 184. 
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ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 164 
Petition Presented by the Society of Awakening Hungarians 
to Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman (Received in Paris 21 July 1919)* * * * 5 
(From) [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/15745] 
PETITION 
addressed by the “Society of Awakening Hungarians” to 
Lieut. Commander Freeman, as Chief of the Entente Mission in Budapest.6 
Honoured Sir, 
The “Society of Awakening Hungarians” has the honour to request you, in view of 
the utter devastation brought about in Hungary by Bolshevism, as well as of the 
despairing cry of an overwhelming majority of her people, to take immediate steps for 
the deliverance of Hungary and Budapest, and for the occupation of that country by 
British troops. 
In explanation of our respectful request, we beg leave to recall the following 
circumstances: 
The Hungarian National Anthem, National Colours, cockade and white flowers were 
the emblems of the Revolution of 31st October, 1918, therefore it was only natural that 
the entire “magyarsag”7 became inspired with the spirit of revolution; moreover, as 
Count Michael Karolyi inscribed on his banner, the principles of independence, defence 
of our frontiers, separation from hated Austria and the dissolution of the German 
alliance. 
Count Michael Karolyi will have to answer before the tribunal of history for his 
infidelity to all these principles, and for daring to gamble away the whole of Hungary as 
if it were his own personal property. 
On Bela Linder, Minister of War, lies the responsibility for the breaking up of the 
Army, one of the reasons for the tide of disaster which has swept upon us. 
The Ministers Barnabas Buza, Sigismund Kunfi and Oscar Jaszi are also to be held 
responsible for the grievous sins committed against the nation. 
From the very moment it assumed power, the Karolyi Government began to prepare 
the way in a well-planned out manner for Bolshevism, until on the 21st March, 1919, 
after a coup d’etat unparalleled in history, the reins of Government passed into the 
hands of the Bolshevists. 
This manner of gambling with power explains to the whole world the no doubt 
incomprehensible circumstances that contrary to the will of the people, Bolshevism 
assumed rule in the country without one drop of blood being shed. 
6 The date of this document is uncertain, though presumably it was written before 18 June 1919, the date 
of Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s departure from Hungary. The petition, as received by the British 
Peace Delegation in Paris, was accompanied by two similar petitions, one of unidentified origin, and one 
by the National Central Trust Company in Budapest. Both associated themselves with the principles and 
aims of the Society of Awakening Hungarians, and were signed by fifteen and twelve persons 
respectively. 
6 Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman was not Chief of the Entente Mission in Budapest. His status was 
never defined precisely, and this may have given rise to the incorrect use of the title here. He was 
formally the representative in Budapest of Admiral Sir E.C.T. Troubridge, President of the Inter-Allied 
Danube River Commission, based in Belgrade. 
n 
Magyarsag: Magyardom or Hungariandom, the whole Hungarian people. 
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Furthermore, Count Michael Karolyi went so far as to utter the falsehood that the 
Social-Democratic Party and Communist Party, united under the title of the Socialist 
Party, were prepared if necessary to defend the territorial integrity of Hungary by force 
of arms. 
As soon, however, as the Bolshevists took over the Government, they announced 
officially that they were no longer in support of the principle of territorial integrity. 
Their first action was to disarm the bourgeoisie, and arm the misguided proletariat, 
literally surrounding themselves with a rampart of bayonets, and employing the most 
unimaginable system of terror and espionage to further their aims. 
We shall not attempt to describe the sufferings and destruction brought upon our 
country, already in a state of utter exhaustion, by Bolshevism. Let it suffice to state that 
the losses sustained by us during four and a half years of fighting for foreign 
ambitions, pale when compared with them, and that conflagration, floods and 
earthquakes could not have brought the country to such a state of devastation. 
The immense and irremediable harm caused to life and property are as nothing, 
however, when compared with the moral injury inflicted on the youth and uneducated 
classes of Hungary by the dictatorship and official propaganda of the Bolshevists. 
It is already an established fact that the destruction with which the whole world is 
threatened is due to the machinations of international Jews, whose policy is to stir up 
discord between the classes and set whole countries ablaze solely with a view to filling 
their own coffers. 
After us the deluge , declare the Jews by whom the principles of Bolshevism are 
interpreted as follows: “What’s yours is mine, but what’s mine is my own; what you 
may do I may do, but what I may do, you may not do”. 
All classes of society throughout the entire country hold the Jews responsible for the 
sufferings which have already gone beyond endurance, and feel instinctively that alone, 
England, the most powerful and noblest of nations, can save us from complete ruin. 
This, honoured Sir, is the desire and general opinion of the people, which the 
“Society of Awakening Hungarians” considers it incumbent on it to bring to your 
notice. 
The “Society of Awakening Hungarians” is not a political party; it is the throbbing 
heart of the Hungarian nation beating high above all political parties and Jewish 
terrorism. 
We make an honourable request; liberate us before it is too late, and we on our part 
will do all we can. 
In addition to this letter, a fresh petition, bearing the signatures of hundreds of 
thousand[s] of our people, will shortly be placed before you, in which the wish will be 
expressed that England should take Hungary under her protection and establish 
political, economic, industrial, commercial and cultural ties between the two countries. 
Such a connection would be equally advantageous on both sides.8 We have been 
plundered of everything, but our soil is fertile and our bodies strong. 
Accept, Sir, the assurance of our esteemed respect. 
8 No such petition has been traced by the editor. 
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No. 165 
Telegram from Clement-Simon (Prague) to S. Pichon (Paris. 
Received 25 June 1919) 
No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13764] 
Prague, 24 June 1919 
Conformement aux instructions du Marechal Foch, le General Pelle a adresse a Bela 
Kun communication lui indiquant le delai et les conditions de l’evacuation. Celle-ci 
devait commencer ce matin 24 juin a 5 heures; les premieres nouvelle que Ton regoit de 
l’armee font penser que les Hongrois se retirent en effet. Bela Kun dans sa reponse a la 
communication de M. Pelle avait d’ailleurs fait connaitre qu’il acceptait de se conformer 
a la procedure prescrite par le General. Dans ces conditions, des negotiateurs tcheques 
se rendront demain a midi a Presbourg avec les (delegues) hongrois pour regler les 
details, c’est a dire determiner les points qui doivent jalonner la limite d’occupation de 
chacune de deux armees. Bela Kun semblait avoir voulu conclure dans les negotiations 
les questions interessant la Roumanie et aussi les questions d’indemnites. Le General 
Pelle tres sagement a repondu que pour les deux objets il ne pourrait que transmettre a 
la Conference de Paris les communications qui lui seraient faites par les Magyars. 
Clement-Simon. 
No. 166 
Telegram from H. Alliz.e (Vienna) to S. Pichon (Paris. Received 26 June 1919) 
No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13764] 
Vienna, 25 June 1919 
Le Gouvernement Bolchevik hongrois fait publier ici une depeche au President de la 
Conference de la Paix indiquant qu’il n’evacuera pas les territoires tcheco-slovaques 
occupes sous pretexte qu’il veut des garanties supplemental de l’Entente. Cette 
nouvelle nous confirme l’opinion generale sur la mauvaise foi de Bela-Kun et la 
necessite ou les Allies se trouveront de proceder a son egard par la (force). 
Le Comite executif central des Congres des Soviets hongrois a procede au 
renouvellement des Commissions du Peuple. 
Les elections ont ecarte (2 gr. fx) socialistes marquant: GARBAI, KUNFI, BOEHM, 
RONAY [RONAI], SZABADOS, BOKANYI qui sont remplaces par des 
communistes, ALEXANDRE GAR (BA) I, ancien magon et depuis vingt ans a la tete 
du mouvement socialiste en Hongrie, avait ete le premier President du Gouvernement 
revolutionnaire. (2 gr. tronques). Le Docteur KUNFI commissaire du peuple pour 
l’instruction publique socialiste la plus (forte) personnalite du parti socialiste hongrois, 
avait d’abord approuve l’etablissement de la dictature du proletariat et la creation d’une 
armee rouge, mais il s’etait prononce depuis quelque temps contre la tendence 
communiste et surtout contre l’influence exageree de Lenine et des bolcheviks russes 
sur Bela-Kun et le mouvement hongrois; Guillaume Boehm generalissime de l’armee 
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hongroise et ci-devant Ministre de la Guerre, apprecie pour ses qualites d’organisation, 
etait devenu suspect aux yeux de Bela-Kun, de favoriser Finfluence purement socialiste 
au sein du Gvt. des Conseils. Romay [Ronai] (gr. fx) etait commissaire du peuple pour 
la Justice et s’opposait a une politique de terrorisme. La reduction des commissaires du 
peuple de 36 a 11 ne laisse au pouvoir que 3 des anciens dirigeants socialistes des plus 
obscurs et de tendance extrdmiste [extremiste] (gr. fx.) Pogany, Landler et Varga. 
Le nouveau president du Conseil executif, Alexandre Dovesak [Dovcsak] s’est 
signale comme agitateur communiste pendant sa captivite en Russie.1 Les elections 
d’hier qui font sortir du Gvt. les principaux chefs socialistes attestent une orientation 
plus prononcee vers Fextreme gauche dans le mouvement bolchevique hongrois. 
Cependant les deux plus celebres terroristes sont egalement ecartes Szamuely, president 
du Conseil de Guerre, et Bila-Bayu [? Bela Vago] qui commandait un corps d’armee 
rouge. 
Allize. 
* It was later revealed that Antal Dovcsak had not been taken prisoner in Russia. (Source: Gybrgy 
Borsanyi, Kun Bela, Budapest, 1979, p. 55.) 
No. 167 
Telegram from Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extract. Received 26 June 1919) 
No. 623 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/13652] 
Vienna, 25 June 1919 
[....] No news from Hungary later than 21st when position of Communists between 
national feeling of the army led by Stromfeld on one side and of Socialists under Kunfi 
on other as causing great difficulty to the administration not known yet what political 
effect of compliance with Entente demands will be. 
No. 168 
Letter from Marshal F. Foch to G. Clemenceau 
No. 3128 (? ) [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14178] 
Paris, 25 June 1919 
Les Telegrammes adresses par le Conseil Supreme des Allies, le 13 et le 21 juin 
dernier, aux Gouvernements Hongrois et Roumain,1 prevoient que les troupes 
roumaines seront retirees du Territoire hongrois aussit6t que les troupes hongroises 
auront evacue la Tcheco-Slovaquie. 
' For the telegram sent to the Hungarian Government see No. 149. 
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II y a lieu de penser que la Roumanie se conformera scrupuleusement aux decisions 
de la Conference de la Paix. Mais on ne saurait se dissimuler que, dans les 
circonstances actuelles, la Roumanie se trouverait placee dans une situation difficile a la 
suite du retrait de ses forces de la THEISS, si ce retrait n’etait pas subordonne a 
quelques mesures de precaution indispensables. 
Obligee de maintenir sur le Dniester et en Bukovine la majeure partie de ses forces 
pour tenir en echec le bolchevisme russe, elle ne peut, en effet, disposer sur ses 
frontieres que d’un nombre limite de Divisions, et ce nombre ne peut etre augmente 
pour le moment, en raison des evenements de Galicie ou la poussee bolchevique 
menace de rompe la liaison etablie entre polonais et roumains. 
Grace a l’obstacle de la THEISS, l’Armee roumaine de l’Ouest suffit a couvrir 
efficacement la Transylvanie, mais retiree sur la frontiere qui vient d’etre fixee pour la 
Roumanie et ou aucun obstacle serieux ne permet de renforcer la defense, elle serait 
incapable de s’opposer a une offensive de l’Armee hongroise, libre de porter vers la 
Transylvanie tout l’effort des huit divisions qu’elle a mobilisees en violation de 
1’Armistice du 13 Novembre [1918]/1) lin the oriSinal] 
Pour mettre la Roumanie a l’abri du danger hongrois, et pour eviter de compromettre 
l’ceuvre de l’Entente en Europe Sud-Orientale, il importe done de subordonner le retrait 
des forces roumaines a l’Est de la THEISS a l’application integrate par la Hongrie des 
clauses de 1’Armistice du 13 Novembre, e’est-a-dire de lui imposer une demobilisation 
immediate, la reduction de son armee a six division sur pied de paix, et la repartition de 
ces divisions sur son Territoire dans des conditions qui excluent toute menace 
d’offensive contre ses voisins. 
Tai l’honneur de soumettre cette question a votre examen, afin que vous puissiez 
proposer a la Conference de la Paix l’adoption des mesures necessaires. 
Signe: Foch. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
It is to be hoped that Marshal Foch’s conditions can be realised. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
3/7/19 
[To] Lord Hardinge (for Mr. Balfour) 
The Hungarians have placed themselves entirely in the wrong by violation of the 
terms of the armistice of Nov. 13th, 1918. It is logical & essential that they should 
disarm before the Roumanians quit their present strong positions, covered by the 
formidable obstacle of the Theiss with broken bridges. 
A retirement to the new frontier line, which presents no military strength, in the face 
of a strong Hungarian Army, with a rascal like Bela Kun in power, would invite 
disaster. 
W. Thwaites Maj. General 
4/7/19 D.M.I. 
(1) [in the original] . L’armistice du 13 Novembre fixait a 6 D.I. [Division d’Infanterie] et 2 D.C. 
[Division de Cavalerie] sur le pied de paix le maximum des forces a maintenir sous les armes par la 
Hongrie. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 283 
[To] D.M.I. 
You have already discussed with me the danger of a Rumanian withdrawal, whilst the 
Hungarian forces are at their present strength & efficiency. As long as the Rumanian 
army is protected by the Theiss, it is fairly safe, but once it retires to its frontiers, it 
certainly couldn’t hope to offer a successful resistance to the Hungarians. 
The Hungarian army is now over 200,000 strong & is steadily increasing. Since the 
telegrams in question were sent, general mobilization has been ordered, & the army has 
risen from 150,000 to over 200,000. It is essential to enforce reduction of the 
Hungarian army to the strength allowed under the armistice of Nov. 13th T8, under 
Allied control, before the Rumanians retire. 
In view of:- 
(a) The known bad faith of Bela Kun’s Government. 
(b) The breaking by the Hungarians of the Armistice conditions. 
(c) The announcement of general mobilization on June 21st. 
We have good reasons for delaying the withdrawal of the Rumanians till the 
Hungarian strength has been reduced. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lt. Col. 
4/7/19 G.S. 
(From) [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14334]2 
As regards the Roumanian forces, any advance on their part has been forbidden by 
the Supreme Council. They are not, however, obliged to begin their withdrawal till the 
Magyar Communist forces have evacuated the whole of Cecho-Slovakia & in this 
connection the weighty considerations urged by Marshal Foch must be taken into 
account. 
2 The main document in this file is printed as No. 180. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
4/7/19 
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No. 169 
Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) toA.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 26 June 1919) 
No. 34 [LI. G. F/46/10/6]1 
Prague, 25 June 1919 
No. 122. Addressed to F.O. 
At a meeting to-day at French Legation of Foreign Representatives at Prague, General 
Pelle made an exposition of military situation in Slovakia. He stated as follows:- in spite 
of cessation of hostilities on both sides the Magyar army shows no signs of intending 
to withdraw from occupied territory. In view of bad faith which Magyars have 
constantly shown General Pelle considers that Magyars are not to be trusted and that 
they may concentrate on weak spot of Czech line and attack; in which case as they are 
superior in men, arms and ammunition disaster to Czech forces might ensue. 
General Pelle definitely stated that in his opinion Magyars will not withdraw their 
troops unless force is brought to bear upon them by (? entente) (group undecypherable) 
in the event of defeat of Czech arms whole of Slovakia might become actively 
Bolshevist and that Vienna, Roumania and Italy might be affected in same manner. 
Most of the fertile lands of Slovakia are in the hands of Magyars and crops are due to 
be cut in fifteen days while food is much needed in Budapest. 
[The following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies precedes 
the above telegram in the original file:] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 27 June 1919 
My dear Davies, 
General Thwaites asked me to send you this telegram, for the information of the 
Prime Minister. I believe the Hungarians are now likely to refuse to withdraw, on the 
plea that they have no guarantee that the Rumanians will retire, 
Yours sincerely, 
W.L.O. Twiss 
1 The telegram is also located in PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13700. 
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No. 170 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris)1 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/13774] 
Budapest, 26 June 1919 
Monsieur CLEMENCEAU, President de la Conference de la Paix, Paris - 
Nous regrettons n’avoir pas refu de reponse a notre question que nous avons adresse 
a vous au sujet des garanties a offrir par les roumains. Nous avons cesse les hostilites, 
nous avons satisfait au desir de la Conference de la Paix de mettre un terme a toute 
effusion de sang et, alors que nous avons arrdte les hostilites et avons interdit a nos 
soldats tout[e]s operationjs] de guerre, les troupes roumaines profitent de cette attitude 
de notre armee pour nous attaquer a KIRALYHELMEC. Les roumains ont ainsi de 
nouveau enfreint d’une maniere flagrante a l’ordre formel de la Conference de la Paix de 
mettre fin a toute inutile effusion de sang, et, comme ils ont prouve par ce fait qu’ils ne 
respectent nullement les decisions de la Conference de la Paix, qui est-ce qui nous 
garantira qu’ils retireront leurs troupes des territoires occupes ainsi que Monsieur de 
[sic] President fa [sic] promis au nom des Puissances Alliees et Associees? 
En attendant votre reponse.2 
(Sd.) Bela Kun 
Commissaire des Affaires Etrangeres de la 
Republique des Conseils Hongroise. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
As far as we know, there was no Roumanian attack. The story is probably a mere 
pretext to delay withdrawal & to avoid compliance with our terms. 
The situation may change, now that the Germans have signed the Peace Treaty. Bela 
Kun no doubt hoped that this would not happen, & will realise that, now that this stage 
has been reached, the Allies will be more free to deal with him. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
1/7/19 G.S. 
1 The English translation of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, p. 706, and in LINK vol 
61, p. 196. 
2 For the discussion of this dispatch in the Council of Four see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI. pp. 701 and 758, 
or LINK, vol. 61, p. 195. 
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No. 171 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to the 
American Relief Administration (Paris. Received 26 June 1919) 
No. not known [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13781] 
Vienna, 26 June 1919 
On Tuesday1 attempt made against Soviet Government, Budapest: succeeded in 
capturing three monitors and three smaller craft which are still held against Government 
on river. Government officers in Hungarian [Hungaria] Hotel shelled but official 
reports from Soviet Government state leaders of movement arrested. Many anti- 
government demonstrations made and old flags flown. 
In view of this fact if some Entente action is taken, it would be appropriate time. 
Entente is in difficult position to ask Czechs or Roumanians, in view of the fact that the 
Hungarians have just complied with demand to retire, and therefore some demand 
would have to be made to put Entente in position to make request for Czechs, 
Roumanians and Serbs to advance. As Hungarians never have delivered up, as required 
by Armistice, guns and ammunition of Mackensen’s army which they are using and 
which they had planned to use for the disturbance of peace in Central Europe, they 
should be required, within a definite short time, and as they will not do this, then 
Entente could arm and munition Czechs, and then a combined advance, at same time 
distributing statements from aeroplanes so that the people could not be fooled by 
government statements. 
If peace concluded with Germany and Austria without stabilizing Hungary, it is not a 
settlement of war over here. Now that Germany is settled do you not think this business 
can receive favourable consideration? Local Austrian Volkswehr2 is being strongly 
propagandized by money sent from Hungary and 41st Battalion already outspokenly 
red and government afraid to take away their arms, with others ready to follow same 
course. With direct communication between Bolshevist headquarters, Budapest and 
munition arsenals here, when the move is made to attack Wiener-Neustadt on frontier 
line south of Pressbourg there will be no force capable of withstanding attack because 
of internal dissension here. Effect of Hungarian Army and its prepared attack here 
known to Government which feels almost hopeless in the matter. This was brought to 
me late yesterday from one of their highest officials, and if nothing is done at Paris the 
people cannot protect themselves and local Bolshevists, who are becoming increasingly 
active, know it. 
T.T.C. Gregory 
1 24 June 1919. 
2 See No. 40, note 7. 
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No. 172 
Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies (Extractf 
[LI. G. F/46/10/5] 
British Delegation, 
Paris, 27 June 1919 
My dear Davies, 
[••..] 
It would be a great thing if the Prime Minister could see Williams Freeman for V4 
hour. General Pershing saw him this morning, with the result that the Americans are 
now getting really busy. I have just been talking to an ex-Austro-Hungarian officer 
from Baja, S. of Buda Pest, where there is now a Serbian division; he says both the 
French and Serbians are anxious to advance, in order to put an end to the war & get 
peace, but that the Hungarian population are far more anxious for the advance to take 
place, in order to escape from Bolshevist tyranny. 
Yours sincerely, 
W.L.O. Twiss 
1 This letter accompanies the copy of a reported exchange of telegrams between Lenin and Bela Kun, 
printed as Nos. 158 and 159. 
No. 173 
Minutes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier 
[PRO FO 371/3515 No. 92856] 
[These minutes are recorded on a memorandum (not printed),1 which had been 
communicated by E. Benes to R.F. Young2 in Paris on 18 June 1919, and was 
forwarded by the latter to the Foreign Office on 20 June. It describes an alleged 
monarchist scheme, backed by the British and the French, to re-establish the Dual 
Monarchy in the guise of a Danubian Confederation, and explains the motives for the 
Italian help given to the Bolshevists by the Italian opposition to this alleged scheme. 
The author accuses Col. Sir T. Cuninghame and H. Allize of taking an active part in this 
project.] 
27 June 1919 
The reports are most probably true. But from what I know, I do not believe the 
memo, altogether fair to Col. Cunningham [s/c] & our Mission in Vienna. I understand 
1 The memorandum is printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 33. 
2 Robert Fitzgibbon Young, an Inspector of the Board of Education with a scholarly interest in Bohemia, 
temporarily transferred to the Intelligence Service for work with the Czechs, especially their communities 
living in the U.S.A. 
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that our Mission is on equally good terms with the moderate strongly anti-monarchist 
Socialists of the Renner group as with the conservative Christian Socialists. It is hardly 
fair to speak of them & the French in one breath. I know e.g. that Mr. Phil[l]potts does 
not believe in the possibility of a Danubian Confederation. But our Vienna Mission is 
not popular with the Czechs because on several occasions when the Czechs were in the 
wrong, it has stood out for the German Austrians. 
I therefore venture to suggest: 
1. that in transmitting the memo, something shd. be said in defence of our Mission. 
2. that however at the same time the D.M.I. shd. be asked to impress on Col. 
Cunningham [sic], who has old personal connections with the Viennese & the Magyar 
aristocracy, to avoid anything which might create the appearance of his sympathizing 
with or supporting the monarchists & rightly distasteful to the Czechs & Yugo-Slavs. 
3. that Mr. Young shd. be asked from whom he received the memo. & who is its 
author. He might take us into his confidence.3 
L.B.N. 
3 R.F. Young received the memorandum from E. Benes (see the introductory remarks), the actual origin 
of the document, however, is not known. 
Regarding the Czechoslovak assessment of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s activities also see DBFP, I/vol. 
VI, No. 58 for C. Gosling’s dispatch from Prague, dated 23 July 1919, which was in fact prompted by a 
copy of the memorandum mentioned above, and in which he summarises his interview with President 
T.G. Masaryk on the subject. During the interview the President did not deny the hostility that existed, 
but “stated that he had himself received a short while ago reports concerning Colonel Sir Thomas 
Cuninghame’s work which placed his activities in a very favourable light.” 
No. 174 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 29 June 1919) 
No. 626 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13964] 
Vienna, 28 June 1919 
Urgent. 
Counter Revolutionary coup at Budapest last Tuesday1 seems to have failed, Engels 
Artillery Barracks, Ludovica Academy2 and three Danube Monitors were centres of 
movement. Monitors fired several shells upon Hotel Hungaria, now called Soviet 
House, which is Headquarters of Bolshevik Government. Land artillery fired upon 
some public buildings and fifty cadets of Ludovica Academy made raid upon one of 
principal telephone stations, latter was recaptured by Red Guards after short fighting. 
Revolt in Artillery Barracks was suppressed as men soon left Officers in lurch, but 
three monitors escaped. 
1 24 June 1919. Also see T.T.C. Gregory’s telegram, dated 26 June, on the same subject, in No. 171. 
2 An officer training academy in Budapest. 
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Apparently part Bourgeoisie took active part in coup as reported that shots were fired 
from windows of some private house. It is particularly significant that section Social 
Democrats, like hands of Muthnefs Weaving Mill sided with Counter Revolutionaries. 
These workmen were disarmed by Red Troops and their ringleaders arrested and 
according to one report already executed like six officers of Artillery Barracks and 
Academy.3 Government announces punish with capital sentence any counter 
revolutionary act and who seized with arms in hand is shot on spot. Central Executive 
Committee instructed Governing Council suppress counter revolution by all means 
force. Chief of Italian Military Mission in Budapest, Colonel Somanelli [Romanelli] 
called upon Soviet Government to spare lives of hostages and political prisoners even if 
caught with arms in hands and treat them like war prisoners, and declared that members 
Government would be called to account by Allied and Associated Government if 
forcible means actually used. Kun in reply expressed great indignation at this threat and 
protested against interference with internal affairs Hungary and against recognition of 
men as belligerents who in interest Counter Revolution want murder women, children 
and exterminate Jews; he also declared Hungarian Government would display greater 
humanity in dealing with Counter Revolutionaries than those Governments which 
conjured up barbarous war and are starving women, children by blockade. 
Counter Revolution also broke out at Kalocsa and neighbourhood; White Guard 
formed there was dispersed by Szamuely after two days fighting. If Communist papers 
Budapest are reliable, White Guard who possessed two guns and several machine guns, 
lost three hundred killed in engagement with Red Forces at Dunapately [Dunapataj], 
3 For revised figures concerning those punished for participation in the counter-revolutionary attempt, see 
No. 175. 
No. 175 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 30 June 1919) 
No. 84 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/14025] 
Vienna, 29 June 1919 
Hungary. I leam from reliable sources that Bela Kun would be glad now to go if he 
could find a pretext. 
Italian civil commission proceeded to Budapest on June 27th. Romanelli acted on 
orders from General Segre so far only three counter revolutionaries have been hanged 
and I think hostages have been released. 
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No. 176 
Memorandum by Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman 
(Received in Paris 3 July 1919)] 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/14380]1 2 
30 June 1919 
MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION IN BUDAPEST AND HUNGARY 
Bela Kun’s government whilst maintaining itself in power by very real terrorism and 
oppression is in reality much disliked by the great majority of the inhabitants of 
Budapest and by the whole of the remainder of the country. 
When the communists first assumed power by a coup on March 21st the majority of 
people in Budapest did not know what form of a Government it was. When it was 
realised that it was a communist and Bolshevist Government it encountered immediate 
opposition from many quarters which it at once suppressed. It had however at that time 
the support of most of the trades unions and working classes. The great majority of 
these now realise that the country is being very quickly completely ruined and are 
consequently now much against the Kun regime. They wish to overthrow the actual 
government and establish a moderate socialist government. 
The leaders of all Trades Unions have repeatedly approached me and told me this. For 
some time they tried to get the workmen themselves to give expression to their wishes 
by demonstrations, etc., but found this to be impossible for the following reasons. Each 
section (or shop stewards section) has a man from the government attached to it with 
the result that immediately any anti-government views manifested themselves in that 
section 4 or 5 men of that section were arrested by the ‘Terror Guard’ and ‘disappeared’ 
and so it became impossible to co-ordinate the movement. 
Furthermore, as these men expressed it it is very hard to un-scramble eggs and if the 
Kun Government was overthrown and replaced by a socialist government, the new 
government would find itself faced by an appalling state of ruin and disorganisation 
produced by three months of Bolshevism. They would therefore require some 
assistance from the Entente to re-establish order and. the economic life of the country. 
Kun has no intention of obeying the Entente’s commands with regard to the 
evacuation of Slovakia or permanent cessation of hostilities. He has declared publicly 
that he ‘will lie and lie to the Entente till even he blushed with lying’. His evasive 
answers to all the Entente notes and ultimatums have all in reality been flat refusals, and 
he has repudiated his declarations with regard to the safety of foreigners and foreign 
property. 
It would be a sheer impossibility to make peace with a government of this type most 
especially as it does not in the least degree represent the country. 
The continued existence of a state Bolshevism forcibly imposed on Hungary is 
preventing the making of peace in that part of the world and entirely preventing the 
resumption of commerce in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Transylvania, and to a large 
extent, Jugo-Slavia. This resumption of commerce is of the utmost and most vital 
importance. 
1 Minutes on the file indicate that the document was communicated by “Commander” Fuller of the Naval 
Section. He is probably Captain C.T.M. Fuller, the Director of the Plans Division of the Naval Section of 
the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
2 Also in PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16812. 
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Kun has repeatedly violated and continues to violate all the terms of the armistice 
conventions of November 3rd and 13th, and it has proved to be Kun’s army which 
were the original aggressors against the Czechs and Roumanians. He has been able to 
form this army by means of forcible recruiting, lack of food in Budapest, and total lack 
of employment. (Every man who when ordered to do so does not join the red army is 
removed from the proletariat societies, all food tickets for himself and family are taken 
away, etc.) This army is fairly well disciplined. It will fight against Czechs and perhaps 
Roumanians individually, both of which nations the Hungarians hate and despise, but it 
will most certainly not fight the Entente or orders of the Entente. 
If the Entente would therefore send a demand to Kun immediately to accept and abide 
by the terms of the above armistice, and saying that in accordance with this armistice 
convention Budapest would be temporarily occupied and that any resistance to this 
occupation would be considered an act of war against the Entente, Kun’s position 
would immediately become untenable. The French troops would march from Szeged, 
would meet no resistance, and would be welcomed in Budapest for the vast majority of 
Hungarians are longing for Allied intervention and delivery from present tyranny. 
Budapest must of course be informed of this demand by leaflets from aeroplanes. 
The Government would fall immediately the French commenced their advance and 
would be replaced by a temporary directorate. The Entente would assume military 
command of the town and elections would be held as soon as possible. These would 
produce a stable and moderate socialist government. 
There exists a very great and universal liking and admiration for the English and if a 
British General could be placed in command of the town it would have an extremely 
good effect and be very popular. This is realised and accepted by the French authorities 
in Szeged, Belgrade and Vienna. 
It is a mistake to suppose that the last three months in Hungary have been bloodless. 
This is very far from the fact. The official executions in Budapest itself have only been 
40 or 50 but there have been a considerable number of ‘disappearances’ which are in 
reality official murders by the ‘Terror Guard’ or ‘Sons of Lenin’ troops. In the country 
the numerous outbreaks in the village[s] have been quelled in the bloodiest manner. In 
one small village near Szombathely of under 400 inhabitants I saw over 30 bodies 
hanging from trees and the body of the priest hanging from the porch of the church. I 
was told that many other people had been killed in this village and buried. 
If the present state of affairs is allowed to continue at Budapest it is certain that 
counter revolutions will break out there and the country will gradually be brought to the 
same conditions as Russia, with a terrible danger to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, 
Roumania and Jugo-Slavia. 
The complete blocking of the Danube above Baja due to the state of affairs at 
Budapest and the mines in the river is having a paralysing effect on Vienna and 
Pressburg and is causing the greatest hardship and unrest. 
F.W[illiams-].F[reeman]. (Initialled). 
30/6/19 
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No. 177 
Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 1 July 1919) 
No. 35 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14120] 
Prague, 30 June 1919 
General Pelle informs me that he has received a telegram from C. in C. of Magyar 
army1 in which he states that he has received orders from Hungarian Government for 
immediate withdrawal of their army from all occupied territory. Evacuation is to 
commence at 5 a.m. June 30th. 
Addressed to Foreign Office 124. 
1 V. Bdhm, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army, 5 May-14 July 1919. 
No. 178 
Memorandum by Sir W. Goode (Extracts f 
[LI. G. F/197/6/3] 
Late June or early July 19192 
THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND ITS EFFECT ON THE RESTORATION OF 
PUBLIC ORDER AND THE REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
All reports are confirmatory of a situation of extreme gravity which is rapidly 
developing within the boundaries of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. This situation is 
the direct result of Bela Kun’s activities in Hungary and the policy of non-interference 
being followed by the Allied and Associated Powers. The Danube River, which is one 
of the great economic arteries of all this territory, is mined at one end not far from 
Pressbourg and at the other end immediately above Baja. In this portion of the river 
practically all the shipyards and river repair shops are located and held under the 
complete control of Bela Kun. In addition more than one half of the lighters ordinarily 
used on the Danube River between Galatz and Pressbourg as well as sixty per cent of 
the river tow boats, are held under the complete control of Bela Kun. This river 
1 This memorandum was compiled by Sir W. Goode from various — mainly British — memoranda for 
discussion by the Supreme Economic Council. A discussion of many of the subjects raised in the 
memorandum also took place at a meeting of the Council of Five on 5 July 1919, to which Sir W. Goode 
was invited. For the minutes of this meeting see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3. 
The copy in the Lloyd George Papers was sent by Sir W. Goode to P. Kerr. 
^ The original copy is undated. From a reference to the counter-revolutionary attempt on the 24 June in 
the last but one paragraph as having taken place “as late as last Tuesday”, the date of the writing of the 
memorandum can be put between 25 June and 3 July 1919. 
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equipment and these shipyards and repair plants are tied up and idle along the river 
banks and therefore contributing in no way to the economic rehabilitation of the 
Riparian territory. 
During the recent advance of the Roumanian Armies to the Tisza River the Bela Kun 
Government was able to withdraw before the advancing Roumanian Armies the bulk of 
the railway equipment in that territory. When it is considered that this railway 
equipment included not only that normally operated in this particular territory, but also a 
large proportion of the Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak equipment, which has 
been taken out of these latter countries by the Germans, it is easily understood how 
seriously and vitally this affects the rehabilitation of the economic life of these adjoining 
countries. 
The railway equipment is for the greater part economically inactive and resting idle on 
the main railroad lines, in no way contributing to the [? solution of the] economic 
problem. As an example of this state of affairs reliably [sic] informants state that 
practically the whole line of railway, Szekesfehervar-Bicske, is completely filled by a 
more or less continuous string of empty freight and oil cars and locomotives. 
We have been attempting by various means to arrive at a solution of this Hungarian 
question and have gone to the extent of negotiating both directly and indirectly with 
Bela Kun. The head of this so called Hungarian Government. Certain of our advances 
to Bela Kun have been based on the assumption that we were dealing with an 
honourable man and perhaps even the honest leader of a wronged people. During his 
recent military operations against the Government of Czecho-Slovakia we demanded in 
an honourable way that he cease this attack and withdraw his troops within the 
boundaries as fixed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. This he 
answered with a more or less evasive acquiescence and it is understood for a certain 
time he actually ceased his attacks on the Czecho-Slovaks, but the fact remains that he 
has not yet complied with the demands addressed him and apparently has no intention 
of so doing. 
He has a great quantity of war material belonging to the Mackensen Army, which he 
is today actually using and planning to use for the disturbance of peace in Central 
Europe. Under the terms of the Armistice this war material should have been turned 
over to the custody of the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. 
He has ignored all demands to turn over this material. 
Bela Kun is carrying on a most active bolshevist propaganda in all the surrounding 
countries and particularly in Austria. [....] 
The result of any success of Bela Kun in Austria, will only be followed by similar 
efforts on his part to expand into adjoining territories. The more territory he gets, the 
more difficult becomes the rehabilitation of economic life and the restoration of order, 
and easier it becomes for Bela Kun to recruit his supporters amongst the idle workmen 
and disorderly elements in this new territory and to thus expand his rule of terrorism. 
The following very late messages between Lenin at Moscow and Bela Kun at 
Budapest have been received through certain representatives in Poland.3 [....] 
It is difficult to present more damning evidence of the real character and policy being 
pursued by Bela Kun. This exchange of notes clearly demonstrates the absolute futility 
of any endeavor to deal with Bela Kun on the basis of our past efforts; they also clearly 
emphasize the fact that some means must be found to place the economic destiny of not 
only Hungary but the surrounding nationals [nations ?] in some other hands than those 
of Bela Kun. As confirmatory of this same policy of “mala fides” a speech or interview 
of Bela Kun’s was published in the newspapers of Budapest some few weeks ago. 
During the course of this speech, as reported, in those Hungarian newspapers, Bela 
3 An exchange of wireless messages between Lenin and Bela Kun follows here in the original. These are 
printed as Nos. 158 and 159. 
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Kun in referring to past and prospective negotiations with representatives of the Allied 
and Associated Powers, stated in effect as follows: 
“I lie and lie and lie to the Entente until even I myself blush with my own lies.” 
This statement was subsequently denied, but the fact nevertheless remains that in 
these days of terrorism in Budapest no newspaper would have dared to publish it 
without its having been a fact, this conclusion being confirmed by the fact that this 
article appeared in more than one of the Budapest newspapers, which are all necessarily 
Bela Kun organs. 
A reliable agent, who for obvious reasons will be referred to as “X”,4 has returned 
from Budapest after passing three or four months in that capital. His observations and 
reports confirm the previous reports that Bela Kun adherents represent but a small 
minority of the Hungarian people, which he roughly estimated as eight per cent in the 
city of Budapest and not two per cent in the surrounding country. He confirms many 
preceeding [sic] reports that Bela Kun is maintaining his power only by violence and 
terrorism. 
“X” was approached and had relations with representatives of the various labor 
unions in Budapest, including the following: 
Iron Metal Workers, 
Coal Miners and Coal Workers, 
Printers, 
Clerks and Indoor Workers, 
Dock Workers and River Workers, 
Bakers’ Unions, 
Federated Trade Unions Council. 
These representatives, whose names cannot, of course, be given, speaking with the 
authority of their various unions and councils, report the present situation as intolerable. 
The population of Budapest is now swollen to nearer two million than 1,300,000. This 
is due to the concentration in Budapest of large numbers of soldiers and refugees. 
Under the present system of laws of the Bela Kun Government food distribution and 
important civilian rights are based on union membership. 
[....] 
“X” reports that it was the primary idea of Bela Kun to prohibit all religious worship, 
irrespective of creed. However, due to the fact that a great many of the Hungarian 
people are of the Roman Catholic faith, this line of action was deemed inexpedient. A 
compromise was therefore made which while permitting worship irrespective of creed 
in churches, such worship is confined strictly within the church; it is illegal for a priest 
to go to the bedside of a dying Roman Catholic for the purpose of administering the last 
communion. 
During the early days of Bela Kun’s Government a law was drafted for the 
communization of women. This law was never passed, as it was deemed inexpedient. It 
has, however, been followed by other laws affecting family life, which are note worthy 
as indicative of the social ideals of Bela Kun and his followers. 
Marriage is a purely contractual relationship which can be broken at the will of either 
of the individuals concerned and with practically no formality. Either one of the 
contracting parties can leave the home whenever they elect and live with another person. 
After a period of six months’ cohabitation with their new partner, they have the right to 
4 This is most probably a reference to Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman. 
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elect to return to their original partner or to enter into contractual relations with the new 
one. The announcement of their election to stay with the new partner automatically 
breaks the old contract and this without responsibility. 
Houses of prostitution have been closed primarily as being economically at variance 
with communistic ideas and also for the purpose of propaganda. The reports so 
frequently made by “parlor socialists” as to the improvement of public morals, due to 
the closing of the houses of prostitution, under communistic principals, are shown by 
impartial observers to be without basis of fact. 
The desire in this statement is not to present the existing social situation in Hungary 
but the existing intolerable economic situation in Central Europe, due to the activities of 
Bela Kun and the blocking of communications incident to this political situation. The 
evils of the social situation have not, therefore, been to the extent they warrant. The 
effort is to show as clearly as possible the policies, character and social ideals of Bela 
Kun and his terroristic minority, and their connection with the economic question. The 
Budapest situation may be accurately described as one in which a small faction, directed 
from Russia, maintaining its control by bloodshed and terrorism is economically 
paralyzing south-eastern Europe today. Tomorrow, if the situation is allowed to go on, 
it may spread over the surrounding countries with results which each for himself must 
picture. 
The Danube, a vital artery for trade, is paralyzed. The railways, telegraph and postal 
services are paralyzed. Czecho-Slovakia and Vienna are prevented from obtaining 
Roumanian oil; food supplies available in certain rich agricultural centres cannot be 
moved into cities and manufacturing centres where they are needed; barges with metal 
ores necessary to put manufacturing into operation have been waiting at Baja for 
months and cannot be moved. The Balkan countries are unable to obtain coal, tools, 
sugar; manufactured products which are waiting in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia cannot 
be exchanged for food and oil. The pre-war and even wartime economic situation of old 
Austria-Hungary is completely arrested. 
The unrest at Budapest is threatening to burst out into a civil war of the bloodiest 
character. As late as last Tuesday5 an attempt of this character was made against the 
Soviet Government at Budapest which succeeded in capturing three monitors and two 
smaller river craft. These monitors shelled the Government officials in the Hungarian 
[Hungaria] hotel. We have no reports as to the final phases of this incident, but 
announcements from the Soviet Government indicate that this movement was stopped 
and the leaders arrested. The effect of this threatened civil war in Hungary will be to 
throw the latter into a state of disorder only comparable to that which has occurred in 
certain portions of Russia, or to drive the Bela Kun regime into a desperate attempt to 
fortify itself by undertaking military aggression against Vienna and Czecho-Slovakia. 
Such aggression, although probably not likely to preserve the Bela Kun Government 
for long, might easily throw Austria and Southern Czecho-Slovakia into confusion. 
This state of affairs, with the further continuance of the present policy of non¬ 
interference, might easily lead to additional and much more vital confusion elsewhere. 
— Competent military authorities are of the opinion that by some joint military action 
on the part of the Allied troops now in this territory, Bela Kun, with his terroristic 
minority, can be squeezed out like a pimple on the face, and this with little, if any, 
bloodshed. They all are in accord that this measure today would be simply a police 
operation. If, however, Bela Kun is permitted to go along expanding and growing in 
strength, his ultimate elimination, which will be forced, will necessitate a serious and 
expensive military operation. 
5 24 June 1919. 
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No. 179 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts. Received 5 July 1919)] 
No. T.C. 573 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/14468] 
Vienna, 1 July 1919 
My dear Twiss, 
[....] 
Returning to the necessities of the moment. I desire once more to emphasise the 
advantage of demanding instantly the disarmament of the Hungarian Red Army. I have 
already pointed out that it will facilitate the disarmament of the Austrian forces 
(Volkswehr1 2 and peasants), and indeed is a necessary preliminary for the consent of the 
rival groups in Austria to part with their weapons. But not only this. It affords an 
excuse for an action which will probably be fatal to Kun. There was a telegram 
published in the newspapers to the effect that such a demand had already been made, 
but I gather that it is not founded on fact. It made however a great sensation as it was 
realised that Bolshevism without a Red Army to support it was too odious a tyranny to 
persist in. In support of this I can quote the opinion of the Socialist leader “Kunfi”, who 
is now in Vienna, who told Bauer, that the position of Kun was becoming impossible, 
that all the Trades Unions, as well as the Socialists, were against him, and that it would 
only need the national feeling of the returning soldiers to raise an overpowering 
opposition to the continuance of his usurpation.3 I realise that it is desired that 
Bolshevism should kill itself rather than be killed by any outside instrument, but I do 
think that now, on the eve of Peace, that a means of bringing to an end a Bedlamite and 
non-national form of Government, which does not represent in any sense the wishes of 
any section of the populace might be used, the more so as it would effectively prevent 
further extension of the disease. 
I have also to chronicle in this connection a distinct change in the attitude of the 
Italians in Hungary towards the Bolshevik Government. Prince Borghese having 
extracted all the monetary resources in return for a.promise of “food and other articles 
to be delivered after the raising of the blockade” has ceased to be so amiable to the 
administration of Kun, and now I leam from a well founded informative [sic] that the 
Italians are taking interest in the Szeged Government. This “volti |>/cl face” is to be 
attributed to the view generally held in Buda Pest that the Socialists — even if they 
returned — could not maintain order. Kunfi in his interview with Bauer maintained this 
view and agreed that only a military dictatorship, or some control temporarily of a 
reactionary character, would avail. Kun makes great use of this argument in his 
speeches pointing out to the people the only alternative to his rule. None the less, the 
Italians, who know the situation very well are so certain that the Communist Regime is 
drawing to an end, that they are looking round to make friends with all possible 
successors. I learn from General Segre that Sig. Cerruti (who used to be Secretary of 
Embassy in Vienna before the war) left last Friday to undertake negotiations for the 
withdrawal of Kun, but that these came to nothing, owing mostly to the fact that the 
Socialists who might succeed, such as Kunfi, Bohm, and Peidl, are too much 
1 This letter is printed in full in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 3. 
2 See No. 40, note 7. 
J For the opposition of the Socialist leaders to the continuation of Bela Kun’s Government also see Col. 
Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram, dated 30 June 1919, in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 2. 
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compromised with the Communists for independent action at present. They joined the 
Communists after the fall of Karolyi, in the expectation of being able to control events, 
and later to reject the extremists, but it was the other way round. And until the position 
is even more hopeless than it is at present they are important. There are many 
speculations as to the exact position of Stromfeld (Cfhief] of S[taff] to Bohm). It seems 
certain that it was he who planned the attacks on Pressburg, Vienna and Wiener 
Neustadt, but his object in doing so is not clear. One version is that he meant to push 
the Hungarians into open breach with the Entente and the very open way in which he 
telephoned his orders, as well as his public announcement of the “Brunn line” as 
ultimate objective of the offensive enterprise, lends colour to this view. Further it is 
established that he personally induced Kun to withdraw but without effect. As things 
are, we are justified in hoping that this nightmare is nearly through, and provided that 
the Entente will refrain from further parley with Kun, and will maintain the blockade, 
we ought to see a change within a fortnight. But nothing will help to accelerate the 
process more than a peremptory demand to disarm the Red Troops. 
[....] 
I questioned Bauer as to his own position and he told me that if he could be assured 
of a Danubian Confederation as a working proposition he would work for it and 
support it. He considered that at present the attitude of the Czechs made it impossible 
and agreed that Deutsch Bohmen was still the ‘key’ to the problem. He thought that 
Masaryk and Tuzar [Tusar]4 would both be willing to grant the German Bohemians 
that measure of autonomy which was necessary to pave the way for a combination of 
Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, but he doubted if they would ever be able to overcome 
the national sentiments of the Krammarsch [Kramar] group. 
My own information from Prague points to the correctness of his view, but no doubt 
you know more of that from Mr. Gosling.5 It seems that Masaryk is willing to give 
autonomy to the Deutsch Bohmen “if they ask for it”. Now there are two groups in 
Deutsch Bohmen, the one led by Lodgman who would accept, the other by Langenhahn 
who wants the “Anschluss” and will not ask for anything. 
As to this, I will write fuller next mail, but meanwhile end by saying that I don’t think 
that Bauer is pushing the Langenhahn group. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) Tom Cuninghame 
4 Vlastimil Tusar, leader of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. 
5 British Charge d’Affaires in Prague. 
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No. 180 
Telegram from Bela Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris f 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14334] 
BUDAPEST, 1 July 1919 
Monsieur le President, 
Le Commandant en Chef de notre Armee, Monsieur BOEHM, vient de nous 
rapporter que les roumains sont passes a l’aube du ler juillet par la THEISS et 
attaquerent pres de TISZALUCZK [TISZALUC] nos troupes qui, conformement a la 
convention conclue, etaient en train de se retirer. De pareilles agressions des roumains 
sont de nature a troubler la retraite des troupes hongroises; d’autre part, elles font douter 
si les roumains obeiront aux ordres de l’Entente et s’ils se conformeront aux stipulations 
les concernant de la Convention bi-laterale. Enfin, de telles agressions necessitent des 
contre mesures de la part des troupes hongroises et, en definitive, ne sauraient que 
retarder la retraite. Les troupes roumaines ont, en outre, endommage la ligne de 
telephone ce qui enfreint egalement aux dispositions contenues dans les telegrammes de 
Monsieur le President interdisant toute sorte d’exces, de pillage ou d’endommagements. 
Je vous prie, par consequent, de protester energiquement aupres des roumains contre 
ces violations de la convention contraires a tout droit international et d’exiger qu’ils 
cessent toute agression; de plus, qu’ils fassent des preparatifs necessaires de retraite a 
leur tour. 
Le Commissaire du Peuple 
aux Affaires Etrangeres, 
Bela Kun 
* An almost identical telegram was sent by V. Bohm to Gen. M. Pelle on the same day, to which Gen. 
Pelle replied that he would transmit the text of the telegram to Marshal Foch. 
The day before, on 30 June 1919, V. Bohm telegraphed to Gen. Pelle protesting against the persecution 
of officials who had acted in the name of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by the Czechoslovak authorities 
on the territories given up by the retiring Hungarian army. Gen. Pelle replied that he had forwarded the 
protest to the Czechoslovak Government. 
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No. 181 
Memorandum by A.J. Balfour 
[BALF Additional 49751] 
Paris, 2 July 1919 
MEMORANDUM 
Monsieur Bratiano called upon me this morning with Monsieur Misu, in order to say 
good-bye. Our conversation was not very prolonged, neither was it very satisfactory. 
Monsieur Bratiano clearly indicated that in his view it would be impossible for the 
Rumanians to abandon the line of the Theiss and retire to the frontier marked out for 
them by the Allies, partly because this last frontier was much less easily defensible than 
the one they are now occupying, partly because Bela Kun, acting in harmony with the 
Russian Bolshevists on the East of Rumania, would be able to throw against this weak 
frontier a stronger force than the Rumanians fighting on two fronts, would be able to 
oppose to them. Additional cause for anxiety to the Rumanian Government was the 
present position of Bulgaria, a country which he declared was overflowing with 
ammunition and small arms, and still possessed, in spite of disarmament, a considerable 
number of guns. His conclusions, as I understand him, were that until Hungary has 
been disarmed, it would be suicidal for Rumania to give up at the bidding of the Great 
Powers its present strategical advantages. It was useless for the Great Powers to give 
orders to nations whom they were unable to protect while carrying them out.1 
A.J.B[alfour]. 
1 In this connection also see a note by P. Kerr, dated 16 July 1919, of his conversation with N. Mi§u on 
15 July in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 47, where references are made to A.J. Balfour’s quoted interview with I. 
Bratianu. On an original copy of the document (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15423) Major H.W. 
Temperley recorded the following minutes on 19 July: “I saw Mi§u today [....]. In the course of his 
remarks he referred to the question of retirement from the Theiss and left me very doubtful as to whether 
the Roumanians really meant to retire.” On the history of the Romanian advance to the Theiss, which 
started on 16 April 1919, and the attitude of the Supreme Council regarding Romanian policy in this 
respect, see No. 149, note 1, and DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, minute 1, note 3. 
No. 182 
Telegram from Colonel B. Coulson (Prague) to A.J. Balfour Paris. 
Received 3 July 1919) 
No. HC. 104 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14358] 
Prague, 2 July 1919 
The Magyar army is retiring on the whole front according to the orders of General 
Pelle, up tc date no acts of pillage committed. 
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No. 183 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 3 July 1919) 
No. 88 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14294] 
Vienna, 2 July 1919 
Clear the line. 
Special agent returned from Budapest on July 1 st has given me convincing proof that 
supposed counter revolutionary [? effort]1 on June 27th was organized by “agents 
provocateurs”. Bela Kun had feared political action by Socialists but now his position is 
stronger. 
Nevertheless he realizes that he cannot maintain the Red Army idle and on July (sic ? 
June) 30th he made a speech saying that troops would be used against Roumania across 
the — [The]iss. Agent had outlined Stro—[m]feld plan which is to withdraw the 7th 
division from Slovakia and coverin[g] Budapest from south to concentrate behind 
The—[iss] between Mischolz [Miskolc] and Szolnok. Nothing was to be feared from 
Czech army. General mobilization to be maintained and fresh divisions organized in 
Western Hungary. Attempt to seize arms at Weiner [Wiener] Neustadt to be renewed. 
Agent states that he is convinced that there will be no peace till army is disbanded and 
that certain (2 groups undecypherable) Bela Kun. Suggest that General Pelle should 
demand of Austro-Hungarians at least proportionate disarmament complying with 
terms of November armistice otherwise all surrounding countries will have to maintain 
troops prepared to resist armed enterprises by reds. 
Addressed Astoria and D.M.I. London. 
1 The text here is uncertain. 
No. 184 
Notes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier for Sir W. Tyrrell1 
[PRO FO 371/3515 No. 101018/(1193)} 
3 July 1919 
Sir William Tyrrell. 
Commander Freeman, just returned from Budapest, came to see this morning and 
gave me an account of the present political and military situation in Hungary. 
1 The document to which L.B. Namiers notes were originally attached is an account, given on 7 July by 
G.S. Spicer, of his conversation with Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman, with an introduction by J.A.C. 
Tilley, dated 10 July. The document is printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 32. It is clear, therefore, that L.B. 
Namier’s minutes had been prepared before the File to which they were attached was created. 
For Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s own views on the situation in Hungary following his departure 
from there, see Nos. 164 and 176. 
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The Bolshevik Council has no hold on the country outside Budapest. The army at the 
front fights the Czechs because this is in accordance with its national spirit and 
traditions. Even its chief commander, Boehm, is not at heart a Bolshevik. Neither he nor 
his army would fight against troops of the Western Powers. Boehm, who has risen 
from the trade unions and is a Socialist rather than a Bolshevik, would most probably 
himself turn against the Bolsheviks. 
In the life of the villages the soviets have made very little difference. The village 
commune continues as before. But the agrarian reform inaugurated by Count Michael 
Karolyi has come to stay. In many cases the peasants carry on the management of the 
big estates in co-operation with their late managers without breaking up the land into 
small lots. The peasants are hostile to the Bolsheviks but would have to be given proper 
guarantees that the new government does not mean a return to the old agrarian system. 
In the town of Budapest itself the organised working men are Socialist but not 
Bolshevik and are strongly opposed to the Bolshevik regime. The Bolsheviks, 
however, alone have more considerable armed forces in the town and moreover have 
developed an organisation of espionage and control which precludes the possibility of 
any effective rising against them. The army at the front naturally does not interfere with 
matters in Budapest. From Commander Freeman’s account one gathers that the position 
is more or less that of France in the concluding days of the Revolution when the 
Jacobins had a free hand in Paris though the armies at the front were by no means of 
their political persuasion. 
I asked Commander Freeman about the “White” Hungarian government at Szeged 
under Julius Karolyi and Paul Teleki. He informed me that these men had tried to get 
Garami, the most prominent of the moderate Socialists, to join them, and that they 
themselves are prepared for a moderate Socialist government with agrarian reform as 
foreshadowed by Count Michael Karolyi’s government while it was in power. I called 
Commander Freeman’s attention to the intrigues which the old aristocratic Magyar gang 
was carrying on against Count Michael Karolyi while he was still in power, and to the 
fact that when asking at that time for an Entente occupation of Hungary these men 
schemed to set up an oligarchic government of the pre-war type which, having 
practically no following among the population, would have had to rely on external 
support. I further called his attention to the fact that in those days these aristocrats 
planned to get us into Hungary also with a view to intriguing against Roumania, the 
Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs — in short that they were out to re-establish their old 
Hungary both geographically and politically and politically. Commander Freeman 
considers that both these ideas are by now a matter of the past. 
I am quite prepared to believe that the Magyars have by now recognised the 
impossibility of preserving Hungary’s “integrity” and that they have practically 
abandoned that part of the scheme. I am not, however, prepared to believe that any of 
the big feudal lords, if they once more feel force behind them, especially in the form of 
foreign bayonets, will not, unless very closely watched, try to re-establish their own 
social dominion. But if they try to do that, or even if merely a serious suspicion arose of 
their trying to do so, we should undoubtedly have all the workmen and all the peasants 
against us. In other words, if any intervention has to come, it must start from the very 
outset in conjunction with people who have the confidence of the country_the 
moderate Socialists and radicals in the towns and the peasant radicals in the villages. 
The presence of a Count Julius Karolyi or a Count Teleke [Teleki] would merely be a 
handicap to us. 
Commander Freeman considers that the French forces now available for Hungary 
would be sufficient to overthrow the Bolsheviks if merely it were made clear that their 
advance does not mean any further encroachments on Magyar territory, but that the 
Allied and Associated Powers mean to establish a regular Magyar government which 
they will no longer treat as an enemy power but help politically and economically. He 
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thinks that then the Bolshevik government, which maintains itself by skilful self- 
advertisement and by make-believe, would collapse like a pack of cards. Of all the 
Allies the British are by far the most popular in Hungary, and Commander Freeman 
strongly recommends that a British general should be put in charge of the 
reconstruction of political government in Hungary, i.e. of the administration, until a 
properly elected assembly is convened. From my own knowledge of the Magyars I can 
fully confirm Commander Freeman’s opinion that it would be in every way most 
desirable that the general put in charge should be British and not French. An Italian of 
course would be out of the question. I asked Commander Freeman whether the French 
would agree to a British general being in charge of Budapest whilst the French troops 
did the work. He believes, indeed asserts, that they would — which seems to me rather 
optimistic. 
Finally I should like to add that Commander Freeman made on me the impression of a 
thoroughly competent, very intelligent and energetic man, though perhaps slightly too 
optimistic and too much inclined to trust people to learn the lessons of events or stick to 
the views which they held when they were down when once more in luck. This, 
however, does not in any way impair the value of his statements of fact which are clear 
and business-like. If action in Hungary is decided upon, he would most certainly be a 
very valuable assistant to any one put in charge of it. 
L.B.N. 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 184 
Further Minutes on the Same Memorandum2 
(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15008] 
Lt-Comm. Williams-Freeman has always held these views & stated them most clearly 
& convincingly. It is now perhaps a more difficult military problem to overthrow Bela 
Kun than it was two months ago, but the need for such decisive action remains the 
same. 
A.W.A. Leeper 
11/7/19 
The question is now before the Council of Five. 
E. Crowe 
12/7/19 
2 The memorandum is not printed, see note 1 above. A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowes minutes are 
quoted from another copy of the same memorandum from the Peace Delegation files (FO 608). 
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No. 185 
Telegram from Vienna1 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14930] 
Vienna, 5 July 1919 
Bela Kun is preparing an offensive against Rumania. At this moment he is massing 
his troops on the Theiss between (? Miskolcz) and ..(jammed) [? Szolnok]. If the 
Rumanian troops do not hold out on the Theiss the Hungarians are in sufficient force to 
oblige them to retire to the Carpathian passes. 
1 The exact source of this wireless message is unknown. It was communicated to the British Peace 
Delegation, together with a wireless message dispatched from Budapest on the same date (see No. 186), 
on 9 July 1919 by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. This copy is marked: “Copy to Mr. Balfour.” 
No. 186 
Telegram from Budapest1 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14930] 
Vienna, 5 July 1919 
The Soviet Government have issued a manifesto to all the soldiers of the Red Army. 
They have not retired, the manifesto declares, before the Czechs or the Rumanians, but 
these are not the only enemies. They have to free their country from the noose which 
the British, French and American money kings are trying to slip round its neck. 
Although they have had to withdraw from Czecho-Slovak territories, the Proletarian 
Fatherland will receive much more fertile and larger territories on the other side of the 
Theiss, which the Rumanian boyars have to evacuate at the command of the Entente. 
They do not renounce their claim to a single inch of Hungarian-speaking territory [....]2 
and try to place upon their necks the double yoke of exploitation and suppression of 
their racial brothers. 
1 This wireless message was received together with the one in No. 185. Also see No. 185, note 1. 
2 Apparently a part of the text has been lost here. 
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No. 187 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received on 9 July, Repeated 15 July 1919)] 
No. 93 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/15340] 
Vienna, 7 July 1919 
Priority. 
Meeting of Allied Military representatives took place on July 6th under presidency of 
Captain Gregory American Mission. President having explained that Hungarian 
questions have been referred to military section in Paris and decision deferred to July 
8th,1 2 it was resolved to send following joint telegram:- 
Military occupation committee of Allied officers assembled on July 6th at Vienna are 
of opinion that - 
(1) Directly it becomes clear to the present Hungarian Government and to the 
Hungarian people that the Entente will proceed to the overthrow of the present 
Bolshevick Regime in Hungary if their demands are not met, the Government of 
Hungary will submit. The Bolshevicks will give way to the Socialists. 
(2) It is therefore necessary, (a) to make the essential authoritative statement in 
explicit terms; (b) commence movement of British and Italian troops; (c) to indicate the 
intention of the Entente to the people of Budapest and the rest of Hungary by aeroplane; 
(d) to advise the Austrian Government of their [the Entente’s] wishes; (e) to 
immediately prepare for simultaneous advance of all troops now on the border. In the 
event of Hungary turning recalcitrant, to continue the transport of British troops from 
the Rhine to Slovakia and of Italian troops to south Hungary. But with the publicity of 
purpose and combined iron troops in the field with initial movement of 
1 This telegram is also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 20. Also see the “Note by Cypher Dept.” below. 
2 For the attempts of the Peace Conference to enforce the terms of the Armistice on Hungary in early 
June see No. 139. For the discussion on the subject of intervention in Hungary in the Supreme Council 
on 5 July 1919 see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2. The report of the Military Representatives of the 
Supreme War Council on the measures to be taken regarding Hungary was prepared on 8 July (S.W.C. 
438, see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 7, Appendix B). Gen. Pelle sent a report on the subject of intervention from 
Prague to G. Clemenceau on the same date {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 9, Appendix D). A discussion of the 
report by the Military Representatives took place in the Supreme Council on 9 July {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 
7, minute 6). The subject was then further discussed in the Supreme Council on 11 July in the presence 
of Marshal Foch and Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav representatives {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 9, 
minute 7). Marshal Foch then prepared a report on the subject on 17 July {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, 
Appendix B). That report was discussed on the same day in the Supreme Council with Czechoslovak, 
Romanian and Yugoslav delegates {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, minute 3). In many ways the final discussion 
in the Supreme Council on the issue took place on 18 July, during which the idea of sending four Allied 
Generals as an International Committee of Inquiry was first suggested by G. Clemenceau {DBFP, I/vol. 
J, No. 14, minute 5). After this date the discussions focused on the question of sending this Committee of 
Inquiry, and the negotiations of Allied representatives in Vienna with Hungarian Socialists opposed to 
Bela Kun’s regime, rather than on direct military intervention. 
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British and Italian troops it is firmly believed the military movement required will be of 
small size and short duration. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
Note by CYPHER DEPT. This telegram was received undecypherable. 
Repetition received to-day. (July 15th 1919). 
No. 188 
Letter from Major H.A. Cartwright (Prague) to Oliver ? of the 
British Peace Delegation (Paris. Extract. Received 21 July 1919f 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15831] 
British Legation, 
Prague, 8 July 1919 
My dear Oliver, 
I’ve just come back from a week in Slovakia and am going to try to tell you anything 
which may interest you of what I saw there. 
I went to act as umpire in the Hungarian retirement for the sector immediately North 
of the Danube, where the Eipel flows into it. It was very interesting and would have 
been much more so if I’d has some spare motor tyres, but as I hadn’t I was confined to 
the one railway — Nove Zamky-Parkan [Parkany] — after the first two days and could 
only use that when I could get the use of the one and only engine. I also wasted a night 
stuck in a bog, and most of the next day being towed home by a pair of buffaloes. 
My first HQ was with a French Brigade commander at Nove Zamky (or Ersekujvar 
or Neuhausel) where I saw and learnt a good deal about the Czech army, but Til come 
to that later. 
Practically the whole country from Pressburg to Parkan[y] is undoubtedly Magyar 
and also the country running Northwards from Parkan[y] along the Eipel with a few 
small pockets of Slovaks, whose position is not unlike that of the Germans in Bohemia. 
My chauffeur, who was also my interpreter, used the Magyar language the whole way 
from Pressburg to Parkan[y] and we stopped about and talked to people in almost every 
village. The Czechs explain this by saying that the people are really Slovaks who have 
been forcibly Magyarised, the late Hungarian government having suppressed all except 
the Magyar language in the schools. There is probably some truth in this as one does 
notice that the Slovak language is used to a certain extent by the older people while the 
younger generations speak only Magyar. (Many of the better class of peasants can 
speak German, which is very much not the case in Bohemia, but that is by the way.) 
However it may have been brought about the vast majority of the people of this 
country are undoubtedly Magyar by sentiment and speech. I talked to a great many 
people and am convinced of this feeling wherever I was. 
They do not want Czech rule, they might tolerate Slovak rule and they would 
welcome Magyar rule but have absolutely no use for Communism. 
1 The editor has not been able to establish the exact identity of the addressee of this letter, though it is 
likely that it was someone associated with the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss 
in particular. 
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The country which I saw is very rich agriculturally and the peasants are well off. 
There appears to be no lack of food there. I got good bread, eggs and milk everywhere 
and from the smallest cottages. There are enormous flocks of geese, ducks and chickens 
and large herds of swine in every village and a good lot of cattle about the country. Our 
old pal the water buffalo is much in evidence looking just as if he’d stopped straight out 
of an Indian village. Every cottage has a large garden, well cultivated, and I think every 
peasant produces his own maize as well. 
The Magyars behaved fairly well in their retirement and I couldn’t hear of much 
pillage anywhere except in the track of an “international battalion” where it was the 
work of individual thieves. (There are two Frenchmen and three Englishmen in this 
battalion.) 
The people I questioned nearly all seemed to resent being asked if the Magyars had 
stolen or driven away cattle and replied quite heatedly in many cases that they had 
stolen nothing and only bought enough for their immediate needs. Probably the very 
day of the departure of the Magyars was not a good time for asking these questions as 
the people cannot have been sure that they had really gone, but I really believe that they 
took very little. Padres, schoolmasters and large proprietors in most places told me that 
they had taken a few horses and cattle and a few loads of grain but they didn’t seem a 
bit annoyed about it. 
The Magyars completely cleared out every railway station. They took all the furniture 
and all the electric signalling, telegraph and telephone instruments and smashed 
anything they couldn’t take away. The last troops to leave were Bolschevists pure and 
simple which accounts for the wanton destruction. 
One large proprietor whom I called on told me he had had 3 good horses and two 
farm wagons taken from him for which the Magyars had paid him 16000 Krone in 
paper “money”. The money was marked valid up to 30th June and the payment was 
made on July 2nd. He used it as spills. The Czechs took some horses from him in their 
retreat for which they did not even give a receipt. 
I visited the Bolschevics three times altogether. On the first occasion I came up with 
the rear guard of their army a couple of miles W. of Parkan[y]. I was in my car and 
flying a flag of truce. I was halted by a very soldierly patrol, who, when I told them my 
business, allowed me to pass through their lines with one of their men on the front seat. 
I went on in search of someone in authority, but was almost immediately halted by a 
patrol of the real genuine article, a mob of soldiers and sailors who crowded round me 
and pointed pistols at me and howled horrible threats; they had a “commissioner du 
peuple” among them who seemed to be particularly annoyed with the Entente. I 
managed to get through them by being very haughty and shouting louder than they did, 
but with a Bolschy on the first seat instead of the genuine soldier I had started with. In 
the town of Parkan[y] I was surrounded by an enormous mob of people and had the 
greatest difficulty in getting anything done but did at last manage to get them to 
telephone to Es[z]tergom for the commander of the VIII Division but it was doubtful if 
he would turn up that night. Then the car went phut and I had to throw myself on the 
mercy of the Bolschis to get it repaired. This they proceeded to do, at a price. It was 
getting dark and I had a longish journey before me so I asked if there was a pub where 
I could get something to eat and they took me to the only hotel where I sat down to feed 
and two Bolschy officers, who both claimed to be the town commandant and nearly 
came to blows about it, sat down at the same table and fed too. I thought it was going to 
be interesting but they were too much of the tub-thumping screaming variety and did 
nothing but rave about the joys of communism and liberty, equality, fraternity, and the 
14 points of Vilson [j/c], who seemed to be their hero (do tell him, perhaps he didn’t 
know!) So I was terminating the entertainment as quickly as possible when a brigade 
commander from Es[z]tergom came and said he was the representative of the G.O.C. 
VIII division, who had gone to Buda Pesth. This man was an officer of the old 
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Austrian army, no Bolschevist, and I think quite content to fight against the Czechs or 
any other friend of the Entente. We had a talk about various things but there was 
practically nothing of importance to discuss as the Magyars were almost behind their 
final line two days ahead of time. The roads are what we call droves in Somerset and 
having no good light the car ran into a Bog and remained there until daylight. Then I did 
10 miles behind buffaloes until we found a road that had once been macadam and got 
home at 10 am. (I was hurrying for all I was worth as I was afraid I should be reported 
“missing chez les Bolschis”, but though I had gone out at noon the day before to find 
the Bolschis and had made arrangements to telephone to HQ at 8 pm. the same night, 
the Czech commandant with whom I lived hadn’t missed me.) 
On two occasions I talked with LAGOSH (spelling uncertain) the commander of a 
regiment which he raised himself from the workmen of the factory in which he worked. 
He hung all those who refused to join before the eyes of the remainder. He struck me as 
being the most perfect type of all that one would expect a Bolschy to be but I believe 
he’s an absolutely sincere fanatic, and firmly believes himself to be one of the saviours 
of the world. 
On the last occasion a staff officer from the ? army corps came to meet me on the 
bridge at Parkan[y]. He was also an officer of the old army. The only questions of 
importance which he raised were, one about the fishing in the Danube, which I referred 
to General Pelle, and, two about the traffic on the Parkany bridge. This last I settled 
with the local French commandant, who, much against his will I persuaded to allow 
anyone who wanted to to depart to the Magyar side within 24 hours on the 
understanding that they could under no circumstances return and vice versa, subject to 
police permission. A young cavalry officer came with his staff officer who interested 
me very much. He was an obvious gentleman and had two Bolschy sailors obviously 
told off to watch him. I managed to tell him that I wanted to talk to him and he replied 
“for God’s sake don’t.” He managed to have a few words with a young Czech officer 
whom he told that he was compelled to serve by threats against his mother and sisters 
and said that if he had talked English to me he would almost certainly have been 
immediately shot or hanged. 
As I was approaching Parkanfy] on the first occasion someone pooped off a round at 
me from the corn; it was probably a Bolschy straggler who had not the least idea what 
he was shooting at. After that I didn’t a bit enjoy my night alone in the car! 
Coulson’s despatch after his visit to Slovakia2 told you a good deal about the Czech 
army and I’ve very little to add to that except that what I saw only assured me of the 
accuracy of all he had written. It really is a most deplorable army. The first time I went 
through their lines the French Commander showed me exactly where I should find their 
outposts on the road and advised me to approach them slowly. I never saw any trace of 
them at all either on the outward or return journey. I saw one of their columns starting 
out to follow up the Magyars, this was the order of march. First a long column of 
transport headed by a fat sergeant in a cab, then a company of infantry marching “go as 
you please” in no formation whatever, then about 500 infantry in approximate fours and 
finally a small detachment of cavalry. This was the day after the departure of the 
Magyars from their front lines. 
(That young cavalry officer I spoke of also told the Czech officer that the monitor, it 
was really a small torpedo-boat, in which they came to see me was the last that 
remained in their hands, all the others, he said, were in the hands of the counter¬ 
revolutionaries. I’ve heard no confirmation of this.) 
Both sides seem to have gone in a bit for “frightfulness”; in one villages which I 
entered with Czech troops I was told by my orderly who was told by an American- 
2 The editor has not been able to identify the dispatch referred to, though for a letter from Col. B. 
Coulson of the nature indicated, dated 8 June 1919, see No. 143. 
308 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919 
speaking Czech, that they had just shot two men without any form of trial. I myself 
stopped them from shooting a man whom they said was a deserter, without trial, but 
they whipped up some sort of a Court Martial and disposed of him in a few minutes. 
This man told me of a couple of atrocities which he had witnessed when he was among 
the Bolshis, but as he couldn’t tell us where to find the bodies we could do nothing to 
prove this story. 
I am certain that the question of Slovakia is no more nearly settled than it was when 
the country was in the hands of the Magyars. It is a country waiting to be colonised but 
the Czechs have a lot to learn before they’ll be acceptable rulers to the people of the 
those parts, whatever you like to call them. The Magyars, without communism, would 
be welcomed with open arms. The Czech advance was not greeted with the enthusiastic 
welcome of their official reports, but with shuttered houses and shops and empty 
streets. 
Yours ever, 
Henry A. Cartwright 
No. 189 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Received 10 July 1919) 
No. HAM 779 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/14934] 
Vienna, 8 July 1919 
FOR ASTORIA, HAM 779 FROM Cunningham [sic] British Military Representative 
Vienna quote reliable news from Budapest dated seventh states that Kuhn [sic] will 
arrange on Thursday next1 a counter revolutionary disturbance in Budapest using 
agents provocateurs in order to upset Socialists stop Socialists desire to fly from 
Budapest and have made application to British for protection unquote. Copy to Hoover. 
Gregory 
1 17 July 1919. 
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No. 190 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Received 10 July 1919) 
No. HAM 785 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15399}1 
Vienna, 8 July 1919 
Have spoken with high Staff Officer Hungarian Red Army2 who reports that ninety 
five per cent of people desire entry of Entente stop does not think Kuhn [s/c] will cede 
until he gets ocular demonstration of intentions of Entente but will then give in stop 
does not believe that Hungarians will fight against Entente troops stop if they do 
maximum number of rounds per rifle is two hundred stop total number of guns is five 
hundred of all calibres in army with one hundred rounds per gun stop no gas masks 
stop no fortifications round Budapest stop Commander of Budapest Corps will not 
make resistance being a Socialist and opposed to Kuhn stop terrorist group round 
terrorist group round Samuelly [Szamuely] consists of four hundred men and Kuhn 
inclines to Samuelly [Szamuely] and to terrorist policy stop Bohm Landler Haubrich 
and Vildner [Weltner] oppose it stop informant states so long as Red Army remains 
armed peace is impossible as army cannot be kept idle and cannot be disarmed by 
existing Government stop in country repressive measures have been taken in many 
towns Kaloc[s]a Steinermanger [Steinamanger]3 Sopron Ves[z]prem Szolnok and 
other places and the peasants are held powerless by terror of Red Guards total number 
of executions of which he has knowledge is two hundred stop increasing famine in 
Budapest is bringing anarchy every day nearer stop informant gives following details 
concerning army Stromfeld has been dismissed from position Chief of Staff and is 
succeeded by Julier stop Politowsky [Politovszky] is no longer Chief of Staff of First 
Corps stop Corps Headquarters as follows First Vago Czegled Second Pogany 
Plattensee4 Third Landler Misckolcz [Miskolc] Fourth comma Budapest Garrison 
comma Haubrich Pesth Fifth Fiedler not known stop informant confirms position of 
divisions as given in this morning’s report but does not know where the fifth division 
is. Copy to Logan. 
Cuninghame5 
1 Also in PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14964. 
2 Probably a reference to Major Geza Lajtos, Chief of Staff of the 4th (Budapest) Army Corps, under the 
Commander of the Corps, J. Haubrich, who, being an uneducated iron-worker, and a notorious drinker, 
was not in a position to give information to a foreign officer. 
3 The German name of Szombathely, a town in western Hungary. 
4 The German name of Lake Balaton. 
5 In PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14964 the text of this telegram is preceded by: “Ham 785 Following 
from Cunningham [sic] for Astoria quote...”, and is followed by: “...unquote Gregory”. “Copy to Logan” 
is left out. 
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No. 191 
Telegram (in 2 parts) from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curz.on 
(London.Received (Part I) 9 July, (Part II) 10 July 1919f 
No. 1137 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 100494]2 
Part I. 
Very Urgent. 
We are now in presence of clear cut situation in Hungary. 
Bela Kun in defiance of Armistice is daily augmenting forces which are all ready [j/c] 
far in excess of those he has a right to maintain. He is also reported to be manufacturing 
guns, aeroplanes and ammunition. There seems to be only two possible policies open to 
us. First is to do nothing and hope that crimes and follies of Bela Kun will soon bring 
his Government to an end without further effort on our part. This is however neither 
very dignified nor very safe. It is a public profession of impotence by Allies which will 
convince every recalcitrant State, small or big, that we may be defied or ignored with 
impunity. It will leave Hungary as a focus for Bolshevik propaganda; and commit3 
Bela Kun to contrive with Lenin what mischief he pleases. His propaganda is already a 
cause of great disquiet in neighbouring Republics: and it seems that his propaganda 
may soon be re-inforced by war. Are we to allow Austria or Bohemia to be attacked? If 
so, League of Nations will be hopelessly discredited before it is legally bom. 
Part 2 follows. 
' Both parts of this telegram are printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, Nos. 30 and 31. 
2 Also preserved in PRO CAB 21/150, where the following minutes are recorded on the file: “Very 
Impt”, and separately: “Mr. Bonar Law wishes P.M. to phone his views.” 
3 The text, as sent from Paris, here reads “permit”. 
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Paris, 9 July 1919 
Part II 
Very Urgent. 
Are we to permit Hungarians to retain territories which we have assigned to other 
states? This is impossible. Are we to leave Hungary out of Peace settlement for an 
indefinite period? This not only inconvenient but it means economic disaster for Central 
Europe which, as Mr. Hoover tells us4 can never resume a normal economic life till it 
can make free use of Hungarian railways and waterways. 
In the circumstances it would seem that proper course is to compel Hungary, as we 
should have compelled Germany, to fulfil armistice which she has signed. If this were 
done (? Bela Kun) would be disarmed and once disarmed could easily be dealt with and 
would soon fall. Unfortunately the Versailles soldiers have reported in somewhat 
gloomy terms upon military aspect of question.5 They are not sure that Roumania and 
Czech soldiers (? and omitted) French who6 are on the spot would be sufficient to (? 
ensure) success. They are not clear how they can be reinforced. They are going to 
consider matter again but if this is done to any purpose and if I am to handle question 
(group undecypherable)7 the C.I.G.S. out here with full information as to views of 
Cabinet. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[....] Hungary seems to be a weak point in Bolshevism now & a strong line there would 
have a good effect all round. 
[Undated and unsigned] 
4 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2. 
5 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 7, minute 6 and Appendix B. 
6 The text, as sent from Paris, here reads: “...that Roumanian, Czech, Serbian and French soldiers 
who...”. 
n 
The text, as sent from Paris, here reads: “...to handle the question I must have the C.I.G.S....”. 
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No. 192 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Major-General W. Thwaites 
(London. Received in Paris 24 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/16075] 
Vienna, 10 July 1919 
To: - The Director of Military Intelligence, 
War Office, 
London. 
The attached account of the situation in Budapest given by the Chief of Staff of the 
Hungarian Red Fourth Corps1 is herewith forwarded.2 
(Sd.) T.M. Cuninghame, Lieut. Colonel3 
General Staff 
British Military Representative in Vienna 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 192 
Major G. Lajtos’ Account of the Situation in Budapest 
Vienna, 9 July 1919 
The situation in Budapest is terrible. There are no foodstuffs, as the peasants hate 
their Jewish rulers, nor any industrial other goods. Consequently, the shops are closed, 
commerce and trade have ceased to exist. The workmen are dissatisfied, but they are 
under the terrorism of their factory directorates and the workmen and soldiers’ councils. 
The reason why Bela Kun does not resign is that he too is being terrorised by the 
terrorists, that he hopes that Bolshevism will spread to German-Austria and Czecho¬ 
slovakia, and that he is not the man voluntarily to renounce the power which he has. 
The supporters of the Government are: 
The terror troops, officially called detective detachment of the Home Office, about 400 
men, 1 armoured car, several minethrowers (about 30), machine guns (some mounted 
cars). As to artillery 16 guns were demanded from the high command last week, but it 
appears these guns have not been given them. 
The proletarians acting as officials, but doing no work, in the different state offices, 
driving about in automobiles and leading a gay life. There are about 10,000 such civil 
servants in Hungary. 
Portions of the Red Army and the Red Guard. The forces of the Red Army are all 
under the terrorism of the political commissaries of whom one is detailed with all 
headquarters of units from the battalion upwards. 
1 Major Geza Lajtos. Also see No. 190, note 2. 
2 For Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s account of his interview with Major G. Lajtos (letter No. T.C. 623, dated 
8 July 1919) see DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 21. 
3 The formal rank of Sir T. Cuninghame was major, temporary lieutenant-colonel. 
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The workmen and soldiers’ councils. 
Although 95 per cent of the population including workmen are opponents of the 
Government nothing can be done by counter-revolutionary quarters in Budapest 
because the arms are in the hands of terrorists and because the workmen are closely 
watched. A coup attempted by the Army or an advance of the White Guard from 
Szeged is likely to lead to civil war. 
The Entente alone is able to restore order in the country and this within one week. The 
English are most respected and their arrival in the country would be greatly welcomed 
by the majority of the population, who would also be greatly pleased if Hungary should 
become an English dominion. 
The Red Army consists of nine divisions of which the 4th has been disbanded. The 
fighting strength of the divisions is very small, e.g. the strength of the 9th division does 
not exceed 2600 to 3000 men. 
In order to free Hungary from the Communists within one week 8 infantry divisions, 
one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armoured cars as possible would be 
sufficient. Propaganda leaflets and handbills should be dropped from aeroplanes 
simultaneously with the offensive action. 
The propaganda literature should promise food for Budapest, coal for Hungary, 
economic and financial support by the Entente, better frontiers than the present 
demarcation line, red-white-green flags in lieu of the present red ones, disbandment and 
disarmament of the Red Army. 
Three divisions would be sufficient as garrison troops in the country. During the 
military dictatorship a Hungarian national army (police, frontier security troops, about 4 
to 5 divisions) should be formed and elections take place. 
No. 193 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. 
Extract. Received 16 July 1919)] 
No. 796 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15425) 
Vienna, 10 July 1919 
[....] 
Colonel Stromfeld resigned yesterday. He is replaced by Colonel Lt. Julier who was 
formerly Chief of Staff of the third division army corps. Yesterday Colonel Stromfeld 
had a long talk with the Italian Colonel Romanetti [Romanelli] at Hotel Ritz. He 
rendered himself to Gyor [Gy<5r] where his family lives. Reason: he declined to agree to 
the retreat from northern Hungary. This is the official issue. In reality he had lost 
confidence in the possibility of military success and felt too weak to assume the military 
dictatorship with a disorderly retreating, unreliable army. Intentions of headquarters: it 
is decided to take the offensive against Roumanians. [....] 
1 The telegram transmits text received from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. [H] Nicolson) 
The strength of the Red Army, at any rate as regards the larger formations, seems to 
be less than we had supposed. I feel sure that the withdrawal from the Czecho-Slovak 
front must have affected their morale & discipline. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
18/7/19 G.S. 
No. 194 
Telephone Message from D. Lloyd George (Criccieth)l to A. Bonar Law (Paris. 
Received 11 July 1919) 
[PRO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15222]2 
In regard to Bela Kun, our difficulty is a good deal due to the Roumanian advance to 
the Theiss in defiance of the Peace Conference and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, 
and this is accentuated by the present refusal to withdraw from Hungarian territory as 
they were asked. If the decrees of the Peace Conference are to be enforced, they must 
be enforced against friend and foe alike. It seems clear that the Western Nations are not 
willing to supply the necessary force. Further, it is impossible to foresee when the 
Allied Forces could be withdrawn if once committed to the occupation of Hungary. 
In view of the very strong declaration made by M. Clemenceau of July 5th 
(I.C.201A)3 which was supported by Tittoni, it is clear that the main burden of action 
would fall on us. 
In the circumstances it is surely un-necessary for the C.I.G.S. to go to Paris. 
Ends.4 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section 
The military plan of operations was put forward by Marshal Foch at yesterday’s 
meeting of the Supreme Council,5 who are discussing the political aspects to-day.6 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
18/7/19 G.S. 
1 The Prime Minister was on holiday at Criccieth at the time. 
2 Also in LI. G. F/24/1/1, and printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, Enclosure with No. 38. 
3 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2. 
4 For D. Lloyd George’s telephone message to A.J. Balfour on 13 July on the same subject see No. 196. 
5 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, minute 3 and Appendix B. 
6 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5 and DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 15, minute 5. 
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No. 195 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 12 July 1919) 
No. 638 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15133] 
Vienna, 11 July 1919 
Priority Clear the Line. 
Reports from Budapest indicate that efforts are being made to rearm and reform the 
demoralized workmens battalions of Hungarian Red Army. Journals here publish 
statement by Bohm to Pelle that if Roumanians do not retire they will be attacked. This 
corroborate previous information that attack is planned in any event for July 15th. 
Therefore though there may be doubt whether Government can induce army to fight 
there is no doubt as to their ag[g]ressive intentions. An informing Czech and 
Roumanians intentions [? Am informing Czechs and Roumanians about Hungarian 
Government’s intentions]. Am informing Czech and Roumanians representatives. 
Addressed Dirmilint. 
No. 196 
Telephone Message from D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) to P. Kerr (Paris) 
[PRO CAB 21/150]l 
Criccieth, 13 July 1919 
Following from Prime Minister to Mr. Balfour. 
I have Mr. Kerr’s note of 11th July,1 2 but do not understand proceedings at Paris in 
regard to Bela Kun. Policy of Allies was first to insist on retirement of Bela Kun from 
Czecho-Slovak territory to be followed immediately by a retirement of Roumanians 
from Hungarian territory, after which peace negotiations with Hungary would 
commence. According to Report of Military Representatives, Versailles, dated 8th July, 
evacuation of Czecho-Slovak territory by Hungarian troops has been carried out within 
the time limit prescribed.3 Although Bela Kun has carried out his undertaking to the 
Allies, and complied with their demands, the Roumanians, who are our Allies, 
resolutely refuse to retire. When a foreign enemy occupies nearly half of the Magyar 
territory and remains within striking distance of their capital, and refuses to withdraw, 
even at the request of their own Allies, is there no justification for the Magyars, under 
such conditions, keeping a large force to protect what is left of their territory, or even to 
1 Also in LI. G. F/24/1/1; and printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 39. 
2 The editor has not been able to trace this document. 
3 The editor has not been able to trace this document. 
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drive4 the invader out of what is acknowledged even by him to be Magyar territory. 
The fundamental fact remains, and this seems to be the dominant fact in the situation, 
that the Roumanians broke the armistice; their breach of the armistice supplies a certain 
justification for the action of the Magyars. But surely the first step is to deal with the 
Roumanians. If we insist on doing what is obviously unfair, I am afraid that is the way 
to make Bolshevism and not to destroy it. The evidence is overwhelming that the 
Roumanian advance has strengthened Bela Kun’s position, and that young officers, 
who belong to the Hungarian aristocracy, have joined Bela Kun’s army to resist the 
Roumanian advance. If we insist on disarming them at the mercy of the Roumanians, 
will not that have the effect of putting the Hungarian national spirit behind Bolshevism? 
A fatal error. Who would accept the word of the Roumanians that they would not 
advance beyond the Theiss if the Hungarian army were disarmed? They could easily 
find some pretext, and their past proves that they are quite capable of inventing one. If 
they advanced, could we stop them? We have already tried to induce them to retire, and 
they pay no heed to our behests. 
Is not the proper course to pursue the original policy and to insist on Roumania 
withdrawing forces from Hungarian territory, making a simultaneous demand to Bela 
Kun to comply with terms of armistice as a condition precedent to peace? 
The decrees of the Conference must be enforced against the defaulter, whether friend 
or foe.5 
4 In DBFP (see note 1) instead of the word “drive”, the word “bribe” appears here. Other, slight, 
differences also occur between the two texts, which are apparently based on two different versions of the 
original. 
5 For A.J. Balfouf s reply see No. 202. 
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No. 197 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 14 July 1919) 
No. 97 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/15341] 
Vienna, 13 July 1919 
In French secret cypher telegram 141[?]9i Tower 3, July 3rd, from Clemenceau to 
General Hallier the following sentence occurs, begins: 
If Bela Kun makes up his mind to cast off Bolshevism idea (group undecypherable) 
would form a Socialist Government (3 groups undecypherable) the Entente, in my 
opinion would be to suddenly (2 groups undecypherable) a Socialist Government 
would be more agreeable to us than that of Szeged. A Bourgeois Government would 
not long remain in power and in this case we should be compelled to intervene once 
more. Ends. 
It is important that Paris Conference realises that Bela Kun has text of this telegram.1 2 
He will certainly use it for his own purpose and the bonafide of any political (1 group 
undecypherable) suggested by him should be asserted accordingly. I presume 
Conference knows that Szeged Government includes ex-Socialist functionaries and has 
a (1 group undecypherable) with the....Dicaliarbis in Budapest, whereby if Szeged 
Government is acknowledged by Entente and placed in power Socialist representation 
is fully secured. As in Austria so in Hungary the peasants are becoming alarmed and 
indignant at the perpetual neglect of their interests by the working class population of 
the towns and there can be no question that the peasant vote at present will be Anti- 
Socialist and a wholly Socialist administration will not bring internal peace in Hungary. 
1 The text here is uncertain, the number is either 14189 or 14199. 
2 In his telegram No. 96, dated 13 July, Col. Sir T. Cuninghame reported to A.J. Balfour that the 
Hungarian Legation in Vienna had decoded a number of French secret cipher telegrams, which he was in 
possession of. “[....] These documents of which I possess decypher give full details of the attitude and 
intention of Allies towards Bela Kun. 
I have (? told omitted) French some time ago their cyphers were compromised but will not tell them I 
have their documents unless you direct me to do so.” (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15335) He also 
asked tor confirmation that new keys had been issued for his own dispatches. Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss 
minuted on the document on 18 July that these had, in fact, been issued. Regarding the French telegrams 
however, no answer from the British Peace Delegation has been traced by the editor. 
318 BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919 
No. 198 
Tele gram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 14 July 1919) 
No. 98 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/15336] 
Vienna, 13 July 1919 
The continued report of ill-treatment of peasants by Bolsheviks of Hungary is causing 
great indignation in Austria. At Kaloc[s]a 19 were hanged under circumstances of 
grossest barbarity. At Szekszard 60 are reported to have been hanged or shot. Similar 
acts at Sobron [Sopron] and Szombathely have already been reported to you. 
Chief of Staff of Budapest garrison1 informed me that he knew of 200 deaths and 
asserted total in Hungary at 2000. 
Chief of Austrian peasant league informs me constant appeals made by Hungarian 
peasants to Austrian peasants to release them from existing tyranny requests league to 
put forward a resolution in Austrian Parliament on July 14th condoning with 
Hungarian peasants and protesting against continued acts of murder coarseness and 
plunder. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
I wonder if it would not be a good thing to give Mr. Mair2 some of these details for 
propaganda purposes. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
18/7/19 General Staff 
1 Major Geza Lajtos. Also see No. 190, note 2. 
2 H.G. Mair was on the Press Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
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No. 199 
Letter from Captain B.H. Barbe, (Vienna) to Major-General W. Thwaites (London. 
Received in Paris 24 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16088] 
M.I.3.b., 
Vienna, 15 July 1919 
The Director or of Military Intelligence, 
War Office, 
London 
The attached referring to conditions in Hungary was given me by the American 
Commissioner1 here. 
(Sd.) B.H. Barber, Captain, 
for Lt. Col. [Sir T. Cuninghame] 
British Military Representative 
in Vienna 
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 199 
Memorandum by Captain B. Weiss2 
10 July 1919 
To American Commissioner, Vienna 
SUBJECT:- Conditions in Hungary 
Interview with Bela Kun 
In this interview Bela Kun showed that he is confident as ever of retaining the present 
form of government, even though he admits that a large part of the farmers, who own 
their land, are positively against the present form of government, as well as all of the 
bourgeoisie, but he insists that the farm hands, especially of the co-operative farms, and 
also the Socialists are in favour and support the present government. According to his 
statement about six or seven million acres of land are being tilled by these farm hands, 
who do their best to produce large crops. He stated that he hoped in this way to get his 
supplies for Budapest and other cities so he could be independent of the small farmers. 
When asked how he would take care of the sick and protect the health of the children 
1 A. Halstead. 
2 This memorandum is also printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 606-609. 
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this coming winter in view of the coal shortage, he answered that the Entente may 
change its policy and lift the blockade thus allowing Hungary to get the necessary 
supplies. I then asked him “If the Allies do not raise the blockade, what then?”. His 
answer was that under any circumstances they would be able to survive for at least a 
year or year and one half in spite of all blockades. He hopes that in a few months time 
Germany and Czecho-Slovakia will turn Bolshevik, when Russia, Germany, Hungary 
and Czecho-Slovakia will form an Entente of their own, and exist as such until the rest 
of Europe joins them. In other words, he is just as confident to-day in spite of all the 
[?counter-]revolutionary movements, as he ever was. 
Upon asking him concerning conditions in Russia, he answered that naturally 
conditions are far better and consolidated than in Hungary, since they had started so 
much earlier. He further stated that by the time Hungary becomes consolidated, 
America will be in the same condition as Hungary is to-day. 
Conditions in Hungary 
As one passes through the country districts one sees the crops ripening, but not being 
cut, and there is great fear that even after being cut it cannot be threshed owing to the 
shortage of coal. The country seems to be fairly well supplied with food, in fact there is 
a surplus but the peasants refuse to give up any food for Budapest. This is due to the 
fact that they do not sympathise with the present form of government, and refuse to 
accept the white or Bolshevik money, which is not accepted in any other country. It also 
seems that the farmers have plenty of money on hand, but cannot buy anything for it as 
there is no commerce at all, which displeases them. 
In different parts of the country there are sporadical outbreaks of counter-revolutions, 
one suppressed and the other commences. On these occasions terror troops are sent to 
suppress the counter-revolution and after suppressed a number of the leaders are 
hanged, the town stripped of all cattle which are sent to Budapest, by which means the 
city is being nourished. In addition to this the town is assessed for sums from five to 
ten kronen, which is to be paid in blue money within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, 
in case of failure the lives of a number of citizens is forfeited. These cases are so 
numerous that it makes it unnecessary to mention the time and places. Eleven of the 
leaders of the last counter-revolution were sentenced to be shot, but so far this sentence 
has not been carried out. 
The Red Army 
In order to accomplish the desired end in the last offensive against the Czecho¬ 
slovaks, the soldiers were allowed to carry the tri-colour, and in this way the soldiers’ 
national spirit was aroused, and they put up a good fight and succeeded. No sooner 
than the fight was over and the army had to withdraw by orders of the Entente, the tri¬ 
colour was replaced by the red flag. This caused much dissatisfaction among the troops, 
and one of their political leaders named Landler made repeated requests to Commander 
Boehm for the replacement of the red flag by the red, white, and green. This, however, 
was not done. The soldiers being disappointed, partly by this act, and partly by the fact 
that they received letters from their families, saying that they are hungry and suffering at 
home, and to a great extent to the influence of propaganda employed by the white 
guard. Many units returned from the front of their own free will. The government being 
afraid to have these troops armed, they placed machine-guns on either side of the 
railroad tracks in the vicinity of Budapest which were manned by the Bolshevik troops, 
and in this manner disarmed the returning troops. The discipline is declining from day 
to day, and the army is falling to pieces. According to some reports in order to keep the 
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Army intact a new offensive was planned for the 15th of June3 against the 
Roumanians, due to the fact that they did not evacuate the territory indicated by the 
Entente. It is also rumoured that there might be a similar attack against the Czecho¬ 
slovaks on the pretext that the Entente did not live up to their promise in making the 
Roumanians evacuate the occupied territory. 
The fighting troops are estimated at about fifty or sixty thousand: cannon about 350: 
small arms munitions about 40,000,000 rounds and well supplied with machine guns. 
A number of the army aviators crossed the border with their machines to the white 
guard in the vicinity of Szegedin and did not return, so that at present they do not allow 
officers to fly, but instead the communistic enlisted men are doing it. 
Life in Budapest 
Life in Budapest is very depressing the people being in a nervous state of mind, 
practically all stores are closed, commerce has ceased entirely, and shortage of food is 
marked. The workmen are getting about three ounces of meat daily, but the bourgeoisie 
has to subsist on vegetables and very little of that. Fat is absolutely unknown, and the 
government does not make any effort to remedy the condition of the bourgeoisie, all 
they want and care for is the proletariat, and of those the communists come first. The 
city is in a continuous state of alarm, the wildest rumours being circulated, so that 
practically every day the government has a number of red guard in readiness to 
suppress a possible counter-revolution. Many of the original labour battalions have 
been disarmed due to lack of confidence, and in their stead many young and old men, 
who are supposed to be communists, were armed, and in this way they tried to make up 
for the military losses. A Socialist leader has informed me that the number of true 
communists is very small, and that the only reason for being [able]4 to keep up the 
present system is due to the following reasons:- 
1. True communists numbering about two or three thousand in Budapest. 
2 Number of labourers who gained high positions through this system, who 
wish to stay in power. 
3. Fact that many Socialists fear the return of the old system of government, 
consequently they remain passive or assist the present government. 
4. Number of intelligent class who could not make a living under previous 
government and at present hold leading positions. 
According to information received from a number of Socialists they desire military 
intervention from the Allies, at the same time making the following proclamation to the 
people:- 
1. Allies intention not to remain in the country, but to occupy it in order to 
restore order. 
2. Allies willing to support Social Democratic Government formed by Garami 
(Minister of Commerce in Karolyi Cabinet and well liked by all classes, and 
now in Switzerland). 
3 “June” is underlined, and “July ?” is written on the margin by hand in the original. 
4 The word “able” appears here in the version printed in FRUS, PPC, see note 2 above. 
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3. Immediate lifting of blockade with shipment of food supplies at the earliest 
possible moment so as to show the beneficial influence of changing 
governments. 
4. Amnesty granted to all taking part in the present government and prevention 
of white guard terror. 
If the above were done the general belief is that the Allied troops, preferably British 
and if possible some Americans, could march into Budapest without any fighting 
whatsoever. 
It is reported that Michael Karolyi and family have left Hungary and are supposed to 
have gone to Italy. 
According to reliable information the rifles of the unoccupied portion of Hungary at 
the end of March, 1919, amounted to 87,000. The factories are capable of turning about 
[? out] 300 rifles a day which would make an additional 30,000 during [? by] this time. 
However, the red government was able to arm 200,000 men by the middle of June, 
showing that about 100,000 rifles have been imported into the country from 
somewhere. The same thing holds true with ammunition, for hardly any was at hand at 
that time, and even at the present time they have 40,000,000 rounds of small arms 
ammunition. The army had about 40 to 50 guns at the end of March, while according to 
reliable information the number at the present time is about 350. They manufacture 
about four guns a week in their factory, which would show that about 250 have been 
imported. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
Interesting, but contains little that is new. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
26/7/19 G.S. 
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No. 200 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Extract. 
Received 16 July 1919f 
No. 844 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15438] 
Vienna, 15 July 1919 
[....] 
in a farewell speech2 to Army Headquarters Bohm said that if Red Army took 
offensive against Roumanians then National socialists who were with Julias [Julius] 
Karolyi I [?] would leave White side and join the Reds this seems to imply that 
offensive was still considered possible on that day if offensive does take place it will 
probably start about July twentieth Landler who succeeds Bohm is a Jew a lawyer and 
was considered a bad one signed Cuninghame. 
Gregory 
1 Forwards text received from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame. 
2 V. Bohm was replaced in his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army by J. Landler 
on 14 July 1919. 
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No. 201 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts. Received 18 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15654] 
Vienna, 15 July 1919 
My dear Twiss, 
I have been much exercised in my mind over the forthcoming offensive of the 
Hungarians against the Roumanians. 
The latter of course are in a very awkward position. They are not strong along the 
Theiss anywhere. But their position posted on the river is much better than it would be 
if they gave up the river line and fell back to the Entente Frontier line. For in the latter 
case their right flank would be completely isolated in the air. 
I therefore repeat what I have already said in a telegram that before the Roumanians 
can be asked to withdraw, the Hungarians ought to be compelled to disarm. 
As for the offensive itself, the unknown factor is the temper of the men. Apparently 
both Bohm and Stromfeld warned Kun that he could not leave one front (under threat 
from the Entente) to concentrate on another, without stampeding the moral[e] of the 
Army. Kun insisted and both Bohm and Stromfeld have resigned in consequence. The 
expected stampede actually seems to have taken place. The Infantry of the 8th Division 
insisted on returning to Western Hungary and have declined to participate in any further 
adventures. The Workmens Battalions which include practically all the Infantry of the 
4th Division walked back to Budapest, Stragglers Posts to disarm them had to be 
instituted in Hatvan, Waitsen1 and Es[z]tergom, and these were formed from the 
improvised 9th Division, a group recruited from the iron workers of Budapest. The 
intention of Kun to turn against the Roumanians was in no degree weakened, and as my 
reports will have shown you the Military preparations for the necessary concentrations 
were continued. But whether this scheme will actually be put into execution is at present 
impossible to say. 
However, I have kept the Czechs and the Roumanians fully informed step by step, 
and have urged them not to make the same fault of disunited action which nearly 
wrecked the whole show last time, and the Czechs now tell me that General Pelle is 
taking steps to avoid this by calling Roumanian Officers to his conferences. I have also 
sent Col. Watt down to see Admiral Troubridge in order to give him a full exposition of 
the situation in Western Hungary, and they have kept their own Military preparations 
up to date in case the mad dog should make a rush Westwards. 
[....] 
I have been much warned against “Agoston” the new Hungarian Minister. In Pest 
they call him a reactionary, in Vienna he is said to be “worse than Csobel [Czobel]2 and 
much more dangerous”. We shall see. It would also relieve the situation here if the 
Hungarian problem could be settled. 
[....] 
Yours sincerely, 
T. Cuninghame 
1 The German name of the northern Hungarian town of Vac. 
2 Em6 Czobel, Hungarian Minister in Vienna in July 1919. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
You should see this letter. I very much doubt if the Hungarians will venture upon an 
offensive against the Roumanians; their army does not seem strong enough to force a 
river like the Theiss in the face of well-armed & organised troops. 
The situation in Austria has improved a great deal in the last month, thanks to the 
modifications made in the peace terms. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
19/7/19 G.S. 
No. 202 
Letter from P. Kerr (Paris) to D. Lloyd George (Criccieth. Extract) 
[LI. G. F/89/3/4] 
Paris, 16 July 1919 
Prime Minister. 
I gave your message in regard to Hungary to Mr. Balfour.1 He agrees with you in 
thinking it essential that the Roumanians should be made to comply with their 
undertakings. 
Mr. Balfour, however, wants me to say that he thinks the situation is not at all easy. 
The Roumanians have not been guilty of any technical breach of the Armistice so far as 
Hungary is concerned, for the Armistice entitled the “armies of the Associated Powers 
to occupy such strategic points at such times as they may deem necessary to enable 
them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.”2 The Roumanians advanced 
to the Theiss only in contravention to the Allied military line. They did so immediately 
after the Bolshevik outbreak in Budapest. This was a provocation to the Magyars, but 
not a breach of armistice. On the other hand, Bela Kun has not only broken the 
Armistice by enormously increasing his forces and proclaiming a general mobilisation, 
but he has broken it also by interrupting the navigation of the Danube and the East and 
West railway traffic through Budapest which is essential to the economic life of Central 
Europe. Further Mr. Balfour was considerably impressed by the statement made by M. 
Bratiano3 to the effect that the Magyar army after withdrawing from Czecho-Slovakia 
was concentrating against the Roumanians, and that the only defensible line which the 
Roumanians could hold was the line of the Theiss because the new frontier line simply 
ran across the middle of the Hungarian plain and presented no sort of strategic frontier 
1 See No. 196. 
2 This is a quotation from the Armistice of 3 November 1919. The Military Convention of 13 November 
1919 is worded differently. For a comparison of the relevant points in the two Armistices see No. 73, 
note 2. 
3 For A.J. Balfour’s memorandum on his farewell interview with I. Bratianu at which the subject of the 
Romanian retirement from the line of the River Theiss was mentioned, see No. 181. 
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whatever, and that if the Roumanians, who were compelled to maintain troops also in 
Russia and Bulgaria, were to withdraw from the line of the Theiss, they would be in an 
impossible position unless the Hungarian army were first reduced to the limits 
proscribed [sic] by the Armistice. This opinion has been confirmed by the British 
Military section here. 
Accordingly Mr. Balfour’s view is that whatever else we may do we must concentrate 
on forcing Bela Kun to comply with the Armistice. At the same time he has informed 
the Roumanians that the decision that they too must retire, still holds, & he has obtained 
an assurance from them that they will withdraw behind their frontier directly the 
military situation permits it. At the present moment he is awaiting Foch’s opinion on the 
military problem. He is very anxious for the C.I.G.S.’ advice before taking any 
decision.4 
Josh Wedgwood has just blown in from Budapest where he has been living in the 
Soviet House. He says that Budapest is entirely in the hands of the Jews, that Soviet 
rule is a hopeless failure, that the peasants are utterly against it, and that it stands 
entirely through the use of Terror troops, clad in black leather. He calls himself an 
anarchist! 
4 For the controversy between Bela Kun and the Peace Conference over the issue of the withdrawal of 
the Romanian troops from Hungary see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 10, Appendix A: Bela Kun’s telegram to G. 
Clemenceau, dated 11 July 1919; DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 10, minute 6: the discussion of the above telegram 
in the Supreme Council on 12 July; DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 11, Appendix A: Bela Kun’s telegram to G. 
Clemenceau, dated 15 July; and DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 11, minute 1: the discussion of the above telegram in 
the Supreme Council on 15 July. 
No. 203 
Telegram from Lord Acton (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 17 July 1919) 
No. 226 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15654] 
Berne, 17 July 1919 
Following sent to-day to F.O. No. 93. 
I am informed by my usual informant on Hungarian affairs that Misael [Michael] 
Karolya [K&rolyi] is at present at Milan where he is endeavouring to gain support of 
Italian Socialists for purpose of recovering power at Buda Pesth. 
Repeated to Rome. 
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No. 204 
Memorandum by SirM. Hankey (Extract) 
[HNKY 8/18] 
17 July 1919 
TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY 
(PART II, Point 17) 
[Germany will be weak for some time to come.] 
Hence, our guarantee to France is not that is likely to call for any very great scale of 
military preparation for the present. If Germany is exhausted, this is even more true of 
Austria and Hungary1 Bulgaria and Turkey. Hungary, under Bela Kun, continues to 
exhaust herself, and, when the present phase has passed, will be equally innocuous. No 
doubt there will be disturbances and alarms, and flickerings of flame in Central Europe 
for some time to come. But the material for another blaze is burnt out. These local 
disturbances will probably remain localised. No great British interest is involved, and 
our policy will presumably be confined to such diplomatic action as will be best 
designed to secure this object. 
1 Crossed out in the original. 
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No. 205 
Notes by W. S. Churchill, A. Bonar Law, D. Lloyd George 
and General Sir H. Wilson1 
[Li G. F/89/3/5] 
cca. 18 July 1919 
(Draft message from [J.T.] Davies to [P.] Kerr in Churchill’s hand. n[o], d[ate].) 
Davi[e]s to Kerr 
Prime Minister 
to Mr. Balfour [?] 
Tell Kerr 
that we have 
Having discussed this matter with Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr. Bonar Law 
inclined to suggest an arrangement 
& are agreed in suggesting action 
H. Wilson & Churchill we are inclined to suggest an arrangement on the following 
for Balfour’s consideration 
lines2 subject to your views. But promptitude is essential as otherwise the forces at 
our disposal may melt away. 
1 These two sets of notes (in reverse order in the archives) were sent by P. Kerr to the Prime Minister 
on 18 July 1919, the day when the Supreme Council (in the absence of D. Lloyd George, President 
Wilson and V. Orlando) discussed at length the problems of Romanian withdrawal from Hungary and 
Hungarian disarmament (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5; and No. 15, minute 5). For another 
discussion of this same subject see A.J. Balfour’s telegram to the Prime Minister, dated 18 July 1919, in 
DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 52. 
The words are crossed out as in the original, and the preceding comments are quoted from the House of 
Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers Catalogue. 
2 In the archives catalogue (see note 1), the remark: “Not indicated.” is attached in a footnote here. 
However, the editor suggests that “following lines” refers to the second set of notes (see below). 
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(Attached: “Proposal to obtain undertakings that the Rumanians will withdraw if Bela 
Kun disarms. In Bonar Law’s hand, corrected by LI. G. and Henry Wilson, on 10 
Downing Str. notepaper. n[o]. d[ate].”)3 
a definite undertaking 
The proposal is that an agreement should be obtained from the Roumanians that they 
to the Paris line in accordance 
will retire beyond the Theiss as soon as the Hungarians have disarmed in accordance 
with the following conditions4 
with the Armistice. We should then make the demand on Bela Kun to disarm & 
guarantee to him that in that case the Roumanians will retire. 
J These comments are quoted from the House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers 
Catalogue. 
4 Footnote from the original archives catalogue: “Not indicated.” 
No. 206 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extract. Received21 July 1919f 
No. T.C. 692 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/15821] 
Vienna, 18 July 1919 
My dear Twiss, 
Since I wrote last, the news of most importance is the nomination of Bohm ex 
Commander in chief of the Red Army to the Post of Minister of Hungary in Vienna.* 2 I 
saw Bauer today about it and asked him if the appointment indicated that the 
preliminaries for conversations between him and Bohm relative to a change of 
Government in Budapest had failed, and he replied that on the contrary it indicates that 
Bohm had so far got his way that he had been placed in a Post which qualified him to 
undertake negotiations. Bauer continuing said that Bohm’s position was now stronger 
than Kun’s and that he had reason for the view that Kun would give way and 
consequently that Bohm would have against him only the Szamuely extremist group. 
He thought that Bohm was now quite secure from molestation by any political 
opponent and it only remained to see how far he was able to carry the Budapest Trades 
Unions with him. Bauer asked me particularly whether I would prefer to deal with 
Bohm direct, but I said I thought that it would be better for Bauer to sound him first and 
orient me in the particular difficulties to be encountered before any direct conversations 
took place. I pointed out to Bauer particularly how important it was for Austria that 
there should be no delay in settling the Hungarian question as it was essential that the 
coal and food difficulty should be got over before the Autumn, otherwise he would be 
faced here with the prospect of a disastrous winter. I advised him therefore to see to 
what extent the advice of the Vienna Arbeiter Rat would influence the Budapest Trades 
Printed in full in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 51. 
2 V. BOhm was appointed to this post on 17 July 1919. 
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Unions. We agreed that it was essential that all Russian Orientation of Policy and 
Association should be ended forthwith, and all measures of terrorism instantly 
abandoned. Also that the Communists should be dismissed and the rights of property 
reasserted. Further than this we did not go. Bauer expects Bohm on Monday3 night or 
Tuesday morning, and will take up the matter direct and inform me without delay.4 So 
far I have informed only the Americans of what is in the wind: i.e. both Gregory and 
Halstead, but if things go further we shall have to take in Borghese; as he has already 
several times tried the same lay without success, and may resent being left out in the 
cold. But Bauer pressed me not to approach anybody else prematurely as he said that 
Bohm had made a special point of dealing with me only. 
Yours sincerely, 
T. Cuninghame 
3 21 July 1919. 
4 For the story of further contacts between O. Bauer, Col. Sir T. Cuninghame and V. Bohm see Nos. 
209, 210 and 211. 
No. 207 
Memorandum by D. Abraham and Count P. Teleki (Szeged) 
for the British Government (Extracts. Received in Paris 30 July 1919) 
[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16653] 
Szeged, 18 July 1919 
CHAIRMAN of the COUNCIL, 
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT1 
To:- The Supreme Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
of the British Dominions beyond the Seas and of the Indian Empire. 
[....] 
Bolshevism in Hungary is a tissue of lies and has made use of Colonel Vix’s note of 
22nd March as a cloak to introduce terror into the country. Thanks to that lie, several 
hundred Bolsheviki, the majority of whom were not even of Hungarian nationality, 
organised a coup d’etat at Budapest under the protection of ex-prisoners of war returned 
from Russia. They deceived the Socialists, who themselves do not form 5% of the 
population, and carried out their plot all the more easily as the Government of Count 
Mich[a]el Karolyi had purposely disorganised the army and disarmed the bourgeoisie 
1 The rival government based in Szeged. For the origins of this government see No. 141. 
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and peasants. When our unhappy country came to its senses again and the deluded 
Socialists saw too late into what a trap they had fallen, a scant thousand of terrorists had 
gagged the nation. 
[....] 
We, a few unarmed men, began our arduous task some weeks ago. On our way, 
which is thick with obstacles, thousands of our fellow country-men have cast in their 
lot with us in the struggle against Bolshevist tyranny. Aviation officers took refuge at 
Szeged and one single aeroplane has enabled us to send news to our brethren in 
distress. They received it with the greatest enthusiasm, they await their liberation from 
us. On receipt of the first message taken by aeroplane, the Staff of the Red Armies 
between the Theiss and the Danube joined us, as well as the 26th Jager Regiment with 
all its equipment, arms, machine-guns, train and baggage. Flying the national flag, the 
three monitors left to us out of the whole flotilla bombarded the Soviet building at 
Budapest, but before they could even put themselves at our disposal had to surrender to 
the British flotilla, moored at Baja. 
[....] 
We do not ask the Allied Powers for help, only for permission to organise ourselves 
within teiritory to be delimited later on. We also ask for free communication, 
permission to transport war material, and that Red troops coming over to our ranks may 
not be disarmed. 
We do not wish to dispute the right of the armies of occupation to disarm troops 
crossing the line of demarcation, but wish to draw the attention of the competent 
authorities to the fact that under those conditions and if the above requests are not 
granted, we shall never succeed in beginning military action against the Communists, 
we shall never be able to end this terrible reign of a terrorist minority, we shall not be 
able to restore freedom of opinion and the people will not recover their right of self- 
determination. 
The disarming of troops who were forced into the ranks of the Red Army and who 
now come to join us is, by preventing all action against them, equivalent to a regime 
favouring the Bolshevists. Such a procedure would not correspond to the spirit of 
neutrality. If soldiers forcibly incorporated in Red regiments support our cause and 
cross occupied territory to join us, that can only be considered the passage of volunteers 
through neutral territory, allowed by the law of nations and frequently occurring during 
the recent war. 
Similarly, according to this principle the arms and equipment of soldiers are national 
property and arms destined to oppose the Bolsheviki are consequently entitled to transit 
via neutral territory. 
This right was enforced by neutral States during the war, all Russian war material 
being brought from America; the Entente has, moreover, adopted the same point of 
view with regard to Kolchak. 
As regards the case in point, this procedure would be in conformity with the principle 
of neutrality, and might even result in re-establishing the balance between our forces 
and those of the Bolsheviki. Further, it might restore the equilibrium disturbed by the 
treatment we have received from the Entente, which differs so widely from their attitude 
towards the Soviet Republic. 
The Entente Powers have not hitherto recognised either the Hungarian Government or 
the Soviet Republic. 
A few weeks ago, this movement was started by a few unarmed individuals; now, 
however, we are certain of being able successfully to oppose the Bolshevist armies with 
a force of over 100,000 men. 
The Communist Government, on the other hand, has succeeded in getting the power 
into its hands by inciting the country to revolution; since when it has given itself up to 
rapine and murder. It has even had the impudence to attack the Czech army (although 
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the latter had not taken the offensive),2 and has pushed it back a considerable distance, 
leaving everywhere seeds of Bolshevism in its wake. Not only are the munition 
factories in its hands, but it is able to obtain guns and other war material from abroad. 
With the exception of the re-establishment of the line of demarcation, no coercive or 
retaliatory measures were taken by the Entente against these aggressions and abuses, 
notwithstanding the fact that by merely advancing the line of demarcation (a procedure 
already adopted on more than one occasion) the lives and property of numerous 
peaceful inhabitants might easily have been saved. If the territory in question had been 
occupied by French, English, American or Italian troops, its population would have 
been free to settle its own destiny. 
Nevertheless, as we have already had the honour to state, we are not asking the 
Entente Powers to send us troops; we content ourselves by asking them merely to 
observe a benevolent neutrality, and to grant us [various facilities, including legal 
provisions and material (including military) supplies.] 
The said 4V2 to 5 skeleton divisions would open an offensive against the Soviet 
Army at Budapest. 
In the course of the advance, the ranks would be filled by the levee en masse of the 
population and by the Soviet soldiers who would desert to us. In this manner, the 
strength of the divisions would be brought up to war footing.3 
(Sd.) Desire d’ABRAHAM, 
President of the Council. 
(Sd.) Count Paul TELEKY [TELEKI], 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
2 Cf. No. 106. 
3 Towards the end of July 1919 the British Peace Delegation in Paris received numerous reports 
regarding the Szeged Government. The following are a few examples: On 21 July Sir C. des Graz sent a 
telegram from Belgrade reporting the visit to Belgrade of Count P. Teleki (Foreign Minister) and A. Balia 
(Minister of the Interior) of the Szeged Government. The last sentence reads: “If their [the Szeged 
Government’s] aid were accepted by the Allies the Szegedin Government could then count on the 
assistance of the Jugo-Slav Government in move against Bolsheviks.” (PRO FO 608/12 No. 
46/1/5/16213) On 22 July Lt.-Col. S.C. Peck, the Commander of the British Military Mission at Fiume, 
reported information he had obtained from E. Meugnier, son of the Spanish Consul in Fiume. Point 7 of 
the dispatch reads: “It is said that Lt. Col. HAUBRICH, Commanding the Bolchevic troops in 
BUDAPEST, is friendly to the Counter Revolutionaries and will join them as soon as a definitive move 
is made. [....]” Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss recorded the following note on this document on 1 August: “I 
doubt if this information is accurate or valuable.” (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16454) 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
This has lost much of its interest owing to the fall of the Bela Kun regime. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
2/8/19 G.S. 
H.G.N[icolson]. 
No. 208 
Telegram from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 25 July 1919f 
No. 366 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16708] 
Very Urgent. 
Bucharest, 22 July 1919 1 2 
Bela Kun appears to have realised Allies have at length decided to deal with him and 
has evidently resolved to get in first blow. Consequently Hungarians attacked 
Roumanians yesterday on line (? Theiss) and have I understand already advanced 
(?some) 15 kilometres east of Szolnok.3 
1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 56. 
2 The telegram was only dispatched on 23 July. 
3 On 21 July 1919 Bela Kun sent a telegram to G. Clemenceau, announcing that the Hungarians had no 
other choice but to attack the Romanians (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 16, Appendix B). For the discussion in the 
Supreme Council of this telegram see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 16, minute 2. 
On a dispatch, sent on 21 July and apparently not preserved in the original file, presumably warning of 
the impending Hungarian attack, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss minuted on 23 July: “I don’t think an offensive 
against the Roumanians on a large scale is likely to take place, in view of the present morale of the 
Hungarian army. If it does, it should not meet with much success.” (PRO FO 608/14 Nn 
46/1/12/15945) 
On a memorandum, sent by V. Cerruti to T. Tittoni on 16 July 1919 about the political and military 
situation in Hungary, Lt.-Col. Twiss recorded on 24 July: “Now that the Hungarians have begun then- 
offensive against the Rumanian forces on the TLeiss, the time would seem ripe for the combined 
offensive against Bela Kun. But time presses, & we should move at once, and not wait until the 
Rumanians have been utterly defeated.” (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/15973) 
F. Rattigan in a telegram, dated 24 July, reported the following from Bucharest: “[....] I learn that 
Roumanian General Staff are confident that they can deal with Hungarian attacks. They state that it will 
take three days to re-establish the situation and after that Roumanian counter offensive may be launched. 
French authorities agree that Roumanian optimism is justified.” (Printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI No 63 ) On 
the original, Lt.-Col. Twiss recorded the following on 5 August 1919 (after the successful Romanian 
counter-offensive): Yes, in attacking the Rumanians, the Red army was taking on a very different 
proposition than their offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, under Italian leadership. Once the 
Hungarians withdrew from the Czecho-Slovak front, they had little chance of success in offensive 
operations, for they were certain to lose much of their morale in such a retirement ” (PRO FO 608/14 Nn 
46/1/12/16924) 
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No. 209 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 
to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Received 23 July 1919) 
No. HAM 911 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16147] 
Vienna, 22 July 1919 
For Astoria Ham 911 repeat to Dirmilint London 663 X July 22 AAA I saw foreign 
secretary today he had seen Bohm who will see me this afternoon and state his case1 
AAA Speaking generally it amounts to acceptance by Kun of necessity of disappearing 
if agreement between entente and socialists can be reached AAA Bohm confirmed 
news of attack and success of red army east of Szolnok AAA in matter of cession of 
three western counties of Hungary to Austria Bauer told Bohm Austria would hold a 
plebiscite and Bohm agreed that majority in favor of Austria would today be 
overwhelming AAA no danger of dispute between two countries as yet but if red get 
further successes and can detach themselves from Roumanians to concentrate in 
western Hungary such danger may arise later Cunningham [sic] end. 
Gregory 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson). 
The present time appears most favourable, both from a military & political point of 
view, to commence operations against Bela Kun with Franco-Serbian & Czecho-Slovak 
armies. We know that Bela Kun is building on the supposed fear of the Entente for any 
military intervention & this has led to his placing his army in a most unfavourable 
position — in full confidence of our doing nothing. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
26/7/19 G.S. 
1 See No. 210. 
For the preliminary arrangements between Col. Sir T. Cuninghame and O. Bauer concerning the 
negotiations with V. Bbhm see No. 206. 
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No. 210 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 24 July 1919f 
No. 102 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16133] 
Vienna, 23 July 1919 
I saw Bohm to-day.* 2 After much discussion and after mutual explanation as to 
entirely unofficial character of conversations I proposed that Bohm should overthrow 
Bela Kun Government and with Haubrick [Haubrich] and -Ostmatte [? Agoston] 
create a military dictatorship in Buda-Pesth calling to assist a strong Entente 
Commission to adjust and control. Communism and Leninism to be repudiated and 
terrorism ended. Arbeiter Rat to be maintained partially and peasants and burghers 
council to be successively added to governing body by co-option. Finally a National 
Assembly to be called. Period of their developement [s/c] to be matter for discussion. 
Bohm thought scheme might succeed and provided Entente indicates interests in it, is 
prepared under certain guarantees to take steps. 
On July 23rd Allied, American and Italian representatives will meet3 to discuss 
scheme, and will report to Paris.4 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Col. Twiss. 
This is quite hopeful. 
Harold Nicolson. 
25/7/19 
[To] Hon. H. Nicolson 
Yes, unless Hungarians are able meanwhile to obtain important successes against 
Rumanians. Bohm’s manoeuvres, even if sincere, must take some time, & meanwhile 
there is a serious danger of the Rumanians being crushed whilst the French, Serbians & 
* Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 57. 
2 This indicates that the telegram was probably drafted on 22 July (see No. 209). 
3 See note 2 above. 
4 See No. 211. 
On 23 July Captain T.T.C. Gregory sent the following telegram from Vienna to H.C. Hoover: “For 
action. Ham 935 for Logan. Am sending important message which would like to know if acceptable at 
once as working basis for business about which we have been talking stop Head of affair would be 
General Boehm who accepts principle stated and believes can arrange business along these lines at once.” 
(PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16314) 
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Czecho-Slovaks look on. We are now allowing the Hungarians to attack our Allies in 
detail, though it would be easy to defeat them by concerted action. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
26/7/19 G.S. 
No. 211 
Telegram (in 2 parts) from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received (Part I) 25 July, (Part II) 28 July 1919f 
No. 104 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16255] 
Vienna, 24 July 1919 
Part One. Urgent 
From Gregory to Hoover. The former Hungarian C.-in-C. William Boriom [Bohm], 
the most powerful factor in the old Hungarian army and himself a Socialist and present 
representative of Hungary in Vienna, having approached the British Military 
representative with a view to ascertaining upon what terms the Entente would be willing 
to come again into relations with the people of Hungary. A conference of the 
representatives of France, America, Italy and Great Britain took place in Vienna on July 
23rd. As a result of which the following formula was submitted to him as a plan of 
action for the removal of the existing Communistic regeme [sic] in Hungary and as a 
means whereby a transitory Government which the Entente would be willing to support 
might be instituted. 
1 This telegram (both parts) is also printed, in a slightly different version, as it was sent by Captain 
Gregory to H.C. Hoover, in DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 18, Appendix A. 
After H.C. Hoover’s presentation of V. BOhm’s preliminary offers to the Peace Conference, but before 
the receipt of this telegram, there was a debate in the Supreme Council in the morning of 25 July as to 
what attitude the Allies should adopt with regard to these offers. During the debate A.J. Balfour pointed 
out that trusting the overthrow of Bela Kun to V. BOhm’s scheme rather than proceeding with the military 
intervention had a great advantage: “In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without 
being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programmes. These 
portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these 
disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm.” Towards the end of the debate 
Balfour observed that he “would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of 
international law in which Hungary now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies’ 
conditions, and yet at the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he felt that in 
acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against the Allies.” In the end the decision regarding the action to 
be taken by the Conference was postponed until next day in view of new information received from V. 
BOhm. (Presumably Part I of the present telegram.) {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 17, minute 1.) When the debate 
was continued on 26 July, they resolved that, in view of the situation resulting from BOhm’s offers, as 
well as from the Hungarian attack on Romanian positions, A.J. Balfour and H.C. Hoover should confer 
in the preparation of a public statement to be sent to Hungary (see No. 214), which should be presented 
to the Council on the same day. {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 18, minute 3.) 
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Formula begins. 
1. Bohm to assume a dictatorship in which complete powers of Government are 
vested. Names of associates to be discussed Haubrich Agoston Garamy 
[Garami] suggested. 
2. Dismissal of Communist Kun Government, repudiation of Bolshevism and 
complete cessation of Bolshevic propaganda. 
3. Dictatorship to bridge over period until formation of Government representative 
of all parties. 
4. Immediate cessation of all Terroristic acts, confiscation and seizures. 
5. Immediate calling of Entente Advisory Bodies. 
6. Raising of Blockade and immediate steps to be taken by Entente to supply food 
coal minerals assistance in opening up the Danube. 
7. No political prosecutions. 
8. Ultimate determination respecting Socialization to be left to permanent 
Government. 
Formula ends. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
Part II. 
Bohm having considered the formula has accepted it provisionally as a basis while 
reserving the final acceptance until after a consultation with his associates. Matters 
having proceeded so far it is essential that the Entente representatives should be 
informed whether the Entente is in general agreement with the principles of the formula 
so that matters in the event of final acceptance by the Hungarian representative may 
proceed further. It is understood that a Mission of four generals is about to be sent to 
Hungary to report upon possibility of finding a solution to the existing situation and it 
is therefore recommended if the Entente is prepared to authorize the prosecution of the 
plan herein elaborated that the departure of this Mission should be delayed until the 
final answer of Bohm is received, otherwise the position on [«c] the Kun regime would 
be once more strengthened by the impression that the Entente will eventually be willing 
to recognise them and the chance of success for Bohm would be seriously diminished. 
Copy sent to War Office by bag. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
There are two points on which I lack information: 
(a) Have any instructions been given to our representatives in Vienna re their dealings 
with Bohm, & in confirmation of the formula given in Cuninghame’s No. 104 (Part I, 
16255) of July 24th? 
(b) What instructions, if any, have been given to the 4 Generals? Our General Gorton 
is now in Czecho-Slovakia, settling frontier questions etc. between the Czecho-Slovaks 
& Magyars. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
1/8/19 G.S. 
Kun has fallen — so that in any case these instructions are out of date. 
H.G.N[icolson]. 
2/8/19 
No. 212 
Telephone Message from General E.L. Spears for the British Peace Delegation 
(Extract) 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16332] 
Paris, 25 July 1919 
(1) Report from General Franchet d’Esperey dated July 22nd. 
Roumanian left and French right have lost touch. French are covering R. Maros 
between Szeged and Nagylak, but are not in any way assisting Roumanians. 
Roumanian High Command have given no information whatever to the French re 
their intentions or the existing situation, which they have had to find out by means of 
their own liaison officers. A portion of the population in the Theiss neighbourhood 
have risen against the Roumanians owing to their exactions. 
[....] 
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No. 213 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 26 July 1919)1 
No. 105 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16368] 
Vienna, 25 July 1919 
I spoke to Bohm again to-day. The Socialist Veldner [Weltner] the head of the 
Budapest Arbeiter Rat arrives in Vienna to-day. Bohm has also summoned Garami 
from Switzerland. Bela Kun made no objection to the coming of Veldner which 
indicates that he is not opposed to the idea of negotiations. Bohm thinks everything will 
depend on success of Roumanians. If they hold their own he thinks he can intervene 
successfully. If Roumanians are pressed back it will be more difficult. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
I don’t trust either Bohm or Bela Kun, who are probably working in harmony. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
1/8/19 G.S. 
Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 64. 
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No. 214 
Statement by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers1 * * * 5 
[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/16383] 
Paris, 26 July 1919 
The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the 
Hungarian People, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the 
economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure 
supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in 
Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and 
spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. 
None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not 
only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment 
actually attacking a friendly Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it 
is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and 
supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to removed, if economic 
reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a 
Government which represents the hungarian [sic] people and not with one that rests its 
authority upon terrorism. 
The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of 
Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms 
of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been 
satisfactorily complied with. 
1 Also printed in DBFP, L/vol I, No. 19, minute 2. 
The statement was released to the press late in the afternoon of 26 July, and wired to Hungary at the 
same time. It was published in the British press on 28 July. The text was drafted by A.J. Balfour in 
consultation with H.C. Hoover, and was accepted with slight alterations by the Supreme Council. For the 
debate in the Supreme Council relating to the statement see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 19, minute 2. 
A. Halstead, U.S. Commissioner in Vienna, in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, R. Lansing, dated 
5 August 1919, wrote that this note played a fundamental role in bringing down Bela Kun’s Government, 
adding, that informal negotiations with the internal opposition were equally important in this connection. 
In his view the Government would have fallen without the Romanian advance, which followed the failure 
of the Hungarian attack on Romanian positions on the Theiss. (See FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 627-628.) 
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No. 215 
Memorandum by A.J. Balfour 
[BALF Additional 49750] 
Paris, 27 July 1919 
ARMIES AND ECONOMICS BEING REFLECTIONS ON SOME ASPECTS OF 
THE ALLIED SITUATION ON JULY 27th, 19191 
It must be obvious to everyone who has followed contemporary developments that 
Allied diplomacy is being seriously embarrassed by Allied Military weakness. Ever 
since peace with Germany seemed in a fair way to be established, it has been a race 
between the Great Powers which should demobilise the fastest. Italy indeed, for 
reasons of her own, has lagged behind her Allies. But this makes little difference since, 
according to Signor Tittoni,* * tin the oriSinall her Government no longer dares to send 
troops beyond her own frontiers for fear of revolution! 
I am not concerned here to justify this procedure. It has the best of all justification — 
it is inevitable. But I must say a word about its consequences, for these have to be 
faced. 
We have at present two kinds of military obligation; the one imposed by Treaty, the 
other by policy. Neither of these should seem very formidable to the States which only 
a few months ago had, I suppose, some fifteen million men under arms. But so rapidly 
have our Armies melted away that both are burdensome, and both lead to unedifying 
recrimination in the Conference Room about the share which the different Allies are 
taking in the common burden. Upper Silesia, for example, has by Treaty to be occupied 
till a plebiscite is held. The soldiers say, or did say, that a division was required for the 
purpose. Where is it to come from, and how is it to be composed? It is to come, say the 
soldiers, from the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. It is to be composed, says M. 
Clemenceau, of Allied troops in equal proportion. The discussion is not yet concluded, 
but I conjecture that in the end this arrangement will prove inconvenient or 
impracticable; that if a division be really required, it will have in the main to be French, 
and that if so, M. Clemenceau will loudly complain of the hardship thus inflicted upon 
his country. This is precisely what he is doing with regard to the occupation of Bulgaria 
and the control of Hungary. “What is Bulgaria to me?” he exclaims. “Why should 
France keep troops to further the interests of Greece? Why should France, and, among 
the Great Powers, France alone, risk her divisions in compelling Hungary to obey the 
Armistice? This is equally the duty of Britain and America and Italy. But there are 
apparently no British or American troops to send; and though there are Italian troops. 
Italy dare not send them. What is he to say to the French ‘Chambre’? How is he to 
justify himself to the French People ?” — and so on. 
These little controversies are harmful, but doubtless they can be arranged. Indeed, if I 
could only find out exactly what are our Military commitments and our own military 
resources, I should not despair of coming to some clear understanding, at least between 
France and ourselves. But there is another aspect of the problem not so easily dealt 
1 In the original file the title is preceded by the following introductory notes: 
“Armies and Economics. Memorandum by Mr. Balfour. 
Stating Allies’ inability to coerce refractory Nations by means of Military force, owing to lack of troops; 
and suggesting use of the economic weapon as means of persuasion.” 
* [in the original] Conference of July 26. [See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 19, minute 2.] 
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with, the aspect which relates to our small Allies and our small enemies. The former, 
one would suppose, would obey us through gratitude; the latter through fear. But the 
gratitude is being rapidly worn away by our persistent efforts to prevent the nations we 
have saved or created from cutting each others throats and seizing each others territory; 
while the fear cannot easily survive the continued spectacle of our obvious Military 
weakness. Greeks, Roumanians, Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, (I say nothing of the 
Italians), have all at different times disobeyed our explicit instructions. The Hungarians 
at the present moment are breaking the Armistice with impunity. The cases are many in 
which a Division or Brigade or even a Battalion would have made a situation easy 
which is now difficult, and have effectually smoothed the diplomatic path to Peace. But 
asking the War Department of a Great Power for soldiers is like asking a medicant for a 
thousand pounds, and you get much the same reply. The Conference is therefore 
compelled to talk when action is required. Even the threat of action is denied us; for so 
notorious is our impotence that we cannot afford the bluff. 
I assume that this disease is incurable. In the absence of any full and authentic 
information on the Military situation I cannot do otherwise. But if we have no soldiers 
wherewith to help and shepherd our friends, or control, and perhaps coerce our foes, 
have we any substitute? I know of none but the economic weapon. But the economic 
weapon is unfortunately not very easy to use; and, except in the crude form of 
blockade, has not, so far as I know, been systematically employed on a large scale as an 
engine of diplomatic persuasion. I plead for a closer study of its capabilities. 
I admit the difficulties in the way of its employment are manifold. In the first place, it 
necessarily consists in withholding, or threatening to withhold, something which would 
otherwise be given — and the Allies, except America, are so impoverished that they 
have very little to give; while America, even if a willing helper, is hampered at every 
turn by her Constitution. Still, it is clear that in the economic reconstruction of Europe, 
Britain, poor though she may be, is going to play a leading part; and President Wilson, 
though he cannot give money, can apparently give food. But there comes in the second 
difficulty, which is apt to impede the use of the economic weapon. It often inflicts direct 
and obvious injury on women and children; and it often produces some injurious 
economic reaction on the Powers that use it. Philanthropy boggles at the first 
consequence; self-interest at the second. But I do not think these objections are 
necessarily fatal. Of course no universal principles can be laid down. Each case must be 
considered on its merits; and with regard to every country where we are likely to have 
trouble, we ought to examine how, by exciting economic hopes or fears, we can 
successfully act upon its rulers. Where the results of such an examination are 
satisfactory we may be well content to lack Military force; though even at the best we 
cannot hope that the remote threats of economic ills will always give pause to greedy 
Governments or peoples intoxicated with a perverted patriotism. There are many 
nations at this moment who understand no argument but force; and on them the sight of 
a British Battalion would have a more immediate effect than the remoter prospects of 
poverty and want. I greatly fear that the inevitable tragedies of the coming winter may 
change the current of their thoughts. In what direction I cannot tell. But surely they will 
think less of War. 
(Sd.) A.J.B[alfour], 
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No. 216 
Telegram from H. Alliz.e (Vienna) to S. Pichon (Paris. Received 30 July 1919) 
No. not known. [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16654] 
Vienna, 28 July 1919 
Je reponds a votre telegramme du 26 juillet.1 
Les Chefs des Missions anglaise et italienne ont confiance en M. Boehm et estiment 
qu’il est en mesure de renverser le Gouvemement de Bela Kun. 
En ce qui me concerne je n’ai aucune confiance dans M. Boehm ni dans les autres 
personnalites hongroises qui seraient disposees a lui prater leur concours. Chaque fois 
que le Gouvemement des Soviets s’est trouve en difficultes il a essaye de negocier avec 
l’Entente. 
Toutefois, nous ne risquons rien a prendre vis-a-vis de Boehm les engagements 
demandes pour le cas ou il serait de bonne foi et ou il reussirait. 
Je crois que ne devons perdre aucune occasion d’essayer de resoudre pacifiquement le 
crise hongroise. D autre part un Gouvemement preside par Boehm opposerait sans 
doute moins de resistance a nos conditions de paix qu’un Gouvemement contre- 
revolutionnaire et nationaliste comme celui de Szeged. 
signe: ALLIZE. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Military]. Representative]. 
You should see M. Allize’s opinion of Boehm. 
Though we may make use of him, I think we ought not to trust him too much, or 
expect great things from him. Cuninghame thinks he is acting in good faith, but there is 
always the chance that he is still in collusion with Bela Kun. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
1/8/19 G.S. 
[....] I agree with A about B. 
C. Sackville-West 
M.R. 
1 The editor has not been able to trace this telegram. 
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No. 217 
Letter from Marshal F. Foch to G. Clemenceau 
No. 3599 (?) [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16755] 
Paris, 29 July 1919 
Au cours de la reunion des Chefs des Delegations des Cinq Grandes Puissances, 
tenue le 26 juillet, il a ete decide que je continuerais ‘les pourparlers avec les Delegations 
“serbe-croate-slovene, roumaine et tcheco-slovaque, pour faire preciser leur point de 
“vue quant aux garanties demandees par elles pour Fintervention militaire en 
“Hongrie.”* 1 2 
Pai l’honneur de vous faire connaitre que je dispose des a present, au sujet de cette 
question, des renseignements suivants: 
Tcheco-Slovaquie. 
Le Gouvernement de la Republique Tcheco-Slovaque a mis a la disposition de 
l’Entente, pour Faction eventuelle contre la Hongrie, la totalite des forces dont il dispose. 
II n’a demande en echange aucune garantie speciale/1) the original] 
Serbie. 
Le Gouvernement Serbe a pose comme condition de sa cooperation l’appui 
bienveillant de FEntente, en vue d’obtenir: 
- d’une part la cessation de toute cause de friction avec FItalie; 
- d’autre part, la protection des territoires serbes contre les troupes et Comitadjis 
bulgares.O tin the original] 
Il est a remarquer que la premiere garantie implique une demarche des 
Gouvemements Allies aupres de FItalie; quant a la deuxieme, elle est deja donnee au 
Gouvernement Serbe dans toute la mesure du possible, par suite de la presence en 
Bulgarie des 30e et 156e Divisions fransaises. 
Roumanie. 
Le Roi de Roumanie a autorise Farmee roumaine a donner aux Allies le concours le 
plus complet pour retablir l’ordre dans FEurope Centrale. 
Independamment des desiderata d’ordre militaire relatifs aux conditions dans 
lesquelles le Haut Commandement Roumain desirait voir regler la participation de ses 
1 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 19, minute 2. 
(1) [in the original] . m du G6n6ral Pell6 du 15 juillet.) 
Tel. de M. Masaryk du 15 juillet. ( Piece N° 1. [Not enclosed in the original.] 
Lettre de M. Benes du 15 juillet) 
(2) [in the original] _ yQjr jettres des 15 et 22/7 du General Pechitch (P.N° 2). [Not enclosed in the 
original.] 
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troupes aux operations projetees,C) the or>ginal] la Roumanie a demande seulement 
comme garantie de securite: 
- d’une part, l’envoi urgent des munitions et du materiel commandes en France et 
en Angleterre, en vue de recompleter ces stocks; 
- d’autre part, l’expedition en Roumanie de locomotives permettant d’intensifier les 
transports et d’effectuer, en cas de besoin, les deplacements de reserves du front 
du Dniester vers le front de la Theiss34) tin the onginal] 
Ces deux questions ont ete mises a l’etude par les services interesses. 
(Signe) FOCH. 
(3) [in the original] _ y0jr jettre 23 juillet. (Piece N° 3). [Not enclosed in the original.] 
Ces desiderata qui paraissent acceptables, visent l’organisation du 
Commandement, la participation des forces roumaines a l’occupation eventuelle 
du pays, le droit de requisition, etc... 
(4) [in the original] _ du Q^n^rai Graziani du 18 juillet (Piece N° 4). [Not enclosed in the 
original.] 
No. 218 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts. Received 1 August 1919)1 
No. T.C. 704 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/16382] 
Vienna, 29 July 1919 
My dear Twiss, 
[••••] 
As far as Austria is concerned, much the most important event is the retirement of Dr. 
Bauer. His pro-Italian pro-German policy broke down under French resentment. [....] I 
think what we have now to anticipate is a “German policy directed towards the 
reformation of a Danubian Confederacy beginning with Austria-Hungary and Croatia 
made in accord (more or less) with Italy, on the assumption that fusion with Austria, 
and the wrecking of the Czecho-Slovak state can be carried out at any time convenient 
to Germany, and that mere fusion with Austria alone is not worth the trouble, at any 
rate at this confused moment. I think myself that we should be more secure if we 
brought about the “fusion” and made a clear cut national line, by so doing excluding the 
countries of East Central Europe. 
[-.] 
The next most important thing is the provision of food and coal for Austria for the 
forthcoming winter. [....] My own attitude towards the Budapest question is largely 
conditioned by the fear of coming trouble in Vienna in winter. If it was really necessary 
to let Budapest “flop”, with Bolshevism as an awful example, there are at least 
arguments for allowing it to proceed to the other extreme, which from what I can judge 
1 Printed in full in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 70. 
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is hardly yet, but on the other hand if its continuation involves the constant fear of 
further extensions it is in the world’s interest desirable to end it at once. [....] 
Coming now directly to the question of Hungary, as you are now aware, the ex- 
Commander in chief William Bohm came to see me, to put out feelers for the purpose 
of ascertaining the attitude of the Entente Governments towards the existing regime in 
Pest and towards any succeeding Governments. My telegrams will have informed you 
of the process of events.2 On the 23rd July he [we] had a conference of Entente 
representatives and defined our attitude, and asked the Entente for an opinion.3 
Personally I have heard from Paris nothing on the subject. But my colleagues have kept 
me informed of the replies which they have received. From them I gather that M. Allize 
made some comments in the telegram which he sent to his Government concerning the 
capacity of Bohm to carry out the task which he himself suggested, doubting in fact if 
he was the man, and accusing him of “playing for time”.4 I certainly don’t think that the 
letter [sic] accusation is well founded as no one knows better than Bohm that the 
situation in Pest grows worse every day. But there is this to be said: Bohm is very tired 
physically (but not insane or more so than others in Hungary) also the terror in 
Budapest is now so acute that everybody’s nerves are affected, and fears for his head if 
his coup fails. But if he can get round him a few good men, and if in particular the 
majority of the Pest Trades Unions support him, then he will recover his old force and 
energy. 
M. Allize apparently preferred “Garami” who is more of a Socialist and less of a 
Spartacist than Bohm, and certainly the choice of Garami would evoke less opposition. 
But he is a rich man, without any great fund of energy and has no standing with the 
army. Still we are trying to get him to Vienna so that the Bethlem [Bethlen] counter¬ 
revolutionary groups can if they please get into touch with him, as at present the Bohm 
group refuse to have anything to do with the Szeged people and vice-versa. Various 
other representatives of the Pest workmen came to see me including Veldner [Weltner], 
the head of the Arbeiter Rat and one was conscious of the same thing throughout, 
namely the impression of the terror inspired by the extremist groups of Szamuely, and 
the impression caused by a series of unsuccessful attempts to throw off the communist 
yoke. They wished to ask from us many guarantees relating to the provision of food, 
coal and clothing but I declined to enter into any such matters pending a more definite 
proposal for action from them. As matters stand Agoston goes back to Pest today to 
report to Kun. Bohm follows on Friday5 (unless Agoston warns him that it is too 
unsafe) and the others return tomorrow. We shall see what will happen. 
Meanwhile there are two important developments to which I wish to draw your 
attention. Firstly the progress of the Peasants Organisation in Hungary, and secondly 
the advance of the Rumanian Army. The first is taking place obviously under extreme 
difficulties, but is making progress. I placed the organisers in close touch with the 
organisers of the Peasants League in Austria, from whose experiences I judged that 
they could derive benefit, and told them what is essential is that they should be ready 
and prepared to take full advantage of the first opportunity to enter Pest, and to join 
their county and commune organisations with the minimum of delay. They will be 
dealing with a situation in which general disarmament will be an outstanding feature 
and so they will labour under difficulties greater than those with which the Austrians 
had to contend, for the only real means of recovering the moral confidence of the 
peasants will be in arming them, but this will be clearly impossible. But a great deal can 
be done in the way of political suasion by effective organisations and if it is done really 
2 See Nos. 206, 209, 210, 211 and 213. 
3 See No. 211. 
4 See No. 216. 
5 1 August 1919. 
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efficiently it will not matter what intervening group holds the Government after Kun, as 
finally the peasants will elect their own representatives. In western Hungary the process 
is already well on the way to realisation, and everywhere some progress is reported. 
As for the Rumanian operations, my telegrams give you the gist.6 Was able to send a 
Press Representative to Bucharest in time to warn the army of what was coming with 
the plan of enemy concentration and the Rumanian Representative here has expressed 
his gratitude to me for my assistance which he states was of value. The question is now 
whether the Rumanians can cross the Theiss and I am hourly expecting information on 
this point. All I know at present is that the bridge head east of Szolnok was stormed by 
the Rumanians yesterday and that the Red International Regts. at Tisza Fured were 
annihilated. I am told that the Theiss is exceptionally low and I don’t see why the 
Rumanians should not be able to get over. If so they may settle the question of 
Budapest quickly, but I fear that the advance upon Budapest involves the danger of 
massacres for the Pest Bourgeoisie. I have sent you the latest distribution list of the 
Hungarian army, also the situation in western Hungary. These have been given to all 
Entente representatives here. 
There is much more to say which I will prepare for next mail, including the situation 
in Slovakia which is of particular interest, but as the bag is now closing I must stop. 
It is very satisfactory that we have now a clearcut repudiation of Kun,7 which ought 
to assist the opponents very materially. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tom Cuninghame. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Military],Representative].8 
You will, I think, like to see this letter from Cuninghame, which is interesting & 
important; Sir Eyre Crowe should also see. 
I hope we shall treat the Austrian counter-proposals kindly, when they come; 
otherwise Austria will be forced to join Germany or to go bankrupt. 
Re the “Anschluss” question, I can’t see Cuninghame’s argument: surely it would be 
better for us to keep Austria from Germany, & to get her join a Danubian 
Confederation. 
Cuninghame emphasises the necessity, from the economic point of view, of settling 
the Hungarian question without delay. I rather doubt if much reliance can be placed in 
Bohm’s promises or suggestions; he is, after all, merely Bela Kun’s envoy to Vienna, & 
is possibly, even probably, working in direct collusion with him. The defeat by the 
Rumanians of the Red Hungarian army offers the best chance of the overthrow of Bela 
Kun, though the counter-revolutionaries are terrorised by Szamuely & his agents. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
1/8/19 G.S. 
6 These military dispatches are not printed, for later ones of a similar nature see Nos 221 222 228 and 
230. 
7 See No. 214. 
8 Gen. C. Sackville-West. 
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No. 219 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A. J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 August 1919)] 
No. 106 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16886] 
Vienna, 31 July 1919 
I saw Bohm to-day who had spoken to Bela Kun yesterday. He gathered the 
impression that the pressure upon Bela Kun was not yet sufficient to induce him to 
yield. The socialists who were with Bohm have proceeded to Budapest to ascertain the 
actual situation in more detail and will report. Bohm is fairly confident of eventual 
success. He said that Red Army is not much disorganised by retreat though some 
changes in disposition of troops have been necessary. Roumanians have made no 
serious effort to cross the Theiss. Small groups crossed near Tokay [Tokaj]. The 80th 
brigade was practically annihilated and remnants are collected at Poroszlo. The river is 
low. 
Addressed D.M.I. London. 
1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 73. 
No. 220 
Tele gram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Viennaf 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 August 1919) 
No. 107 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16912] 
Vienna, 1 August 1919 
Chief of Budapest Workmen’s Council1 2 came to see me in company with Bohm. He 
seemed to think Bela Kun could be forced out if right movements were chosen, states 
he would not attempt anything in the nature of a coalition government. But I hear 
privately that he is in touch with the Szeged Government secretly. He asked for 
(special) financial and economic promises from Entente. I said that I would represent 
his view to Paris. 
Repeated D.M.I. 
1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 74. 
2 J. Weltner. 
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No. 221 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919) 
No. 686 x [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16995] 
Vienna, 1 August 1919 
Following identifications of Red Army. 23rd Regiment dissolved. 
Majority of cavalry including elements of 1st, 7th & 9th Hussars surrendered to 
Roumanians. Bridge-head division Budapest Corps dissolved anti-aircraft guns sent 
forward to Theiss. From 4th Division 7th or 9th regiment transferred to Western 
Hungary for mutiny. End. 
Also addressed to Dirmilint. 
No. 222 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919f 
No. 687x [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16994] 
Vienna, 1 August 1919 
Austrian Foreign Office report Kun Government fell to-day and replaced by wholly 
socialist Government under Peidl including Garamy [Garami] Haubrich and Agoston. 
Report is also current that Roumanians have crossed Theiss and are advancing on 
Ujrzasz [Ujszasz]. Red Army in rout. 
Addressed Dirmilint.1 2 
1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 75. 
2 The Supreme Council was first informed about the fall of Bela Kun’s Government on 2 August 1919 
from Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram, dated 1 August (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, Appendix A). In the 
telegram Lt.-Col. Romanelli reported: “Le Gouvernement Hongrois de la Republique des Conseils a 
donne aujourd’hui ses demissions et a ete remplace par un Gouvernement qui a declare d’accepter les 
propositions des Puissances Alliees, telles qu’elles ont ete arrgtees a Vienne le 25 juillet par M. le Prince 
Borghese, Ministre Plenipotentiaire de l’ltalie, et Monsieur le Colonel Cunningham [sic], Chef de la 
Mission Militaire Britannique a Vienne. [....]” The “propositions” referred to are contained in No. 211. In 
return for the acceptance of the propositions by the Hungarian Socialist Delegates, Prince Borghese and 
Col. Cuninghame appear to have made an undertaking that in the event of the envisaged change of 
government in Hungary, the Allies would require the Romanian Army to stay on the line of the River 
Tisza, which would be the demarcation line of a new provisional armistice till the Peace Conference 
procured a final settlement. In the debate which followed the receipt of Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram in 
the Supreme Council (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, minute 1) A.J. Balfour said “the Council about the 
13th of June, had ordered the Roumanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own 
frontiers. [See FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 411-412, 413 and 416.] They had not done so. Their excuse had 
been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it was 
impossible for them to risk giving up a defendable line for one which was strategically far worse. Under 
the present circumstances, he thought that the Roumanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line 
originally laid down for them.” To this T. Tittoni answered that he thought that “for the time being [....] 
the Roumanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave 
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No. 223 
Telegram from G. Clemenceau (Paris) to 
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Romanelli (Budapest f 
[DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, Appendix B] 
Paris, 2 August 1919 
J’ai l’honneur de vous accuser reception de votre radio du ler aotit annor^ant la 
demission du Gouvemement de la Republique des Conseils, la formation d’un nouveau 
Gouvernement hongrois et les declarations faites par ce dernier qui ont ete portees a la 
connaissance du Conseil Supreme. 
Le Conseil des Allies estime qu’il n’[a] pas a intervenir dans la politique interieure de 
la Republique hongroise et a ce titre n’a pas a faire etat des propositions suggerees par 
deux membres des Missions Alliees a Vienne.2 
Les seules bases reconnues des relations des Puissances Alliees et Associees et de la 
1 For the origins of this dispatch see No. 222, note 2. The English translation is printed in FRUS, PPC, 
vol. VII, pp. 490-491. 
2 Reference to Prince L. Borghese and Col. Sir T. Cuninghame. 
evidence of good behaviour the Roumanians could then be told to withdraw within their own frontiers. If, 
on the other hand, the Hungarians were again deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Roumanians 
would be regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it would be easy to order the 
Roumanians to withdraw, and they would certainly comply.” Later Tittoni pointed out that “General 
Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the Roumanian troops, but for their advance to stop.” 
This latter statement, however, did not take sufficient notice of the fact that, since the quoted request by 
V. Biihm had been made, the Romanians advanced west of their previous positions. In any case, there 
appeared to be a consensus in the Supreme Council that whatever promises had been made to V. Bbhm 
and his Socialist colleagues in Vienna, these promises had not received the authorization of the Peace 
Conference, and had, therefore, no binding force for the Conference. G. Clemenceau remarked: “the 
Council had no cognisance of General Boehm.” A.J. Balfour summed up his position as follows: “In any 
case, the Hungarians had attacked the Roumanians on the plea that the latter had not observed the 
armistice. The Hungarians had been defeated, and Bela Kun’s Government had fallen. He quite agreed 
that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before [i.e. letting themselves be deceived by 
the Hungarians], but personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a humane and 
orderly Government or any specific kind of Government whatever. This was an interference in their 
domestic affairs. He would adhere strictly to the armistice, and call the Hungarians to observe it. It might 
further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary were such as could be recognised, the Allies 
would make peace with it speedily.” G. Clemenceau’s reply sent to Lt.-Col. Romanelli on 2 August 
(printed as No. 223) reflected the views expressed in the Supreme Council. 
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Hongrie sont: 1° — 1’armistice du 13 novembre 1918,3 dont les conditions doivent 6tre 
respectees par le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois, tout particulierement en ce qui 
conceme la demobilisation de l’armee; 2° — la notification de la Conference de la Paix 
en date du 13 juin4 pour la fixation de la ligne sur laquelle doivent etre maintenues les 
troupes hongroises du cdte des frontieres tcheco-slovaques et roumaines. 
Le Conseil des Allies demandera seulement au Gouvernement roumain d’arrdter ses 
troupes sur les positions qu’elles occupent actuellement a la suite de 1’agression dont 
elles viennent d’etre l’objet du fait de l’armee hongroise et ne le priera pas de les retirer 
jusqu’a la ligne fixee le ler juin5 avant que le nouveau Gouvernement de Budapest ne se 
soit strictement soumis aux clauses de 1’armistice. 
Les Puissances Alliees et Associees attendent le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois a 
ses actes, elles esperent que l’avenement d’un Gouvernement qui executera ses 
engagements et representera le peuple hongrois hatera le moment du retablissement de 
la paix et de la reprise des relations economiques regulieres. 
CLEMENCEAU 
3 For the text of the (Belgrade) Armistice of 13 November 1918 see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 183. 
Note 13 to DBFP, I/vol.I, No. 26 suggests F. Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, New 
York, 1942, p. 478 for the English translation of this present dispatch. At this point the text there reads: 
“...(1) the armistice of November 3, 1918...”. The editor has not been able to account for this difference 
beyond doubt, but it seems likely, as FRUS, PPC also cites “November 13”, that Clemenceau referred to 
the Belgrade Convention of 13 November 1918, and not the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 
1918, and that the mistake, therefore, is in Deak, op. cit. For the significance of the difference between the 
texts of the two armistices see No. 73, note 2. 
4 See FRUS. PPC, vol. VI, pp. 411-416; partially printed in No. 149. 
5 See FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, pp. 814-815 (minutes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 11 June 1919), or 
FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, p. 416 (part of the Allied note sent to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania on 
13 June 1919). 
No. 224 
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
toA.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919j1 
No. 688 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17034] 
Vienna, 2 August 1919 
Kun Bela arrived in Vienna and is interned by Police. Report is current that Samuely 
[Szamuely] was stopped by Austrian frontier authorities when trying to cross into 
Austria with quarter million crowns and committed suicide. 
Addressed Astoria and Dirmilint. 
Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 80. 
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No. 225 
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (?) (Vienna) to the 
American Relief Administrate n (Paris. Extracts. Received 4 August 1919) 
No. not known [PR 0 FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17064] 
Vienna, 2 August 1919] 
[....] 1 propose to start immediate shipments from Banat to Vienna on Danube and 
want to try some Hungarian cars to divide with Austria on coal shipments. Have also 
taken steps to get special wire to Budapest and immediate connection with Belgrade. 
[....] Two train-loads of fugitives from Pest is en route to Austria. First carrying women 
and children, members of families former Bolshevist leaders. Question now is what to 
do with them here. Agreed to have them put in decent cold storage at border and await 
determination of final disposition. Will send you some independent stuff as to details of 
meeting which B.K. out [ ? resulted in the ousting of Bela Kun?]. Understand reason 
for this stop. Most important thing to do now is to stop Roumanian advance. Borghesi 
[Borghese], Austrian Govt., Cunningham [sic] and I all agree that this Govt, should be 
left alone to work things out. Roumanian further advance or occupation of Pest will 
surely cause lots unnecessary trouble and stir up nationalist feeling which is so strong 
and which would unite all parties against them. You must do something on this at once. 
They may not have sense enough themselves. Have just received visit from Hungarian 
minister1 2 who asks about food blockade and child feeding. I believe blockade should 
be suspended not withdrawn pending developments. [....] What will Chief3 do about 
child feeding Budapest? Not necessary in country but would justify some expenditure 
and should react favourably on rest of Bolshevist places which are eagerly watching 
this situation. We have personnel enough within reach to handle this. Torrey4 could 
take charge. 
Will probably have some trouble about gold but will go after it. Borghesi [Borghese] 
is working OK and Cuninghame also, so that we will get this gold working. Ippen, 
[Austrian] Foreign Minister, who succeeded Bauer, has called just this moment and 
tells me that Kuhn [Kun], Landler and Por5 are here in Vienna and have just been 
interned, as will about ten others, who are on the way.6 Present Government Pest 
1 Neither the sender’s name, nor the exact addressee of this telegram is indicated on the original file. The 
date of dispatch can only be deduced from the content, as it cannot be inferred unambiguously from the 
title. The copy was received by the British Peace Delegation on 4 August 1919 with the title: “COPY OF 
TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, AUGUST 2nd, 
1919.” Therefore it is possible that the American R.A. received the telegram on 2 August. From the text it 
is very likely that the writer is Captain T.T.C. Gregory. 
2 V. BOhm. 
3 This is probably a reference to H.C. Hoover, Director General of the American Relief Administration. 
4 The editor has not been able to establish further details about the identity of this person, who was 
probably a member of the American Relief Administration. 
5 Erno Por, Head of the International Propaganda Bureau of the Hungarian Bolshevik Government with 
the rank of Deputy People’s Commissar, where he was later replaced by G. Alpari. Helped in the 
establishment of the short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic. 
6 As a result of an agreement signed by V. BOhm and T. Ippen on 2 August, the Austrian Government 
initially allowed the entry into Austria of B. Kun, J. Landler, E. Por, B. Vago, J. Pogany, M. Rakosi, E. 
Madarasz, J. Hirossik, J. Varga, and G. Lengyel, all functionaries of the fallen Government. 
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wanted to get them out of the country. They will be in custody of police and not 
permitted to talk people. Austrian Govt, will turn them over at entente request or later 
send them back to Hungary. Should make soap out of him but that’s later story. Sameuli 
[Szamuely] killed himself at noon to-day at Weiner Newstadt [Wiener Neustadt]. There 
is important question whether present socialist government should be recognised or 
whether other elements should be brought in. Paris should proceed with present 
government, giving them chance to turn round, but with understanding that agricultural 
and other elements should be brought in, as soon as possible. Received telegram few 
minutes ago from man I sent Pest last night that Roumanians still advancing and great 
source of danger and trouble if they enter Budapest, which is now in excellent order 
and under strong control. Will try get by phone from Pest exact location, if known, of 
Roumanians but the principle applies just the same. Causey is itching to get into Pest 
and grab hold of railroad situation which is so important in coal and Banat movements 
just now. Prince Borghesi [Borghese] is Italian Ambassador who has been in Hungary 
and has good head. Kuhn and his associates will be interned somewhere in country not 
in Vienna.7 Just received report from my man in Pest that best information is 
Roumanians forty or fifty kilometres from Pest. Quick action is necessary. Hutchinson8 
just advises Czechs have to-day signed coal contract with Austria, copies being 
forwarded here to-day. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
I doubt the genuine character of the new government. I don’t trust a single Bolshevik, 
especially if he’s a Jew, and the new Cabinet contains several of these. The sooner we 
disarm the Red army, the better. The next thing should be elections, & appoint a real 
Hungarian Government, representative of the nation, & to eliminate all Jews. I can’t 
believe that the Magyar people wants to be ruled by Bohm, Peidl, Garami etc. 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
4/8/19 G.S. 
I agree. 
Harold Nicolson. 
4/8/19 
The Council of Five have dealt with this. 
E. Crowe 
5/8/19 
7 Bela Kun was interned in Karlstein and in Stockerau. 
8 Member of the American Relief Administration. 
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No. 226 
En Claire Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 3 August 1919) 
No. 698 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17127] 
Vienna, 3 August 1919 
Have just seen Reuters correspondent who left Budapest 8 p.m. last night. He reports 
that all was quiet. He states, however, that there would undoubtedly have been excess 
on the part of the extreme element had it not been that the declaration of the Entente 
published on July 27th1 enables the trade unions to control the situation. 
Repeated Dirmilint. 
1 See No. 214. 
No. 227 
En Clair Telegram fro Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 August 1919)] 
No. 690 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17146] 
Vienna, 3 July 1919 
Bohm and Veltner [Weltner] informed me to-day they had received instructions from 
Budapest Government to lay before representatives of the Entente programme of new 
Hungarian Government. 
I first made it clear that the suggestion which formed basis of conversation between 
the Allied representatives and Bohm (referred to in Romanelli’s telegram to 
Clemenceau)2 have been superseded by wireless from Allied Governments] of July 
27th.3 They said they fully understood this. The chief points of programme are as 
follows, begins. 
1. General election for constituent national assembly will be held at the earliest 
possible moment. For technical reasons preparations will probably take eight to 
ten weeks. 
2. Orientation to Russia abandoned and relations with Communist Russia broken 
off. Orientation to Entente instead. 
1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 81. 
2 See No. 222, note 2. 
3 See No. 214. 
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3. Cessation of regime terror and violence. Cessation of all Bolshevik 
propaganda at home and abroad. Soviet Government organ already ceased to 
appear. 
5. [sic] All political prisoners have already been released. 
6. General political amnesty. 
7. Re-establishment of democratic liberties including press speech and meetings. 
8. Question of extent of socialization will be decided by National Assembly. 
9. Foreign Property respected. Hungarian and Austrian experts will meet to 
discuss matters immediately. Ends. 
Bohm and Veltner [Weltner] asked that Roumanian advance should be stopped and 
Theiss made demarcation line and blockade be raised immediately. They urged in 
particular that thirty-six waggons of paper in Vienna might be allowed to go to 
Budapest in order that Newspapers may continue to appear and enable the Government 
to explain new position to the people. British delegate of I.A.T.C. informs me export of 
ten car loads of rotation paper has been authorized by that commission without 
instructions from Paris. At my request Bohm promised to induce his government to 
raise immediately mines laid in the Danube. I raised the question of taking 
representatives of bourgeois and peasants class into the government. Bohm considered 
this would be dangerous at present but could be reconsidered in eight to ten days. 
Telegram ends. 
Repeated Dirmilint. 
No. 228 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 August 1919) 
No. 691 [PRO FO 608/14 No.46/1/12/17140] 
Vienna, 3 August 1919 
(8 p.m.) 
Italian Mission here heard by telephone at 17.30 August third that one Roumanian 
cavalry Brigade with artillery was on eastern outskirts of Budapest. Colonel Romanelli 
had given commander copy of M. Clemenceau’s wireless telegram stating that the 
advance of the Roumanians would be stopped.1 Brigade commander had replied that he 
was unable without direct orders from his divisional general. Romanelli asked that 
troops should not actually enter the town pending reference to higher authority and will 
telephone when he has an answer. If Roumanians do enter, mayor will hand over 
functions to Romanelli. All quiet so far in Budapest. Ends. 
Repeated to Dirmilint. 
1 See No. 223. 
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No. 229 
Copy of Two Telegrams Sent by J. Gorvin to Sir W. Goode with Commentary 
[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/17199] 
Supreme Economic Council, 
Food Section, 
Paris, 3 August 1919 
[Copy for] Col. Twiss. 
The following telegrams were received by the American Relief Administration at 11. 
a.m. this morning regarding the Hungarian position:- 
“To Hoover from Gregory. Roumanian advance guard 18 or 20 km. from Budapest 
main body about forty. Minister of War Haubricht [Haubrich] requests me transmit 
message asking advance be stopped on fear of trouble in occupation by Roumanian 
troops”. 
“To Hoover from Gregory. Exceedingly anxious and request small detachments of 
Entente soldiers of different kind not more than a regiment in all which would greatly 
stabilise local forces. This I would suggest could be done by having Troubridge come 
with monitors also some French and Italian detachments who are close by.1 One of Old 
Red Guards shot one of Roumanian advance party and there is apt to be further unrest 
and trouble of same sort. Haubricht [Haubrich] has already started to comply with 
Clemenceau’s telegram on conditions of armistice”.2 
Col. Logan, who handed me the telegrams, informs me that Mr. Hoover will take up 
the question of childrens’ [sic] feeding in Hungary, referred to in yesterday’s 
telegrams,3 on his return this evening. 
I understand that Mr. Balfour agrees that the Roumanian advance be stopped. 
1 In this connection also see Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram to G. Clemenceau, dated 3 August 1919, 
printed in DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 27, A. 
2 See No. 223. 
3 See No. 225. 
MIKLOS LOJKO 357 
You will note that it is suggested that Admiral Troubridge should be sent up the 
Danube with monitors.4 
(Sd.) J. Gorvin, 
for Sir William Goode. 
4 Shortly after the dispatch of these telegrams Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge was posted to Budapest for a 
period as one of the organisers of the Allied relief programme and the effort to re-establish trade among 
the Danubian countries. His critical attitude to the Romanian occupation of the city at the time occasioned 
protests from I.C. Bratianu on 19 and 30 August 1919 (see DBFP, V vol. VI, Nos. 124 and 148). Later, 
at a meeting of the Supreme Council on 15 November 1919, G. Clemenceau, while acknowledging the 
value of Admiral Troubridge’s services in Budapest, called attention to allegations about the Admiral’s 
Habsburg sympathies, especially his alleged friendship with the Archduke Joseph, who played a 
prominent role in the intensive power struggle that followed the fall of Bela Kun’s regime. (See No. 232, 
note 4.) Clemenceau added that “he wondered if it were not advisable for the British Government to take 
this situation into account all the more so because the Admiral’s influence throughout Hungary was 
considerable.” (See DBFP, I/vol. II No. 23, minute 6.) On 15 November Sir E. Crowe sent a telegram to 
the Foreign Office in London, informing Earl Curzon of these allegations. In a letter, sent on 19 
November 1919 to Walter Long, First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Curzon transmitted Sir E. Crowe’s 
telegram and added: “I should be the first to express appreciation of the services which are being rendered 
by Admiral Troubridge and the effect of the presence of the monitors under his command on the situation 
in Hungary. But I feel that the delicacy of the present situation in that country cannot be too strongly 
impressed on the Admiral, as also the importance of not acting in any way which might give the outward 
appearance of favouring any of the political parties in Hungary.” (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/20516.) 
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No. 230 
En Clair Tele gram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 5 July 1919) 
No. 692x [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/17206] 
Vienna, 4 August 1919 
Reports from Budapest indicate that Roumanian troops are still coming into the city, 
which has now been formally occupied. Government are apparently in doubt whether 
they will be able to remain. Hungarians complain of acts of violence by Roumanians, 
including many arrests of officers and men. Americans report that Ministry is under 
impression that Czechs and Serbs are also advancing and that occupation by various 
nations who did not come in until after the working men and trades unions had 
overthrown the government may make serious difficulty in the way of reorganization. 
Americans advise provision of an Entente Commission in Budapest which can be 
found from the Entente personnel present. General Gorton1 is here and is proceeding 
immediately to Budapest. Ends. Addressed Dirmilint. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson) 
The position now appears to be aggravated by the presentation by the Rumanians of 
extremely harsh terms to the Hungarian Government; these terms were handed to the 
Hungarians yesterday evening, the latter apparently being given only 4 hours to reply. 
A copy of the terms (in French) has just been received through the Americans, sent by 
Gen. Gorton, & Cols. Romanelli & Causey from Buda Pest, & Gen. Sackville-West is 
placing it before Mr. Balfour at this morning’s conference.2 
W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col. 
6/8/19 G.S. 
1 See No. 232, note 3. 
2 For the text of the Romanian note see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 29, Appendix B. For the discussion in the 
Supreme Council on 6 August about the note and the telegram sent by the Conference to the Romanian 
Government in connection with the note see DBFP, I/vol. I. No. 29, minute 2. 
The Peace Conference was formally opposed to the Romanian occupation of Hungarian territory, and 
issued repeated requests to the Romanian authorities to comply with the resolutions of the Conference. 
The Romanians withdrew from Budapest and its surrounding areas in November 1919, completing their 
withdrawal from the whole territory of Hungary by June 1920. In conjunction with the Romanians, the 
Czechoslovak army in the north and the Yugoslav army in the south kept parts of Hungary under 
occupation; these armies were also withdrawn at around the time of the Romanian withdrawal. 
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No. 231 
En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 August 1919) 
No. 694x [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17253] 
Vienna, 5 August 1919 
Negotiations between the existing Budapest Government and the Szeged Government 
are proceeding with object of bringing about a coalition. The arrival in Vienna of 
Garami in whom both sides are prepared to trust is hourly expected and on his arrival 
no further difficulties will remain. A correspondent coming from Budapest to-day states 
that conduct of the Roumanians in the town is good and that if they are sent away 
before international control is established outbreaks of extremists who regard Socialist 
Government as reactionary and refuse to have anything to do with Szeged Government 
may yet take place. News of collapse of Bolshevism has had most favourable effect in 
Vienna and prospect of cessation of all funds has put complete end to communist 
agitation. Ends. Addressed Dirmilint. 
No. 232 
Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 
to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Received 9 August 1919f 
No. T.C. 713 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/17581] 
Vienna, 5 August 1919 
Since I wrote last things have moved quickly and in a manner such as we more or 
less anticipated. The Red Army on the Theiss collapsed before the Roumanian counter¬ 
offensive and by August 1st was already in a hopeless condition. Accordingly the Rote 
[Rate] republic* 2 was constrained to yield to the demands of the Trades Unions and to 
dismiss. The negotiations which we had conducted in Vienna through Bauer Bohm and 
Veldner [Weltner] came in very opportunely to prevent anything in the nature of a last 
stand by the Budapest garrison, as well as all attempts at pillage by the extremist 
element. It was scarcely to be hoped that the advance of the Roumanians could be 
checked but the arrival of General Gorton3 in Vienna made it possible to send down at 
once a British Representative to prevent excesses on the part of the Roumanians. Before 
he left however, he managed to take the first steps towards effecting a coalition of the 
Szeged and Budapest Governments which will be the best means of averting serious 
outbreaks in the country districts. The Buda Pesth Government have exaggerated 
notions as to the strength of the “white forces” in Hungary, who are in reality only 
* Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 87. 
2 The republic of the workers’ councils. 
3 The British member of the Allied Military Mission to Hungary. The other members were Gen. Jean- 
Cesar Graziani (France), Gen. Harry Hill Bandholtz (U.S.A.) and Gen. Ernesto Mombelli (Italy). The 
plan of sending four Allied Generals to Hungary was suggested by G. Clemenceau at a meeting of the 
Supreme Council on 18 July 1919. For the details see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5. 
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about 1200 strong. Consequently the Socialist groups are ready to do anything to 
prevent their advance and to prevent the propagation of “white terroristic” agitation. The 
Szeged representatives are, however, very recalcitrant (perhaps not unnaturally) and so 
I called Bethlen to confer with Bohm before me, since I knew that if they met alone 
nothing would come of the meeting. Gorton and Phil[l]potts were also present and we 
got them to agree to hold their hands until the arrival of Garami — the Socialist whom 
all parties agree to accept. Bethlen sent a message by aeroplane to Teleki of the Szeged 
Government to refrain from all that might tend to excite civil war pending news as to 
the chances of a coalition. 
If the coalition comes off all will be well — otherwise I fear that the town will get up 
against the country and vice versa and trouble and misrule will last long.4 
4 The Socialists could not form a coalition with the Szeged Government, and the Socialist administration 
set up under the premiership of G. Peidl did not last long. On the evening ot 6 August a group calling 
itself “The White House” entered the Prime Minister’s residence and forced the Government to resign, 
while the building was surrounded by units of the Romanian Army. The Habsburg Archduke Joseph 
became Governor of Hungary and appointed I. Friedrich as Prime Minister. 
This event prolonged the political instability in Hungary, which formally ended on 1 March 1920, when 
the National Assembly, under considerable pressure from the military, elected Admiral Miklos Horthy, as 
Regent. In fact the uncertainty lasted until about the mid-1920s, by which time the economic and social 
consolidation of the new system was achieved under the premiership of Count I. Bethlen. 
With regard to the resignation of G. Peidl’s government Sir C. des Graz reported from Belgrade on 10 
August 1919 in his telegram No. 227 (received 13 August): “Rumour circulating here yesterday that 
Socialist Administration at Buda Pesth has been replaced by Government with the Archduke Joseph at its 
head caused a flutter. Idea is distasteful here if means possibility of reunion of Hungary with Austria 
under a Habsburg and creation anew of a stronger State on the borders of Jugo-Slavia. I heard last night 
that it was thought that the Szegedin Government would join new Government at Pesth and it is said that 
forces under orders of former — about 3 battalions — are already on their way to Pesth.” (DBbP, I/vol. 
VI, No. 101, note 1.) 
Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, in his letter sent to Sir R. Graham on 28 August from Vienna (received 2 
September), writing about the feared re-emergence of a monarchist movement in Austria, which would 
provoke a corresponding Socialist, or even Communist counter-movement, remarked: “The intervention 
[in Hungary] of the Archduke Joseph cannot be considered otherwise than as very unfortunate and 
inopportune from this point of view [....]” {DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 147.) 
The Peace Conference paid less attention to the internal developments in Hungary after the fall of Bela 
Kun’s Government, while the primary objective remained the signing of a Peace Treaty with Hungary at 
the earliest possible date. As this could only be done with representatives of a stable, and preferably 
representative, government, the Conference sent Sir G. Clerk on a mission to Hungary in October 1919 to 
facilitate the creation of a coalition government. The Peace Treaty, however, was only signed on 4 June 
1920. 
The fall of G. Peidl’s government was reported to the British Delegation in Paris by Sir C. des Graz 
with a three day delay. The Supreme Council briefly commented on the change at their meeting on 18 
August. F. Polk said that “Mr. Hoover’s conclusion was that this [the one that replaced G. Peidl’s] 
Government should not be recognised as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph 
remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognise him he would fall, and he could then be 
replaced by a Coalition Government.” S. Pichon asked “whether there was any proof that the 
Roumanians had supported this Government.” F. Polk replied that “they of course deny it. The 
information received was to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. 
The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.” A.J. Balfour reiterated the 
above points when he proposed a draft for a telegram to be sent to the Allied Generals in Budapest (see 
note 3 above) informing them of the views of the Conference. {DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 36, minute 1, and 
Appendix C.) 
It is interesting to note that Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, in his letter to Sir R. Graham on 28 August (see 
above) attributed the take-over by the Archduke Joseph to an intervention by the representatives of the 
Vatican in Budapest. Though he claimed to have evidence for this, he did not reveal it in his letter, and the 
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I gave Gorton all the information I had at my disposal and I have already heard that he 
has arrived in Buda Pesth and is working in accord with Borghese[,] Romanelli and the 
Americans. The whole affair is an immense relief to Vienna as you can imagine. 
Already the Communists have found their money supplies cut off and consequently 
their houses, clubs and institutions are being closed. They are greatly dejected at the 
course of events, and we have nothing more to fear from them for a spell. 
Equally the chances of opening the Danube and getting food and coal in have cheered 
up people a lot. 
The next thing to do is to form in Hungary a Peasants’ Organization similar to that in 
Austria and I have already taken the necessary preliminary steps. When that is 
potentially powerful, I am convinced that a belt will be drawn South of Czecho¬ 
slovakia which will prevent the collapse of that state into similar political experiments. 
Generally in fact, the political situation has much improved. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) T. A. Cuninghame. 
No. 233 
En Clair Telegram from Earl Curz.on (London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. 
Received 9 (?) August 1919) 
No. 1067 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/17567] 
London, 8 August 1919 
Very Urgent. By bag. 
Parliamentary question for August 11th1 asks whether Entente have demanded or 
intend to demand from German-Austria the surrender of Bela Kun; and , if so why. 
I assume that there is no such intention. Please telegraph reply as soon as possible. 
The question was raised in the House of Commons on 11 August by Col. J. Wedgwood, and was 
answered by A. Bonar Law in a manner which had been suggested by Sir E. Crowe (see minutes to the 
document). Colonel Wedgwood then asked: “May I take it from that that the Council of Five will not 
attempt to extradite members of the late Soviet Government in Hungary who have committed no crimes 
against humanity?” A. Bonar Law answered: “I hope the hon. Member will not ask to say more than I 
have — that the matter is not under consideration at present.” (The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report 
(Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 119, London, 1919, column 874.) 
editor has not found further references to this aspect of the removal of the Socialist administration of G 
Peidl. 
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Minutes attached to the document: 
So far as I am aware there is no such intention. It is possible, of course, that the new 
Hungarian Government may ask for Bela Kun’s extradition for offences against 
criminal law. 
Harold Nicolson 
9/8/19 
Reply: 
“The question has never been raised or considered by the Council of Five.” 
E. Crowe 
9/8/19 
Telephoned to F.O. 10.30. a.m. Aug. 11.1.R.M. 
No. 234 
Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley (Extracts) 
[HOLM ACC 727/1] 
ca. end of 1919, 
or later 
NOTE ON THE AUSTRIAN TREATY1 
The whole procedure with regard to the Austrian Treaty has been, as is now generally 
agreed, singularly unfortunate and it seems desirable to place on record what I know 
personally as to this matter and to give some account of the attempts which I made to 
get a revision of the Treaty at the last stage. 
Owing to the great importance of the questions connected with Germany, at the first 
stage, after the Armistice, little or no attention seems to have been given in the Foreign 
Office to the problems which would arise owing to the dissolution of the Austrian 
Monarchy. In the Political Intelligence Department I had always been disturbed by the 
fact that we had no one on whom we could place complete reliance, whose chief duty it 
was to keep in touch with the developments in Austria. In Victoria Street2 Seton 
Watson had charge of this Department. He was of course very capable and had great 
knowledge, but even as regards his work the criticism might fairly be made that he 
looked at the Austrian problem too much from the point of view of the Southern Slavs. 
Though he knew everything, he was scarcely the person we should have chosen to 
present an account of things from the Viennese point of view. But for a real 
1 In the first part of the memorandum the term “Austria” is used denote “Austria-Hungary”, whereas, 
towards the latter part, it refers to the new state of “Austria”. 
2 A colloquial name applied to the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. 
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appreciation of what was going on, this point of view wanted representing just as much 
as that of the Croatians and the Serbs and the Czecho-Slovaks. This applies also to 
Hungary, for there was some danger that Hungarian problems might be looked upon 
too exclusively from the point of view of the Croatians, the Slovaks and the 
Rumanians. Sound policy however requires that we should be fully informed as to the 
point of view of the enemy as well as of that of our friends. 
When the Intelligence Department moved to the Foreign Office,3 Seton Watson left. 
No one was appointed to take his place. I repeatedly drew attention to this and tried to 
find some efficient substitute. The best I could get hold of was Phil[l]potts, but he was 
sent on a mission to Vienna. It is characteristic that though he was sent out apparently 
by the Foreign Office, he is absorbed into Military Intelligence, and we seem to have no 
information from him. I had the greatest difficulty even in finding out when he went to 
Vienna. The most suitable person in the Foreign Office would have been Max Muller, 
who knew both Austria and Hungary and had been working on it throughout the war, 
but there were difficulties connected with standing in getting him into the P.I.D. He 
however gave occasional advice. The work about Austria had therefore to be done 
chiefly by Namier. I got occasional help from Randall as regards Tyrolese and German 
Austrian matters. Namier had great knowledge and ability, but he had a great deal to do 
in connection with Poland, and again his interpretation could not be relied upon as 
being unbiassed. During the summer of 1918 at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, we 
drew up a joint memorandum about the policy to be adopted in case of a revolution in 
Austria;4 in doing this, I got a great deal of assistance from Seton Watson. 
It obviously was of the highest importance when the revolution actually took place to 
have someone watching the events with the greatest care; what should have been done 
is to have a weekly report giving a concise narrative and drawing attention to any 
political conclusions. It was quite impossible to get anything of the kind done. 
After the armistice we had to occupy ourselves with drawing up memoranda 
preparatory to the work of the Peace Conference. At once we were confronted by the 
difficulty of dealing with Austria. I got a memorandum by Namier which contained 
much valuable material, and at my request Seton Watson wrote an additional 
memorandum on the Hungarian situation and on the legal aspects of the revolution.5 
These memoranda were not nearly sufficient; they might however have formed the 
beginning for consideration of the very serious problems which obviously would arise. 
I have, however, never seen any indication that anyone read them or took any notice of 
them at all. Their very existence appears to have been ignored as well as the fact that 
there were any problems to be considered in Austria. In the distribution of work for the 
Peace Conference, Sir Ralph Paget was appointed in charge of the Austrian and Baltic 
sections; his staff consisted of [A.W.A.] Leeper and Nicolson, both of them very able 
and well informed, but both of them by their previous work interested rather in the 
Balkans than in the Austrian section. So far as I know no initiative with regard to 
Austria came from Sir Ralph Paget. 
On his appointment as Ambassador to Brazil, Austria together with the Balkans was 
transferred to Sir Eyre Crowe. The result was that one man was put in charge of the 
whole of Europe with the exception of the Northern and the North-Eastern sections. He 
was given no addition to his staff, except [A.] Akers Douglas, who was specially 
charged with matters concerning Western Europe. It seems to have been generally 
3 25 March 1918. 
4 This memorandum has not been traced by the editor. 
5 See Annex I in No. 15, and note 2 to No. 15. 
The revolution referred to is the take-over, and the declaration of the Republic, by Count M. 
Karolyi in Hungary in late October, early November 1918. 
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assumed that Austria should continue to go with Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but 
in fact, as before, no one seemed to take any interest in the matter and again no initiative 
or suggestions of any kind came, so far as I am aware, from Sir Eyre Crowe. 
When we came to Paris, the same condition of things continued. Sir Eyre Crowe was 
in charge with Akers Douglas, Leeper and Nicolson working under him. Akers 
Douglas was chiefly responsible for Germany, Belgium, etc., Nicolson and Leeper for 
the South-East; [....] The same state of things continued in the P.I.D. I succeeded from 
time to time in getting information and memoranda from Namier and Randall, both of 
whom were very willing and capable, but I do not think that in a single case did I 
receive either enquiries, suggestions or instructions from anyone in authority. 
Meanwhile, as the Conference got to work, the Committees were appointed to draw 
up the frontiers of the new States. We had therefore a Czecho-Slovak Committee, a 
Rumanian Committee, a Yugo-Slav Committee, a Polish Committee. Each of these 
approached the problems of the frontiers from the point of view of the new State or the 
Ally; the questions which they had to discuss naturally affected Austria and Hungary, 
but no one was charged with the duty of watching their conclusions so as to see what 
sort of effect they would have when put into force as regards Austria and Hungary 
themselves. 
During the first months of the Conference, no steps of any kind seem to have been 
taken towards considering the political problems which would inevitably arise when the 
time came for drafting the Treaty of Peace with Austria. During the first months the 
work was often not great in amount and there were many people in the Political Section 
who had as a matter of fact hardly anything to do. The Council of Four was established, 
the Council of Foreign Ministers continued to sit, and it was their duty to deal with 
matters not dealt with by the Four. As the Four were completely occupied with the 
German Treaty, there was an admirable opportunity for the Council of Foreign 
Ministers to consider or to cause to be considered in the various delegations the 
Austrian problems. No discussion on these matters, as far as I know, took place in the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, and meanwhile, they complained that they had nothing to 
do, and no reference was ever sent to the Political section of the British Delegation 
authorising to occupy themselves with the matter. The general result was that all the 
valuable time in which there might have been opportunity for serious discussion of the 
matters was completely wasted. 
Then at last instructions were sent out that we were to get on with the Austrian 
Treaty. I do not know what precise form the instructions took but we may say certainly 
that there were no instructions to the Political Section to consider whether there were 
special political problems connected with Austria and to give advice to the other 
sections who dealt with more strictly technical matters. This was certainly the case in 
the British Delegation. When, therefore, the different sections and Committees turned 
their attention to the Austrian Treaty, what they did in fact was to adopt almost en bloc 
the clauses of the relevant sections of the German Treaty and apply them to Austria 
simply eliminating the word “Germany” and putting in “Austria”. The result was 
lamentable. In the first drafts sent up by the different sections there was no attempt on 
any basis to meet the peculiar problems arising from the dissolution of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. In mere matters of drafting the words Austria and Austria- 
Hungary were used without any discrimination; again the Treaty was drafted on the 
lines that there were two kinds of States, enemy on the one hand, allies on the other. 
Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia were Allies; therefore there was given to them and 
their nationals as against Austria all the rights which, for instance, Frenchmen and 
Englishmen acquired as against Germany. This entirely ignored the fact that a State 
such as Czecho-Slovakia, although it had technically become an Ally, and therefore an 
enemy of Austria, at the time of the armistice was in fact not an enemy of Austria, but a 
part of Austria. This led to such impossible conclusions as that the property of Austrian 
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citizens in Czecho-Slovakia was liable to confiscation without compensation in the 
same way as that of Germans in Great Britain or France. This is the most extreme case 
of the injustice in the Treaty, but there were many other classes similar in character and 
they all arose from the fact that the political aspect had never been thoroughly 
investigated. There also had been no discussion as to such a point as what was the legal 
status of the new Republic of Austria. Was it legally identical with the Austrian Empire, 
or was it a new State arising out of its dissolution. 
[....] I succeeded with Hankey’s help in making an opportunity of presenting the 
matter to the Council of Four. I explained to them briefly the reasons why it seemed to 
me in accordance with facts, just and desirable to recognise that Austria was not 
identical with the old Austria, but a new State. Apparently these observations made 
considerable impression upon them. I drafted a preamble based on these lines, which 
was included in the draft Treaty, and the Council of Four themselves ordered to be 
inserted the words that Austria should be recognised as a new and independent State. 
These words were actually written in by President Wilson with his own hand. 
[....] 
It was very difficult to get attention paid to these matters [related to the liquidation of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy]. I had the impression from one or two brief 
conversations that Lord Hardinge agreed with me, but he did not give any support; Sir 
Eyre Crowe also in a general way agreed, but nothing effective was done through the 
regular official channels. However, I sent a copy of my memoranda to Philip Kerr; he 
mentioned it to Mr. Balfour and I was asked to go to lunch with him to talk over the 
matter. In fact practically nothing was said about it, but at the end I received very brief 
instructions to work out the matter in detail. 
I therefore began a very careful examination of some of the sections. [....] 
The most important points were questions of nationality, economic clauses, ports and 
waterways. 
The whole question of Nationality was constantly coming up both in connection with 
the New State Treaties and in the committee appointed to consider the special Italian 
clauses. [....] 
The greatest difficulty was caused by the Economic clauses. [....] Again, it was agreed 
that many matters which were left over must be referred to special conventions to be 
concluded between the inheriting States; I insisted that I could be no party to the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers giving their sanction to such special 
conventions unless Austria was allowed to come in on equal terms. I succeeded in this 
and eventually a clause to this effect was inserted in the Austrian Treaty. 
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No. 235 
Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley 
[HDLM ACC 800/20] 
27 June 1922 
PEACE SETTLEMENT MEMORANDA 
REPARATION 
Confidential 
(A Chapter from a history of the Peace Conference)1 
Chapter IV/I 
A large part of the minutes of the committee2 consists of memoranda put in by the 
smaller States — Poland, Greece, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Serbia — estimating 
the amount that might be obtained, not from Germany, but from other enemy Powers, 
Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. With these we are at present not concerned, but nobody 
who reads them can fail to see how serious was the influence of the attitude assumed by 
the Great Powers upon the smaller States; every one of these memoranda contains 
suggestions first of all for stripping their former enemy bare of every kind of realisable 
wealth, and then, after this had been done, of subjecting them to the payment of a very 
exorbitant sum as a permanent tribute. The spirit they showed, which was the natural 
reflex of the spirit of the greater Powers, was one which, if not checked, must be fatal 
to the future of Europe. Nothing would have been more wholesome than that these 
memoranda should be circulated among the leading statesmen in order that they might 
see how the action to which they were themselves being committed appeared when it 
was put forward by others. But who can blame the jackals that follow the example of 
the lions? 
1 Sir J. W. Headlam-Morley’s memoirs of the Paris Peace Conference (A Memoir of the Paris Peace 
Conference, 1919) were published in 1972 in London edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant 
and Anna Cienciala. The passage quoted here is not included in the volume. 
2 It is not indicated which committee is referred to. 
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No. 236 
Memorandum by A. Ponsonby 
[PRO FO 371/9902/C 2786] 
Foreign Office, 
London, 16 February 1924 
MEMORANDUM 
The political Constitution of Hungary is for the time being merely parliamentary in 
appearance. As a matter of fact the rule of the Bethlen Government is based on counter 
revolutionary methods. Even though article 13 of the fundamental law of 1920 lays 
down that the re-election of the National Assembly should be carried out under the 
same basis as that of the First National Assembly, Count Bethlem [Bethlen], by Order 
in Council issued in February 1922, ignoring this provision, deprived one-third of the 
electors of their right of vote and abolished secret ballot in rural constituencies. The 
result was that the election, in 80% of the constituencies was carried out by open vote. 
It appears herefrom that the present National Assembly is lacking all legal basis. 
As opposed to the agreement made with the Hungarian political parties, including the 
Social Democrats, by Sir George Clerk as representative of the Allied Powers in 
November 1919, according to which the form of Government should be decided by 
plebiscite the National Assembly declared Hungary to be a kingdom. Republican 
propaganda is forbidden and the republicans are prosecuted. On the other hand, 
legitimist propaganda, in spite of the fact that the Hapsburgs have been dethroned in the 
meantime, is freely allowed and the members of the Hapsburg family enjoy royal 
privileges. 
Though under law No I of 1920, the Regency has been only provisionally 
established, still no time limit has been set. So that the Regent can only be discharged 
by decision of the National Assembly, and there is very little likelihood, under the 
present circumstances, of such a decision being arrived at. This undecided form of 
government is the source of uncertainty and unrest. 
The war measure based on DORA (Law 63 of 1912) is to a great extent still in force. 
The exercise of civil rights (liberty of press, freedom of the [sic] assembly and 
association) is limited at the discretion of the Government. The formation of New Trade 
Unions, not only depends on the Governments] decision, but s uch [?] is entirely 
forbidden whenever railway, trams service, civil and municipal employees are 
concerned. 
Numerous murders and atrocities committed by counter revolutionaries, particularly 
by the so called ‘awakened’ Magyars remain unpunished. These received amnesty when 
the crimes were committed for “patriotic” reasons without any trial having even taken 
place. On the other hand, very minor offences, committed by Socialists and Liberals, are 
punished with two or four years imprisonment. Administrative internment of 
individuals politically suspect is still valid, so that the personal liberty of the citizen is in 
the hands of the Government and the police. 
We still have censorship of letters and telegrams and telephones for which there is no 
legal basis. 
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Trial by jury is still suspended and there is still an extraordinary procedure, without 
appeal, in force for those called ‘Communists’. Judges, civil servants, being the chief 
supporters of the present regime,1 show special clemency towards the Right whereas 
towards the Left, even [?where] there is only the mildest opposition, they are rigorous 
to an extent which is strongly opposed to traditional practices, so for instance, an Editor 
of an extremely reactionary paper (A Nep) has been sentenced to one day’s 
imprisonment for seditious libel; the contributor to the Socialist paper “Nepszava”, 
Szakasits, has been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the same crime. 
SUGGESTIONS 
It would scarcely be feasible to revert to the Clerk agreement of 1919, though this has 
never been carried out. It would be possible and desirable however to enforce Articles 
55, 58, 76, 355, of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, which grants protection to personal 
liberty, minority rights (repeal of the so-called Numerus Clausus Act)2 and Labour. 
This would be all the more justified as the Peace Treaty contains many unjust clauses, 
oppressive to the Hungarian people, which clauses have been carried out in their 
entirety. The repeal of the special measures which are part of the war measures, should 
automatically result with [sic] the carrying out of the Peace Treaty. It is strongly 
desirable that Great Britain should be represented in Budapest by a member of the 
Labour Party, or somebody in sympathy with Labour who would use his influence 
with the Hungarian Government for the abolition of counter-revolutionary measures, 
and who would be kept informed by the Opposition Parties as well. 
In realising the Loan3 care should be taken that the burden does not fall on the 
shoulders of the poorer classes. We recognise the importance of the Loan for the 
improvement of economic conditions. In connection with the Loan it should be taken 
into consideration however that the granting of the Loan without the necessary 
precautionary measures'1^11 the original) WOuld mean rather the support of the Hungarian 
reactionaries than the support of the people. 
Minutes attached to the document: 
[Excerpts from a minute] 
We cannot actually find any undertaking given to Sir George Clerk which 
corresponds exactly to that quoted in Mr Ponsonby’s minute. The nearest we can get to 
it is paragraph 2 in his report to the Supreme Council of November 29, 1919 
(C. 157685—flag J). It runs as follows:- “The main condition was that such a 
Government must include representatives of the different political parties in Hungary. It 
also must be such as to satisfy the Supreme Council that it was able to maintain law and 
1 The comment: “Yes, rwt the feudal landlords.” was written in handwriting on the margin of the original 
document beside this passage. 
2 The Act restricted the number of students of Jewish origin who could attend higher educational 
institutions. 
3 This is a reference to the financial loan that the Hungarian Government had requested from the League 
of Nations, and which the League granted to Hungary later in 1924. 
+ (in the original) [Comments in handwriting:] “The League should provide for very strict control & an 
able & strong American as Commissioner-General delegate.” [The Commissioner-General referred to 
was the American financier Jeremiah Smith.] 
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order, to hold elections based on universal suffrage, in a free impartial and democratic 
manner, and be prepared to send delegates to Paris to negotiate the peace with the 
Allies”. 
It is very questionable whether by agreeing to this condition it was ever contemplated 
that the Hungarian Government were entering into a servitude for all time both as 
regarded themselves and their successors in office as to the nature of their suffrage law. 
And though nothing is easier than to draft instructions to Mr Hohler, as directed in Mr 
Ponsonby’s minute, yet it is only right that the Department should indicate that this may 
involve us in an acrimonious discussion with the Hungarian Government who may 
accuse us of intervening in the internal affairs of their country. That the enquiry may be 
resented is shown by the inquiry recently made of Mr Hohler by the Hungarian Prime 
Minister4 (see his despatch no. 81 just in-C.2915)5 “whether it was a fact that M. Peidl 
has been seeking to obtain the intervention of the Britidh [sic] Government in the 
internal affairs of Hungary". 
[••..] 
Draft to Mr. Hohler submitted herewith. 
M.W. Lampson 
22/2/24 
[A memorandum was prepared by the Central Department of the Foreign Office on 22 
February 1924, which also partly dealt with A. Ponsonby’s memorandum of 16 
February. The following are excerpts from this memorandum.] 
From: [PRO FO 371/9902/ C 3619] 
[..••] 
The facts stated in the memorandum attached to Mr. Ponsonby’s minute are, though 
perhaps in places slight[ly] coloured and exaggerated, substantially accurate and have 
been reported by Mr. Hohler in various despatches and annual reports. But the question 
of direct intervention by the British government opens a vista of so many complications 
that it would be well to consider the matter carefully before embarking on such a policy. 
In Mr. Ponsonby’s minute it is suggested that Mr. Hohler should inform the 
Hungarian government that we attach importance to the fulfilment of the undertaking 
said to have been given to Sir G. Clerk in 1919. There is no trace in the Foreign Office 
archives of that particular undertaking having been given or required, and it is 
remarkable that, were it in fact given, Sir G. Clerk should have made absolutely no 
mention of it in his report to the Supreme Council. [....]6 
It must moreover be borne in mind that the government, elected on the basis of 
universal suffrage as agreed above, was itself responsible for the passage into law of 
some of the measures complained of, and that those measures which were in force prior 
to its advent to power were in the course of its two years of office allowed to remain on 
the Statute Book. All things considered the Department are bound to point out that 
unless His Majesty’s Government are prepared to embark on and pursue a policy of 
4 Count I. Bethlen. 
5 Not printed. 
6 Here the passage from Sir G. Clerk’s report of 29 November 1919, quoted in M.W. Lampson’s minute 
above, is reproduced again, and it is remarked that Hungary, by agreeing to those points, cannot be 
considered to have entered into perpetual servitude vis-a-vis the Allies. 
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direct intervention in the domestic affairs of Hungary, it may be of doubtful wisdom to 
endeavour to hold them to the condition laid down in 1919. 
[....] 
Central Dept. 
22/2/1924 
No. 237 
Letter from T.B. Hohler (Budapest) to R. MacDonald (London. 
Received 31 March 1924) 
No. 137 [PRO FO 371/9902/C 5341] 
Budapest, 26 March 1924 
Sir, 
With reference to my despatch No. of the 12th instant' and your despatch received 
No. 97 of the 3rd instant,* 2 I have the honour to report that although I have not yet 
received from you a copy of Sir George Clerk’s report to the Supreme Council of the 
29th November, 1919, yet I thought that the quotation from it given in your despatch 
above mentioned2 supplied me with sufficient material to go on, and I was unwilling to 
defer any longer carrying out your instruction. I therefore sought an interview with 
Count Bethlen this morning and explained to him that I wished to speak to him in your 
name in a most serious but entirely private manner. I began by reading to him such 
parliamentary questions as have been sent to me by the Foreign Office, in order that he 
might understand the atmosphere, and I then read to him your abovementioned 
despatch. 
Count Bethlen paid the greatest attention to its contents and took notes of several 
points. He at once replied to me in the most courteous manner, but with very great 
firmness, to the effect that he was glad to notice that your observations were of a private 
nature, and he laid great stress on the fact that he could only reply to me in a purely 
private manner, as he could not admit that any foreign country was justified in any kind 
of interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. He said that this point had been 
specially laid down in the Treaty of Trianon, which regulated the relations between 
Hungary and Great Britain, as between Hungary and all other foreign Powers; its 
complete independence and sovereignty were further guaranteed by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, and had been further confirmed by the first of the two protocols just 
concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and signed by all the countries 
concerned. He then went on, again laying emphasis on the fact that his words were to 
be regarded solely in the light of private explanation, to state that the agreement that Sir 
George Clerk made in November 1919 was solely with the Hungarian political parties; 
there was, in fact, no Government which was recognised at that time, and the 
engagements then come to were of an ad hoc character, come to solely in order to form 
a Government which might be recognised and with which the Allies might be able to 
negotiate for a treaty of peace. It was impossible that any one party could or would have 
' Not printed. 
2 Not printed. 
2 The quotation mentioned can be found in No. 236. 
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accepted an engagement for the future; Count Bethlen said that he had often discussed 
the whole question with Sir George Clerk, and the idea had never been mooted that any 
undertaking was being entered into which would restrict the unlimited rights of 
Hungary to arrange for herself her own internal affairs. This was proved by the first 
paragraph of the quotation which you have sent me from Sir George Clerk’s report: 
The main condition was that such a Government must include representatives of the 
different political parties in Hungary.” Was it suggested that from that date 
henceforward any Government that might be formed must include representatives of the 
different political parties? 
Passing to the question of universal suffrage, Count Bethlen dwelt on the statements 
very currently made concerning restrictions alleged to have been imposed on the 
number of voters, by which one million voters were disfranchised. He said that the 
decree under which what we may call the “Clerk elections” were held was in virtue of a 
law passed by the Government of M. Friedrich, which had legal duration for two years; 
within those two years a new Bill was to be introduced, and, in fact, such a Bill was 
introduced; the committee of the House busied itself with it and accepted it with certain 
modifications, which had been suggested by the Opposition. The Chamber did not pass 
this Bill in plenary sitting, as a factional obstruction was made by the Opposition, so 
that a vote could not be taken before the expiration of the period for which the 
Assembly had been elected, though it was perfectly certain that the majority of the 
House were in its favour just as the majority of the committee had been. Count Bethlen, 
who just then acceded to power, found himself faced with three possible ways out of 
the dilemma. The first was to adopt the Friedrich Law; but that had already been 
rejected by the House in committee, and it was quite unquestionable that the majority of 
the Chamber was opposed to it. Secondly, a decree might be passed under the 
Constitution adopting the new Bill, which had been accepted by the committee, 
although it had failed to pass the Chamber. Finally there was a third, and the only true 
legal, way, namely, to go back to the law of 1918; but this law was far less liberal in its 
nature than the Friedrich Law, which had granted the franchise to much wider classes 
of people. The first alternative was undoubtedly opposed by the majority; the third, 
although the only legal solution, would leave the country under a far too reactionary 
regime. He had therefore decided to choose the second alternative, adopting by decree 
the Bill which had already been accepted by the committee. No statistics, he said, 
existed of the number of persons enjoying the franchise under the Friedrich Law, so 
that it is impossible to say what number might have been disfranchised by it. At all 
events, at the present time 60 per cent, of the population, whether male or female, 
enjoyed the privilege of the vote. 
His Excellency was good enough to express his thanks for the friendly character of 
my communication, whilst reiterating that I must regard his words as a purely private 
communication, as the question was one which he must refuse to discuss with me 
officially. 
I have, &c. 
T. B. HOHLER 
Minutes attached to the document: 
Count Bethlen adopted the attitude we expected, which indeed was the only one he 
could take up, and he was very friendly. 
C. Howard Smith 
2/4/24 
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Yes, but he gave no satisfaction at all to our enquiry,4 & has left the matter just as 
bad, if not worse, than it was before. 
Harold Nicolson 
2/4/24 
I took advantage of Sir George Clerk’s presence this morning to ask him about this, 
though I had not at that time seen this despatch or I should have shown it him. He 
entirely confirmed what Count Bethlen now says, as recorded by Mr Hohler. The 
condition as to universal suffrage applied only to the election of the Constituent 
Assembly of 1919. Sir George Clerk was categorical on the point. And after all it 
stands to reason that no government, Hungarian or otherwise, could bind its successors 
in such a way. 
Incidentally not even in this country have we got universal suffrage. 
Perhaps the matter may now be allowed to drop? I do not think that we shall gain 
anything by pursuing it. 
M.W. Lampson 
2/4/24 
I agree. 
P[onsonby]. 
7/4/24 
I agree. 
E. C[rowe] 
2/4/24 
4 The inquiry regarding newly imposed restrictions on the franchise in Hungary, including the 
introduction of voting by open ballot in rural constituencies, and other limitations on political rights. For 
A. Ponsonby’s memorandum concerning these issues, see No. 236. 
BIOGRAPHICAL GLOSSARY 
The biographical data provided here concentrate on the period covered by this 
sourcebook. Where no dates are indicated for the function or appointment of a particular 
person, the period dealt with by the book applies. Regretfully, the editor has been 
unable to find dates of birth and death for all entries. Names marked with an * are 
treated as entries elsewhere in the Glossary. 
ABRAHAM, Dezso (1875-1973). Hungarian M.P., member of Count M. Karolyi’s* 
Party, during the last years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Count G. Karolyi’s* Government at Arad, and subsequently, 
Minister of the Interior in Karoly Huszafs Government. 
ACTON, Lord (Richard Maximilian Lyon-Dalberg-ACTON), 2nd Baron (1870-1924). 
British diplomat. Held various posts in Europe. Charge d’Affaires at Berne 
intermittently during and immediately after the First World War. 
ADAM, Eric Graham Forbes (1888-1925). British diplomat. 3rd Secretary in the 
Diplomatic Service for the period of the Paris Peace Conference, served on the 
Political Section of the British Delegation at the Conference. 
AGOSTON, Peter (1874-1925). State Secretary for Internal Affairs in Count M. 
Karolyi’s* regime. Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the 
Hungarian Republic of Councils. Formerly Professor of Law at the Law School 
of Nagyvarad (today Oradea). British diplomats and military officials interceded 
on his behalf during the reprisals that followed the fall of Bela Kun’s* regime. 
A freemason. Died in France in 1925. 
AKERS-DOUGLAS, Aretas. British diplomat. Held various posts in the Middle East 
and Europe. Transferred to Bucharest on 1 April 1914. Appointed to the 
Foreign Office in London in 1915, became Deputy Head, for a period, of the 
Western European Section of the Political Intelligence Department. On the 
Political Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Appointed Diplomatic Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
August 1919. British Ambassador in Vienna from 1921. 
ALBY, General. Chief of Staff (Chef d’Etat Major) at the French War Office. 
ALLIZE, Henri. Head of the French Military Mission in Vienna. (Ministre 
plenipotentiare en Mission a Vienne.) 
AMERY, Captain (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Leopold Charles Maurice Stennet 
(1873-1955). Liberal Unionist M.P. for Birmingham, Sparbrook division. 
Attached to the War Office with special appointment, November 1917. On the 
Staff of the Imperial War Council. Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet and 
Imperial War Cabinet till January 1919, when he became Under Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 
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ANDRASSY, Count Gyula, the Elder (1823-90). Actively participated in the 
Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848-49. Was sentenced to 
death and executed in effigie by the Austrian authorities in 1851. Later, 
however, became one of the chief architects of the Compromise of 1867 with 
Austria. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1867-71, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, 1871-79. Resisted attempts to transform the Monarchy into a 
Trialist state by the inclusion of Bohemia as an equal partner. Forged a close 
alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary with an anti-Russian and anti- 
French bias. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 gained authorization for the 
Monarchy to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina. Resigned in 1879 as a result of 
the difficulties arising out of the occupation. 
ANDRASSY, Count Gyula, the Younger (1860-1929). The last Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He lived in Switzerland 
during the political upheavals of 1919. 
ASHMEAD-BARTLETT, Ellis (1888-1931). Correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, 
with a scholarly interest in the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. He wrote a number of books on these subjects. He described his 
experiences in 1918—19 in the book: The Tragedy of Central Europe, London, 
1923. 
BALFOUR, Arthur James (1848-1930). British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
December 1916-October 1919. Member of the British Delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference. 
BALOGH, Elemer (1871-1938). Professor of Law at the University of Budapest. A 
confidant of Count Istvan Tisza, a member of the Protestant Council of 
Hungary. After 1919 one of the chief figures of the Revisionist cause in 
Hungary. 
BARBER, Captain (temporary Major in the Army) Basil Hastings. British General 
Staff officer, 2nd grade. Attached, as 3rd Secretary, to H.M.’s High 
Commissioner in Vienna in October 1919. 
BARNES, George Nicoll (1859-1940). Minister without portfolio, member of D. 
Lloyd George’s* War Cabinet. 
BAUER, Otto (1882-1938). Austrian Socialist theoretician and politician. Leader of the 
II. International and of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs under Chancellor Karl Renner, November 1918—July 1919. 
BEAK, George Bailey (1872-1934). British diplomat. Held various posts in Africa and 
Europe. In charge of the Consulate-General in Zurich towards the end, and 
immediately after the First World War. 
BENE§, Eduard (1884-1948). Czechoslovak delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, 
Foreign Minister. Later President of Czechoslovakia. 
BERTHELOT, General Henri-Mathias (1861-1931). Head of the French Military 
Mission to Romania, 1916-18. Reorganized the Romanian Army in 1917. An 
Army of the Danube was created under General H.-M. Berthelot at the end of 
October 1918. Army units were assigned to it by General L. Francet d’Esperey* 
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from the southern Russian front. Not having exact instructions from Paris, the 
theatre of operations for both armies remained imprecise. Until 14 March 1919 
General H.-M. Berthelot was in charge of the French operations in South 
Russia. From 14 March General L. Franchet d’Esperey* took over the Russian 
command, and Berthelot was charged with overseeing that Allied decisions 
were carried out with regard to Romania. His headquarters were in Bucharest. 
He was recalled from Bucharest to Paris on 11 April 1919. 
BERTHELOT, Philippe. Acting director of Political and Commercial Affairs at the 
Quai d’Orsay. Chairman of the Commission for the Protection of Minorities in 
the New and other States during the Paris Peace Conference. Later Secretary- 
General of the Quai d’Orsay, 1920-21, and 1925-32. 
BERTIE, Francis Leveson, first Viscount Bertie of Thame (1844-1919). British 
Ambassador in Paris 1905-18. 
BETHLEN, Count Istvan (1874-1947). Transylvanian aristocrat. Head and chief 
organizer of Hungarian emigres opposed to the the Bela Kun* regime in 
Vienna. Prime Minister of Hungary, 1921-31. 
BEVERIDGE, Sir William Henry (1879-1963). Second Secretary at the British 
Ministry of Food, 1916-18, Permanent Secretary, 1919. Director of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 1919-37. 
BLISS, General Tasker Howard (1853-1930). Soldier, scholar, diplomat. Member of 
the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace, and military representative of the 
United States on the Supreme War Council. 
BOLGAR, Elek (1883-1955). Hungarian lawyer and historian. Ambassador to Austria 
during the Hungarian Republic of Councils, 26 March 1919-early May 1919, 
then a member of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. 
BONAR LAW, see LAW. 
BONSAL, Major Stephen (1865-1951). Served in the United States Army. Sent on a 
fact finding mission to Hungary, belonged to the entourage of Colonel E. 
House.* 
BORGHESE, Prince Livio. Roving Ambassador of Italy after the First World War. On 
missions in Belgrade, in Budapest, and in Paris. He worked on improving trade 
relations between Hungary and Italy during Bela Kun’s* regime. 
BORNEMISZA, Baron Gyula (1873-1925). Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the 
provisional Hungarian Government established in Arad. 
BORROW, Major Edward. British Representative on the Inter-Allied Commission in 
Vienna. 
BOHM, Vilmos (1880-1949). Precision tool-maker by profession. Left of Centre 
Social Democratic leader in Hungary. Minister for War in Denes Berinkey’s 
(Prime Minister under Count M. Karolyi’s* presidency, January-March 1919) 
Government, Commissar for War and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces 
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during Bela Kun’s* regime, from which posts he resigned on 17 July 1919. 
From then on he was Hungarian Minister in Vienna until 3 August 1919. 
BRATIANU, Ionel C. (1864-1927). Romanian politician, leader of the National 
Liberal Party. Prime Minister, Plenipotentiary Delegate at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Ceased to attend the sessions of the Conference in June 1919. 
BRIAND, Aristide (1862-1932). Prime Minister of France for two short periods 
before the war, and again from 1915 till 1917, when he formed a small War 
Cabinet with Lyauty as Minister of War. He was out of office at the time of the 
Peace Conference. After the Peace, he pursued a conciliatory policy as Prime 
Minister in 1921-22 and 1925-26. As Foreign Minister (1925-30) he worked 
closely with Streseman during the Locarno period. He also strengthened the 
Little Entente, and negotiated the Briand-Kellog Pact. 
BRIDGES, General George Tom Molesworth (1871-1939). Chief of the British 
Military Mission to the Army of the Orient. 
BROWN, Professor Philip Marshall. Professor of International Law at Princeton 
University. Member of the Coolidge* Mission, stationed in Budapest. Also 
attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. 
BULLITT, William Christian (1891-1967). On President Wilson’s* Staff at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Sent on a Mission to Russia, from which he resigned in May 
1919. The first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1934-36. 
BUTLER, Cyril Kendall (1864-1936). Attached to the British and Allied Relief and 
Food Control Commissions in Austria. 
CAMPBELL, Ronald Hugh (1883-1953). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe. 2nd Secretary in the Diplomatic Service while in attendance at the Paris 
Peace Conference from January 1919. Private Secretary (personal) to the 
Superintending Ambassador (Lord Hardinge of Penhurst).* Appointed Private 
Secretary to Earl Curzon of Kedleston* (July 1919-December 1919). 
CARTWRIGHT, Major Henry Antrobus (1887-1957). General Staff Officer, 3rd 
grade (temporary). British Assistant Military Representative in Vienna from 20 
March 1919. 
CAUSEY, Colonel William Bowdoin (1865-1936). American President of the Allied 
Railway Commission, with headquarters in Trieste. 
CECIL, Lord, Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (1864- 
1958). British statesman. A memorandum he prepared in 1916 formed the basis 
of the idea for the League of Nations. Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs to rank directly after the Secretary of State from July 1918. On the 
League of Nations Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference 1918-19, and later chief British representative on the Supreme 
Economic Council (February-July 1919). Delegate for South Africa at League 
Assemblies, 1920-22. In charge of League affairs, as Lord Privy Seal, 1923. 
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CERRUTI, Vittorio. Italian Secretary of Embassy in Vienna before 1915. 
Accompanied Prince L. Borghese on various missions during 1919. Secretary 
for Political Affairs to the Italian Military Mission in Budapest after June 1919. 
CHURCHILL, Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965). British politician and 
statesman. Minister of Munitions, 1917-18, and Secretary of State for War, 
1919-21. 
CLEMENCEAU, Georges (1841-1929). French politician and statesman. Prime 
Minister and Minister of War, 1917-20. President of the Paris Peace 
Conference, 1919. 
CLEMENT-SIMON, Gustave. French Minister in Prague (Ministre Residant de France 
a Prague), 1918, and in Belgrade in 1921. 
CLERK, Sir George Russell (1874-1951). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Private Secretary to Earl Curzon of 
Kedleston,* January 1919-September 1919. Acting Permanent Under¬ 
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for a period. British Ambassador in 
Prague from September 1919. Sent on a Special Mission to the Romanian 
Government by the Supreme Economic Council, September 1919-October 
1919. Sent on a Mission as Special Delegate of the Supreme Council to 
Budapest, October 1919-December 1919. 
COOLIDGE, Professor Archibald Cary (1866-1928). Professor of History at Harvard 
University. Member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and 
Director of the Special Commission of Study in Austria. 
CORNWALL, Lieutenant-Colonel James Handyside Marshall- (1887-1985). Member 
of the Military Intelligence Branch (Military Section) of the British Delegation 
at the Paris Peace Conference, concerned with Austria-Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. 
COULSON, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil John Blenkinsop. British Military Attache at 
Prague, and from April 1919 Chief of the British Mission to Czechoslovakia. 
He resigned from this post in November 1920. 
CRACKANTHORPE, Dayrell Eardley Montague (7-1950). British diplomat. Held 
various posts in Europe, Asia and America. British Counsellor of Embassy at 
Madrid from April 1919. 
CROWE, Sir Eyre (1864-1925). Took part in leading reforms at the British Foreign 
Office, 1903-06. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1912- 
20. Member of the Phillimore Committee, which considered proposals for a 
League of Nations. Minister Plenipotentiary, and on the Political Section, while 
in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference. Head of the Western European 
Section of the Political Intelligence Department, and after the appointment of Sir 
. R. Paget* as Ambassador to Brazil, he took over the responsibility for the 
former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well. Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1920-25. He died in April 1925. 
CUNINGHAME, Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel), Sir Thomas Andrew 
Alexander Montgomery-, 10th Baronet (1877-1945). Served in the Boer War, 
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received D.S.O. in 1900. Appointed Military Attache to the British Embassy at 
Vienna and the Legation at Cettinje (capital of the Kingdom of Montenegro), 
with the temporary rank of Major in 1912. Appointed to the General Staff at the 
War Office in 1914. Temporary Military Attache at the Legation at Athens in 
1915. Relinquished the latter appointment in 1916. Graduated from the General 
Staff College in 1918. British Military Representative in Vienna, 1918-19. 
CURZON, George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859-1925). A fellow 
of All Souls College, Oxford. Governor-General of India 1898-1905. Lord 
Privy Seal, 1915. Lord President of the Council, 1916-19, 1924. Leader of the 
House of Lords. Acted as Secretary of State for Loreign Affairs ‘in interim 
during the absence of A.J. Balfour* at the Paris Peace Conference. Secretary of 
State for Loreign Affairs, October 1919-24. 
DAVIES, John Thomas (1881-1938). Private Secretary to D. Lloyd George* 1912- 
22. 
DERBY, Edward George Villiers Stanley, seventeenth Earl of (1865-1948). Secretary 
of State for War and President of the Army Council, 1916-18. British 
Ambassador on a Special Mission to Prance, 1918-20. 
DES GRAZ, Sir Charles Louis (1860-1940). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe, the Middle East and South America. Transferred to Belgrade in 1914. 
Appointed British Ambassador to the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia 
in January 1919. Retired in 1920. 
DIAZ, General Armando (1861-1928). Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Italian Army from November 1917. In 1918 he won a decisive victory over the 
disintegrating forces of the Austro-Hungarian Army near the Piave front, and 
signed an armistice with the Austro-Hungarian High Command in Padua on 4 
November 1918. According to the terms of the armistice, the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy surrendered unconditionally and withdrew behind its pre-war 
borders. The Entente did not recognize the validity of this armistice. Diaz 
became Minister of War in Benito Mussolini’s first government, 1922-24. 
DRUMMOND, Sir James Eric (1876-1951). Private Secretary to Earl Grey, and 
subsequently to A.J. Balfour. Attached to the British Delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference. First Secretary-General of the League of Nations. (Seconded 
from the Foreign Office.) 
DUFF, Sir Evelyn Mountstuart Grant- (1863-1926). British Consul-General in 
Budapest from 1911. Ambassador in Berne from 1913. Left Berne in 1916, and 
retired in 1917. 
DUTASTA, M.P. French Ambassador in Berne. Secretary-General of the Paris Peace 
Conference. He performed the formal functions, but was rather forced into the 
background by the energetic Sir M. Hankey.* 
ESTERHAZY, Count Mihaly (1884—[?]). Son-in-law of Count Tivadar Batthyany, 
who was Minister of the Interior in the first cabinet of Count M. Karolyi.* 
FOCH, Marshal Ferdinand (1851-1929). Chief of the French General Staff, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, 1918. 
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FRANCHET d’ESPEREY, General Louis Felix (1856-1942). Later Marshal of 
France. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of the Orient. 
FRIEDRICFl, Istvan (1883-1958). Had belonged to the conservative wing of the 
Hungarian Independent Party. State Secretary for War in Count M. Karolyi’s* 
government in 1918. Hungarian Prime Minister 7 August-25 November 1919. 
Secretary of State for War in Karoly Huszar’s (Prime Minister November 
1919-March 1920) government. Resigned from his government post, and in 
1922 united with the Legitimist group of Count G. Andrassy, the Younger,* 
creating the Associated Christian Opposition. 
FULLHAM, Townley. A British national interned in Hungary throughout the First 
World War. 
GARAMI, Erno (1876-1935). Precision tool-maker by profession. Hungarian 
moderate Social Democratic leader, de facto head of the Hungarian Social 
Democratic Party before 1918. Editor of the Social Democratic paper Nepszava. 
Member of the National Council after October 1918, and Minister of Commerce 
in Count M. Karolyi’s* Government. In exile in Vienna during Bela Kun’s* 
regime. Minister of Justice in G. Peidl’s* Government in August 1919. At the 
end of 1919 involved in negotiations with Sir G. Clerk.* Returned to emigration 
in Vienna. 
GARBAI, Sandor (1879-1947). Stonemason by profession. Hungarian Social 
Democratic leader. Member of the National Council after October 1918, and 
Government Commissioner for Housing in Count M. Karolyi’s* Government. 
President of the Revolutionary Directorate during the Hungarian Republic of 
Councils. A figurehead, rather than a real leader, as B. Kun* was the de facto 
head of the regime. Minister of Public Education under the premiership of G. 
Peidl,* 1-6 August 1919. Later emigrated to Austria, and then to France. In 
emigration he represented the Austro-Marxist view. Finally, he renounced his 
connections with the labour movement altogether. 
GOETZ, Major Charles E.G. Officer of the Special Reserve of Officers, Militia 
Territorial Force, or Volunteers. Released from Austria, acquainted with the 
situation in Hungary, had been treated as a civilian enemy. 
GOODE, Sir William (7-1944). Head of the British and Allied Relief Commission in 
Austria, and British Representative on the Supreme Economic Council at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Unofficial financial adviser to the Hungarian 
government 1923-41. 
GORTON, General Reginald St George (1866-1944). British Representative on the 
Allied Military Mission for Hungary, August 1919-F»bRiary 1920. 
GORVIN, John Henry (1886-1960). Member of the Allied Food Council, and of the 
British and Allied Relief Commission. 
GOSLING, Cecil William Gustav (1870-1944). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe and South America. Charge d’Affaires on Special Mission to Prague, 
January 1919-January 1920. 
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GRAHAM, Sir RogmaW-William (1870-1949). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe and the Middle East. Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs from January 1919 during the absence of Lord Hardinge of 
Penhurst,* who was delegated to the Paris Peace Conference. British 
Ambassador to the Netherlands from September 1919, transferred to 
Luxemburg in November 1919. 
GREENLY, Major-General Walter Howorth (1875-1955). Head of the British Military 
Mission in Romania 1918-20. 
GREGORY, Captain Thomas Tingey Craven (1878-1933). Chief of the Central 
European Division of the American Relief Administration. In 1919 he was 
based in Vienna. A lawyer in San Francisco in civilian life. 
HAGGARD, Captain Vernon Harry Stuart (1874-1960). Under Admiral E.C.T. 
Troubridge’s* command in the Royal Navy. Led a mission to Budapest on the 
Danube from Baja in March 1919. 
HALLLER, General. Member of the French Military Mission in Vienna. 
HALSTEAD, Albert. Member of the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace. Led a fact 
finding mission to Central Europe. 
HANKEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir Maurice P.A. Later Lord Hankey (1877-1963). 
Assistant Naval Secretary and afterwards Secretary to the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, 1908-14. During the First World War Secretary to the War 
Council, to the War Cabinet and to the Imperial War Cabinet. During the Peace 
Conference Secretary to the British Empire Delegation, British representative on 
the Secretariat of the Council of Ten, and after 19 April 1919 Secretary to the 
Council of Four. His minutes of the Peace Conference are reproduced in FRUS, 
PPC, 1919. After 1919 he became Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet and 
formed the Cabinet Secretariat. In his various functions he produced a large 
amount of notes and memoranda for the information of the participants of the 
Peace Conference. In many of these memoranda Hankey effectively gave advice 
to his superiors in diplomatic and military questions. 
HARDINGE, Charles, Baron Hardinge of Penhurst (1858-1944). Took part in the 
reforms of the British Foreign Office, 1906-19. Held various diplomatic posts 
in Europe, Asia and America. Viceroy of India, 1910-16, Chairman of the 
Royal Commission to enquire into the causes of the Irish Rebellion in 1916. Re¬ 
entered the Foreign Office as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs in 1916. Superintending Ambassador at the Paris Peace Conference, 
1918-19. Later, at Sir M. Hankey’s* suggestion, designated as ‘Organizing 
Ambassador5. 
HARMSWORTH, Sir Cecil Bisshopp (1869-1948). Liberal M.P. for South 
Bedfordshire. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
January 1919-October 1922. 
HAUBRICH, Jozsef (1883-1939). Commander of the 4th (Budapest) Army Corps 
(Military commander of Budapest) during Bela Kun’s* regime. Subsequently 
Minister of War in G. Peidl’s* Government, that succeeded Bela Kun’s* regime 
on 1 August 1919. Leader of the Hungarian Steelworkers’ Union. 
BIOGRAPHICAL GLOSSARY 381 
HEADLAM-MORLEY, James Wycliffe (1863-1929). Afterwards Sir James H.-M. 
Classical scholar, permanent staff inspector under the Board of Education, 
1904-14. On the outbreak of war transferred to Wellington House, a 
propaganda organization, under the direction of the Liberal politician, C.F. 
Masterman. On the Section dealing with Germany in the Intelligence Bureau of 
the Department of Information. Responsible for questions relating to Germany 
in the Western Europe Section of the Political Intelligence Department. On the 
Political Section of the Intelligence Clearing House of the British Delegation at 
the Peace Conference. In an undated document, bearing the title “Political 
Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Instr. 1., Preparation for the Peace 
Conference”, in HDLM, 727/11, which deals with the organizational 
framework of the Political Intelligence Department as it was planned before the 
start of the Peace Conference, the following passage shows the important role 
J.W. Headlam-Morley and Sir W. Tyrrell* played in the P.I.D. during the 
Conference: 
The procedure for dealing with the memoranda will be as follows: 
As soon as a draft is completed, it should be sent on to Mr. Roxburgh for entry 
in a jacket and registration; it will then be sent through Mr. Headlam-Morley to 
Sir William Tyrrell for his observations and approval and will be forwarded to 
the head of the [particular] section who, if he approves, will order it to be 
printed. 
J.W. H.-M. was Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
from 1920. 
HENRYS, General Paul Prosper. A commander of the French Army of the Orient. 
HERRON, Professor George Davis (1862-1925). American clergyman, lecturer and 
writer. To a certain extent, he enjoyed President Wilson’s* confidence. He was 
nominated as one of the American representatives to be sent to the proposed 
Prinkipo conference with the Russians. In January 1919 President Wilson* 
used him in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve an agreement in the question of 
the revision of Italian claims under the Treaty of London. 
HOARE, Colonel Sir Samuel John Gurney, Baronet (1879-1976). British Unionist 
M.P. for Chelsea. 
HOHLER, Sir Thomas Beaumont (1871-1946). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Asia, Europe, Africa and America. Appointed British Ambassador on 
proceeding to Constantinople with Admiral Sir S. Calthorpe’s Special Mission, 
November 1918. AppoinRgl His Majesty’s High Commissioner, December 
1919, and British at Budapest, July 1921. Appointed Consul- 
General there, April 1922. Transferred to Santiago, October 1924. 
HOOVER, Herbert Clark (1874-1964). Director of the U.S. Food Administration. 
Director-General of Relief from January 1919. American President, 1929-32. 
HORTHY, Admiral Miklos (1868-1957). The last Commanding Admiral of the 
Austro-Hungarian Navy. Minister of War in Count G. Karolyi’s* Government 
established in Arad and later set up in Szeged in May 1919. Regent of Hungary, 
1920-44. 
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HOUSE, Colonel Edward Mandell (1858-1938). Chief Representative of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace. Deputied for President Wilson* during the 
labels absence at the Paris Peace Conference. 
HOWARD, Sir Esme William (1863-1939). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe and the United States. Consul-General at Budapest, 1909-11. Privy 
Councillor, August 1919. On the Political Section of the British Delegation at 
the Paris Peace Conference. Helped to draft Foreign Office memoranda for the 
British Peace Delegation. Head of the Northern Europe Section of the Political 
Intelligence Department. 
JASZI, Oszkar (1875-1957). Hungarian sociologist, political writer. Minister of 
Nationalities in Count M. Karolyi’s* cabinet, 1918. 
JONES, Thomas Hugh. Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet. Secretary to the 
Economic Advisory Council. 
JOSEPH AUGUST, Archduke (1872-1962). Homo regius of King Charles in 
Hungary, October 1918. Reclaimed this title in August 1919 and appointed I. 
Friedrich’s* government. Resigned from his position on Entente pressure on 15 
August 1919. Actively supported M. Horthy’s* regime. 
JULIER, Ferenc (1878-1946). Succeeded A. Stromfeld* as Chief of Staff of the 
Hungarian Red Army on 3 July 1919. 
KAROLYI, Count Gyula (1871-1947)). Head of the provisional Hungarian 
Government established on 5 May 1919 in Arad, and transferred to Szeged on 
31 May 1919. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1930-31, Prime Minister, 1931-32. 
KAROLYI, Count Mihaly (1875-1955). Leading Hungarian Opposition politician 
during the war. Headed his own party. Headed the October revolution of 1918. 
Prime Minister and President of the Republic, and later, of the People’s 
Republic of Hungary. In exile from the second half of Bela Kun’s* regime. 
KENNARD, Sir Coleridge Arthur Fitzroy, Baronet. British Charge d’Affaires in 
Stockholm intermittently in 1919. 
KERR, Philip Henry. Later Lord Lothian (1882-1940). Together with Lionel Curtis, he 
founded the Round Table (1910), and was its first Editor. Private Secretary to 
D. Lloyd George*, 1916-22. Took part in negotiations with Austro-Hungarian 
peace feelers during the First World War. He served the Prime Minister in this 
capacity at the Paris Peace Conference. Principal author of the Preface to the 
Treaty of Versailles. Became a member of R. MacDonald’s* Cabinet in 1931. 
KIMENS, Richard Edward (1872-1950). British diplomat. Employed at the British 
Consulate in Petrograd from July 1918. Assistant Commissioner to the British 
Mission to Poland from December 1918. Acting British Commissioner and 
later Acting Commercial Secretary in Warsaw in 1919. Officiating Consul at 
Warsaw, April -September 1919. 
KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, Hughe Montgomery (1886-1971). On the Political 
Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
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KRAMA&, Karel (1860—1937). Leader of the Young Czech movement before the war. 
President of the Czechoslovak National Council. First Prime Minister of 
Czechoslovakia, 1918—19. First Plenipotentiary Delegate for Czechoslovakia at 
the Palis Peace Conference. 
KUN, Bela (1886-1939). Of Transylvanian origin. Had a journalistic and clerical 
experience in the Hungarian Social Democratic Party before 1914. During the 
First World War suffered shell-shock on the Russian front, and became a 
prisoner of war there. While in captivity, he got involved in Bolshevik 
propaganda in Russia, and was hand-picked by Bolsheviks for more trusted 
work in Moscow in 1918. Returned to Hungary with Austro-Hungarian 
prisoners of war, and founded the Communist Party of Hungary in November 
1918. Their skilful organization and well-timed propaganda action made the 
Communist Party attractive to the impoverished classes of the country. Kun 
founded the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in collaboration with Centre 
and Left wing Social Democrats in March 1919. De facto leader of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic, or Republic of Councils, in which he ultimately 
relied on “terror” detachments, secret funds and a secretive Communist network 
to counter resistance by the old ruling classes and social democratic wavering. 
His personality gave vent to parallel traits of cruelty and generosity. After the 
downfall of his regime at the beginning of August 1919, he was given refuge in 
Austria before being handed over to the Russians, who elevated him into 
membership in the leading circles of the Third International. In the 1930s he 
most probably became a victim of Stalin’s terror campaign. He died in captivity 
in the USSR in 1939 in circumstances that have not been clarified to the present 
day. 
KUNFI, Zsigmond (1879-1929). Born in the border region of Transylvania. Active in 
the Social Democratic Party whilst pursuing a teacher’s career. From 1906 he 
moved to Budapest, where he was editor of the Socialist theoretical organ, 
Sz.ocializmus. After having been elected into the Social Democratic leadership' 
he endeavoured, with the “bourgeois radicals” to capture the allegiance of the 
intellectuals. Held ministerial posts in Count M. Karolyi’s government. In 
March 1919 he decided to support Bela Kun’s* Republic of Councils, and 
became People’s Commissar for Education, but soon became sickened by the 
dictatorial methods of the Communists. Went into exile in Austria in the autumn 
of 1919, and was a leading journalist of emigre social democratic papers. As M. 
Horthy’s* regime became consolidated after 1924, Kunfi lost his faith in the 
feasibility of social democracy in Hungary. Committed suicide in 1929. 
LAMMASCH, Professor Heinrich. The last Prime Minister of Austria in the Dual 
Monarchy, October-November 1918. Formerly President of the Hague 
Tribunal. 
LAMPSON, Miles Wedderburn. British diplomat. Held various posts in Asia. 
Transferred to the Foreign Office in London, April 1920. Attached to the British 
Delegation to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 
October 1921-February 1922. Promoted to be a Counsellor in the Foreign 
Office, January 1922. Attached to the Locarno Conference, October 1925. 
LANDLER, Jenb (1875-1928). Lawyer. Left-wing Social Democrat, later Communist. 
People’s Commissar for Commerce, and later for the Interior during Bela 
Kun’s* regime. One of the top leaders of the government. Commander of the 
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3rd Red Army Corps, and later Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red 
Army. Emigrated to Vienna after the fall of Bela Kuns* regime, where he 
continued to play a leading role in organizing the Hungarian working class 
movement. 
LANSING, Robert (1864-1928). American politician, Secretary of State in President 
W. Wilson’s* Administration, 1915-20. Head of the U.S. Delegation to the 
Paris Peace Conference after President Wilson’s departure from Paris. 
LAW, Andrew Bonar (1858-1923). Liberal Unionist M.P. for Glasgow, Central 
division. A member of the War Cabinet. Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the 
House of Commons, January 1919-March 1921. Plenipotentiary to the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919. 
LE ROND, General. A member of the French Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Played an important part in the territorial settlement, especially in 
Eastern Europe. French expert on the Polish Commission. Member of the 
Commissions on Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav affairs. 
LEEPER, Alexander Wigram Allen (1887-1935). Born in Australia. Second Class 
Assistant in the British Museum from 1912. Wrote extensively in The New 
Europe, mainly on Central European affairs. Seconded for service in the 
Foreign Office in March 1918. Head of the Balkans Section of the Intelligence 
Bureau of the Department of Information. Responsible for Balkans affairs in the 
South-Eastern Europe Section of the Political Intelligence Department. Often 
contributed to work related to the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. On the Political Section of the Intelligence Clearing House of the 
British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
LEEPER, Reginald (Rex) Wildig Allen (1888-1968). Brother of A.W.A. Leeper. 
Appointed temporary clerk in the Foreign Office in March 1918. On the Section 
dealing with Russia in the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of 
Information. In charge of Russian affairs in the Northern Europe Section of the 
Political Intelligence Department. 
LENIN (Ulyanov), Vladimir Ilyich (1870-1924). Russian Communist revolutionary. 
LLOYD GEORGE, David (1863-1945). British Liberal leader. As Prime Minister, 
headed the Liberal-Conservative Coalition Government, 1916-22. 
LOBIT, General Paul de. French Commander of the Allied “Army of Hungary”, based 
in Belgrade, and later in Nagykikinda. 
LOGAN, Colonel James Addison, Jr. (1879-?). H.C. Hoovefs* chief assistant in relief 
work. 
MACDONALD, James Ramsay (1866-1937). British politician. Chairman of the 
Independent Labour Party, 1906-09. Leader of the Labour Party, 1911-14. 
Labour M.P. for Leicester, 1906-18. Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, and Leader of the Opposition, 1922. Prime Minister, First Lord of the 
Treasury and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January-November 1924. 
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 1929-35. Lord President of the 
Council, 1935-37. 
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MACKENSEN, General August von (1849-1945). Commander of the German forces 
in Romania, 1917-18. 
MALCOLM, Sir Iain Zachary (1868-1944). Coalition Liberal Unionist M.P. for 
Croydon South. Parliamentary Private Secretary to A.J. Balfour* from 
December 1916. Resident Official British Director of the Suez Canal Company 
fropi November 1919. 
MALLET, Sir Louis du Pan (1864-1936). Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey. 
Acting Assistant Under- Secretary of State. On the Political Section of the 
British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. On the Middle East Section of 
the Political Intelligence Department. 
MANCE, Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Henry Osborne (1875— 
1966). Director of Railways and Roads (Class B) at the Department of 
Movements and Railways of the War Office from 1916. On the Military Section 
of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
MASARYK, TomaS Garrigue (1850-1937). The chief founder and first President of 
Czechoslovakia (1918-1935). 
MILNER, Alfred, first Viscount Milner (1854-1925). British Secretary of State for 
War, February 1919-November 1919. 
MI§U, Nicolas. Romanian Minister in London and a Delegate Plenipotentiary at the 
Paris Peace Conference. 
MULLER, Max. British Consul-General in Budapest before the war. From 1914 he 
was writing regular reports on the economic condition of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, which were circulated to the Cabinet and to interested 
departments. In charge of Far Eastern affairs from 1919. 
NAMIER, Lewis Bernstein (1888-1960). Appointed temporary Clerk in the Foreign 
Office, March 1918. On the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of 
Information, dealing with East and Central Europe, till 25 March 1918, when 
the Bureau was incorporated into the Foreign Office as the new Political 
Intelligence Department. At the new Department he was an adviser on Poland 
and former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
NICOLSON, Harold George (1886-1968). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Spain and Turkey. Transferred to the Foreign Office in 1914. Second Secretary 
from April 1919. He was responsible for questions relating to the Balkans 
together with A.W.A. Leeper in the South-Eastern Section of the Political 
Intelligence Department, often contributing to work done in connection with the 
former, territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Deputy head of the 
South-East European Section of the Department under Sir R. Paget.* On the 
Political Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Participated in General J.C. Smuts’s* Mission to Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
in April 1919. Seconded for service under the League of Nations, October 
1919-May 1920. Promoted 1st Secretary in January 1920. Promoted 
Counsellor of Embassy at Teheran, 1925. 
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OLIPHANT, Lancelot (1881-1965). British diplomat. Held various posts in the Middle 
East. Assistant Clerk in the Foreign Office from 1916. Entrusted with Central 
European affairs from 1920. 
ORLANDO, Vittorio Emanuele (1860-1952). Italian Prime Minister, 1917-19. 
PAGET, Sir Ralph. Held various diplomatic posts in Africa, the Middle East and 
Europe. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1913. 
British Commissioner for the Co-ordination Relief Work in Serbia from 1915. 
British Ambassador in Copenhagen from 1916. Head of the Austrian and Baltic 
Sections of the Political Intelligence Department. Appointed Privy Councillor 
and British Ambassador to Brazil, 1918. 
PEIDL, Gyula (1873-1943). Hungarian Social Democratic and trade union leader. 
Prime Minister, 3 -7 August 1919. 
PELLE, General Maurice. Commander of the French Military Mission in 
Czechoslovakia, 1919-20. 
PHILLPOTTS, Owen Surtees (1870-1932). British diplomat. Held various posts in 
Europe. On special service at Berne, October-December 1918. On special 
service (military intelligence) at Vienna until June 1919. British Commercial 
Commissioner with rank of Commercial Secretary (Grade II) in Vienna from 
July 1919. Commercial Secretary in Vienna from April 1920. 
PICCIONE, General Luigi. Italian commander of the Czechoslovak forces in Slovakia 
until May 1919. 
PICHON, Stephen Jean Marie (1857-1933). French Foreign Minister, 1906-11, 1913, 
1917-20. 
PLUNKETT, Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Edward Abadie 
(1870-1926). British Military Attache in Belgrade from 1918. 
POGANY, Jozsef (1886-1939). Hungarian Social Democratic leader. Head of the 
Soldiers’ Councils under Count M. K&rolyi’s* presidency. During Bela Kun’s* 
regime Peoples Commissar for periods for War, for Foreign Affairs and for 
Public Education. Commander of the 2nd (Szekesfehervar) Red Army Corps. 
POINCARE, Raymond (1860-1934). The President of France, 1914-20 and Prime 
Minister 1922-24. 
POLK, Frank Lyon (1871-1943). Acting U.S. Secretary of State. Acting head of the 
U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference after R. Lansing,* the Secretary 
of State left Paris. 
POMMEROL, Captain J.G.L. Member of the British Mission in Budapest. 
PONSONBY, Arthur Augustus William Harry (1871-1946). British diplomat. Private 
Secretary to Queen Victoria. Served in Constantinople, Copenhagen and the 
Foreign Office in London, 1894-1902. Resigned post of 2nd Secretary in 1902. 
Private Secretary to Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman (Prime Minister, 1905- 
OS). Liberal M.P. for Stirling Burghs, 1908-18. Elected Labour M.P. for 
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Sheffield, Brightside division, 1922. Was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, January -November 1924. 
RANDALL, Alec Walter George (1892-1977). Appointed temporary clerk in the 
Foreign Office at the News Department in April 1919. Second Secretary from 
RATTIGAN, William Frank Arthur (1879-1952). British diplomat. Held various posts 
in Europe and the Middle East. At the outbreak of war lent to the War Office for 
service with the General Staff of the Army. Transferred to Bucharest in 
February 1915. British Charge d’Affaires in Bucharest, April 1919-October 
READING, first marquess of, Rufus Daniel ISAACS (1860-1935). British 
Ambassador to the United States on Special Mission, January 1918-May 1919 
Lord Chief Justice of England, 1913-21. Viceroy of India, 1921-26. 
RODD, Sir James Rennell. British diplomat. Held various posts in the Middle East and 
Africa. British High Commissioner in Rome, July 1918-November 1919. 
ROMANELLI, Lieutenant-Colonel Guido. Chief of the Italian Military Mission in 
Budapest after 12 May 1919. 
ROOSEVELT, Captain Nicholas. Member of the Political Section of the U.S. Military 
Mission in Budapest. y 
RUMBOLD, Sir Horace George Montagu, Baronet (1869-1941). British diplomat 
Held various posts in Europe, the Middle East and Japan. British Ambassador 
in Berne, September 1916-September 1919. 
SACKVILLE-WEST, General C. Military Representative on the British Section of the 
Supreme War Council. 
SARGENT, Orme Garton (1884-1962). British diplomat. Acting 2nd Secretary in the 
Diplomatic Service at Berne from 1917. First Secretary from April 1919. In 
July 1919 attached to the Peace Delegation in Paris, on the withdrawal of 
which, in December 1919, he was attached to the British Embassy in Paris for 
the work of the Conference of Ambassadors. Permanent Under-Secretarv at the 
Foreign Office, 1946-49. 
SEGRE, General Roberto. Italian Army general. Head of the Inter-Allied Armistice 
Commission at Vienna. 
SETON-WATSON, Robert William (1879-1951). Educated at Winchester and New 
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